THE MARINES IN VIETNAM
1954-1973
An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography
First Division Marines debark from a UH-34D helicopter of HMM-163 in the early morning of 11 October 1967, to begin Operation Medina. This search-and-destroy operation was a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese effort conducted in an area 12 miles south of Quang Tri city. (Department of Defense [USMC] Photo A421900)
THE MARINES IN VIETNAM
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An Anthology and
Annotated Bibliography

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Foreword

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, based on articles that appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, and Marine Corps Gazette, has served well for 14 years as an interim reference on the Vietnam War. It has both complemented and supplemented our official histories on Marine operations in Vietnam. Since its publication in 1974, however, events in Vietnam and the appearance of additional significant articles in the three periodicals have made both the anthology and bibliography somewhat dated. This expanded edition extends the coverage of the anthology to 1975 and the entries in the bibliography to 1984.

The editors have added 10 articles to the 13 that appeared in the first edition. One article on fire bases in the original has not been included. The format remains basically the same. The first 16 accounts give a chronological presentation of the Marine participation in the Vietnam War, from one lone Marine advisor in 1954, through the buildup and withdrawal of major forces, the “Easter Offensive” of 1972, the evacuation of U.S. citizens from both Phnom Penh and Saigon, and the Mayaguez incident in May 1975. In the second group, the remaining six articles are arranged topically. They concern aviation, logistics, civil affairs, Navy medical support, amphibious doctrine, and maritime support. Part II of the publication is an annotated bibliography of articles from 1954-1984, prepared by the Vietnam writers in the Histories Section. Although recognizing that many fine articles pertaining to Marines in Vietnam have appeared in numerous other periodicals, the History and Museums Division, because of limitations of time and resources, confined its attention to the three aforementioned publications.

I wish to thank the editors of the Proceedings, Review, and Gazette for their support and cooperation in permitting the reproduction of these articles. These publications made a significant contribution to the record of the Marine Corps’ participation in the Vietnam War by originally publishing these articles. Reproducing these pieces in our anthology will yield a further dividend.

E. H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
Preface

The opening article of this anthology concerns itself with the beginnings of the Marine involvement in Vietnam following the Geneva Accords in July 1954, which ended the French war with the Communist Viet Minh and resulted in the de facto partition of the country at the 17th Parallel. Colonel Victor J. Croizat, who served as the first U.S. Marine advisor to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps, discusses the origins of both the South Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps. Although authorized in October 1954, the first headquarters of the Vietnamese Marine Corps was not established until the following May. By this time, the French political and military influence throughout South Vietnam was waning and the American influence increasing. Thus Colonel Croizat concludes that the South Vietnamese Marine Corps, unlike the Navy (which had been established by the French in 1952), has been "almost wholly a creation of the United States . . . . The initial consolidation of Corps units into two battalions, the later formation of a three-battalion regiment, and the eventual evolution of the brigade structure all owe their realization to the U.S. advisory effort." However, he also notes that " . . . the decisions that have brought them to their present status were made by the Vietnamese themselves."

A new phase of Marine participation began in 1962, six years after Colonel Croizat's departure in 1956. Following President Kennedy's decision in January 1962 to expand the U.S. advisory effort with the establishment of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the first Marine tactical unit deployed to Vietnam in April. Marine helicopters belonging to Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-362 (HMM-362), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp, lifted off the deck of the USS Princeton (LPH-5) and landed at the Soc Trang base located in South Vietnam's Mekong Delta. Organized into a task element code-named Shufly, the Marine helicopters provided support to the South Vietnamese units combating the Viet Cong. Lieutenant Colonel Clapp in the second article appearing in this series describes the experiences of his squadron in a counter-insurgency environment.

The third article, co-authored by Jack Shulimson, the Senior Vietnam Historian in the History and Museums Division, and Major Edward F. Wells, a platoon leader in Vietnam and a former historical writer with the division, gives a general overview of the commitment of major Marine combat units to the war during the period 1965-71. The Marines provided the first major U.S. ground units sent to Vietnam and implemented a strong pacification program. By 1967, the 3d Marine Division was strung out in fixed defensive positions along the Demilitarized Zone dividing the two Vietnams and fighting a more or less conventional war against the North Vietnamese Army. The 1st Marine Division continued the counterinsurgency war in the Da Nang area of operations. Shulimson and Wells observe that after defeating the North Vietnamese regulars in the "DMZ" in 1968-69, Marine operations focused more clearly on the pacification campaign south of Da Nang: "After four years of inconclusive combat . . . the United States began its disengagement from Vietnam. Marines were among the first to leave."

In the next four articles, Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, currently the Director of Marine Corps History and Museums, who served in various staff and command billets during two tours in Vietnam, presents, in contrast to the Shulimson and Wells piece, detailed annual accounts of Marine operations.

General Simmons in his first article traces the evolution of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade into the III Amphibious Force (III MAF). Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt's III MAF by April 1966 consisted of two Marine divisions and a reinforced aircraft wing and was responsible for all U.S. operations in I Corps Tactical Zone, the five northern provinces of South Vietnam. During this period, the Marine role expanded from a limited defensive mission for the Da Nang Air base in early 1965 to a fully balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification.
General Simmons discusses the resulting development in command relations and the so-called differences between the “Army” and “Marine” strategies. During 1966 the Marine effort was hampered by two events. The first was the political upheaval caused by the removal of General Nguyen Chanh Thi, the I Corps Tactical Commander. The second event was the infiltration through the DMZ of regular North Vietnamese battalions and regiments into Quang Tri Province. The 3d Marine Division deployed north into Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces to meet this new challenge in Operations Hastings and Prairie while the 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for the three southern provinces of I Corps (Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai).

In the second of his four articles, General Simmons continues the narrative of Marine operations through 1967. He discusses the controversies over the "McNamara Wall," the M-16 rifle, and the CH-46 helicopter as well as covering the major operations and the continuing buildup. By the end of the year, Marine strength in Vietnam had risen from approximately 68,000 in January to over 77,000. In his concluding paragraph, General Simmons declares: "There was reason for optimism as 1967 ended. The enemy had elected to make the northern provinces of I Corps Tactical Zone the main battle area and each time he had attempted to take the offensive he had been badly beaten. With the movement of U.S. Army troops into I Corps, an acceptable troop density had been achieved. Pacification efforts . . . appeared to be regaining momentum."

Quoting General Westmoreland, General Simmons calls 1968 the year of decision. The year opened with the enemy’s Tet offensive with strong strikes at Da Nang, Hue, and just south of the DMZ. In countering this sudden conflagration, U.S. forces in I Corps reached 52 battalions (24 Marine and 28 U.S. Army). General Simmons comments that Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., General Walt’s successor, was commanding the equivalent of a field army. In his article, General Simmons discusses the expansion of allied forces, command relationships and changes, as well as describing the big battles such as the defense of Khe Sanh. He concludes with the observation that the first half of 1968 was marked by the greatest combat activity of the war but that after August the enemy "gave up on his pursuit of military victory through large-scale attacks and reverted to small-unit attack and harassment with mortar and rocket fire." By the end of the year, the Marines along with their South Vietnamese allies were making significant progress in pacification and the Marines began reducing some of their forces. The number of Marine infantry battalions declined from 24 to 21 at year’s end. III MAF strength was down from a peak of 85,250 in September to approximately 81,000 at the end of December.

In his last article, General Simmons portrays the retraction of Marine Corps forces from Vietnam following 1968. The year 1969 opens with substantial Marine forces still conducting large operations while supporting the South Vietnamese pacification efforts. By the end of June, however, President Nixon had announced the first redeployment of American forces. Beginning with the departure of the 9th Marines, the entire 3d Marine Division was out of Vietnam by the end of the year. Throughout 1970 and early 1971, other Marine units left Vietnam in succeeding increments. On 14 April 1971, III MAF Headquarters departed for Okinawa, leaving behind the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. Two months later, the brigade was deactivated. Residual Marine forces in Vietnam consisted of approximately 500 Marines, most of whom were performing essentially liaison, advisory, staff, and guard functions. Approximately 60 officers and men were advisors with the Vietnamese Marine Division which played a large role in the defensive actions incidental to the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter offensive and in the later South Vietnamese counteroffensive. During this period, Marine helicopters from the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade on board Seventh Fleet shipping supported the Vietnamese Marines. Two Marine fixed-wing aircraft groups, MAGs-12 and -15, returned to Vietnam and supported the South Vietnamese forces. MAG-12 operated from Bien Hoa and MAG-15 later redeployed to Nam Phong in Thailand.

The next three accounts depict specific operations during 1968 and 1969. Captain George R. Christmas commanded Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines during the recapture of Hue in 1968. In his article, Captain Christmas concludes that the major lesson of the Battle of Hue was "that imagination and aggressiveness are the best weapons in our arsenal." Major General Raymond
C. Davis took over the command of the 3d Marine Division in May 1968. He and Lieutenant Harold W. Brazier, his aide, describe the 3d Division's victory over the North Vietnamese 320th Division in August 1968 through the employment of fire bases and mobile tactics. In the last of these three articles, 1st Lieutenant Gordon M. Davis portrays the 9th Marines Operation Dewey Canyon in the vicinity of the A Shau Valley near the Laotian border during January-February 1969. The operation involved the use of fire bases and mobile forces but ended "as a conventional regiment-in-the-attack with all three battalions on line."

Following a period of relative calm after the withdrawal of major U.S. combat forces from South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese launched their "Easter Offensive" on 30 March 1972. The next two articles treat the Marine Corps and South Vietnamese Marine Corps response to this unexpected attack. In the first piece, two U.S. Marine advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps in 1972, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald H. Turley and Captain Marshall R. Wells, tell how the Vietnamese Marines met the challenge of the North Vietnamese onslaught. Vietnamese Marines fought bravely and retreated in good order. By 1 May, the North Vietnamese had captured Quang Tri City and the South Vietnamese had established a new defensive line to the south on the My Chanh River. The South Vietnamese Marine Division manned these defenses and was one of the spearheads in the South Vietnamese counteroffensive on 28 June. On 15 September, Marine forces recaptured Quang Tri City's Citadel and organized resistance within the city collapsed. Lieutenant Colonel Turley and Captain Wells conclude their article with this appraisal of their Vietnamese counterparts: "Vietnamese Marines, short in stature, rich in courage and full of determination, stood tall in the eyes of all Marines."

Colonel Albert R. Pytko views the Easter Offensive from the perspective of the U.S. Marine air response. He describes the deployment of Marine fixed wing aircraft to Vietnam, Thailand, and to carriers of the Seventh Fleet in order to support the South Vietnamese ground forces in their successful containment of the North Vietnamese advance. Colonel Pytko continues his narration of Marine air operations against the North Vietnamese through January 1973 when a cease fire was reached with North Vietnam.

As a result of the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, a Joint Casualty Resolution Center was established at Da Nang Air Base to resolve outstanding cases of Americans still missing in action or known dead, but whose bodies had not been recovered. Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Esau served in that assignment and provides a subtly haunting description of his return to Da Nang in August 1973 and of the attendant feelings of frustration and futility.

The next three articles deal with the climatic events of 1975 and the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam. Colonel Sydney H. Batchelder, Jr., and Major David A. Quinlan, both participants in the events they portray, write about the planning and evacuation of U.S. personnel from Phnom Penh in April 1975 when the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodia. In the next article, Brigadier General Richard E. Carey and Major Quinlan, once again as co-author, recount the planning and actions leading to the evacuation of Americans from Saigon, a few weeks after the fall of Phnom Penh. Because of the length of the original three-part article, the editors have taken the liberty of presenting an abridgement in this edition. This shortened version still manages to convey the immediacy and intensity of those dramatic days. The last article of the three, "'Mayday' for the Mayaguez," tells of the rescue of the seized ship off Cambodia through five different viewpoints—that of the patrol squadron commander, the captain of the destroyer escort, the Marine company commander, the operations officer of the Marine battalion, and the commander of the guided missile destroyer. "Like the traditional 'Hey Rube' distress call of circus folk, the 'Mayday' of the Mayaguez summoned ships, aircraft, sailors, and Marines to rescue." This incident served to mark the end of the unhappy U.S. participation in the war in Southeast Asia.

In contrast to the chronological organization of the previous series, the next six articles are arranged topically. They touch upon such specialized aspects of the Marine war in Vietnam as amphibious doctrine, Marine civil affairs, logistics, Marine aviation and medical support.

General Keith B. McCutcheon, an outstanding Marine aviator of three wars, covers the entire
spectrum of Marine aviation in Vietnam from the introduction of Lieutenant Colonel Clapp's squadron in 1962 to the redeployment of Marine aviation which began in 1969-70. During the Vietnam War, General McCutcheon served as Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in 1965-1966 and returned to Vietnam to command III Marine Amphibious Force in March 1970. He was slated to become Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps prior to his illness which caused him to leave Vietnam in December 1971 and to die in July 1972. In this comprehensive article, General McCutcheon describes the buildup of Marine aviation; the building of the Chu Lai SATS (Short Airfield for Tactical Support) field; the introduction of new types of aircraft into the war; and helicopter and fixed-wing operations. He presents an even-handed account of the command and control questions over Marine air which eventually led to the adoption of the "Single Manager Concept." Under this latter concept, the Seventh Air Force became the "single manager" of all U.S. air in South Vietnam although III MAF retained operational control of its aviation assets. General McCutcheon declared: "The system [single management] worked. Both the Air Force and the Marines saw to that. . . . MACV as a whole received more effective air support, and III MAF continued to receive responsive air support from its own units."

Amphibious doctrine was another sensitive area and required extensive cooperation between the Marines and the other services. Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hilgartner, who served with the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces as well as on staff positions at Headquarters Marine Corps and the Pacific Fleet, discusses the application of amphibious doctrine to the Vietnam War. He concludes that the doctrine as outlined in NWP-22B/LFM-01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, proved adequate for the Vietnamese situation although requiring certain modifications; the major one being that ComUSMACV was "accorded extensive control and . . . allowed to prescribe virtually every important aspect of the employment of amphibious forces, from specifying the mission to delineating the characteristics of the amphibious objective area."

Although less controversial than doctrinal questions, logistics was of overriding importance in the war. Colonel James B. Soper, who served as a logistics officer on the Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac) staff, discusses the development of the Marine logistic effort in the Western Pacific from the first landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade in 1965 to the expeditionary redeployment of forces in the latter stages of the war. He concludes: "At the beginning, it was the operational and logistic status of FMFPac that permitted the early employment of its units. In the end, it was the same capabilities that permitted FMFPac to be redeployed at the earliest and to re-establish itself as the country's force in readiness."

Another facet of the Marine war in Vietnam was its pacification effort. Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Evans, a civil affairs officer in Vietnam who later headed the Civil Affairs Branch at Headquarters Marine Corps, describes the Marine campaign to deny the enemy the vital support of the people. He declares that such tactics as the Combined Action Program, civic action, and the I Corps Joint Coordination Council served to extend South Vietnamese governmental control in the heavily populated coastal regions of I Corps.

In the next article of this anthology, Commander Frank C. Collins, Jr., USN, who served on the staff of the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, discusses the role that agency played in the logistic support of Marine forces in I Corps. The Naval Support Activity provided the Marines with common-type support as well as operating all of the ports in the five northern provinces of Vietnam. In addition, its Seabees were responsible for much of the construction effort in support of the Marines. The author notes that the motto of the Naval Support Activity was "They shall not want." The Marines of III MAF did not lack for combat logistic, maritime, and construction support.

Of all the supporting units in Vietnam, none was more welcome and more necessary to combat Marines than the "Doc." Commander Frank O. McClendon, Jr., MSC, USN, who served in several responsible positions during the Vietnam War, including special assistant to the Surgeon General of the Navy, describes Navy Medical Support in Vietnam with an emphasis on resources and facilities. Because of considerations of space, the editors have abridged the account, but believe the result does justice to the author's intent.
The annotated bibliography (Part II of this publication) has been brought forward to the end of 1984. Captain Robert H. Whitlow, Major Gary L. Telfer, and Major Charles M. Johnson all assisted in the compiling of the bibliography of the first edition. Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Babb, Major Frank M. Batha, Major George R. Dunham, Mr. Charles R. Smith, and Dr. V. Keith Fleming assisted in the selection of the additional articles that appear in the anthology and bibliography of this edition. Major Dunham in addition abridged the two condensed articles in the anthology.

Mr. Jack Shulimson, Senior Vietnam Historian, completed the review and editing for both editions. Mr. Robert E. Struder and his helpful staff, Mr. W. Stephen Hill, Mrs. Catherine A. Kerns, and Lance Corporal James W. Rodriguez, skillfully steered the manuscript through the various publication phases. Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Chief Historian; Colonel John G. Miller, Deputy Director for Marine Corps History; and Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, Director of Marine Corps History and Museums, provided guidance and made the final review.

Despite the limited abridgement of two articles, the anthology remains largely a facsimile reproduction. No effort has been made to correct typographical or any other errors that may appear.
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Vietnamese Naval Forces: Origin of the Species

By Colonel Victor J. Croizat,
U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)

Until the end of France's Indochina War in mid-1954, the U. S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group headquartered in Saigon was primarily concerned with providing logistic support to the French Union Forces. Not until mid-1955 did the responsibility for the organization, training, and equipping of the Vietnamese Armed Forces pass from the French to the Americans. This transition, inherently difficult, was complicated by the massive movement of Union forces and civilian refugees from North to South Vietnam, by the uncertainty in the South Vietnamese military force levels that the United States would support, and by the need to build up, from a zero base, an organic logistic support capability within the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

Because of the dramatic impact of these complexities, historical records of the period focus on major issues. The fortunes of lesser organizations such as the Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps were determined

When, in 1956, the Vietnamese Navy was at last strong enough to be master in its own house, Vietnamese-commanded LSTs, such as this one seen on the Mekong River, carried out the coastal and inland waterways patrol mission which, until then, had been commanded by French naval personnel.
largely by individual initiatives and were little documented. The article that follows seeks to remedy this deficiency by presenting authoritative data which comes from personal observations and from letters and reports written by the author at the time when he was an active participant in the events described.

The failure of the French in yet another negotiation attempt in early 1947 confirmed that the break occasioned by the Viet Minh attacks against the French in Hanoi the preceding December was final. The French then undertook to parallel their military operations with a political offensive in which the government of Ho Chi Minh would be countered by a new government formed in the South under the former emperor Bao Dai. Ultimately, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would be brought into the French Union as Associated States to enjoy many of the prerogatives of sovereign nations, including their own separate armed forces.

Bao Dai, then living in Hong Kong, was not disposed to accept the French invitation unless the Vietnamese themselves were also to offer some support. But Bao Dai had few adherents; a major pacification effort in the South would be needed to gain him support. At the same time, the French had planned an offensive for late 1947 to destroy the Viet Minh in the Tonkin highlands. An immediate difficulty arose when part of the French forces had to be redeployed to Madagascar. This caused the offensive to be scaled down, and even though four battalions were brought up from the South, the action proved inconclusive. Moreover, the withdrawal of forces from the South aggravated the security situation there.

It was evident, at the beginning of 1948, that an Expeditionary Corps of 108,000 men could not maintain stability in the South and pursue the enemy in the North at the same time. To economize forces, the French began a system of fortified posts in the South, a system that later was repeated and improved upon in the North. In addition, they began to recruit Vietnamese into auxiliary units. These actions eased some of the difficulties.

By early 1949, the Expeditionary Corps had reached a strength of 122,000. In the North, however, the situation remained precarious since the Viet Minh still had not been hurt critically. In the South, in contrast, the pacification effort appeared increasingly effective, and arrangements were at last in order to return Bao Dai to Saigon.

Fearful of upsetting these arrangements, the French civil authorities refused to release military forces for an all-out effort to destroy the Viet Minh in the North before they could link up with the Chinese Communist forces then approaching the border. In Paris, however, the government reacted to the Chinese menace and agreed to deploy more forces to Indochina. This action caused the High Commissioner in Saigon to agree to the offensive in the North. But the reinforcements were diverted to the South, and the offensive failed to materialize as planned. Further to aggravate the situation the Viet Minh struck at the French northern border garrisons. Their attacks were so effective that, by October 1949, only the French Air Force could deliver the 500 tons of supplies required each month by the isolated posts.

As 1949 ended, the French had succeeded in creating a government under Bao Dai. Otherwise the initiative was passing to the Viet Minh simply because the French had too few troops to safeguard too large an area, subjected to too many diverse difficulties. Such were the conditions that prevailed in Indochina when the French and Vietnamese agreed to establish the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

The Franco-Vietnamese Agreement, signed in Paris on 30 December 1949, stated that the Vietnamese Armed Forces were to include naval forces whose cadres, organization, and training would be provided by the French Navy. In response to this agreement, Vice Admiral Ortoli, commanding French Naval Forces in the Far East, proposed in April 1950 that the Vietnamese Navy initially include only river units. Meanwhile, the Navy Ministry in Paris was drafting directives on the organization of the Vietnamese Navy. These appeared in July and included authorization for training, for up to six Vietnamese candidates, at the Naval Academy at Brest. The first three Vietnamese, selected haphazardly for the assignment, arrived in Brest in October. There they quickly became disheartened by the wintry seas and weather of Brittany; all resigned before the end of the year. No better progress was made elsewhere in 1950.

In February 1951, the Secretary of the Navy in Paris expressed astonishment that nothing had been done to bring the Vietnamese Navy into being. The Admiralty in Saigon replied that under direction of the High Commissioner, all questions relating to the Vietnamese Navy were the concern of the Permanent Military Committee. This body had yet to meet, and in any event it was charged only with making preliminary studies. Naval headquarters in Paris nevertheless insisted that action be taken. Accordingly, in April 1951, Admiral Ortoli forwarded to Paris a development plan for the Vietnamese Navy. This plan proposed that two naval assault divisions under French command be formed promptly in 1951. It further proposed that the construction of a recruit training center in Vietnam be undertaken that same year; officer and enlisted spe-
cialist training of Vietnamese was to take place in France. The recruit center was to be opened in 1952. Then, in 1953, a number of river flotillas would be organized. This would be followed in 1954 by the transfer of four YMS-type minesweepers to the Vietnamese, and lastly, in 1955, a squadron of patrol planes would be activated.

In May, the Secretary of the Navy advised that he was prepared to accept these proposals with the stipulation that the time schedule be advanced and provision made to include seagoing forces. To this end he announced the intent to transfer a 600-ton Chevreuil-type escort to the Vietnamese in 1952, and to begin construction in France of two second-class escort ships of the E. 50 class (1,250 tons), and four minesweepers of the D1 class (365 tons) for the Vietnamese government. He also instructed the Admiral in Saigon to give the highest priority to the development of a budget for the Vietnamese Navy covering the costs of the recruit training center, the recruitment of Vietnamese cadres, and the necessary initial naval construction.

While this activity was taking place in naval circles, the Permanent Military Committee held its first meeting on 1 May 1951. Beginning with this session, it quickly became evident that the Vietnamese government, under the urging of its French advisors, and in particular that of General de Lattre, looked to the organization of its armed forces as a single entity, inevitably to be dominated by the Army. The Navy, greatly disturbed by this attitude, protested to the Minister of the Associated States, stating that it opposed the idea of a navy being nothing more than a service element of the army.

The French Navy was otherwise divided, since Admiral Ortoli in Saigon disagreed with Paris over the development plans for the Vietnamese Navy. The Admiral insisted that the Vietnamese Navy should begin only with river forces, and the addition of seagoing units should not be considered at least until 1954. This view eventually was to prevail, but the debate was to continue for some time.
On 6 March 1952, the Navy of Vietnam was officially formed and, on 12 July 1952, this young "student sailor" was a member of the first company to undergo recruit training at Nhatrang's boot camp.

On 15 August 1951, the French Naval Mission was accredited to the Vietnamese government, and in November the work on the recruit center began. During this same period the French also organized an officer training course on board one of their gunboats for candidates recruited from among former students of the Hydrography School in Saigon. The Vietnamese Navy was in a fair way to becoming a reality.

Early in 1952 the Commander of the French Naval Forces in the Far East and the High Commissioner agreed upon a modified plan for the organization of the Vietnamese Navy. This plan provided for the opening of the recruit center at Nhatrang in 1952 as previously proposed. The two naval assault divisions that originally were to have been organized in 1951 were to be activated in 1953, when it was also proposed to organize a flotilla of 30 river boats and to effect the transfer of one division of three YMSs. The Vietnamese naval staff was to be organized in 1954; in addition, a coastal patrol flotilla was to be formed by integrating the boats of the customs service into the navy.

While this proposal was being reviewed, Imperial Ordinance No. 2 appeared on 6 March 1952, officially establishing the Navy of Vietnam. Then, on 1 May, the organization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces General Staff caused a reorganization of the French Military Mission. Incident to this reorganization on 20 May, a "Navy Department" was created within the mission charged with "commanding, administering, and managing the units of the Vietnamese Navy and directing its development." In July, Admiral Ortoli presided at the formal opening of the recruit training center at Nhatrang.

One of the most pressing concerns of the Navy Department within the French Mission was to obtain a firm and agreed-upon plan for the development of the Vietnamese Navy. This was becoming ever more difficult as the number of agencies interested in the subject multiplied and the divergent views of Paris and Saigon were not reconciled. To resolve the issue, the Department requested the Franco-Vietnamese High Committee to address the question. But, before the Committee could act, the Secretary of the Navy in Paris outlined a new long-range program that purportedly reflected the views of the Ministries of Defense and of the Associated States in Paris, and of the Admiralty in Saigon. This program provided for the progressive development of the Vietnamese Navy by the organization of units and the acquisition of ships and craft in two phases.

The first phase, beginning in 1953, called for the implementation of the previous Saigon proposal for the organization of two naval assault divisions and one river patrol flotilla of 30 boats, plus the transfer of three YMSs. The year following, two other naval assault divisions were to be formed. The second phase involved the addition of units as follows: 1955—two minesweepers; 1956—two coastal patrol ships; 1957—two coastal patrol ships; 1958—one minesweeper and one escort ship; 1959—two coastal patrol ships, one escort ship, and two amphibian patrol plane squadrons.

As this program was being formulated, the Franco-Vietnamese High Committee met and, at its session on 7 July 1952, agreed that the Vietnamese Navy should be charged with river police and coastal surveillance missions. By coincidence, the development plan prepared by the Committee in conformity to these missions duplicated the Phase I Program announced by the Secretary of the Navy. A plan acceptable to all had finally appeared.

In July 1952, 350 Vietnamese apprentice seamen had been recruited—50 of whom were to become petty officers. Then, in September, nine Vietnamese Navy officers, representing the first group of locally trained personnel, entered the service. This group was followed by a second class of officer candidates which, like the first, was recruited from among former students at the Hydrography School in Saigon. Additionally, five candidates selected by competitive examination were sent to Brest to enter the Naval Academy there in October.

Progress was being made, but the Navy Department within the French Mission suffered from a shortage of French personnel both to serve as cadres for the Viet-
Vinh Long Dinassaut (naval assault division) was activated. This was the Cantho Dinassaut (naval assault division) comprising one river flotilla (each composed of LCTS, LCMs, LCVPs, sampans, and river patrol boats), and the addition of one LST and four LSSLs. This augmentation, if adopted, would require the Navy to reach a total strength of 2,700 men by the end of the year, with the United States to provide military assistance to make up the material shortages.

The supplementary program was forwarded to the Franco-Vietnamese High Committee where it was discussed throughout the remainder of 1953. Incident to these discussions, the question of whether the Army or the Navy should control the river flotillas was raised for the first time. It was at that time that the new commander of French Naval Forces in the Far East, Vice Admiral Auboyneau, proposed the organization of a Marine Corps.

On 10 April 1953, the first unit of the Vietnamese Navy, still with French cadres but under its own flag, was activated. This was the Cantho Dinassaut (naval assault division) comprising one LCM (command), two LCMs, and two LCVPs. At the end of the same month, the French assigned LSIL-9033, under French flag, to the training center at Nhatrang. Later, in June, the Vinh Long Dinassaut (naval assault division) was activated.

These activations and assignments raised the "flag" question, and debate over this issue became sufficiently lengthy and acrimonious to suspend all transfers of ships and craft, other than rivercraft, to the Vietnamese for the remainder of 1953. Among the French, some wanted Vietnamese ships to fly a "tricolor" jack; others wanted the Vietnamese commission pennant to include the national colors of both countries; and still others wanted to devise a completely new flag for the French Union. The Vietnamese simply held that their ships should fly Vietnamese national flags and commission pennants.

While these arguments waned, the Navy Department of the French Mission decided that it would be prudent to recruit the additional Vietnamese needed to bring the Navy up to the strength of 2,700 men. The Franco-Vietnamese High Committee had not yet agreed to the supplementary naval program for 1954—nor would it ever—but the Navy Department considered that the training of additional Vietnamese was fully warranted, particularly since enlisted specialists were henceforth to be trained at Nhatrang, where the charter of the recruit training center had recently been expanded.

As 1953 drew to its close, it was painfully evident that the Vietnamese Navy had progressed very little in the course of four years. The upset, early in the year, in what had momentarily appeared as a firm development plan had not been resolved, nor were there any central guidelines to follow. The French Navy staff and the Vietnamese Armed Forces General Staff each had its separate program, and the Vietnamese Navy appeared destined to continue to live a hand-to-mouth existence. A further handicap of the Vietnamese Navy was the joining of all of the Vietnamese military services under a single general staff and single budget in June 1953. This was most serious for the infant Vietnamese Navy, for its strength of only two dinassauts, corresponding to about 1/200th of the strength of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, made it appear so inconsequential that it was largely ignored by the Vietnamese government. As a result, the fortunes of the Vietnamese Navy depended upon actions taken at subordinate echelons—actions which tended to be influenced far more by local events than by any long-range plans. There was, therefore, an urgent need to convince the government that even a small navy could not be organized without a reasonable plan that extended several years into the future and provided the basis for orderly procurement, construction, recruitment, and training of personnel.

The Franco-Vietnamese High Committee eventually acknowledged this need, and, at its session of 15 February 1954, adopted the concept of a five-year naval development plan. The Committee also considered that personnel of the Navy should be designated as Fleet personnel to man seagoing ships, large rivercraft, and service units, and as Marine Corps personnel to man river patrol craft and dinassauts, to form commandos and a one-battalion landing force. The Committee further recommended a substantial development program that by 1958 would have provided the Vietnamese Navy with four dinassauts, nine minesweepers, six escort ships (two of 600 tons and four of 2,000),
Until Lieutenant Commander My became head of the Navy, it was commanded, for two months in mid-1955, by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, Brigadier General Tran Van Don, seen here with My and Captain Recher, right. Eight years later, Tran Van Don would be one of the leaders of the coup that overthrew President Diem.

Four LSMs, four LSSLs, seven LCTs/LCUs, 16 coastal patrol boats, eight river gunboats (250-ton), five coast patrol ships, and one hydrographic survey ship. This program was concurred in by all agencies concerned and was forwarded to the Vietnamese and French governments in March 1954 for approval.

Shortly before, on 11 February 1954, the flag issue having been resolved, the French transferred three YMSSs to the Vietnamese. This was followed in March by the transfer of two LCU and Dinassaut 22, and in August by the transfer of Dinassaut 25. By the time the Indochina War ended in July of that year, the Vietnamese Navy consisted of four Naval Assault Divisions, three YMSSs, two LCU, the Naval Schools at Nhatrang, and two receiving stations—one in Saigon and the other in Haiphong. The personnel strength also had increased. In January 1954, the Navy mustered 22 officers and 684 men; by July, this had grown to 45 officers and 975 men. On 30 October 1954, the Vietnamese Navy had 131 officers and midshipmen, and 1,353 enlisted men. Of these, 86 midshipmen and 233 enlisted men were in schools in Vietnam and France.

With the end of hostilities and the withdrawal of the French from the North, the Vietnamese general staff considered that the five-year plan submitted in March by the Franco-Vietnamese High Committee had to be modified. Accordingly, Major General Nguyen Van Hinh, Chief of the General Staff, recommended on 27 October that, by the end of 1954, the Vietnamese Navy include a shore establishment comprising a naval headquarters and receiving station in Saigon; the naval schools at Nhatrang; river bases at Mytho, Cantho, Vinh Long, Faifoo (Hoi An), Tam Ky, and Quang Ngai; boat repair facilities at Hue, Mytho, and Cantho; and Marine Corps facilities necessary to the Corps' growth. The operating forces were to include four dinassauts, two escort ships (600-ton), two coastal patrol ships, two LSMs, three YMSSs, two LSSLS, four LCU, 16 coastal patrol boats, and three LCU repair craft. The Marine Corps was to consist of a headquarters, four river companies for duty with the dinassauts, and a one battalion landing force.

General Hinh further recommended that in 1955 the shore establishment be expanded and improved upon as necessary (to include a Navy communications facility), and that three coastal patrol ships, three AMSSs, two LSMs, and one hydrographic survey ship be added to the Navy. He also proposed the addition of three commando and six light support companies to the Marine Corps. To meet these programs, he anticipated
that the personnel strength at the end of 1955 would have to reach 160 officers and 3,300 men in the Navy, and 90 officers and 3,730 men in the Marine Corps. The French cadres required for such an establishment were listed as 60 officers and 370 petty officers of the Navy, and 20 officers and 165 NCOs of the Colonial Army.

The Marine Corps appeared in these proposals because there had been a number of specialized formations among the native units organized by the French during the war which, although in the Army, were intended to work with the river and coastal forces of the Navy. This association had been found to be particularly important in the case of river forces and all such units normally had an infantry element attached. The inventory of these special units also included one 420-man "amphibious battalion" equipped with 37 M29Cs (Wes- sels) and 13 LVTs.

The formalization of these relationships, an issue of discussion since the preceding year, was achieved on 13 October 1954 when a government decree signed by Ngo Dinh Diem set forth articles as follows:

"ARTICLE 1. Effective 1 October 1954 there is created within the Naval Establishment a corps of infantry specializing in the surveillance of waterways and amphibious operations on coast and rivers, to be designated as:

"The Marine Corps"

"ARTICLE 2 . . . . .
"ARTICLE 3. The Marine Corps shall consist of various type units suited to their functions and either already existing in the Army or Naval forces or to be created in accordance with the development plan for the armed forces.

"ARTICLE 4. These units will be of the following types:
River Companies
Landing Battalion
Light Support Companies
Commando
Naval Assault Divisions

"ARTICLE 5 . . . . .

The proposal endorsed by General Hinh and collaborated in by the French, like all of its predecessors, was destined to be overtaken by events. It also marked the last time that the future of the Vietnamese Navy would be discussed solely between the French and the Vietnamese. Thenceforth, U.S. officers would enter into the deliberations. Eventually, Americans were to replace the French in advisory functions, but just when and under what circumstances this was to be done remained unclear, since, as General Hinh indicated, French cadres were to be present in numbers in the Vietnamese Navy through 1955.

At the time of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, the United States had 342 military personnel serving in the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Indochina. This group, whose strength could not be exceeded by virtue of the Agreement, had been primarily concerned with "assistance" to the French in the nature of equipment and supplies. Its "advisory" function had related only to the use of U.S. equipment and had had nothing to do with operations or training. These last domains had been and remained entirely the province of the French. Indeed, Chief, MAAG, had obtained agreement to the assignment of U.S. liaison officers to the French Commander-in-Chief's headquarters in Saigon only in early 1954—but none had yet been assigned when the war ended.

In the final stage of the war the French Expeditionary Corps in Indochina totalled 235,721 men (this figure includes 2,460 female military personnel, 380 of whom were nurses). Of this total, 115,477 were Indochinese serving in either regular or auxiliary units. In addition, there were 257,130 men in the armed forces of the Associated States. The vast majority of the Asian contingents in both cases were Vietnamese. Thus, when the Indochina War ended, the Vietnamese Armed Forces exceeded 200,000 men. Further, while the French were withdrawing some forces from Vietnam, in a process that was accelerated when the Algerian rebellion broke out in November 1954, there was ample evidence that the French intended to retain a presence in the country. This was evident in the expansion of the naval station at Tourane (DaNang), in the great improvement to the facility at Cap St. Jacques (Vung Tau), and in the construction of an oil storage tank and liaison aircraft strip at Cam Ranh Bay—all of these developments that took place after the end of the war. Further, the new Commander of French Naval Forces Far East, Vice Admiral Jozan, made the point informally on several occasions that it would be desirable for France to retain military bases in Vietnam in order to better permit it to meet its obligations under the Manila Pact, signed in September, which ushered in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Ngo Dinh Diem did not encourage these French views. On the contrary, he pressed for the complete independence of South Vietnam and called for an early withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps. This was to have a major impact upon the Vietnamese
Armed Forces for they had been receiving their support directly from the French, who in turn were using resources provided by the United States. With the cessation of hostilities, U.S. military assistance to the French in Indochina ceased, and title to material previously provided reverted to the United States. The United States was thus compelled to move in and take an active role in the interests of the Vietnamese military establishment.

In late 1954, the United States announced its willingness to support the Vietnamese Armed Forces at a level of 90,000 men. This offer was strongly opposed in Saigon and, in early 1955, the figure was revised to 100,000. Then, later in the year, when it became evident that the end of the Indochina War had not brought an end to the fighting in the South, the figure was raised to 150,000 where it remained until the expansion of the U.S. support effort in 1961.

U.S. involvement in the support of the Vietnamese Armed Forces inevitably entailed involvement in matters of organization and training that previously had been exclusive French responsibilities. As an initial step toward ensuring the necessary coordination, officers of the U.S. MAAG and of the French Mission were brought together in late 1954 into an Advisory, Training, and Operations Mission (ATOM).

On 15 January 1955, the U.S. member of the Senior Team, ATOM, proposed missions for the Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps that included limited amphibious operations, river and coastal patrol, minesweeping, fire support, and logistic support for military forces. The force levels in ships and craft recommended, however, were far less than those required for the missions. It was little more than a valiant effort to try and fit the Vietnamese Naval Forces into the 3,000-man ceiling imposed under the overall Vietnamese Armed Forces strength of 100,000 set by the United States at that time.

Shortly after this proposal appeared, an agreement was reached with the French, wherein Lieutenant General O’Daniel, U.S. Army, Chief, MAAG Vietnam, would assume responsibility for the organization and training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces under the overall authority of the French High Commissioner.

At that time ATOM was reorganized and redesignated as the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM). The new organization, whose name was believed to be less likely to recall Hiroshima to sensitive Asians, consisted of 225 French and 120 U.S. personnel. The Navy Division of TRIM, initially composed of three U.S. and two French officers, was headed by a French Navy captain who also commanded the Vietnamese Navy and was the senior naval officer in the French Mission. Under the circumstances, the advisory function of the U.S. officers was scarcely onerous. The Navy Division of TRIM nevertheless prepared a new plan for the development of the Vietnamese Naval Forces which was forwarded by Chief, TRIM, to the Minister of Defense on 28 April 1955. This plan, like its ATOM predecessor, was concerned primarily with meeting the 3,000-man ceiling. The force levels thus continued to be unrealistic in terms of the missions contemplated and did little more than reveal that since the end of the war, the French had transferred to the Vietnamese Navy one LSSL, two LSILs and two LCUs to add to the three YMSs and two LCUs on hand at the end of hostilities. Further, the plan envisaged in the case of the Marine Corps, a crippling cut, to 1,000, from the 2,373-man strength that existed on 31 December 1954. This, admittedly, was in part compensated for by charging the amphibious battalion of 700 men intended for service with the Navy to the Army ceiling, but this could not be accepted as anything like a permanent arrangement.

As these events were happening, the Vietnamese were becoming increasingly anxious to assume full control over their armed forces. The date of 30 June 1956, which the French and Americans agreed would allow time for the organization and staffing of the headquarters and service elements needed by the Vietnamese naval establishment to operate on its own, became too remote for the Vietnamese.

As a first measure, a headquarters for the Marine Corps was established on 1 May 1955. This made it possible to focus the U.S.-inspired effort to bring together the varied units of the Marine Corps into a two-battalion force with the ultimate view of progress-
ing on to a regiment. Chief, TRIM announced that the Vietnamese Navy would become independent on 31 December 1955, but, on 30 June 1955, Premier Diem assigned the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces additional duties as the Naval Deputy on the General Staff. This, in fact, made Army Brigadier General Tran Van Don the head of the Vietnamese Navy. The arrangement was short-lived; on 20 August, the Premier appointed Lieutenant Commander Le Quang My as the Naval Deputy and Commander of the Vietnamese Naval Forces. Commander My promptly replaced all French personnel in command assignments in the Vietnamese Naval Forces with Vietnamese personnel. The French retained command only at the naval schools, but this, too, was terminated on 7 November 1955. When this rapid sequence of events ended, the French found themselves with nothing more than advisory functions comparable to those of the U.S. personnel. French personnel released from command assignments moved to TRIM.

This development, harmonizing relations and functions between U.S. and French personnel, came at the time when the support ceiling for the Vietnamese Armed Forces was raised to 150,000 men. This brought the Vietnamese Naval Forces authorized strength to 4,000, of which 1,837 were to be Marines. As a consequence of these events and the accelerated reduction of French naval forces in Vietnam, the expanded Navy Division at TRIM, in collaboration with Vietnamese officers, undertook a detailed review of the whole of the Vietnamese naval establishment. This, together with a survey of the French naval resources remaining in-country that could be transferred to the Vietnamese, provided the basis for the preparation of two plans for the Vietnamese naval forces.

The first of these was a reorganization plan intended to use only in-country resources to provide an immediate capability for carrying on the coastal and inland waterways patrol missions being relinquished by the French. The plan was also to provide the Navy with the essentials of the command, administrative, and logistic support systems needed for it to become truly independent. Additionally, it was envisaged that the Navy should have the means of furnishing limited transport for the Army, and should have a modest amphibious force that eventually would take its place with the Army’s parachute regiment as an element of the country’s general reserve.

The reorganization plan prepared on the basis of the foregoing considerations provided for a Navy of 2,845 officers and men organized into three components. The Shore Establishment was to include a naval headquarters and service elements; four coastal commands with headquarters at Saigon, Nathrang, Quinhon, and Tourane (DaNang); the naval schools at Nathrang; four river force bases at Mytho, Cantho, Long Xuyen, and Vinh Long; and three boat repair facilities at Sai-gon, Cantho, and Tourane. The second component, the Sea Force, was to consist of five PCs, three YMSs, two LSSLs, two LSMs, and ten coast patrol cutters. The third component, the River Force, was to include five dinsaus, each comprised of six LCMs, four LCVPs, and five outboard motor boats; four LSILs; five LCUs (one a repair craft); and two YTLs. The Marine Corps, totaling 1,835 officers and men, was to be formed into a headquarters and two infantry battalions.

This reorganization plan provided for a naval establishment aggregating 4,680 officers and men or 680 above the authorized ceiling. Moreover, the five PCs in the Sea Force represented an increase of three PCs above the approved force levels. These modest augmentations were considered reasonable in the light of the considerably expanded responsibilities of the Vietnamese Navy and were retained in the plan forwarded to the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces on 1 November 1955 as a TRIM plan.
On 7 December 1955, Lieutenant General Le Van Ty, the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, convened a conference at his headquarters to discuss naval matters. He first gave his approval to the reorganization plan, thereby authorizing the excess of 680 men beyond U.S. support ceilings. His action also constituted agreement for the consolidation of the Marine Corps into a two-battalion force, this being detailed later in a document signed on 21 December 1955 by Lieutenant Commander My.

General Ty then turned the discussion to the future of the naval forces. In response, TRIM officers presented a two-year development plan that had been prepared on the assumption that the reorganization plan would be approved. This development plan called for an expansion of the naval forces to 9,000 men by the end of 1957 in order to provide for a Coastal Patrol Force and a River Force which, together with the required shore facilities, could deny coastal and inland waters to the Viet Minh and to other illicit traffic. In addition, there was to be a Transport Force to provide lift for an army regiment or permit the conduct of amphibious operations at up to regimental level. The Marine Corps was to be increased to a three-battalion regiment to constitute, along with the Parachute Regiment of the Army, a general reserve for the Armed Forces available on immediate call. Finally, the various headquarters and logistic agencies for the operating forces would be expanded or created as necessary.

The development plan concluded that to carry out the missions contemplated, the minimum forces required by the end of 1957 for the Coastal Patrol Force were four DES, ten PCs, and 27 Motor Patrol Boats (CGUB type); the River Force was to include five dinassaus (each with nine LCMS and eight LCVPs), four LSILs, two LSSLs, and four LCUs, while the Transport Force was to comprise four LSTs and four LSMs. Finally, one squadron of amphibian patrol planes was to be activated.

After considering the development plan that had been outlined to him, General Ty stated that he agreed with it in principle and was prepared to accept a compensatory reduction in Army troop strengths if this became necessary to meet the naval forces requirements under the 150,000-man support ceiling. The future of the Vietnamese Naval Forces at last was assured.

This jointly-prepared development plan marked the final French contribution to the evolution of the Vietnamese naval establishment. From the very first, the French had stressed the importance of the river forces. The naval assault division concept that they had developed and bequeathed to the Vietnamese was perhaps the most important single tactical innovation to emerge from the Indochina War. Of related significance was the insistence of the French that infantry elements should be part of a river force and should normally operate with the boat units. This practice provided the basis for the eventual organization of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. It should also be noted that the French included heavy fire support ships of the LSSL and LSIL types in the River Force, even though each dinassaut had LCMS modified as monitors. Further, the French anticipated the need for a Vietnamese coastal patrol force and undertook to form one as the Vietnamese Navy gained operational competence. From the beginning, the French also advocated the inclusion of a patrol plane squadron in the Vietnamese Navy. This was never done, but the validity of the proposal appears to be confirmed by the U.S. Navy patrol plane mission which has been carried on for several years over South Vietnam coastal areas. Finally, the French emphasis on training and the construction of the naval schools at Nhatrang as the first steps in the creation of a navy were noteworthy attitudes.

The legacy of the French to the Vietnamese Navy is substantial; its organizational structure is essentially French in concept. Since 1956, however, the impact of U.S. operational procedures and practices has served to give to the Vietnamese Navy a dual patrimony. The Vietnamese Marine Corps, in contrast, has been almost wholly a creation of the United States. The French ideas regarding a Vietnamese Marine Corps very clearly did not extend beyond a grouping of diverse, small, infantry units for service with river forces. The "amphibian battalion" previously mentioned was not intended to be duplicated or otherwise to evolve as anything but a specialized unit. The initial consolidation of Corps units into two battalions, the later formation of a three-battalion regiment, and the eventual evolution of the brigade structure all owe their realization to the U.S. advisory effort. It must be acknowledged, however, that, since 20 August 1955, when the Vietnamese Naval Forces passed under Vietnamese command, the decisions that have brought them to their present status were made by the Vietnamese themselves.

Commissioned in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1940, Colonel Croizat has commanded all Marine units from a platoon to a regiment. He commanded the first amphibious tractor unit in combat at Guadalcanal in 1942, and, in 1954, became the first advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. In 1957, he was assigned to observe the employment of helicopter-borne forces in the Algerian War. Between 1958 and 1961, he served, successively, in Haiti (conducting negotiations that led to the establishment of the U.S. Naval Mission there), French West and Equatorial Africa (on a fact-finding mission), and on Okinawa (as Chief of Staff, FMF Seventh Fleet). From 1961 to 1964, he was U.S. Military Advisor's Representative to SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok. He commanded the Fifth Marines in 1964 and, prior to his retirement in 1966, returned to Vietnam to prepare an interim doctrine for the conduct of riverine warfare.
Shu-Fly Diary

by Archie J. Clapp, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

The Commander, First Marine Aircraft Wing, received the execute order in the latter part of March while engaged in SEATO Exercise TULUNGAN in the Philippines. This was fortunate, in a way, because he had the affected elements of his normally far-flung command close at hand. Planning was accomplished in his command post on Mindoro, where all essential details were nailed down in a few days, with no appreciable disruption to TULUNGAN.

The commitment called for the unit to be in place by 15 April 1962. Vietnam was divided into three Corps areas of responsibility, with I Corps in the extreme north, II Corps in the center, and III Corps, which the squadron would support, in the south. This meant that the Marines would be working in the Mekong Delta region, which comprises most of the III Corps area. The former Japanese fighter strip at Soc Trang in Ba Xuyen Province was designated as the Marine base of operations.

Soc Trang lies about 85 miles south-southwest of Saigon, in the heart of what is commonly referred to as “Indian Country.” The government has control of a few population centers in that area, but the countryside is dominated by the Viet Cong. Thus, the Marine base would be, in effect, an island in a hostile sea. To discourage the VC from “coming ashore on the island,” a Vietnamese infantry battalion, supported by a 4.2 mortar battalion was detailed for perimeter security. Close-in and internal security would be handled by our own cooks, mechanics, and clerks. Because of the “island” nature of the base,
Early in 1962, a Marine helicopter squadron was ordered to Vietnam. Its mission was to support the Vietnamese in their struggle against the Communist Viet Cong insurgents. This is an account of Operation Shu-Fly as seen through the eyes of the helicopter squadron commander.
the entire deployment would be executed by air—we would go ashore by air and continue to be supported by air. The only items not air-delivered were fuel and water. A civilian contractor risked ambush to deliver aviation fuel by truck and Marine water trucks bustled between the base and the town of Soc Trang, a distance of about three miles.

Our task unit consisted of an operational element and a base-keeping element. The former was my outfit.

The normal 200-man T/O of my unit was augmented by about 50 maintenance personnel. In addition to our H-34D helicopters, we were given O1B observation aircraft and C-117D transport aircraft, the latter were utilized for liaison and ration runs between Soc Trang and Saigon.

The base-keeping element was given about the same number of personnel as the helicopter squadron. In addition to usual camp facilities, it was assigned a TAFDS and a MATCU, the latter equipped with TACAN and GCA. The primary reason these navigation and landing aids were included on the equipment list was so the C-130R transports could get into Soc Trang with essential supplies and gear, regardless of weather conditions. Secondly, of course, the helicopters would make use of them at night and in foul weather.

Exercise TULUNGAN ended on 1 April, and the squadron immediately backloaded to the USS Princeton (LPH-5), which had been its home for the preceding six months. The ship then steamed north, stopping first at Subic Bay. There, we went through an around-the-clock process of swapping aircraft with our sister squadron so that we would take the aircraft ashore that had the longest time to run before scheduled overhaul. This completed, the Princeton headed still farther north to Okinawa to pick up the remainder of our personnel and gear.

Meanwhile, the task unit headquarters and MABS were making their last minute preparations at Okinawa. Then, on 8 April, they began flying into Soc Trang to start erecting the camp and establishing liaison with the Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (COMUSMACV) and the Vietnamese III Corps Headquarters.

The Princeton departed Okinawa on the evening of 10 April and arrived at a position about 20 miles off the mouth of the Mekong River at dawn on 15 April. All personnel and gear were helicopter-lifted ashore by mid-afternoon. The only difficulty encountered was when one O1B made an unscheduled landing back aboard ship because of a rough-running engine; however, it was able to fly ashore later. The helicopter squadron portion of the camp was erected by dark, and the task unit could have started accepting missions the next day. It was a week, though, before III Corps requested the first combat troop lift. The intervening time was spent with briefings, area familiarization flights, and in making the camp more habitable. A few minor missions were also flown.

Our activities in Vietnam can best be viewed in chronological order. Examination of a relatively small number of our missions will be sufficient to determine what lessons were learned on this deployment and to pinpoint procedures that we considered either effective or ineffective.

Wednesday, 18 April: Two helicopters were requested to haul priority supplies from Ca Mau to Binh Hung. Ca Mau is the southern-most town in Vietnam that is under control of the Vietnamese government; Binh Hung is Father Hoa's famed "village that refuses to die." No roads lead to Binh Hung. The tree-lined canals and streams, which are the only surface routes of transportation, are ideal for ambush, and the VC control the surrounding countryside. Therefore, helicopters are the safest means of transportation between Binh Hung and the "outside world." For this reason, Marine helicopters, being based farther south than any other helicopter unit, would fly the Ca Mau-Binh Hung route many times.

Upon their arrival at Binh Hung, the pilots received their first taste of just one of the operational hazards in the area: unpredictable terrain. They landed and shut-down on what appeared to be hard, dry ground. In a couple of minutes, though, they noticed that the landing gear was slowly but steadily sinking. Timbers were quickly shoved under the axles, yet the axles were solid on the timbers before the helicopters could be started and rotors engaged for take-off. After that experience, the helicopters always carried a short length of marston-matting to be placed under the wheels by the crew chief before the
helicopters were shut down in the field.

Friday, 20 April: A practice troop lift was flown with the 21st Division. A problem was highlighted that had not occurred to us before. The small size of the Vietnamese troops (they are about five-footers) made it difficult for them to embark in the helicopters when they were on solid ground, and impossible when they were in mud. The squadron metal-workers built large jury-rig steps from wood and angle iron to solve the problem.

Sunday, 22 April: The squadron made its first troop lift against opposition today (Easter Sunday). "Operation Lockjaw," as it was called, consisted of landing approximately 340 troops of the Vietnamese 7th Division on one side of a stream-divided village while a U.S. Army helicopter company (from Saigon) landed a like number on the other side. Opposition was light and no aircraft were hit, so the Corps gained some "combat veterans" for a very reasonable price.

Tuesday, 24 April: "Operation Nightingale" entailed landing troops of the 21st Division in eight separate landing sites. Enemy small arms fire was received upon landing in several of the sites, and one helicopter was hit in an oil line. The pilot was able to take off and fly about a mile from the objective before landing in a rice paddy near a Self Defense Corps outpost. We were then able to make use of the "down-bird" procedure we had formulated, but had not yet tried.

A wingman landed and retrieved the crew, while a division of four helicopters proceeded to the forward loading site where it picked up the repair crew and troops from the reserve to form perimeter security. The repair crew determined what was needed to fix our downed bird; the part was flown in from Soc Trang, immediately installed, and the helicopter was then flown out and returned to base—all within two hours of the time it was hit. The reserve troops were then lifted out of the area.

The ground action went quite well also. The Viet Cong lost 52 troops killed and two captured, against three Vietnamese troops killed and six wounded.

Thursday, 26 April: The squadron went on its first "short-order" mission today. The III Corps briefing officer arrived at Soc Trang shortly after 0700. The crews were briefed, helicopters proceeded to the troop pick-up point, and landing was executed at 0900. Very light opposition was encountered upon landing, and the Vietnamese troops rounded up over 100 VC suspects for questioning. This indicated to us not only that quick-reaction type missions are feasible, but also that the results are more than satisfactory.

Tuesday, 1 May: Twenty-four helicopters and two observation aircraft launched to help

The Marines established their base camp adjacent to a former Japanese fighter strip, three miles from the village of Soc Trang. The entire deployment—tents, vehicles, supplies—was made by air.

Saturday, 5 May: The Ba Xuyen Province Chief requested helicopter support to help his civil guards raid a VC "fortified village" located about 12 miles southwest of Soc Trang. Because of the proximity of the target, and
the obvious problem of maintaining an element of surprise, a tactic new to us was utilized. The helicopter flight rendezvoused over Soc Trang at treetop-level and proceeded to the objective at the same altitude. The flight leader climbed to 1,500 feet and flew slightly to the rear of the flight so that he could keep it in sight. He was thus able to give "steers" to each element of the flight so that they were able to land precisely as planned on sites that encircled the village.

This procedure of "calling the plays from the top of the grandstand" is quite effective when a low-level approach is required and low-oblique checkpoints are limited, as was the case here. Surprise apparently was maintained, too, because the troops reported 60 VC killed, 15 wounded, and 24 captured, with no friendly losses.

**Wednesday, 9 May:** The village of Cai Ngay is located about 20 miles south of Ca Mau, and is situated in a heavily wooded area where two sizable streams cross. The Viet Cong had made Cai Ngay a well fortified village. We received a mission request to pick up troops from the 21st Division at Ca Mau and land them at Cai Ngay as soon as a preparatory air strike had lifted. According to plan, the Vietnamese "Able Dog" pilot broke off his attack as we came in sight. He had been working the village over for about 20 minutes and several columns of rising smoke indicated that he had done his job well.

The helicopter flight split into six smaller flights to land troops in their encircling positions, and the individual flights commenced their landing approaches simultaneously. Half the flights received small arms fire while they were still in their approaches, and it continued until after they had discharged their troops and departed the area.

Eight of the 22 helicopters, plus the only participating OIB, were hit at least once. One Vietnamese Army man was killed and another wounded while they were airborne. Some automatic rifle fire was observed. All except one of the damaged aircraft were able to get back to Ca Mau before repairs were made. The damaged aircraft had to make an emergency landing a few miles from Cai Ngay for repairs before it could be returned to Ca Mau. The "down-bird" procedure got another workout.

Why, we wanted to know, were we subjected to this heavy opposition when we were landing on the heels of an air strike? We concluded that it was not in spite of, but because of the air strike. When the air strike started, the VC grabbed their guns and headed out of town. They must have made it as far as the ditches and dikes running through the fields that were the intended helicopter landing sites. There the VC took up firing positions.

The VC were doubly lucky in this instance, because they apparently found themselves outside the ring of troops the helicopters placed around the village. When the troops closed on the village, their bag was zero.

We began to have serious reservations about preparatory air strikes in this type operation. Besides the possibility of inflicting casualties on current or potential friends, forfeiture of the element of surprise is a certainty. There did not seem to be enough favorable results to offset these drawbacks.

That is not to say, however, that there is no place for air support in counter-guerrilla operations. Some on-call support would have been most welcome that day, and would probably have caused some VC casualties. But the language barrier between the attack pilots and helicopter flight leader precluded calling the strike in on target. This mission precipitated our insistence upon being covered by support fighter aircraft flown by English-speaking pilots.

**Thursday, 10 May:** The squadron returned to the scene of its first combat troop lift today, and the general scheme of maneuver was just about the same as before. This time, however, there was a welcoming committee.

As the flight approached the village, armed men could be seen scurrying out into the fields where they dove into tall weeds and literally disappeared. A few of them, who happened to land in a sparse spot, could be seen lying on their backs firing upward at the helicopters as they passed only a few feet above them. The rest of them were presumably doing the same thing. One helicopter was hit, but was able to make it back to the forward loading site before repairs were made.

This mission pointed up a cardinal principle of counter-guerrilla work: never repeat a previous maneuver. It is a tremendous temptation to repeat something that works
well the first time, but there are few tactics more dangerous (or less effective) when operating helicopters against irregulars.

By the very nature of their doctrine, the Viet Cong is an "army of shadows." They must remain dispersed among the population, mass only when they intend to deliver a blow, then very rapidly disperse again. As long as the struggle is classified as an insurgency, they will always be "outweighed" by the government troops. Therefore, if they allow themselves to become cornered, they are dead.

While the government troops are "heavier" and pack more punch, there is no reason why they cannot be just as nimble as the VC, if the helicopters are employed to maximum advantage. There is no point in "telegraphing punches" with elaborate preparations for a massive mission; quick-reaction missions give better results anyway. And it isn't that difficult to vary ground tactics, constantly change flight procedures and routes, and employ various means of deception.

In the instant case, the VC apparently were so sure that the previous successful operation would be duplicated some time in the future that they formulated a counter plan and waited nearly a month to put it into effect. And it paid off for them. While five helicopters were shot down on a single mission early in 1963, it is reported that they were making their third landing in the same place.

Saturday, 19 May: The Ba Xuyen Province Chief received intelligence to the effect that a meeting of some Viet Cong leaders would take place in a village about 12 miles southeast of Soc Trang. Troops were brought to Soc Trang for loading and they were landed in "typical" formation (i.e., in four groups at the four corners of the objective village).

The Viet Cong, as usual, started slipping through the thin line of government troops, and headed for a river that lay about a mile away across open rice paddies. Their getaways seemed to be certain.

About the time they reached the mid-point between the village and the river, however, four helicopters that had been circling out of sight came in and landed their troops in a column between the VC and the river. Not all the fleeing VC were captured, but the tactic was successful enough to convince us that we were on the right track by employing an airborne reserve concept.

The Shu-Fly Diary

Shu-Fly Diary

The principal reason the effort was not more successful was that some of the troops didn't know which way to advance when they debarked from the helicopters. We remedied this situation for future operations by preparing a debarkation diagram. A simple sketch was made of the plan view of the helicopter cabin. The legend, "Direction of Attack," was put on it in both English and Vietnamese. A quantity of them were reproduced and distributed to the pilots. Just before landing, the copilot marked an arrow on a diagram and handed it to the crew chief, who in turn gave it to the heli-team leader.

Wednesday, 23 May: A message was received about 2000 stating that two Vietnamese officers had received severe head wounds in an engagement about 30 miles southwest of Saigon and needed immediate evacuation. The weather was quite poor at the time. A ragged ceiling hung at about 300 feet and rain-hampered visibility was limited to no more than a couple of miles.

Two helicopters launched and navigated the 50 miles to the pick-up point by a combination of dead reckoning and occasional visual checks on larger towns en route. When they reached the vicinity of the site, they were guided to a landing by a bonfire. The casualties were picked up rapidly and taken to a hospital in Saigon.

Judging by the reaction of the 7th Division Commander, in whose sector it took place, this was as important as any mission we flew. He indicated that this was the first night helicopter evacuation they had had, and the effect it would have on the morale and fighting spirit of his troops was immeasurable. Daytime casualty evacuation missions were numerous and routine.

Sunday, 27 May: We were "spending a quiet Sunday at home" when a message was received that a fortified village located about 85 miles north of Soc Trang was under attack. Aircraft were manned and launched immediately and proceeded to a troop pick-up site about 15 miles from the besieged village. The VC broke contact immediately and slipped away into the nearby woods just before the troops were landed.

While the mission produced no scalps, we heard later that this rapid response to a call
for help from the villagers did much toward selling the fortified village concept to the people in that vicinity.

We heard of more than one instance where the VC broke off an attack simply because helicopters appeared overhead, even though the 'copters were headed on another mission and the crews were unaware that the attack was in progress. So the mere presence of airborne helicopters in an area would appear to limit the insurgents' freedom of action.

Saturday, 2 June: An American advisor in an observation aircraft spotted what appeared to be a VC camp on a hilltop in the vicinity of Rach Gia. He reported the sighting to the 21st Division Commander, who immediately requested and received helicopter and fixed-wing air support.

The helicopters were launched from Soc Trang as soon as they could be manned, picked up troops at Can Tho, and proceeded to the objective. When they arrived, a B-26 Vietnamese bomber had the hilltop under rocket attack. The troops were landed in an encircling disposition around the base of the hill. They contracted around its sides and scaled the hill without making VC contact.

This seemed to us to be another case of an air strike serving the purpose of warning the VC, if this had indeed been one of their camps. It strengthened our previously stated conviction that uncontrolled air strikes are of questionable value at best in counter-guerrilla work and probably do more harm than good.

Monday, 4 June: The day started as a routine lift of 7th Division troops in the Plain of Reeds area to the west of Saigon. But it turned out to be our "Longest Day."

When the troops landed on their first objective, a village situated at a stream junction, many armed and uniformed Viet Cong soldiers were flushed from the village. They headed north in the direction of the Cambodian border. This signalled the beginning of a huge checker game all over that sector.

When the helicopters returned to the pick-up point for the second scheduled load, the flight leader hurriedly briefed the Division Commander as to what he had observed. The Division Commander decided to carry through with the second scheduled landing in approximately the same place as the first. He indicated that this was to give him a substantial holding force and he would start hitting from the other direction (i.e., this was to be his "anvil" and he intended to make other "hammer landings" and catch the VC in between).

Five more landings were made with troops from the reserve and from various garrisons in the area, and with security troops "borrowed" from the local province chief. On one of the landings, the VC got the jump on the government troops and slipped outside the "net." The helicopters swung around and made a dummy landing approach to the far side of them, so they turned and ran back into the face of the government troops (an example of deception, as previously mentioned).

On the last landing, we confirmed something we had suspected right along: the aviator's hard hat is not bullet-proof. The flight leader's copilot, was leaning out the window using a submachine gun to spray a group of VC troops who were firing at the flight as it was lifting off. The flight leader heard a bullet hit the aircraft and looked around the cockpit to see if everything was still functioning. He saw a large hole in the back of the copilot's helmet and informed him that the back of his helmet had been nicked.

The copilot turned around to face the flight leader, who then spotted a small clean hole in the front of the helmet. The bullet had gone in the front of the helmet and out the back, passing through the half-inch-thick padding between the helmet and his head.

The main lesson gained from this day's flight was the importance of remaining flexible. It is a good idea to plan meticulously for this type combat, just as much so as with any other type. Since targets are nearly always fleeting, however, and unexpected opportunities present themselves and then nearly always evaporate immediately, the commander must be prepared to alter his plans much more rapidly than with most other types of combat. Ideally, an officer with power of decision over commitment or non-commitment of the troops should be airborne over the scene of action.

"Meanwhile back at the fort," (Soc Trang) things were somewhat less than quiet for the few aircraft and crews left there. The Ba Xuyen Province Chief came to the base seeking assistance. He had been unable to
gain communication with his garrison at Vinh Quoi, about 25 miles west of Soc Trang.

Troops were loaded into the only four helicopters remaining at the base, and they proceeded to Vinh Quoi. When they arrived, they found the village in flames, with several hundred pillaging VC still on the scene. The VC decided to flee instead of finishing their job of destruction—probably because they had no way of knowing that the bulk of the choppers were up north and they outnumbered by far any force that could be landed right away.

As the VC scurried away from Vinh Quoi in all directions, by boat and on foot, the four helicopters shuttled troops into the ransacked village to set up a defense before dark. On outbound trips, they evacuated the widows, orphans, wounded, and dead.

_Thursday, 7 June:_ On a landing with 21st Division troops today, many people flushed from the objective village while the helicopters were on final approach. There were so many, in fact, that they posed somewhat of a traffic problem in the landing sites. As no weapons were in evidence, it was out of the question to use suppressive fire, both because of the don't-shoot-first policy and the likelihood of hitting innocent people. Nevertheless, two of our helicopters were hit by small arms fire.

This was by no means the only time we were faced with this situation—the VC intermingling with the local population while they fired at us. If there is an answer to this problem, we didn't find it. This is one of the inherent characteristics of counter-guerrilla work that merely has got to be accepted as part of the job.

_Friday 8 June:_ Today we experienced good results with the Eagle Flight (the name given to the airborne reserve). A system of ground-to-air signals was worked out so that the same troops could be retrieved and used over and over again.

As usual, many people started streaming out of the objective village while the main flight of helicopters was landing. The reserve troops were then placed where they could intercept and check a group of them. When they were satisfied that they were "clean," they would signal for pick-up. In the meantime, the helicopter flight cruised around keeping the

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<tr>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Ground Control Approach</td>
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<td>MABS</td>
<td>Marine Air Base Squadron</td>
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<td>MATCU</td>
<td>Marine Air Traffic Control Unit</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>TACAN</td>
<td>Tactical Air Navigation</td>
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<td>TAFDS</td>
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area under surveillance, and would have another suspicious group spotted by the time the troops were picked up again.

This evolution was repeated several times before they hit pay dirt. A lone, black-clad figure was seen making his way from dike to dike toward a tree-lined canal, his apparent escape route. The troops landed and picked him up, and he was identified as a VC leader. He was carrying a suitcase filled with money and documents.

**Thursday, 14 June:** The squadron participated in its first jungle mission today, supporting the 5th Division in a landing in Viet Cong “D-Zone.” The landing site was a pear-shaped clearing about 35 miles north of Saigon, in which the VC had emplaced sharpened bamboo poles as an anti-helicopter device. While the helicopters could probably have landed among the poles without too much difficulty, it would have been pretty hard on the troops when they debarked. Therefore, the landing was made around the perimeter of the clearing between the poles and the trees.

By restricting us to a landing in this narrow perimeter, the VC had an ideal set-up for a mine or machinegun defense. Fortunately, though, they chose not to defend the site.

We noted several differences between jungle and delta helicopter operations. Whereas we had some degree of selectivity of landing sites for a particular objective in the delta area, there are likely to be no more than a couple, and perhaps only one clearing in the jungle that is usable for a certain objective. This, of course, favors the defender.

Also, it is more difficult to remain oriented over a “sea of trees” than over a patchwork of streams and canals. Generally speaking, though, the degree of accuracy in navigation is greater than in the delta area. Dead reckoning can be employed over the jungle, and when it leads to a clearing, that undoubtedly is the right spot. In the delta, however, most villages are similar enough in appearance that the objective could be any one of several in the immediate vicinity unless pinpoint navigation and accurate map reading is used to single out the proper one.

Although it fortunately did not apply on this mission, the matter of making forced landings and retrieving crews from downed aircraft is considerably more difficult in a jungle area than on the delta.

**Saturday, 16 June:** The VC ambushed a convoy to the north of Saigon, killed two American officers and several Vietnamese soldiers, and captured a quantity of weapons. The squadron was diverted from another mission to land troops in an attempt to head them off.

The helicopters received small arms fire while landing. As soon as they had discharged their troops and cleared the area, a radio call was received that requested them to land again and move some troops that had been placed in the wrong spot by another outfit. The request was denied.

The only reason this is noted here is to bring out a principle. Although we considered it feasible to land and discharge troops while receiving moderate small arms fire, it is not feasible to land and sit on the ground long enough to load troops within range of opposing small arms. Troops can debark in a few seconds, but loading is another matter. Either the troops must group into heli-teams for rapid loading and be vulnerable themselves, or the helicopters must make sitting ducks of themselves while they wait for the troops to get organized and loaded. Therefore, loading must be done in a “secure” area, unless likely loss of troops and/or helicopters is an acceptable risk under the prevailing situation.

**Monday, 18 June:** Today was the only time we had to delay a mission because of weather. Between the pick-up point and the landing site, rain got so heavy that we could no longer keep visual contact with the ground and the flight elements lost sight of one another. A preconceived plan for such a situation was executed without difficulty. On signal of the flight leader, each flight element reversed course in turn, starting from the rear. After breaking into clear weather, the flight rendezvoused and proceeded to the pick-up point to wait for the squall to pass, then proceeded with the operation again.

**Friday, 6 July:** We made a second trip to Cai Ngay today. The helicopters received no opposing fire and the troops found the town completely deserted. The state of the refuse and garbage indicated that the mass evacuation had probably taken place the day be-
A Vietnamese infantryman, his AR-15 rifle slung over his shoulder, heads out on a patrol, seemingly unmindful that his country has been engaged in anti-guerrilla warfare against the Viet Cong insurgents for more than nine years.

Therefore, it was arranged that the government troops set up their encircling positions in darkness and close with the VC as soon as it was light enough to see.

All navigation would have to be visual, so the route was selected accordingly. The half moon would give enough light to reflect from bodies of water, which decided the checkpoints. Distinctive river/shore contours, lakes, and stream junctions provided the navigation fixes. Helicopter running lights were extinguished before reaching the Initial Point, and thereafter the engine exhaust was used to hold formation. The landing was made with the aid of the exhaust reflecting in the flooded rice paddies to show where the ground was.

The landing was completed without incident. It should be noted, though, that the success of this landing does not automatically make all types of night landings without landing aids a routine matter. The terrain was flat, the moon gave some degree of illumination, and the squadron at this time had been flying together for two years. The conditions were therefore nearly ideal.

Wednesday, 1 August: My squadron was officially relieved by another Marine helicopter squadron at 0001 this morning. All aircraft and gear changed hands at this point, although the actual work involved in the transfer had been going on for over a week. Also, the incoming pilots had been flying on missions in increasing numbers over the same
period, while my pilots were slowly phased back to Okinawa for return to the States. This created a minimum break in continuity because of the squadron exchange.

All told, my squadron had made some 50 combat troop-lift missions which entailed about 130 landings by flights of helicopters against Viet Cong opposition.

Seventeen of our helicopters and two of the OIBs sustained gunfire damage, most of them more than once. While the VC created considerable work for the metalsmiths and mechs, they fortunately did not manage to do any damage that came under the cognizance of the doctor.

Crew Protection

Before we landed in Vietnam, we exchanged our orange flight suits for tan ones so as not to present quite as attractive a target in the cockpit. We wore standard ground-type body armor over the suits. This type protective gear is not ideal but was all we had. In the high heat and humidity, many of the crewmen developed fairly serious cases of rash from wearing the armor for extended periods of time. Also, the armor leaves too much exposed area and would not stop a direct hit anyway. A camouflage, fire-retardant flight suit is needed in case the crew has to walk out following a crash landing. And built-in armor plate is needed in the helicopter. Ideally, it should be easily removable so that the additional weight would not have to be carried when it was not needed.

Armament

We decided not to install machine guns on the helicopters as the Army had done. There were several reasons behind this decision, the principal one being that it would tend to block the cabin door. We figured that our best defense was to hold our time on the ground in the landing zone to a bare minimum. The best way to accomplish this is to have the cabin exit door clear and to have the crew chief help the troops disembark rather than handle a machine gun. We did, however, carry two “Greasegun” submachine guns in each helicopter. The copilot covered the left side of the helicopter while the crew chief covered the right when we were close to, or on, the ground. They, of course, fired only when they could see a VC soldier firing at us.

Maps

We used 1:250,000 maps for en route navigation and 1:100,000 for terminal guidance in the objective area. This was found to be an adequate system as long as the crew remained oriented. There is no opportunity for re-orientation, though, when flying at 100 knots a few feet above the ground.

Vulnerability

The question of helicopter vulnerability seems to be a perennial one, so we will examine our experience in this regard. We had nearly every part of a helicopter hit at one time or another—main rotor blades, tail rotor blades and shaft, engine, transmission housing, tires, structural spars, etc. The only hits that made an immediate landing essential was when an engine oil tank or line was damaged, and the oil was subsequently pumped overboard. Granted, most of the hits were from single-fire weapons; and heavy automatic fire would probably have made it an entirely different ball game. Still, the helicopter does not seem to be as fragile as some people think.

It would be foolhardy in the extreme to try to storm a fortified position in helicopters, or attempt to operate in the vicinity of a machine gun concentration. Likewise, some losses will likely occur when operating in an environment somewhat less formidable than either of those described here. Still, it is not necessary to “sanitize” an area completely.
before helicopters can operate in it, if moderate losses are an acceptable factor. Surprise, deception, sound tactics, and a variety of "plays" will go a long way toward keeping losses at a minimum level in the counter-insurgency environment.

Crew Escape

Although relatively slow-flying helicopters are undoubtedly more vulnerable than high-performance, fixed-wing aircraft, when subjected to the same pattern of fire, the helicopters do have an advantageous characteristic. In a counter-insurgency situation, the countryside is "no-man's land" at best, if not totally hostile. If a fixed-wing aircraft goes down, the crew must either evade and walk out, or defend themselves while a helicopter is summoned for pick-up. On the other hand, since helicopters do not normally travel singly over hostile territory, they have inherent escape means in the form of an accompanying helicopter. Also, they are more likely to have a repairable machine after landing, one that can be flown out again.

Escort Aircraft

Helicopters need escort aircraft to call on for suppressive fire. The escorting aircraft must have flight characteristics that permit them to stay close to the helicopters and constantly in a position to initiate an attack. A target is not going to be seen until it is firing at the helicopters, and when this happens, even a short delay is too long.

The armament of the escort aircraft should be anti-personnel in nature. Their sole mission is to make someone stop shooting at the helicopters, and make them stop immediately. When an enemy gunner is no longer a threat to the helicopters, he ceases to be a valid target for the escort aircraft. When the helicopters get out of his range, he should be forgotten unless there are aircraft in the vicinity that are not assigned to the escort that can take him under fire.

It is realized that this is a rather loose and indefinite treatment of the important subject of helicopter escort, but it is purposely so. It is intended merely to give a sketch of the results the helicopter flight leader needs in order for him to get his work done (i.e., keep the opposition off his back while he places troops where they are supposed to be). Much work is still needed in developing hardware and doctrine before this result is achieved.

Conclusion

What did Operation Shu-Fly add to the store of knowledge for this type combat? It certainly did not produce a group of anti-guerrilla experts who have all the answers. It is believed, however, that most of the participants did come away with a keen awareness of the unique characteristics of this type combat. Along with a very few answers, they undoubtedly have many more questions to which they will try to find solutions. And if an appreciation of the problems inherent in this facet of military operations is all that was gained, then the deployment can still be considered productive.

Liaison Officer For Intercommunication

During a SEATO joint exercise, one of the allied officers was assigned as a liaison officer on board a U.S. ship. When he got back to his own ship, one of his friends was curious to know what he had done.

"Nothing," said the liaison officer, "just translate our people speaking English to the English speaking people."

—Contributed by Lieutenant Pravit Sivaraks, Royal Thai Navy
THE MARINE EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM, 1965-71

FIRST IN, FIRST OUT

by Jack Shulimson and Maj Edward F. Wells

Vietnam was not an unsuccessful campaign from the Marine Corps' perspective. When the call came for American ground forces, the Marines were ready. They were the first U.S. ground forces committed to South Vietnam.

In August 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin crisis caused the U.S. Pacific command to transform the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) from a paper organization into a viable, deployable air-ground force of 6,000 Marines. During the next few months, U.S. commanders prepared various contingency plans for landing one or two Marine battalions in South Vietnam. At the time, that country was in the throes of Viet Cong (VC) insurgency, aided by North Vietnam and exacerbated by internal political chaos as one government followed another.

Sensing victory in their grasp, the Communists directed their attacks for the first time against U.S. advisors and installations. In retaliation, President Lyndon B. Johnson, in February, ordered air strikes against North Vietnam. On 22 February, Gen William G. Westmoreland, USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (ComUSMACV), requested two Marine battalions to secure the key Da Nang airbase. By the end of February, President Johnson approved the deployment of the Marine brigade to South Vietnam, and the U.S. negotiated with the South
April, U.S. authorities agreed to deploy further Marine forces and to permit the Marines at Da Nang to engage in counterinsurgency operations. By early May 1965, the Marines had established two additional enclaves in South Vietnam, one at Chu Lai, 57 miles south, and another at Phu Bai, 30 miles north of Da Nang. At this time the 9th MEB became the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) and now included the headquarters and major elements of both the 3d Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Further negotiations between MACV and Washington, addressing the continuing Communist threat, resulted in an agreement to deploy additional U.S. troops, both Army and Marine. By midsummer, the Marines at Da Nang had moved outside the confines of the airbase and had expanded their tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) to include the Viet Cong infested villages to the south. In August, the 7th Marines, the lead regiment of the 1st Marine Division, arrived.

The American buildup occurred because the South Vietnamese were unable to cope with the increase in strength of the Communist-led forces. Allied intelligence estimates of the total enemy strength in South Vietnam had risen from a possible 138,000 in March 1965 to over 226,000 by the end of the year. MACV believed that these forces consisted of more than 110,000 guerrillas, 39,000 political cadre, 18,000 combat support troops, and approximately 70,000 men organized in regular formations, including 19 regiments ranging from 2,000 to 2,500 men in strength. Seven of these regiments were identified as North Vietnamese.

By late summer of 1965, the United States had established the complex command structure under which, with minor modifications, it would fight the remainder of the war. III MAF, led since June by MajGen Lewis W. Walt, reported to USMACV (Gen Westmoreland) but remained administratively and logistically linked to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), commanded by LtGen Victor H. Krulak. USMACV, in turn, was a subordinate unified command under Adm Ulysses S.G. Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac) who was responsible to Washington. Although under the nominal operational control of CinCPac, Westmoreland, in effect, had a free hand in fighting the war in South Vietnam.

De facto functional and geographic divisions characterized the employment of the four U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam. The Navy executed the carrier-based air campaign against North Vietnam and the maritime anti-infiltration operations, codenamed "Market Time." Second Air Division, later Seventh Air Force, coordinated the
U.S. air war in South Vietnam and provided air support to U.S. Army and ARVN forces. Marine air remained under the direct operational control of III MAF until the Air Force assumed “single management” in 1968. Two U.S. Army Field Forces, Vietnam were responsible for U.S. operations in II and III Corps and, later, IV Corps areas, as III MAF was in I Corps.

The Marines’ location in the densely populated agricultural area of Quang Nam province dictated a strategy of pacification. At Da Nang III MAF believed no more than 2,000 VC troops to be within a 25-mile radius of the airbase, yet the Communist guerrilla political apparatus permeated the southern portion of the TAOR. Gen Walt estimated that 150,000 civilians were living within 81mm mortar range of the airbase and consequently “the Marines were into the pacification business.”

Through 1965 and early 1966, III MAF developed a coordinated pacification campaign within the three Marine enclaves at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai. An ingredient of this effort was Civic Action, a program for self help, medical assistance, and community development for the local population. The Marines also introduced a novel organizational concept, the Combined Action Platoon, which stiffened a Popular Force (local Vietnamese militia) platoon with a Marine squad. In “Golden Fleece” operations, Marine infantry units routinely protected the rice harvest. Marine battalions, in “County Fair” operations, conducted sophisticated cordons and searches of individual hamlets. While the people were fed, medically treated, and entertained, local officials and police identified and interrogated VC suspects. The Marines hoped to root out the Communist infrastructure in the villages south of Da Nang by taking apart each hamlet, “bit by bit . . . [and putting] it together again.”

In developing these pacification techniques, Marine officers of Gen Walt’s generation recalled their training in counterinsurgency by veterans of Caribbean interventions. Other Marine officers had attended U.S. Army counterinsurgency schools in the early 1960s and LtGen Krulak had served as Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency to the JCS. Krulak, moreover, served as an informal personal advisor to Admiral Sharp “on all Marine matters.”

Gen Krulak later succinctly defined the Marine Corps-III MAF outlook on how the war should be fought. He argued:

It is our conviction that if we can destroy the guerrilla fabric among the people we will automatically deny larger units the food and the intelligence and the taxes and the other support they need.

In commenting on this period many years later he noted:

There was no virtue at all in seeking out the NVA [North Vietnamese Army] in the mountains and jungle; that so long as they stayed there they were a threat to nobody, that our efforts should be addressed to the rich, populous lowlands . . .

Gen Westmoreland had a different perspective. He contended that the introduction of North Vietnamese units into the south created an entirely new situation. The MACV commander believed that the Communists wanted to develop multidivision forces in relatively secure base areas while at the same time continuing extensive guerrilla actions to tie down friendly forces. He had doubts about the thrust of the Marine Corps pacification campaign. He believed that the Marines were “stalled a short distance south of Da Nang,” because the ARVN was unable to “fill in behind Marines in their expanding enclaves.” He wanted the Marines “to find the enemy’s main forces and bring them to battle, thereby putting them on the run, and reducing the threat they posed to the population.” Although Westmoreland wanted the Marines to form mobile strike forces, he “had no wish to deal so abruptly with Gen Walt” that he would “precipitate an interservice imbroglio.” He later explained “rather than start a controversy, I chose to issue orders for specific projects that as time passed would gradually get the Marines out of their beachheads.”

From the III MAF point of view, Gen Walt believed that the differences with MACV were more in emphasis than in substance. One III MAF officer observed:

Westmoreland’s view was “Yes, we accept the Marine Corps’ concern about pacification, but we want you to do more. . .” General Walt’s position was “Yes, I will engage the enemy’s main force units, but first I want to have good intelligence.”

Gen Walt’s III MAF was linked to FMFPac.
Both Gen Krulak and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., viewed the Marine differences with MACV as more basic. Gen Krulak declared:

"Our effort belonged where the people were, not where they weren't. I shared these thoughts with Westmoreland frequently, but made no progress in persuading him.

Gen Greene later stated that Gen Westmoreland and his commanders were preoccupied with the large unit war. He maintained that I Corps, with the bulk of its population concentrated in a narrow coastal strip, was an ideal location "to initiate security operations against key points along the coast." He had advocated such a strategy:

in a presentation to the Joint Chiefs and to General Westmoreland. The Chiefs were interested but Westmoreland wasn't. And being CG MACV his views of the 'big picture', the 'broad arrow', prevailed...

Despite the differences over pacification and the big unit war between MACV and the Marines, Gen Westmoreland's directives were broad enough to include both approaches. Under the terms of the November 1965 MACV instruction, the Marines were to defend and secure their base areas; to conduct search and destroy missions against VC forces that posed an immediate threat and against distant enemy bases; to conduct clearing operations in contiguous areas; and, finally, to execute contingency plans anywhere in Vietnam as directed by ComUSMACV.

Working within these "all-encompassing" objectives and general guidelines, Gen Walt developed what he called his "balanced approach." This consisted of a three-pronged effort employing search and destroy, counterguerrilla, and pacification operations. III MAF believed that it could secure the 265-mile-long I Corps coastal plain by the end of 1966, once it joined its two largest enclaves at Da Nang and Chu Lai.

These plans were soon to be frustrated. In the spring of 1966, an unforeseen political crisis, caused by the removal of a popular South Vietnamese I Corps commander, brought Marine pacification efforts to a standstill. No sooner had this crisis passed and the Marines resumed the offensive, than the North Vietnamese mounted their first incursion into South Vietnam directly through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Vietnams. In response, III MAF ordered the 3d Marine Division north into the border province of Quang Tri.

By the end of 1966, III MAF's two divisions fought distinctly different wars. The 3d Marine Division conducted a conventional campaign in thinly populated northern I Corps while the 1st Marine Division continued to combine large unit and counterguerrilla operations in the populous south. A North Vietnamese leader predicted:

The National Liberation Front (VC) will entice the Americans close to the North Vietnamese border and will bleed them without mercy...the pacification campaign will be destroyed.

Although by December 1966, III MAF numbered nearly 70,000 men, a Marine general summed up the year's frustrations, "...too much real estate—do not have enough troops."

A further drain on Marine manpower was the effort to establish an anti-infiltration barrier south of the DMZ. This project, unofficially dubbed the "McNamara Wall," originated with a special study group ordered by then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in April 1966. This group concluded that an unmanned barrier, consisting of seismic and acoustic sensors, monitored and supported by U.S. aircraft, was feasible. Extended negotiations involved the entire chain of command. Ultimately, Westmoreland proposed, and McNamara accepted, an alternative conven-
ional manned barrier and strong point system across the eastern DMZ. This would later be extended to the west. Gen Westmoreland directed III MAF to provide the concept for a “mobile defense/conventional barrier.”

From the beginning the Marine command disagreed with any barrier concept. Gen Walt told Westmoreland that if he had the additional forces projected by the barrier planners “a far better job of sealing the DMZ could be accomplished without the barrier itself.” The III MAF commander observed, “we are already too short of troops to divert any of them to a function of this nature.”

Despite Marine objections, barrier planning continued. The original plans called for the 3d Marine Division to conduct a series of clearing operations and to complete the construction of the eastern sector of the barrier by November 1967. In May of that year, the Marines began work on a 200-meter-wide trace between Con Thien and Gio Linh in the eastern DMZ.

Reflective of fluctuating command direction, construction proceeded fitfully. BGen Louis Metzger, assistant 3d Marine Division commander, remembered that there was a constantly changing emphasis—high interest during April through June of 1967, but then a drying up of both materials and guidance from higher headquarters. The new III MAF commander, LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., who had succeeded Walt in June of 1967, was not as opposed to the anti-infiltration system as his predecessor, since he believed that its completion would free his forces for use elsewhere. Cushman, however, told Westmoreland in August that he needed additional troops to finish the trace by November. At this point, Westmoreland required an estimate of casualties if the project were to be completed on time. When informed that total losses might number as high as 2,000, Westmoreland asked for an alternative plan. The Marines were to stop work on the barrier itself until the “tactical situation stabilized,” but were to complete the strong point construction. By the end of 1967, most of the strong points were finished but, “the sensors, wire, and minefields, along the so-called trace were not in, nor were they ever to be in.” Metzger called the whole effort “ill-conceived.”

With the Marines thinly stretched from the DMZ to southern I Corps, Gen Westmoreland implemented in the spring of 1967 a contingency plan for their reinforcement. On 9 April, lead elements of the Army’s 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the vanguard of Task Force Oregon, later to become the Americal Division, arrived at Chu Lai. Under the operational control of III MAF, the Army division assumed responsibility for the Chu Lai TAOR and the two southern provinces of I Corps. A senior Marine on Westmoreland’s staff, BGen John R. Chaissel, remembered:

The introduction of the Americal Division was done with amazing smoothness. . . .[Westmoreland] picked the right guy [Army MajGen William B. Rosson] to go up there . . .

Rosson and Gen Walt were personal friends which made for an easy transition. According to Chaisson, the arrival of the Army units “gave Walt the little edge he needed,” and permitted the 1st Marine Division to concentrate its efforts on the area south of Da Nang while the 3d Marine Division focused on the northern tier threat.

Army reinforcements notwithstanding, Gen Krulak in July 1967, observed: “that the bulk of the war is in the I Corps Tactical Zone where the U.S. Marines are fighting with less than a proper proportion of the available resources.” He pointed out that allied forces in I Corps totaled 222,000 arrayed against 60,000 enemy, a troop ratio of 3.7:1 as compared to ratios of 6.9:1 and 6.7:1 in II and III Corps, respectively. Even more striking comparisons were reflected in casualty figures. Allied forces in I Corps accounted for nearly 20,000 of the 46,000 enemy killed throughout Vietnam. In turn they suffered nearly half of the 6,700 friendly troops killed countrywide.

During 1967 the Marine war had grown in intensity. For the 3d Marine Division, conventional fighting against the NVA ranged from the hills around the former Special Forces camp at Khe Sanh in northwestern I Corps, to “Leatherneck Square” in the eastern DMZ. South of Da Nang in the An Hoa basin and the Que Son Valley, the 1st Marine Division combined large unit operations with its ongoing pacification campaign. That year, the Marines conducted more than 11 major operations of battalion size or larger and over 356,000 small-unit patrols. Marines killed nearly 18,000 of the enemy at a cost of nearly 30,000 Marine casualties, including 3,000 dead. By year’s end, III MAF had blunted the enemy push through the DMZ. With the reinforcement by the Americal Division, the Marines believed that allied forces by December 1967 had made significant pacification gains throughout I Corps.

Despite optimism in the American command about winning the war in Vietnam, U.S. intelligence received disturbing reports that the enemy planned yet another offensive. Gen Westmoreland expected the NVA to make its move in the north. By mid-January 1968, MACV identified elements of two enemy divisions near Khe Sanh and three in the eastern DMZ.

With the Marines strung out along the DMZ in the north, Westmoreland sent additional Army
reinforcements to I Corps. These units, the 1st Air Cavalry Division and a brigade of the 101st Airborne, were to deploy into southern Quang Tri and northern Thua Thien Provinces. At the same time, the III MAF commander, Gen Cushman, ordered the 3d Marine Division to advance its command post from Phu Bai to Dong Ha. The 1st Marine Division was, in turn, to assume responsibility for the Phu Bai enclave south of the Army's assigned operating area. At this climactic point in the Vietnam fighting, III MAF's share of the 250,000, allied forces in I Corps now Included two Army divisions, a brigade of a third, as well as two Marine divisions, an air wing, and supporting forces.

Both Westmoreland and Cushman believed that the Marines were most vulnerable at Khe Sanh. Many observers compared this isolated western outpost, dominated by high hills and only four miles from the Laotian border, with the ill-fated French forward base at Dien Bien Phu.

Gen Westmoreland prized Khe Sanh as a base to monitor enemy infiltration into Laos and as "an eventual jump off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail." Marines were less convinced of Khe Sanh's strategic worth. As one Marine general observed in late 1966, "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere." Reluctantly, the Marines had established a base at Khe Sanh in October of 1966. By April 1967, a Marine regiment occupied the position and, in heavy fighting, had seized key high ground from enemy forces massing to attack. Khe Sanh remained relatively quiet throughout the remainder of 1967.

With the buildup of enemy forces in January 1968, the Marine command had to decide whether to reinforce or abandon Khe Sanh. One Marine analyst observed that there was no acceptable alternative to defending the base:

It was the only logical thing to do. We were there in a prepared position and in considerable strength. A well-fought battle would do the enemy a lot more damage than he could hope to inflict on us.

The arrival of Army troops in I Corps permitted a modest reinforcement of the Khe Sanh garrison. The Marines would depend on massive air and artillery support to destroy the North Vietnamese. "The Siege of Khe Sanh" began on 20 January 1968 with sharp fighting in the hills north of the base.

Despite command expectations of a decisive battle in the north, the ensuing enemy offensive took on an unexpected sweep and intensity. During the period of 29-31 January at Tet, the lunar new year, the Communists hurled some 80,000 North Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong guerrillas against 105 cities and towns throughout South Vietnam. In I Corps, enemy forces attacked all the major population centers including Da Nang and Hue, the heretofore untouched former imperial capital. U.S. and South Vietnamese forces immediately repulsed all of these attacks except at Hue. In 26 days of dogged, house-to-house fighting, U.S. Army, Marine, and ARVN troops expelled the enemy from the city, killing some 5,000. In military terms the Communist offensive was a failure. The expected popular uprising did not materialize, and the South Vietnamese acquitted themselves well. Gen Cushman estimated that in I Corps alone, the enemy lost, during the first three months of 1968, over 33,500 dead, the equivalent of 74 battalions. III MAF was ready to resume the initiative. Cushman remarked that following Tet:

We went after the enemy in a series of short duration operations using the mobility of our forces to fix and destroy enemy forces which had escaped from the major Tet battle areas. By the first of April we were ready to begin the big counteroffensive.

The first step was to relieve the 6,000 Marines at Khe Sanh. From January through the end of
March, North Vietnamese gunners maintained steady pressure on the embattled combat base with as many as 1,000 shells and rockets a day. On 6 February, the NVA overran the U.S. Special Forces camp at Lang Vei some six miles southwest of Khe Sanh, but limited their ground attacks against the Marine base to probing the hill outposts and the perimeter. U.S. artillery and air bombardment, including massive B-52 “Arc Light” strikes, prevented a general assault. Employing innovative air tactics, Marine and Air Force helicopter and fixed-wing transport pilots kept the base supplied under marginal flying conditions. With a break in the weather, the U.S. 1st Air Cavalry Division and a Marine regiment, the 1st Marines, on 1 April moved to the relief of Khe Sanh. While the Marines advanced along Route 9, the 1st Cavalry used leapfrog helicopter tactics to deploy east and south of the base. On 4 April, the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh attacked to the southeast and two days later joined the Army troopers. Within a week, Route 9 was opened and on 14 April, the Marines seized the last of the commanding terrain north of the base. The 77-day “Siege” was over.

In his book On Strategy Army Col Harry G. Summers observed that though Khe Sanh and the Tet offensive were North Vietnamese and Viet Cong tactical failures, they could be considered “strategic successes since, by eroding our will . . . [the Communists] were able to capture the political initiative.” Indeed, viewed retrospectively, Tet was the policy watershed of the Vietnam War. President Johnson rejected recommendations for a Reserve callup and limited major troop augmentations. Moreover, he restricted the bombing of the north, began negotiations, and announced his decision not to run again for the Presidency.

In early 1968, Gen Westmoreland reexamine command relations in I Corps. The influx of additional Army units stretched the command fabric that had smoothly accommodated the initial Army reinforcements. On 9 February, the MACV commander established a forward command post at Phu Bai, under his deputy, Gen Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., USA. This interim headquarters, known as MACV (Fwd), in coordination with III MAF, controlled all U.S. forces in the northern two provinces of I Corps. Although Gen Westmoreland denied in his memoirs that he lacked confidence in the Marines, his trusted subordinate, Marine BG Chaisson, who ran the MACV combat operations center, disagreed. He recalled that Westmoreland was “nervous about the quality of our leadership when he recognized that the biggest battle of the war was going to be fought up there.” According to Chaisson, MACV first proposed to take over direct command of all U.S. forces in northern I Corps. Chaisson remembered that in heated staff debate this idea was rejected in favor of the MACV (Fwd) proposal.

Although there was no major disagreement between III MAF and MACV (Fwd), Gen Cushman later stated:

Having the senior commander’s agent in the battle area resulted in his [Abrams’] exercise of more command influence and direction over III MAF forces . . . than is customarily exercised by the senior command.

This awkward arrangement ended in mid-March when MACV (Fwd) became Provisional Corps, later XXIV Corps, directly subordinate to III MAF.

An additional command irritant to MACV was the relative autonomy of Marine aviation. In accordance with Marine doctrine, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was an integral component of the III MAF air-ground team. Westmoreland believed that the introduction of major Army units
into I Corps required "the efficient management of tactical air resources" by one commander. With the approval of CinCPac, Westmoreland assigned, on 10 March 1968, the commanding general, Seventh Air Force, as "single manager for air" and gave him "mission direction" over Marine fixed-wing aircraft. Although protested by the new Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Leonard F. Chapman, directly to the Secretary of Defense, Westmoreland's order prevailed. Marine air functioned, with some modifications, under the single management system from that point to the end of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Notwithstanding the changing political climate in the spring of 1968, the allies in South Vietnam continued to take the initiative against the reeling NVA and VC. In I Corps, Gen Cushman commanded the equivalent of a field army. By May 1968, his maneuver units included 24 Marine and 29 Army battalions and his total forces numbered over 154,000. During the month, the 3d Marine Division repulsed a division-size enemy attempt to cut Marine supply lines along the Cua Viet River in the Dong Ha sector of the DMZ. The Army's 1st Air Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions conducted a mobile operation in the A Shau Valley, a key southwesterly avenue of approach to Hue. South and west of Da Nang, the 1st Marine Division mounted operations to protect the approaches to that city and to recoup earlier pacification gains lost during the Tet offensive. The Americal Division pursued similar operations in southern I Corps.

By mid-1968, the U.S. command decided to vacate the Khe Sanh base and to suspend further work on the "McNamara Line." These two decisions freed the 3d Marine Division from the defense of fixed bases and permitted a more aggressive approach. In a series of mobile operations employing the firebase concept, the Marines repeatedly bested the NVA. For the first time, the division operated with all its organic subordinate units, enhancing tactical integrity, command, and control. The most ambitious of these forays was Operation DEWEY CANYON. In early 1969, the 9th Marines entered an enemy base area in the southwestern corner of Quang Tri Province hard by the Laotian border. Making skillful use of helicopters and firebases, the Marines killed 1,600 of the enemy and captured over 1,400 weapons and hundreds of tons of ammunition, equipment, and supplies.

Throughout I Corps and especially in the heavily populated 1st Marine Division sector south of Da Nang, Marines and South Vietnamese soldiers attempted to regain control of the countryside. In June 1968 Gen Cushman, together with the South Vietnamese I Corps commander, directed that a new effort be made in rural areas. Emphasizing revolutionary development, civic action, and an expanded combined action program, the South Vietnamese Government (GVN) and the U.S. Forces were to reassert control of the contested regions. According to Cushman, the crux of the campaign was to protect the hamlets at night and deny the VC access to the population. In November 1968 the South Vietnamese Government instituted a countrywide Accelerated Pacification Program. By the end of the year, 116 of the 141 targeted hamlets in I Corps were rated as "secure."

This pacification progress continued through the next two years. By May 1970, one III MAF commander, LtGen Herman Nickerson, boasted, "The Viet Cong has lost the people war." His successor, LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, was more cautious. He remarked that despite the indicators, "we must accept the fact that a large portion of the . . . people are apathetic toward the GVN." By the end of 1970, the allies in I Corps had put into effect a broad pacification program that appeared to be succeeding, but at a painfully slow pace. Yet, for the Marines and South Vietnamese, time was running out. Ready or not, the South

Helicopters resupply 9th Marines in Quang Tri.
President Nixon was committed to removing U.S. forces from Vietnam.

Vietnamese would have to assume a much larger share of the war.

From the outset of his Presidency in January 1969, Richard M. Nixon committed his administration to the reduction of U.S. troop levels in South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed, during the first half of that year, a plan for the removal of U.S. forces in six successive redeployments. Depending upon the battlefield situation, the troop withdrawals might be completed as early as the end of 1970 or as late as December, 1972. The Marine Corps Commandant, Gen Chapman, remembered: "I felt, and I think that most Marines felt, that the time had come to get out of Vietnam..." LtGen Chaisson, then on Chapman's staff, explained: "We had adopted, from 1969 on, the idea that we were in the postwar period." The first redeployments occurred in 1969, and by the end of the year the entire 3d Marine Division had departed Vietnam.

From the Marine Corps point of view, it was logical that the 3d Marine Division should be the first of its major units to leave. Senior Marine commanders agreed that their forces in Vietnam should retain a balanced air-ground character until withdrawn. LtGen William J. Van Ryzin, the Headquarters Marine Corps chief of staff observed: "We didn't want to get into a World War I type of organization where we just became another brigade of an Army division..." As early as 1968, Marine planners in Washington suggested that whereas one Marine division in northern I Corps required substantial Army reinforcements, Marine resources alone would be sufficient in the south. They recommended that Marine dispositions should be oriented on Da Nang rather than the north. Such a move, the planners argued, would enhance command and control, provide ready access to a deep water port, and permit "full resumption of [the] Marine tactical concept regarding protection of population and resources.

From mid-1969 into 1970, commands at all levels debated the timing, sizes, and proportions of projected troop withdrawals. Proposals included "Marine-heavy" and "Marine-light" redeployments. The JCS originally recommended a Marine command in Vietnam until the end of 1972. This was opposed by Headquarters Marine Corps, MACV, and CinCPac. It was finally resolved that the last Marines, save 500 advisors, liaison personnel, and security guards, would be out of Vietnam by July 1971. LtGen Donn Robertson, then commanding general, III MAF, shifted his headquarters to Okinawa on 14 April. The 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade, some 13,000 ground, air, and support troops, remained in country for another two months. On 26 June, MajGen Alan Armstrong, the brigade commanding general, and the last 10 members of his staff flew out of Da Nang. LtGen Chaisson recalled:

"We [Headquarters Marine Corps] fought... to get our forces out of Vietnam and we did. We got down to 500 men in Vietnam in June of '71 from the 85,000 we had there in the fall of '69.

The period of Marine redeployment from late 1969 through 1971 has been called "a time of troubles." The larger societal problems of racial conflict and drug abuse intruded upon the armed forces. Moreover, the growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War prompted critical media scrutiny of all the Services. Normally accustomed to popular support, the Marine Corps found itself in an uncomfortable position.

Although nothing in the Marine record quite compared with the My Lai massacre, there were several documented crimes committed by Marines against civilians. From 1965 through 1971, 27 Marines were convicted of murdering Vietnamese civilians; another 16 were convicted of rape and 15 of manslaughter. In the most notorious atrocity, a 5-member Marine patrol entered the hamlet of Son Thang 4 in the Que Son Valley south of Da Nang and deliberately gunned down 16 Vietnamese civilians; 11 women and 5 children. Despite a maladroit effort at coverup by the platoon commander, the Marine command promptly brought criminal charges against all concerned. III MAF attempted to prevent such incidents by timely disciplinary action and its ongoing Personal Response Program. This program emphasized familiarizing Marines with Vietnamese society and customs. As one historian wrote, however:

The effectiveness of these measures in improving the attitudes of Marines and Vietnamese toward each other is impossible to measure. To the end, probably, dislike and distrust, tempered by a wary..."
tolerance, . . . were the dominant sentiments on both sides. Tension was constant and violence never far below the surface as the Marines redeployed, but III MAF never gave up the effort to maintain a measure of humanity and compassion in the conduct of an often savage war.

Another aberration was the outbreak of a series of "fragging" incidents during this period. The term "fragging" came from the widely available M26 fragmentation grenade and referred to the attempted murder of officers and NCOs by their own men using this grenade. During 1970, the 1st Marine Division reported 47 fragging incidents that resulted in a total of 1 dead and 41 injured. Motivations for these crimes ranged from resentment against leaders perceived as being overly aggressive or incompetent to racial and drug-related matters. Whatever the causes, by mid-1970 the Marine command recognized the problem and instituted a number of investigative measures to confine and eradicate this plague. Between January and April 1971, there were only two reported fraggings, neither of which resulted in any casualties. But, as one division officer remarked, "Few, if any, such incidents . . . occur in . . . units standing down . . . " or redeploying.

Racial tensions were another stress on organizational cohesion. The Marine Corps and the Navy were the last of the Services to integrate. Young blacks, entering the Marine Corps in a period of new racial awareness, were impatient with seeming institutional discrimination. Beginning in 1968, racial unrest surfaced throughout the Marine Corps. In July 1969, at Camp Lejeune, a group of blacks assaulted 15 whites. Gen Chapman, after a tour of Marine commands, acknowledged, "There is no question about it, we've got a problem." On 2 September 1969 he issued ALMAR 65. Building on traditional axioms of Marine leadership, this directive mandated an all-out campaign against the vestiges of discrimination and accommodated some of the symbols of black pride. It permitted black Marines to wear modified "Afro" haircuts and allowed "Black Power" salutes on informal occasions. Despite this order, racial turmoil continued throughout the Marine Corps, including Vietnam. In III MAF, Marine commanders combined authoritative and conciliatory methods in the pursuit of racial harmony. Statistics bore out the validity of their approach. Of the 37 incidents in the 1st Marine Division during 1970, only 8 occurred during the last 6 months.

A social evil that permeated the American "youth culture" and, by extension, young people in uniform was the illicit use of marijuana, hallucinogens, and "hard drugs" that had become widespread by the late 1960s. In 1970, American officials estimated that, in the U.S. Armed Services, there were 300 percent more personnel using drugs than the previous year. The Marine Corps was not immune, especially in Vietnam. In the 1st Marine Division, drug-related incidents numbered 831 in 1970, up from 417 the year before. Marine commanders believed that some 30 to 50 percent of their men had some involvement with drugs. Through the period of redeployment, the Marine Corps insisted on treating drug use as a violation of military law and was officially adamant against any amnesty. Because of the local situation, and a rash of drug incidents in late 1970, Gen Armstrong admitted that he deliberately contravened official policy and authorized a short-term plan which permitted those who, on their own initiative, requested treatment, to be kept out of the disciplinary system. Armstrong explained that he " . . . caught a good bit of static . . . [but] felt we had an operational problem; I took an operational solution at the time. It worked. . . ."

All of these problems—uncontrolled violence, racial tensions, and drug abuse—were symptomatic of the stresses that the long war had imposed upon the American people and their armed forces. The Marine Corps combated the dilution of its prewar elite status by reemphasis on military fundamentals together with adjustment for contemporary realities. Moreover, postwar strength reductions made possible the administrative discharge of "substandard" Marines. In any case, the Marine command in Vietnam, until its final withdrawal, continued to function at a high level of operational effectiveness. One Marine regimental commander paid tribute to his men by stating, "They really put it on the line, day in and day out. . . ."

Even at the height of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, Marine leadership looked for-
ward to the shape and direction of the postwar Corps. In July 1967, one Marine general remarked that after Vietnam "we seek optimum posture as a forward, ready amphibious force." Gen Krulak was even more emphatic. He declared:

I was the foremost proponent of reducing the size of the Marine Corps. . . . Only the Marine Corps sought actively to reduce . . . needless to say, we didn't run into any opposition from SecDef or his minions. They were delighted.

By being among the first to redeploy, the Marines escaped the worst manifestations of indiscipline and organizational breakdown that plagued the residual American forces in Vietnam in the early 1970s. Grasping early that the United States was disengaging from Vietnam, Marine leadership envisioned a postwar reemphasis on the Corps' statutory amphibious mission and maritime character. Testifying before Congress in early 1970, Gen Chapman said:

Our existing plans and programs are directed toward a hard, lean, fully combat ready and professional force with emphasis upon expertly trained and highly motivated personnel.

Chapman's successor, Gen Robert E. Cushman, argued that the Marine Corps had come out of Vietnam, "Tougher, and more resilient than ever and we are prepared to resume our role as this nation's amphibious ready force of combined arms."

Despite Cushman's brave words, after Vietnam there was no "public relations honeymoon" for the Marine Corps as there had been after previous wars. With the postwar emphasis on the defense of Europe and NATO commitments, the Marine Corps' mission and force structure were the subject of public examination and debate. Analysts within and outside the defense establishment questioned the continued validity of the amphibious assault. Throughout all this, the Marine Corps continued to define its primary mission in terms of service with the fleet and capability to project power ashore. Gen Louis H. Wilson, Cushman's successor as Commandant, observed that the Marine Corps commitment to NATO was couched in "maritime, rather than strictly continental terms."

The 1970s represented anything but smooth sailing for a Marine Corps involved in, among other things, a manpower crisis in recruiting and recruit training practices together with the effects of the all-volunteer force. The Marine Corps responded to these challenges with institutional strength and flexibility. These were rooted in decisions going back to the late 1960s to get out of Vietnam early and reaffirm the Corps' traditional value system and amphibious mission.

Was Vietnam an unsuccessful campaign from the Marine Corps' perspective? Arguably, it was not. When the call came to send American ground forces to Vietnam, the Marines were ready. They were the first U.S. ground forces committed to South Vietnam. From the beginning, the Marine Corps criticized the MACV "search and destroy" concept and implemented a strong pacification campaign based on coastal enclaves. By 1967, nevertheless, one Marine division was arrayed against the North Vietnamese in the sparsely populated DMZ area. Committed to fixed bases, such as Khe Sanh and Con Thien, and to constructing the "McNamara Wall," the Marines found themselves in an unaccustomed defensive role. With the defeat of the NVA forces in the DMZ in 1968 and 1969, Marine operations returned to their emphasis on the pacification campaign south of Da Nang. After four years of inconclusive combat, however, the United States began its disengagement from Vietnam. Marines were among the first to leave. By the time the last Marine forces redeployed in June 1971, pacification seemed to be working. The Da Nang area was relatively secure and the Viet Cong were quiescent. In a sense, as one Marine later wrote, "The U.S. forces were not defeated militarily, but a national policy failed."
"It was obvious that neither the air war, nor the ground war, nor the political war was going well. The original hope, that with Americans securing the major bases, the South Vietnamese could successfully carry the fight to the Viet Cong, was fast fading."

**Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1965-1966**

*Edwin H. Simmons*

*Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps*

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*Da Nang, March 1965. Elements of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade prepare to come ashore at Red Beach Two, beginning the commitment of U. S. ground combat forces in South Vietnam. Small craft, such as the LCU-1476, have been hard-worked ever since, in both amphibious assault and logistic support of the ground and air forces ashore.*
On 6 March 1965, the Pentagon announced that two battalions of Marines, some 3,500 men, were being sent to South Vietnam at the request of the government in Saigon, and that they would have the limited mission of strengthening security at Da Nang. The next day, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told a national television and radio audience that the Marines would shoot back if shot at, but that their mission was to put a tight security ring around the Da Nang air base, thus freeing South Vietnamese forces for combat.

These Marines were the first U. S. ground combat forces to be committed to the war. The 23,500 American servicemen already in Vietnam were called “advisers” although many of them were actually serving in combat support units, such as Marine and Army helicopter elements but two reinforced Marine infantry battalions, despite restraints placed on their employment, could only be viewed as “participants.” It was obvious that there had been a major change in policy. How had it come about?

In February 1965 our aircraft had begun to attack military targets in North Vietnam, not in tit-for-tat response to specific provocations, as in the past, but on a sustained basis. Many of the U. S. Air Force and South Vietnamese fighter-bombers making those attacks were based at Da Nang, whose airfield was vulnerable to retaliation to the kind of raid, perhaps, that had been made on Bien Hoa on 1 November 1964, when four Americans were killed, and 27 aircraft were destroyed or damaged; or on Pleiku on 7 February 1965, when eight Americans were killed, 80 wounded, and 20 aircraft were destroyed or damaged. The Viet Cong were credited with the capability of doing this and more to Da Nang. Intelligence reports showed 12 battalions 6,000 men, more or less within striking distance of the air base. Not until the threat to Da Nang was unmistakable did Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara recommend to the President that the Marines be landed.

On 7 March, the day Secretary Rusk made his broadcast, the Viet Cong probed the garrison town of Mieu Dong, three miles south of the Da Nang airfield. In Da Nang itself, all was quiet, but there was something of a feeling of being under siege. At sea, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade waited for orders to go in.

DA NANG LANDING

The northern arm of the Bay of Da Nang is formed by the Hai Van Mountains, a spur of the Annamite chain that comes out of the west, then drops precipitously from 1,192 meters down to the water’s edge. The southern arm of the bay ends in a bulbous fist made by the 621-meter Mon Ky (or Monkey) Mountain, once an island perhaps, but now an extension of the mainland, connected by a neck of sand. Except during the north-east monsoon, the bay is a good harbor one of the few protected, deep-water anchorages on the Vietnamese coast and, even in normal times, Da Nang was second only to Saigon in tonnage handled. It is the old French colonial city of Tourane, and from a distance looks colorful and exotic, but at closer range, you see that it is war-worn, shabby, and swollen with refugees and other newcomers who have doubled its population in the last five years, to its present estimated 200,000.

For some years, Marine Corps contingency plans had taken into account the possibility of Marines being used in this area, but contingency plans are prepared for many places and usually are closely held: not much is heard about them at the junior officer and troop level. However, there was reason for much more broadly-based familiarity with Da Nang, for it was the objective area in Marine Corps Schools’ Amphibious Warfare Study XVI. Prescience or coincidence? Perhaps both. Before World War II, from 1936 to 1940, Advanced Base Problems III, VI, and VII had used Palau, Guam, and Saipan as target areas.

The Nam O bridge carries Highway One, which is the old Mandarin Road, and the Trans-Vietnam Railway northwards across the Song Ca De. As recently as the summer of 1964, one could travel by rail, albeit dangerously and with a certain amount of forbearance on the part of the Viet Cong, 380 miles south from Da Nang to Saigon. But by March 1965, the railroad had been badly cut and, southwards from just below Da Nang, all the major bridges were down, and much of the track had been removed. It was still possible, although at some hazard, to go 50 miles north by rail: after crossing the Nam O bridge (which the Viet Cong did not destroy until April 1967), the line goes past the Esso terminal at Lien Chieu, hugs the front of the Hai Van promontory, burrows through many tunnels, comes out on the north side, then hurries across the open flatslands to the imperial city of Hue.

Highway One roughly parallels the railroad, but

The coast and operating area, Da Nang to Hai An. The coastal area south of Monkey Mountain is low, and sandy areas alternate with rice paddies. Roads are unimpressive. For example, below Marble Mountain the road paralleling the coast is a rutted dirt passage, similar to that shown on page 16, degenerating at times into sand.
chooses to zig-zag up over the Hai Van Mountains, through the pass the French called, with reason, “Col des Nuages” (Pass of the Clouds). At Da Nang, the monsoon season is the reverse of what it is in the rest of South Vietnam: the summer is hot and fairly dry; the winter is warm and wet. By March, the drenching rains have passed, but the prevailing wind is still from the northeast, coming down from China across the South China Sea. There is an endemic condition in the spring months called “le crachin”, when the clouds pile up on the mountains and the lowlands are filled with a drizzling mist.

**Across the Beach**

On the morning of 8 March 1965, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch) had been at sea for two months. Early that day, Commodore Henry Suerstedt, Commander Task Group 76.7, brought his three ships—USS *Union* (AKA-106), USS *Vancouver* (LPD-2), and USS *Henrico* (APA-45)—into Da Nang Bay. The ships took station 4,000 yards off Red Beach Two. Commander Amphibious Task Force and CTF 76, Rear Admiral Don W. Wulzen, was on hand in the USS *Mount McKinley* (AGC-7). The beach is a fine, curving strip of sand the color and feel of raw sugar, just north of Da Nang and south of the Nam O bridge. The skies were gray and sullen, and a stiff wind from the northeast was roughening the water. Sea conditions were such that H-hour, scheduled for 0800 local time, had to be delayed an hour.

The surf was still running five feet or more when the first wave of Battalion Landing Team 3/9 (Lieutenant Colonel Bertram E. Cook, Jr.) crossed the beach at 0902. By 0918, all scheduled waves were ashore, and general unloading began. The area had been thoroughly swept by two Vietnamese battalions, and there was air cover. While 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, did not expect the beach to be defended, neither did they expect quite the reception they received: an elaborate official welcome, including a group of giggling Vietnamese girls who proceeded to decorate the leading edge of the landing force, including General Karch, with garlands of red and yellow flowers.

Battalion Landing Team 3/9 had been the Special Landing Force of the Seventh Fleet. The other BLT of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, BLT 1/3 (Lieutenant Colonel Herbert J. Bain), was airlifted to Da Nang from Okinawa aboard the USS *Vancouver*. BLT 3/9 arrived. HMM-365, now aboard the USS *Princeston* (LPH-5), flew in its Sikorsky UH-34Ds and turned them over to HMM-162 (Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Curtis), whose officers and men were arriving from Okinawa by airlift.

Also already on the crowded airfield were two Hawk batteries of the 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Bertram E. Cook, Jr.), which had been ordered forward from Okinawa on 7 February. Now, with enough Marine infantry ashore to provide security, better positions for the missiles could be found in the surrounding hills.

**Defense of the Airfield**

General Westmoreland, ComUSMACV, was emphatic that the overall responsibility for the defense of the Da Nang area should remain with the Vietnamese. The specific mission assigned to 9th MEB was to reinforce the defenses of Da Nang air base and of such other installations agreed upon with General Nguyen Chanh Thi, Commanding General I Corps and I Corps Tactical Zone. (General Thi’s rank at this time was actually brigadier general. In the Vietnamese service this carried the insignia of two stars, there being another one-star rank, that of sub-brigadier general. Later Thi was promoted to major general with three stars. Finally, in the winter of 1965 the Vietnamese government brought the titles into consonance with the stars—and U. S. practise—and Thi became a lieutenant general.)

Besides its shared responsibility for the close-in security of the airfield, 9th MEB was given the task of defending about eight thinly-populated square miles of high ground just west of the field, and the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, moved toward that area early on 10 March. Company I climbed Hill 327 (327 meters or about 1,073 feet), the dominant terrain feature, named it “the hungry i” after themselves and a San Francisco night
club, and began to dig in. Company K took over Hill 268, which was lower and farther to the north, while, behind them, the engineers began cutting a road. As soon as the road was ready, a Hawk battery was to move up from the airfield to a better firing position.

These moves put the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, in classic position for defense of the airfield against an attack by a conventional enemy but, unfortunately, contributed little to its defense against the usual Viet Cong pattern of guerrilla action: mortar attack, infiltration, and demolitions. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, remained on the airfield to secure it against those forms of attack.

**Security**

In a few years, the field had grown from a provincial airport to a major air base, a heterogeneous collection of activities—some military, some civilian, some Vietnamese, some American—clustered around a single 10,000-foot concrete runway, oriented just a little west of due north and south. On the east side of the field were Vietnamese and U. S. Air Force operations, most of the hangars and shops, the terminal of Air Vietnam, and the Vietnamese dependents' housing, which blurred into the city of Da Nang. Off the north end of the runway there was a narrow stretch of paddy, then the beach and the bay. On the west side were the Marine helicopter units, headquartered and billeted in a complex of crumbling old French barracks. Mixed in with them were a South Vietnamese armored outfit and bits and pieces of other Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units. Just beyond the wire on the west side, where Highway One and the railroad run north and south, there had mushroomed what the Americans called "Dog Patch"—an aggregation of bars, laundries, tailors, photographers, and souvenir shops.

South of the field was the more rural Hoa Vang district, about a mile of it, and then the Song Cau Do River which flows from southwest to northeast. The Phong Le bridge carried the tracks of the railroad and alternate Route One across this river. A mile farther downstream was the Cam Le bridge. Except for a narrow strip along Highway One, the territory south of the river was pure Viet Cong, and aircraft approaching Da Nang had to run a spiteful gauntlet of fire from Viet Cong small arms.

The perimeter enclosing the air base had grown since the time of the French. It consisted of a ring of dilapidated, concrete blockhouses, interspersed with spidery, steel watchtowers, a perimeter lighting system of unreliable performance, and belts of rusting barbed wire hung, here and there, with triangular tin signs marking minefields left by some previous defender. Pressing close to the wire was a rabbit warren of Vietnamese dwellings, some substantial but most made of tin, thatch, and cardboard. Just before the Marines arrived, it was decreed that this warren must be cleared out to a depth of 400 meters, so that a kind of *cordon sanitaire* could be established around the base, but this involved relocating some 7,000 persons and would take months to do.

From this confused, congested field, virtually every kind of tactical and transport aircraft in the U. S. inventory was being operated. With all these tempting, soft-skinned targets available to the VC, it was chilling to the Marine defenders to realize that just beyond the wire and within mortar range, there lived some 250,000 Vietnamese of varying political inclinations.

**I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE**

Beyond Da Nang, there was the larger problem of the I Corps Tactical Zone, which is both a military zone and a political region. I Corps is the northernmost of the four Vietnamese corps areas and it includes five provinces—Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. Its northern boundary is the frontier with North Vietnam; the demarcation line, usually given as the 17th parallel, is actually a river, the Song Ben Hai, as far as the hamlet of Bo Ho Su, then, a straight line running west to where the boundaries of Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam come together. The western border, shared with Laos, is the ridgeline of the Annamite Mountains. These mountains run some 750 miles southeastward out of China and average, along this stretch, 5,000 feet, but there are peaks that go up at least 8,500 feet (and some say 10,500 feet). It is these mountains that cause the reversal of the monsoon seasons. To the south, a spur of the Annamites runs down to the sea near Sa Huynh and forms the southern boundary of the I Corps area. From Sa Huynh north to the mouth of the Song Ben Hai is some 225 miles. The country is very slender here, varying from at most 70 miles in width to as little as 30. There are about 10,000 square miles in the I Corps Tactical Zone, something less than one-sixth the total area of South Vietnam.

The coastline is a series of promontories, sandy beaches, and minor deltas formed by the rivers that have their beginnings in the Annamites. The roads leading to the interior follow the valleys of these rivers and the most notable are Route 9, which moves west from...
Dong Ha in the north across into Laos; and Route 14, which appears on maps in this book and in those of the Army Engineers as Route 4. Route 14, which begins at Hoi An, below Da Nang, bends west into the mountains, then drops south to Kontum, Pleiku, and beyond.

Not only is the I Corps area physically separated from the rest of South Vietnam, it is also culturally and historically somewhat different. Southwest of the Annamites is old Cochin China. The I Corps area is part of the Central Lowlands and old Annam.

In 1965 it was estimated that 2.6 million persons lived in the I Corps area (as compared to 16.5 million for all of South Vietnam). Up in the hills, there was a scattering of montagnards subsisting mainly on hunting, fishing, and slash farming, and in the towns and cities there were some Chinese, Indians, and others—mostly shopkeepers—but at least 85 per cent of the population was ethnically Vietnamese. Most of them lived along the coast and in the little alluvial valleys tucked between the knuckles of the mountains. The rural Vietnamese
tend to cluster together in hamlets—isolated houses are few, as are large towns—and most of them are either commercial fishermen or rice farmers. Nearly half a million tons of rice are produced annually in the five northern provinces.

Hamlets are the basic community unit. The next larger political unit is the village. (The term “village” is somewhat misleading; it is applied to a community more comparable to a township than to what we think of as a village.) Traditionally, the hamlets and villages have had a large degree of self-government and an old proverb says that the Emperor’s law stops at the village gate. The villages are combined into districts, which are comparable to U. S. counties and are about the first level where the central government makes itself felt; districts, in turn, are the major divisions of the provinces.

I Corps’ military boundaries followed the political boundaries. The tactical area of the 1st Division consisted of the two northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. Its commander was Brigadier General Nguyen Van Chuan, an able and professional soldier, whose headquarters were at Hue. Although these two provinces are closest to the North Vietnamese border, conditions were measurably better in them than in the rest of I Corps area.

The tactical area of the 2d Division consisted of the two southern provinces of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. This division was commanded by Brigadier General Hoang Xuan Lam, whose headquarters were at Quang Ngai city, and who was to outlast both Thi and Chuan.

By an arrangement formalized in September 1965, Quang Nam, the center province, was treated as a special sector, and garrisoned by the 51st Regiment, under the command of diminutive, dependable Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Thi Lap, and by a number of separate battalions. Government troops controlled the city of Da Nang, Hoi An, the capital of Quang Nam Province, and very little else except for beleaguered district headquarters, whose garrisons were immobilized because the VC were roaming almost at will throughout the province.

Corps headquarters occupied a handsome French colonial compound just east of the airfield at Da Nang. It took no great imagination to hear the ghostly bugles of the French Expeditionary Corps sounding through the galleried, two-story buildings, freshly painted yellow with red-brown trim.

Besides commanding the 1 Corps, General Thi, controversial even then, was government representative, that is to say, military governor of the region. In Saigon, they called Thi the “Warlord of the North.” Native to the region, having been born near Hue, he was then 42 years old. He had fought for the French in World War II, had been captured by the Japanese, and had escaped. Under Ngo Dinh Diem he had commanded the Airborne Brigade, and his favorite uniform was still the red beret and the purple-and-green camouflaged utilities of the paratroops. A ringleader in the 1960 attempted coup against Diem, he had gotten away to Cambodia, where he remained three years in exile. After Diem’s demise he returned eventually to become commanding general of the 1st Division. General Nguyen Khanh was then CG I Corps. After Khanh became premier, Thi moved up to corps commander and, later, was one of the leaders who combined to force Khanh out of the government.

I Corps was authorized about 30,000 ARVN troops—regulars—of whom about 25,000 were present for duty, and 18,500 of the Regional Forces, of whom about 12,000 were present for duty. The latter were lightly armed provincial troops, and, at this time, they had no formation larger than a company. Also on the rolls were some 23,000 of an authorized 29,000 Popular Forces—the local militia, used in squad- and platoon-sized security forces for the hamlets and villages.

Two chains of command extended down from General Thi, one military, the other political. The military chain, of course, passed through his division and special sector commanders. The political chain passed through the provincial chiefs, who were appointed by Saigon, presumably on the recommendation and with the concurrence of Thi. It was not easy to find civilians qualified and willing to serve as chiefs of the provinces; hence, most of the chiefs were military, generally in the rank of lieutenant colonel. Next below the province chiefs were the district chiefs and they, perhaps without exception, were Army officers, usually in the grade of captain, sometimes of lieutenant.

Typically, the district headquarters was the remnant of an old French fort, surrounded by mud and bamboo breastworks, usually triangular or square in outline with a bastion at each corner, reminiscent of Vauban and the seventeenth century. These little forts were garrisoned with, perhaps, a company of Regional Forces, a platoon or so of Popular Forces, and, if they were very fortunate, a section of 105-mm. howitzers with regular
ARVN gunners. Dozens of these outposts were scattered throughout I Corps. Most often each controlled the ground within rifle shot of its fort, but very little more.

MOVE TO PHU BAI

The landing of the 9th MEB had brought the strength of the Marines in the Da Nang area up to about 5,000 men. On 11 April, BLT 2/3 (Lieutenant Colonel David A. Clement) which had been on Jungle Drum III, a combined counterinsurgency exercise in Thailand, off-loaded across Red Beach Two under a blazing sun, in contrast to the conditions when 3/9 had landed the month before.

The next day, a reinforced company from 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, was sent by helo 42 miles north to Phu Bai where, seven miles southeast of Hue, there was an airport and an important communications facility. On 14 April, after BLT 3/4 (Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Jones) had arrived from Hawaii, the Marines moved into the Hue-Phu Bai area in strength.

Hue, halfway between Da Nang and the demarcation line, has a population of about 100,000, which makes it South Vietnam’s third largest city. It is on the River of Perfumes, picturesquely named, but not suitable for oceangoing shipping. It has no industry to speak of, but it has other values. For two centuries Hue was the imperial capital; there are the royal palace, the ancient tombs, the old citadel built by the French. Even the Viet Cong view the city with respect, and it has been remarkably free from physical depredations. There is, however, a mutual antipathy between Hue and Saigon. Hue is Annam, and Saigon is Cochin China. Hue remembers that when it was at the height of its imperial splendor, Saigon was still a fishing village. The militant Buddhists are strong in Hue, which is also the seat of the University, and in recent years the city has often been the starting point for political disaffection.

Meanwhile, on 10 April, VMFA-531 (Lieutenant Colonel William C. McGraw, Jr.) began arriving at Da Nang. Its F-4Bs (McDonnell “Phantom IIs”) were the first fixed-wing Marine tactical aircraft to be shore-based in Vietnam.

ACTIVATION OF III MAF

On 3 May, Major General William R. Collins, CG, 3d Marine Division, arrived at Da Nang with a small advance party. Three days after his arrival, 9th MEB was deactivated and the III Marine Expeditionary Force was established, along with 3d Marine Division (Forward). Ground elements were under 3d Marines (Colonel Edwin B. Wheeler); aviation elements under Marine Aircraft Group 16 (Colonel John H. King, Jr.).

The next day, 7 May, the designation III Marine Expeditionary Force was changed to III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). The change came about in this way: there had been one or two back-page news stories, datelined Saigon, pointing out that the word “Expeditionary” in 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was not apt to be popular with the Vietnamese, as it might call up memories of the French Expeditionary Corps. ComUSMACV asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give the III Marine Expeditionary Force a more neutral name. The JCS agreed but noted that designation of units was a service prerogative. Accordingly, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, looked over a list of possible designations. “III Marine Amphibious Corps” was a popular contender because of its famous World War II antecedents, but it was pointed out that, even though the Vietnamese used the word “Corps” to designate their own units, they might find it offensive as a U. S. designation. Thus, “III Marine Amphibious Force” was chosen.

Meanwhile, the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which equally suddenly had its designation changed to 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade, was approaching the coast of South Vietnam.

Chu Lai Landing

On 10 March, the 6,000-man 1st Marine Brigade, based at Kaneohe and commanded by the Marine Corps’ first air ace, Brigadier General Marion E. Carl, began loading out at Pearl Harbor aboard shipping that had arrived in February to lift the Brigade to California where it was to take part in Exercise Silver Lance. The Brigade’s participation in the exercise was cancelled and the shipping held over: its destination was not California but Okinawa.

The Brigade, which included the 4th Marines (Colonel Edward P. Dupras, Jr.) and Marine Aircraft Group 13 (Colonel Ralph H. Spanjer), represented about one-third of the 3d Marine Division plus supporting aviation from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. First elements sailed on 11 March, arriving at Okinawa on 19 March. Mean-

The fighting area, from just north of Da Nang to just south of Quang Ngai. The many scattered villages, divided into tiny hamlets, are where the war against the Viet Cong must be won. Route 4 on the maps in this book, and Route 14, discussed by General Simmons, are identical.
while, on 14 March, the 3d MEB, General Carl commanding, was activated.

At 0800 local time on 7 May, 3d MEB made an unopposed landing at Chu Lai, a bare stretch of beach 55 miles southeast of Da Nang. The amphibious task force was again under Rear Admiral Wulzen, and the troop list included RLT-4 with BLTs 1/4 and 2/4, and HMM-161 (Lieutenant Colonel Gene W. Morrison). Other air support was provided by MAG-16 based at Da Nang. The troops of the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. Fredericks) and of the 2d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Fisher) noted that the sand and pine trees were markedly similar to those on the beaches of North Carolina, but even the August heat of Camp Lejeune's pine barrens could not match the May temperatures of Chu Lai.

On 12 May, a third BLT, built around 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William D. Hall) came ashore. This ended the amphibious operation; the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade was dissolved and its parts were absorbed into III Marine Amphibious Force.

The immediate purpose of the landing was to secure the ground needed for an expeditionary airfield which could relieve some of the congestion at Da Nang. Seabees of NMCB-10 and Marine engineers went to work on the airfield site on 9 May. The deadline for the beginning of flight operations was 1 June. Some, but not all, of the difficulties in putting in a strip at Chu Lai
The fighting area, from just north of Da Nang to the DMZ. Toward the end of 1966, the center of gravity of the fighting in I Corps Tactical Zone moved into this section and ever since, the fighting here has been fierce.

had been foreseen. It was no surprise that the sand was bottomless, but the locally available laterite (a red clay made up of aluminum and iron oxides) did not live up to expectations as a stabilizer.

Nevertheless, the deadline was met. The field was officially opened at 0800 on 1 June when eight A-4 “Skyhawks” arrived from Cubi Point in the Philippines. The first plane was piloted by Colonel John D. Noble, commander of MAG-12, which was to operate from the field. The “Skyhawks” were from VMA-223 (Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Baker) and VMA-311 (Lieutenant Colonel Bernard J. Stender). At 1329 on the same day, the first combat strike was flown when four A-4s were launched in support of the ARVN against targets seven miles southwest of Chu Lai. A third attack squadron, VMA-214 (Lieutenant Colonel Keith O’Keefe) arrived shortly thereafter.

New Commanders

General Westmoreland visited III MAF on 8 May and, besides seeing what the Marines were doing, he gave Major General Collins his concept of future operations: for the time being, the Marines were to continue with their defensive mission, consolidating and developing their base areas, which were now three—Da Nang, Hue/Phu Bai, and Chu Lai; then, when authorized, III MAF would be permitted to undertake limited offensive operations directly related to the defense of their bases; finally, it could be expected that a stage would be reached where III MAF would engage in more extensive offensive operations, if CG I Corps requested it to do so.

On 11 May Major General Paul J. Fontana arrived from Iwakuni, and established the headquarters of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Advanced) at Da Nang.

Something else that happened on 11 May was to have lasting consequences. Three companies of 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, searched and cleared Le My hamlet complex, eight miles northwest of Da Nang air base. Four hundred civilians were liberated from Viet Cong control, and a pilot model civic action program was begun.

Both General Fontana and General Collins were completing their Far East tours. On 24 May Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon assumed command of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Advanced), and on 30 May Major General Lewis W. Walt arrived to be the new Commanding General, III MAF, and CG, 3d Marine Division. General Collins was relieved officially at 0900, 4 June. Having been promoted on 10 May, just before he left Washington for Vietnam, Walt was the junior major general in the Corps. For the three years immediately before this assignment he had been the Director, Landing Force Development Center, Quantico.

As CG III MAF, General Walt was both a commander of a subordinate command and a component commander. As ComUSMACV, General Westmoreland exercised operational command over all forces assigned or attached to MACV, including III MAF. MACV, in turn, was a subordinate unified command under CinCPac. The commanding general of III MAF was also Naval Component Commander by virtue of United Actions Armed Forces (UNAAF), which says: “the Senior officer of each service assigned to a unified command and qualified for command by the regulations of his own service is the commander of the component of his service unless another officer is so designated by competent authority.”

In this dual capacity, General Walt’s position was comparable to those of General Westmoreland and Lieutenant General Joseph H. Moore. In addition to being ComUSMACV, Westmoreland was the Army Component Commander (Commanding General, U. S. Army Vietnam), while Moore was Commander, 2d Air Division, and Air Force Component Commander.

Naval Component Command functions in support of MACV were under the direction of CinCPacFlt. Of greatest pertinence at this time, was the responsibility of the Navy to provide logistic support to U. S. forces operating north of Quang Ngai, that is, in I Corps Tactical Zone. At first, the tasks of operating port facilities, unloading and moving cargo, and operating supply depots were performed by provisional elements of the Seventh Fleet and by III MAF. On 21 July 1965, Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, was established to discharge these responsibilities. Naval construction effort had earlier been consolidated under the 30th Naval Construction Regiment.

(General Walt remained Naval Component Commander until 1 April 1966 when Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward, until then Chief of the Naval Advisory Group, MACV, was named Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. This expanded responsibility for Admiral Ward represented a consolidation of all Navy activities in Vietnam, including the Naval Advisory Group, Naval Support Activity, 30th Naval Construction Regiment,
and Task Forces 115 (coastal patrol) and 116 (river patrol). The III MAF, however, was specifically exempted from the command of U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam.)

The III Marine Amphibious Force was, of course, a part of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; hence military command, other than operational control, remained with CG FMFPac.

General Moore, in addition to being Commander, 2d Air Division (later Seventh Air Force), was also Deputy ComUSMACV for air operations. There was, therefore, a special relationship between General Moore and General McCutcheon, who as CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, was also Tactical Air Commander and Deputy CG III MAF.

Two separate air wars were being fought in Vietnam. The “in-country” war, or that limited to South Vietnam, was being directed by General Moore. The Tactical Air Control System (TACS) was almost identical with that used in Korea, except that greater use was being made of airborne Forward Air Controllers (FACs). The system included a joint operations center (JOC) and a joint tactical air control center (TACC), manned by both Americans and Vietnamese, in Saigon, and direct air support centers (DASCs) in each of the Corps areas.

Allowance was made for the fact that III MAF operated its own integrated system in support of Marine ground operations, which had first priority. Marine aircraft not needed for these missions were made available for support of other forces and were fitted into the country-wide control system in exactly the same manner as U. S. Air Force aircraft.

Marine aircraft were also made available for the “out-of-country” war. These operations were not controlled by General Westmoreland or General Moore—although they might suggest targets—but by Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, CinCPac.

EXPANDING MISSIONS

On 30 May, with III MAF barely established, I Corps got its worst beating of the year. It happened along Route 5 which goes west from Quang Ngai parallel to the Song Tra Kuc. The 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment, was ambushed by the Viet Cong in a little hamlet a short distance from its base at Bu Gia. Of the 400 men in the battalion, only three U. S. advisers and 65 South Vietnamese soldiers broke through. General Thi committed his last available reserves: one Ranger and one Vietnamese Marine battalion. In the confused fighting that followed, the 39th Rangers lost 108 men. General Thi, estimating his adversaries at five battalions, asked Saigon for two Vietnamese airborne battalions and the help of a U. S. Marine battalion. He got neither of those, but he did get Marine helolift and extensive close air support from VMFA-531. The fighting subsided, and friendly losses were counted at 392 killed and missing: 446 rifles and carbines, 90 crew-served weapons lost; it was claimed that 556 Viet Cong were killed and 20 weapons captured. A disaster had been averted, but the question had been raised: under what circumstances would U. S. combat troops go to the aid of the South Vietnamese?

By this time, the first week in June, after three months of defensive operations, the Marines had suffered nearly 200 casualties, including 18 killed in action. It had become increasingly apparent that they (and farther south, at Bien Hoa, near Saigon, the newly-arrived 173d Airborne Brigade) were engaged in more than static defense. As early as 28 April, during a visit to Da Nang, the Commandant of the Marine Corps had told the press that the Marines were not in Vietnam “to sit on their ditty boxes;” they were there to “kill Viet Cong.”

In Washington, the press asked the State Department to redefine the U. S. military role in Vietnam. On 5 June, Robert J. McCloskey, speaking for the State Department, and indicating his statement had the approval of highest departmental officials, said:

“As you know, American troops have been sent to South Vietnam recently with the mission of protecting key installations there. In establishing and patrolling their defense perimeters, they come into contact with the Viet Cong and at times are fired upon. Our troops naturally return the fire

“It should come as no surprise therefore that our troops engage in combat in these and similar circumstances. But let me emphasize that the Vietnamese Government forces are carrying the brunt of combat operations. Those United States forces assigned as advisers to the armed forces of Vietnam remain in that capacity.”

At that time, of the 51,000 American servicemen in Vietnam, some 16,500 Marines and 3,500 Army Airborne troopers had “defensive” missions; the rest might be said to be in an “advisory capacity.”

Meanwhile, Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor was in Washington for consultations. His resignation and replacement by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge were in prospect, but had not as yet been announced. President Johnson met with Taylor and his top political and military advisers. A meeting of the National Security Council, in itself a rare event, was held. It was obvious
that neither the air war, nor the ground war, nor the political war was going well. The original hope, that with Americans securing the major bases, the South Vietnamese could successfully carry the fight to the Viet Cong, was fast fading. With the coming of the summer monsoon (not in I Corps, but on the other side of the Annamites), various advantages would accrue to the Viet Cong. There was great concern over the Pleiku-Kontum area in the Central Highlands, where there were as yet no U. S. combat troops. There was talk now of the eventual commitment of 300,000, even 500,000, U. S. troops to Vietnam.

On 8 June the State Department issued a statement which was widely construed to mean that, in recent weeks, President Johnson had given General Westmoreland authority to order U. S. ground forces into offensive combat. On 9 June the White House came out with a statement which partially contradicted and partially confirmed the previous day’s release. It said in part:

“...There has been no change in the mission of United States ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to General Westmoreland recently or at any other time. The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the air base at Da Nang. They have the associated mission of...patrolling and securing actions in and near the areas thus safeguarded.

“If help is requested by the appropriate Vietnamese commander, General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available and when, in his judgment, the general military situation urgently requires it.”

The above statement was, of course, consistent with the instructions given by General Westmoreland to General Collins, and later repeated to General Walt.

“Army” Versus “Marine” Strategy

By this time, two supposedly conflicting “strategies” were being debated in the press. One strategy emphasized mobile operations: not only should U. S. troops go to the rescue of beleaguered SVN forces, but there should also be U. S. “search and destroy” operations, actively and aggressively seeking out the Viet Cong. The other, labeled the “ink-blot” strategy, held that U. S. forces should establish secure “coastal enclaves,” such as Da Nang, and from these gradually reach out, in carefully conducted “clear and hold” operations.

The first strategy became known as the “Army” strategy, and the second as the “Marine” strategy. Each had its vociferous advocates who failed to see that the two strategies were not necessarily mutually exclusive. There were some critics who said that the Marines had become cautious and defensive-minded. It is true that at this time General Walt regarded the defense of Da Nang air base as his first and most important mission since the orders he had received so stated.

On 17 June, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Verle E. Ludwig) landed at Da Nang and assumed responsibility for the close-in security of the air base, relieving 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Now at the end of its Western Pacific tour under the “transplacement” system then in effect, BLT 3/9 sailed for Okinawa, where its colors and unit designation would be transferred to a new BLT arriving from the States.

Just before dawn on 1 July the almost inevitable happened. A Viet Cong demolitions squad got through the barbed wire and onto the flight line on the east side of the runway and hit the south end of the field with mortar fire. Explosives and 57-mm. recoilless rifle fire destroyed two C-130s and one F-102, and damaged one C-130 and two F-102s. One U. S. Air Force airman was killed, and three Marines wounded.

The raiders had made their approach through the thickly populated area south and east of the field, an area where the ARVN was responsible for security. Up to the time of the 1 July attack, General Thi had been reluctant to permit Marines to operate in heavily populated areas. After it, however, and at least partly as a result of it, it was agreed that the Marine area of responsibility should be expanded southward and eastward. The headquarters of the 9th Marines (Colonel Frank E. Garretson) and 2d Battalion, 9th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel George R. Scharnberg) landed at Da Nang on 6 July and moved immediately to the south of the airfield, giving some depth to the defenses.

In July a Provisional Base Defense Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel William H. Clark) was formed by drawing on the personnel of the support and service units. Admittedly, this was a short-term measure which, if extended too long, would work to the detriment of the parent units, but it did provide manpower for the airfield perimeter. These measures helped, but did not solve all the problems of close-in security for the field.

Landing at Qui Nhon

In II Corps Tactical Zone, the military situation remained tenuous. About the middle of June General
Westmoreland had asked General Walt to be prepared to deploy two Marine battalions to the Pleiku-Kontum area, if required, but the port of Qui Nhon presented a more immediate problem. There was an airfield there, and a substantial start had been made on creating an Army logistics base. Furthermore, at Qui Nhon, Route 19 strikes off at right angles from Route 1 and goes up through An Khe to Pleiku. Qui Nhon had to be held secure until Army troops could arrive.

On 1 July, the Seventh Fleet’s Special Landing Force, then BLT 3/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Bodley), supported by HMM-163, went ashore at Qui Nhon. On 7 July, BLT 2/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter) landed and relieved BLT 3/7 which, the next day, went back aboard its shipping and reconstituted the SLF. Thus, 175 miles south of Da Nang and in II Corps area, a fourth Marine “coastal enclave” was created.

FACT-FINDING AND PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS

On 8 July President Johnson formally nominated Henry Cabot Lodge to resume his post as Ambassador to Vietnam in place of Maxwell D. Taylor, who had submitted his letter of resignation. Defense Secretary McNamara announced that he and Lodge would leave shortly for Vietnam to meet with Ambassador Taylor and to bring their impressions up to date. This would be McNamara’s sixth fact-finding trip to Vietnam. They arrived in Saigon on 16 July, and on 18 July visited I Corps and III MAF. The party included Ambassador Taylor, Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, General Earle G. Wheeler, General Westmoreland, Assistant Defense Secretaries John T. McNaughton and Arthur Sylvester, and others of almost equal rank.

“The over-all situation continues to be serious,” said McNamara in Saigon before he left for Washington. “In many respects it has deteriorated since 15 months ago, when I was last here.”

Six hours after McNamara’s return to Washington on 21 July, President Johnson and his chief advisers began a series of discussions designed to hammer out major decisions about U. S. military, political, and economic involvement in Vietnam.

After eight days of intensive review, President Johnson on 28 July outlined his decisions in a nationally televised press conference. U. S. military strength in Vietnam would be increased from 75,000 to 125,000 “almost immediately.” (The 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile) was then in process of loading out from Gulf Coast and southern East Coast ports.) The reserves would not be called up. Instead, the draft would be doubled from 17,000 to 35,000 each month, and voluntary enlistment programs would be intensified. After the build-up reached 125,000, additional forces would be sent to Vietnam as required.

Marine Manpower

Up to this point, the Marine Corps had supported the deployment of 25,000 Marines to Vietnam without increasing its authorized strength. The Corps had begun fiscal year 1965 with 190,000 Marines authorized, and as a step toward a pre-Vietnam goal of 206,000, an increase of 3,100 had been programmed and approved. So, at the time of the President’s decisions, its authorized strength was 193,100.

Activation of the Organized Reserve would have given the Marine Corps an almost completely manned and trained 4th Marine Division and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. But the Reserves were not to be called up. (As Secretary McNamara explained to the House Armed Services Committee, the call-up of the Reserves had been considered but rejected, because it was anticipated that operations in Vietnam would be drawn out and the Reserves would be a wasting asset if called up on a short-term basis under the President’s emergency authority.) Further complications were that involuntary extensions of enlistment were limited to four months (and were to be terminated entirely by October 1966),
and that most of the junior officers were Reserves who, on completing their obligated service, went home.

In peacetime, replacements to the Western Pacific were built around a "transplacement" system. This was essentially a rotation, on a 13-month cycle, of infantry battalions and aircraft squadrons between the West Coast and the Western Pacific. It was decided that the transplacement of infantry battalions would cease after the deployment of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, in September 1965. Rotation of aircraft squadrons would be limited in the future to squadrons introducing new types of aircraft and the return of squadrons with older aircraft.

Cancelling transplacement made it necessary to "homogenize" the carefully "stabilized" battalions and squadrons. Otherwise, everyone in a unit having the same rotation date would have resulted in unacceptable peaks and valleys of experience. This smoothing-out process, nicknamed Operation Mixmaster, which involved the inter-unit transfer of thousands of Marines, took place over the next several months.

While there would be no more rotation of units between the West Coast and the Western Pacific, there would be a limited rotation of units between Vietnam and the Western Pacific reserve based on Okinawa (and some air units in Japan), and it would be possible to maintain the 13-month tour for individual Marines.

In August 1965, as a direct consequence of the President's decisions, an increase of 30,000 Marines (to 223,100) was authorized. This would provide three new battalions (communications, engineer, and military police) and two helicopter training squadrons. It was hoped that it would also permit the manning levels of deployed units to be brought up to full strength, and a bit to be added to the training base and personnel pipeline. Also authorized were an additional 2,500 spaces for the Organized Reserve (to a total of 48,000).

**FOUR REGIMENTS**

On 14 August the headquarters of the 7th Marines (Colonel Oscar F. Peatross) and BLT 1/7 (Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kelly) came ashore at Chu Lai. The 7th Marines, a 1st Marine Division regiment which had departed Camp Pendleton on 24 May, was now fully committed to Vietnam. Other 1st Marine Division units were on the way. Battalion Landing Team 2/1 was scheduled to become the SLF. In the middle of July, BLT 1/5 had moved to Kaneohe, where it had become the major ground element of the reconstituted 1st Marine Brigade. On 16 August the headquarters of the 1st Marine Division left Camp Pendleton, and on 24 August Major General Lewis J. Fields, the division commanding general, opened his forward command post at Camp Courtney, Okinawa, assuming also the responsibilities of Commander Task Force 79.

The posture of III MAF's infantry regiments, which would remain essentially unchanged from mid-August until the end of the year, was as follows:

- 3d Marines, with its 1st and 2d Battalions, was west and north of Da Nang air base. 3d Marines also had under its operational and administrative command the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, stationed at Phu Bai.
- 9th Marines, with its 2d Battalion, was south of Da Nang, as was part of the 1st Battalion. The rest of the 1st Battalion was on the airfield itself. A new BLT 3/9 (Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Tunnel), one of the last "transplaced" battalions, arrived at Da Nang on 15 August.
- 4th Marines, with its 1st and 2d Battalions, and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, was at Chu Lai.
- 7th Marines, with its 1st Battalion, was also at Chu Lai. Its 2d Battalion was at Qui Nhon (now under operational control of Army's Task Force Alpha) and the 3d Battalion was at sea as the SLF.

**FOUR MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUPS**

MAG-16, the veteran helicopter group, was at Da Nang air base, getting ready to move across the Tourane River to the new helicopter and light plane facility, originally called Da Nang East but later renamed, more solemnly, Marble Mountain Air Facility. One medium squadron was kept at Phu Bai in support of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines.

MAG-11 had come into country on 7 July and had taken over the fighter-bomber squadrons operating from Da Nang.

MAG-12 with its attack squadrons was at Chu Lai.

MAG-36, another helicopter group, was scheduled to come into Chu Lai on 1 September. One squadron was with 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Qui Nhon.

**COORDINATING WITH I CORPS**

On 30 July General Westmoreland paid General Walt a visit of more than routine interest. CG III MAF, said ComUSMACV, was to have operational control of all U. S. ground elements in the I Corps Tactical Zone; most notably, he would have operational control of the I Corps Advisory Group. This would provide an effective bridge between U. S. combat forces and the
advisory effort. General Westmoreland also told General Walt that he had a "free hand" in the conduct of operations in I CTZ, and he expected Walt, in coordination with General Thi, to undertake larger offensive operations at greater distances from base areas.

General Walt reminded ComUSMACV that III MAF was still bound by the letter of instruction issued early in May; that the restraints were such that operations beyond base areas were essentially limited to "reserve reaction" forces, a kind of rescue operation to be conducted if and when South Vietnamese forces were in serious trouble. General Westmoreland said these restraints were no longer realistic, and invited General Walt to rewrite the instructions, working into them the authority he thought he needed, and promised his approval.

On 3 August, General Walt, by formal message, advised General Westmoreland that III MAF stood ready to undertake offensive operations. On 6 August, ComUSMACV granted authority for such undertakings, and designated General Walt as Senior Adviser, I Corps.

Colonel Howard B. St. Clair, U. S. Army, was re-designated Deputy Senior Adviser and continued as Commanding Officer, I Corps Advisory Group. This group was essentially a U. S. Army unit, although there were some 60 U. S. Marines and about an equal number of Australians serving as advisers.

Guidelines provided by General Westmoreland emphasized integration of Vietnamese and U. S. effort. A prime problem, however, was that there was no jointure of U. S. and Vietnamese command at any level. Without some kind of unity of command, how could two separate, distinct military structures, each of corps size, operate in the same corps area? Part of the answer was the designation of Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR). In these TAORs, which radiated out from Marine bases, III MAF had primary (but not absolute) tactical responsibility and could conduct operations with a minimum of coordination with I Corps.

Various factors affected extension of these TAORs:

First, General Thi and I Corps had to permit the expansion. Initially, as mentioned earlier, he had been reluctant to allow Marines to operate in populated areas. This had been overcome, but still each increase in the size of a TAOR had to be carefully negotiated so as to be of greatest mutual benefit.

Second, growth of the TAORs was limited by the strength of III MAF; as the Force grew so could TAORs be expanded.

Third, the limits of a TAOR could not be the forward edge of the Marine positions. There had to be adequate room out front for reconnaissance, maneuver, and the use of supporting arms. (This requirement sometimes caused problems. Uninformed observers tended to regard everything enclosed by a TAOR as being under firm Marine control, which often was far from the case.)

Fourth, there had to be a judgment as to the capability of the Vietnamese to fill in behind the advancing Marines, and to pacify what had been cleared.

In August the 4th Marines (Colonel James F. McClanahan), in company with elements of the 2d ARVN Division, tried a number of small-scale offensive operations west of Chu Lai. As field exercises against negligible resistance, they were moderately successful, but they showed conclusively that, without unity of command, operations could best be described as "coordinated," not as "combined." Several things could be done to help make this coordination work.

First, the problems of coordination could be simplified by giving the Americans and the Vietnamese separate and distinct zones of action for their maneuver elements.

Second, fire support had to be coordinated by a single agency, so there was agreement on a single Fire Support Coordination Center.

Third, American advisers with Vietnamese units had to act not only as advisers but also as III MAF combat liaison officers.

Operations Starlite and Piranha

For some time there had been reports of an enemy concentration south of Chu Lai. On 15 August, III MAF developed hard intelligence indicating that the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, some 2,000 strong, had moved into prepared positions on Van Tuong Peninsula, 15 miles south of Chu Lai airstrip. This information, plus the fortuitous circumstance that RLT-7 with its 1st Battalion had just arrived at Chu Lai, and the Special Landing Force (BLT 3/7) was close by, made possible Operation Starlite, the first regimental-sized U. S. battle since the Korean War. On 17 August, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Fisher) and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Muir) were assigned to RLT-7.

On 18 August Operation Starlite was launched. It was a converging movement, using a river crossing in LVTs from the north, a helicopter-borne assault on the west or inland side, and an amphibious landing with lift provided by Task Force 76 on the southeast beach of the
Van Tuong Peninsula. By 24 August, at least 964 VC had been killed, an attack against Chu Lai had probably been frustrated, and the 1st Viet Cong Regiment had been rendered combat ineffective. A more lasting result was that the Viet Cong were disabused of any illusion that they could defeat the Marines in a stand-up battle. Moreover, this and later amphibious operations by the Marines forced the Viet Cong away from the coastal peninsulas where they had previously found sanctuary from their enemies.

Operation Piranha came close on the heels of Starlite—it began on 7 September. This time the target was Batangan Peninsula, eight miles southeast of Van Tuong, where a build-up, possibly remnants of the 1st VC Regiment, was reported to be taking place, and which was reputed to be a place of entry for the seaborne infiltration of supplies for the Viet Cong. Operation Piranha was a coordinated operation; sizable elements of the 2d ARVN Division and some Vietnamese Marines participated. It took longer to plan than did Starlite; the intelligence was not quite so good; results not so spectacular. Nevertheless, in the three-day fight the Marines—RLT-7 again—counted 183 Viet Cong killed in action, .66 of them in a single cave. The South Vietnamese scored an additional 66 VC kills.

**Base Defense Coordination**

While these heartening battles were going on south of Chu Lai, progress of sorts was also being made in the defense of Da Nang.

There had been another setback on 5 August when the VC raided the Esso storage terminal at Lien Chieu, destroyed two JP-4 storage tanks and damaged three other tanks, resulting in a loss of nearly two million gallons of fuel. Lien Chieu is inside Da Nang Harbor, on the south shore of Hai Van Peninsula. There are good hydrographic reasons for the terminal being there, but at this time it was outside the Marine TAOR, and its defense had been entrusted to two understrength Regional Force companies. To protect it adequately, it would have been necessary to bring the entire Hai Van promontory into the Marine TAOR. This would have taken at least a reinforced rifle company, and that many men could not be spared at the time. However, subsequent to the attack, a Marine platoon was moved to the Nam O bridge, which crossed the Song Ca De about one mile down the road from Lien Chieu. The five-span steel structure was a much threatened target of the Viet Cong.

On the Da Nang airfield there were the Provisional Base Defense Battalion and part of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. About half of the 1st Battalion had been siphoned off by the increased involvement of the 9th Marines south of the Song Cau Do. On 16 August the newly arrived 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, relieved the 1st Battalion on the airfield.

Lack of unity of command continued to be a major barrier to effective security. As early as 29 May, COMUSMACV had named CG III MAF as the Special Area Coordinator for Da Nang. This assignment included responsibility for coordinating physical security, but the terms of reference were geared to an earlier situation: advisory and noncombatant. If General Walt was expected to carry out his mission of defending the airfield, he needed clear-cut authority over not only his own forces but, as far as security was concerned, over the other tenants. However, as base commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hung, Commanding Officer, 41st Tactical Wing, VNAF, had over-all responsibility for defense of the field and he could not have relinquished it, even if he were so inclined.

Once again, “coordination” had to be substituted for “command.” Lieutenant Colonel Clark, who commanded the Provisional Base Defense Battalion that was formed in July, was named Base Defense Coordinator, and was later relieved by Colonel George W. Carrington, Jr. Defense of the airfield was divided into two parts: III MAF assumed responsibility for tactical defense of the field, which involved the continued assignment of an infantry battalion to man perimeter positions and to patrol outwards: the other part of the defense was internal security and, in accordance with accepted military practice, each tenant unit was charged with its own internal security. A Joint Defense Communication Center was established to keep the tenants in contact with one another.

This new arrangement got its first testing as soon as it was activated. There was a series of minor probings the night of 17 August. The system seemed to work, for the VC did not get through the wire.

On 21 August operational control of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, as Air Base Defense Battalion, was passed directly to III MAF, and on the 22nd, the Provisional Base Defense Battalion was dissolved and its members returned to parent units. From then until the following spring, battalions of the 9th Marines were rotated to serve six-week or two-month tours as Air Base Defense Battalion—an assignment that was less dangerous, but in many ways more tedious and exacting, than combing the rice paddies south of the river.
Raid on Marble Mountain and Chu Lai

China Beach, across the Tournave River and east of Da Nang proper, curves in a gentle arc from Monkey Mountain seven miles south to Marble Mountain. The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, was operating in the vicinity of the latter eminence, an authentic monolith of black-veined, gray marble. (A moribund tourist trade revived with the arrival of the Marines and a brisk traffic in marble ash trays ensued.) Between Marble Mountain and Monkey Mountain, China Beach was filling up with support facilities: Seabee battalion camps, the Naval Hospital, and the Marble Mountain Air Facility, now occupied by MAG-16 (Colonel Thomas J. O’Connor) and its helicopter squadrons.

On the night of 27 October, a Viet Cong raiding force quietly assembled in a village northwest of MAG-16 and adjacent to a Seabee camp. Apparently, it came by boat, although whether downstream along the river or south across Da Nang Bay is not clear. Under cover of 60-mm. mortar fire which engaged the Seabees heavily, at least four demolitions teams moved out to attack the airfield and the hospital. Forty-one VC were killed, but least four demolitions teams moved out to attack the MM. mortar fire which engaged the Seabees heavily, at across Da Nang Bay is not clear. Under cover of 60-
mag-16 (Colonel Thomas J. O’Connor) and its helicopter squadrons.

MAG-16’s flight line, but two VC did get to the A-4s with satchel charges, destroying two and damaging six before they were cut down.

It was a bad night at Marble Mountain and at Chu Lai but, when morning came, it appeared that a larger attack against Da Nang itself had been averted. During the night a Viet Cong battalion 18 kilometers west of Da Nang was brought under artillery fire and dispersed. About the same time, eight miles south of Da Nang, near Thanh Quit, a VC company stumbled into a Marine squad-sized ambush, ran into a sheet of fire, and fell back, leaving 15 dead on the trail.

MONSOON

Expected to begin in September in I Corps, the monsoon season did not come on in force until October. By November the rain was averaging an inch a day. The largest problems were logistic. The roads, optimistically surfaced with laterite, dissolved into thin red soup. Storage areas flooded. The northeast winds roughened the sea and made unloading at Da Nang and Chu Lai increasingly difficult. Construction schedules fell behind as engineers and Seabees were forced to switch to repair and maintenance.

The Korean Division had arrived at Qui Nhon. Amphibious shipping was going to lift BLT 2/7 out of Qui Nhon in the first week of November; the battalion was to be released from army control and taken to Chu Lai to rejoin its parent regiment. Then it was planned to move 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, to Da Nang in the same shipping.

Blue Marlin

It seemed logical to combine the above moves into a two-phase amphibious operation. Thus, Operation Blue Marlin got under way on 7 November, when BLT 2/7 loaded out at Qui Nhon in the shipping of Task Group 76.3 (Captain William J. Maddocks). At Chu Lai, TG 76.3 took aboard the 3d Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Brigade, then proceeded north. On 10 November, the Marine Corps’ birthday, they landed northeast of Tam Ky, about 18 miles north of Chu Lai and a third of the way between Chu Lai and Da Nang. Sea conditions were marginal. Both the Paul Revere (APA-248) and the Windham County (LST-1170) parted their anchor chains. The Marines went ashore in LVTs and LCMS. The surf was rough but there was no opposition other than the elements. Moving inland, the force turned southward astride Highway One, and joined a motorized column sent up to Tam Ky from Chu Lai. Resistance was negligible, but the coastal area from the water’s edge west to Highway One and from Tam Ky, capital of Quang Tin province, south to Chu Lai at least had had the benefit of a thorough sweep.

Phase I of Operation Blue Marlin achieved an historic first: the Vietnamese Marines participated in their first combined amphibious landing with the U. S. Marines. Along with the Vietnamese Airborne Brigade, the Marine Brigade was classed as having the best fighting battalions in the South Vietnamese service. It had been much used as a mobile strategic reserve, so much so, in fact, that its amphibious potential had not been fully developed. The Vietnamese Marines were formed after the departure of the French in 1954, with the advice and assistance of the U. S. Marines. Originally a

Two Marines of M Company, 3/7, entering a cave about 25 miles southwest of Da Nang during a search and destroy mission 22 December 1966.
river-type landing force, it had grown to a brigade of five infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and an amphibious support battalion.

Phase II of Blue Marlin began with the loading-out of 3rd Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William H. Lanagan, Jr.) from Chu Lai. They landed on 16 November south of Hoi An, 25 miles below Da Nang, and were joined by two Ranger battalions and two special ARVN "strike" companies. This area, south of the Song Gua Dai, mostly fishing villages, was known to be heavily infested by the Viet Cong and to be the source of much harassment against Hoi An, capital of Quang Nam province (and site of ancient Fai Fo, where the Portuguese in the 16th century had established a trading station). In the three-day operation that ensued 25 VC were killed, 15 captured.

**Hiep Duc**

On the night of 16/17 November, while Blue Marlin was in progress, the Viet Cong attacked and overran Hiep Duc, a district capital, 25 miles west of Tam Ky. Hiep Duc is in the valley of the Song Tranh: to the north, Nui Chom Mountain goes up to 944 meters, to the south, Nui Da Cao goes to 670 meters. The monsoon fills the valley with rain, and even when Da Nang and Chu Lai are fairly clear, the clouds driven in from the sea hang on the mountains. There were no good radio contacts with the survivors of Hiep Duc, but there were reports that the attackers were from the 1st Viet Cong Regiment; that this regiment after Starlite had withdrawn to the mountains of western Quang Tin province, had refilled its ranks, and was emerging under cover of the monsoon to do battle once again.

I Corps counterattacked with two battalions of the 5th ARVN Regiment, which were helilifted into the area in one of the most difficult of such operations yet attempted. The weather was bad and the enemy were using heavy antiaircraft machine guns—the first time these had been encountered in any numbers. On 17 November MAG-16 and MAG-36 lifted in 788 ARVN troops. Twenty
of the participating 30 helicopters were hit by ground fire. Covering air support flown by MAG-11's F-4s and MAG-12's A-4s dropped 14 tons of bombs and fired 512 rockets and 1,532 rounds of 20-mm. The next day, 463 more ARVN troopers were lifted in.

Hiep Duc was retaken, but there was a sad and all-too-frequent epilogue. General Thi estimated that a garrison of at least a battalion would be needed to hold the town. He could not spare it. The 5th Regiment was returned to Quang Ngai. Hiep Duc was abandoned.

Throughout I Corps, other garrisons and outposts were being hit. Some held and some did not. The outlines of the VC monsoon strategy were clear. Against the South Vietnamese forces, that strategy was to concentrate on the destruction of isolated outposts: to strike with locally superior forces, holding out a reserve with which to ambush would-be rescuers. Outlying district headquarters, with their Popular Force and Regional Force garrisons, were to be eaten up, one by one, and then perhaps a move would be made against the provincial capitals. The aim was not to seize and hold terrain, but to inflict as much damage and embarrassment as possible; to wear down the ARVN as they marched in a dozen directions to counter VC moves.

Against the Americans, the VC strategy was to avoid the risk of a stand-up battle. There would be no large-scale attacks against major bases, but if small units—fire teams, squads, even platoons and companies—were unwary, they would be surprised and struck. And to show that the American defenses were not impervious, carefully prepared and skillfully executed commando raids would be made against rewarding targets—raids such as those already executed against Lien Chieu, Marble Mountain, and Chu Lai.

**Thach Tru**

On 22 November the triangular fort at Thach Tru, on Highway One, 29 kilometers south of Quang Ngai, was hit. This time, however, the enemy overstepped himself. The fort was not manned by an underarmed Popular Force or Regional Force contingent. The headquarters and one company of a Ranger battalion were in the fort itself, another company was on a nearby commanding hill, and a third company was in the village. In a brutal fight that began in the last hours of darkness and lasted until mid-morning, the enemy succeeded in getting through the belts of barbed wire and over the palisade into the fort.

Fortunately, the USS *O'Brien* (DD-725) (Commander Charles S. Christensen) was within range when the firefight started and, at noon, she was joined by the USS *Bache* (DD-470) (Commander Arthur R. Hasler, Jr.). The battalion commander of the Rangers credited naval gunfire with breaking the back of the attack. (In 26 hours, the *O'Brien* fired 48 tons of ammunition, a total of 1,392 rounds of 5-inch at an average rate of one round every 66 seconds.)

Marine air came on station in the morning, and, in spite of abysmal flying weather, hammered at the enemy, who had taken up defenses in the hills west of Thach Tru. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, which had been standing by, ready to go into Hiep Duc, if necessary, began arriving by helo in mid-afternoon, while the 2d ARVN Division started a mechanized column down the road from Quang Ngai. The Seventh Fleet moved the Special Landing Force into position offshore, ready to land on two hours' notice. At nightfall, the USS *Fletcher* (DD-445) (Commander Robert L. Morgan) relieved the *Bache*.

Seventy-one of the defenders of Thach Tru were killed, 74 wounded, and 2 missing. But the attackers paid a much higher price: 175 dead, 3 prisoners, and an unusually large bag of weapons—5 75-mm. recoilless rifles, 9 machine guns, 6 60-mm. mortars, 2 submachine guns, and 114 rifles.

Next morning, 23 November, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, attacked to the west, driving a holding force out of the first line of hills, killing three, for sure, and capturing eight weapons including a machine gun. From captured weapons and prisoners, it became evident that the force attacked was not Viet Cong, but a PAVN formation from North Vietnam. Later, it was decided that it was the 95th Regiment of the 325th Alpha Division.

**REASSESSMENT BY McNAMARA**

On the afternoon of 28 November, Defense Secretary McNamara arrived once again in Saigon. With him, as before, were the JCS Chairman, General Wheeler, and Assistant Secretaries McNaughton and Sylvester. At a brief news conference, McNamara told the press that accelerating infiltration by North Vietnamese regulars would clearly require counteraction. He then had a five-hour meeting with Admiral Sharp, General Westmoreland, and MACV’s principal staff officers and subordinate commanders, including General Walt. The core of the discussion was the entrance of PAVN formations into overt combat, the rate of infiltration of these units from the north, and the corresponding increase in U.S. forces which would be required to counter it. It was
accepted that there were seven PAVN regiments in the
country; the presence of an eighth was considered
“probable,” and of a ninth “possible.”

The fight at Thach Tru had solidly established the
presence of elements of the 325th Alpha Division in
lower Quang Ngai province. With less certainty, it was
believed that there was at least one PAVN regiment
operating south of the DMZ in Quang Tri province, and,
perhaps, elements west of Hue in Thua Thien province.

The next day, 29 November, McNamara spent some
two hours in further discussion, then he and his party
made a quick tour of Vo Dat, An Khe (this was shortly
after the Cavalry’s first big victory at Ia Drang Valley),
and Camranh Bay, before departing for Guam and an
inspection of the B-52s based there.

Five Tasks for III MAF

General Walt had recommended to ComUSMACV that
the number of Marine infantry battalions be increased
from 12 to at least 18, and the supporting fighter-attack
squadrons to eight. He based these recommendations
not so much on the threat of North Vietnamese forma-
tions, as on estimates of what was required to pursue
effectively a balanced strategy in I Corps. As III MAF
saw it, this strategy involved five fundamental tasks:

First, to defend and continue to develop secure base
areas.

Second, to support the operations of the Vietnamese
I Corps.

Third, to conduct offensive operations against the
Viet Cong.

Fourth, to be prepared to provide forces to support
contingencies elsewhere in South Vietnam.

The fifth task, less military, but every bit as impor-
tant, involved what, for the moment, was being called
“rural construction.” Successive euphemisms have
served as formal substitutes for the word “pacification.”
“Revolutionary development” succeeded “rural con-
struction.” Informally, many Vietnamese and Ameri-
cans continued to use “pacification.”

If there was a fundamental difference at this time be-
tween Army and Marine thinking on how the war
should be prosecuted, it lay probably in differences of
opinion as to just how large a role U. S. forces should
play in pacification. The Marine Corps was more san-
guine about the chances of American success in this
role; it had gotten off to an earlier start, and had de-
veloped a number of procedures and techniques that
showed promise.

(It should be remembered that up to this time, most of
the Army’s combat operations had been in the thinly
populated highlands against Main Force and North
Vietnamese formations. Later, when the Army oper-
ated in more heavily populated areas their methods
pretty much paralleled those of the Marines. Con-
versely, as will be shown later, when the North Viet-
namese crossed the DMZ into I Corps in strength, an
increasing percentage of Marine forces had to be de-
ployed against them, to the detriment of the pacifica-
tion effort.)

Pacification, Marine Style

Some of III MAF’s optimism stemmed from early suc-
cesses at Le My. On 19 June 1965, for example, some
350 rice farmers from farther up the Song Ca De Val-
ley had voluntarily come into the protected hamlet.
Le My rapidly developed into a modest showplace. On
their tour of Le My, visitors to Da Nang (and there
were many; everyone—political, military, theatrical,
journalistic, business, and international personages—
found reason to visit Da Nang) got a sand-table ori-
entation, met the village officials, saw the dispensary, th
the school, and the new market place.

For a while, pacification appeared remarkably simple:
you liberated a hamlet or village from VC domi-
nation, provided it with a shield of security, and nurtured
and encouraged the renascence of governmental control
and institutions with a sincere and carefully thought-out
program of civic action. While this seemed to work well
in the thinly populated, generally pro-government area
west of Da Nang, which was the 3d Marines’ zone of
action, it did not work so well, or at least the results
were not so dramatically apparent, south of Da Nang in
the 9th Marines’ zone of action. The spinal cord of the
latter zone was Highway One running south. Fifteen
miles below Da Nang, it crosses the Cua Dia (or Thu
Bon or Ky Lam, the river changes its name every few
kilometers). There, Route 14, which starts at Hoi An,
runs along the north bank of the river, intersects High-
way One, and then continues inland. A thin belt of terri-
tory along the highway and the eastern section of Route
14 was under government control; all the rest of the
zone—rich ricelands, where two crops a year are har-
vested—was dominated by the Viet Cong. The area,
eventually assigned to the 9th Marines, is heavily popu-
lated, having some quarter of a million people.

Golden Fleece

From 1 September until mid-October, when the rains
A CH-46 helicopter of squadron HMM-265 hovers over Marines during an operation near An Hoa in Quang Nam Province on 2 December 1966. Notice how steep the mountain slope is.

the way to Hoi An—the half of Hoa Vang district that lay south of the Song Cau Do, nine villages in all. Then came the real test: the pacification of that area.

By the end of the month, the chief of Quang Nam province—at that time, the vigorous and brilliant Lieutenant Colonel Tung—had completed his planning for the two-phase Ngu Hanh Son program (also called the Five Mountain program, or the Nine Village program). A trained government cadre of 350 men, enough for five villages, was available. Phase I, which was to be completed by the first of the year, would be the pacification of the five villages west of Highway One. Phase II would be the pacification of the four villages east of the highway. Popular Forces would be recruited, trained, and organized for the security of the district. In accordance with the formula of one squad for each hamlet and one platoon for each village, nearly 1,000 men would be required; less than 100 were available. Until the Popular Forces were ready, security would be provided by the 59th Regional Force Battalion, specially formed of five companies, one for each of the villages of Phase I. The program began on 1 November 1965.

As III MAF saw it, the Marines’ job was to provide the environment, the circumstances, the outer shield of tactical defense, and some of the material resources needed to make the program work.

Staff Reorganization

To improve its coordination of civic action efforts, III MAF underwent a fairly radical revision of staff responsibilities. By doctrine, “civil affairs” were the responsibility of G-1; “psychological operations,” the responsibility of G-3. But in Vietnam, four-fifths of “psychological operations” were concerned with relations with the populace, not with tactical operations, and “civic action” meant a much more direct contact with the local people than did the traditional “civil affairs.”

Therefore, III MAF created a new general staff section, G-5, to coordinate all civic action programs, except medical assistance, which remained the province of the Force Surgeon. The 3d Marine Division followed suit and established a Division G-5, and the regiments and battalions, whose civil affairs and psychological warfare functions had been assigned to officers as additional duties, moved toward having full-time S-5s. Sev-
eral young platoon leaders, having completed their Vietnam tours, voluntarily extended to fill these challenging civic action billets.

To improve coordination with other U.S. agencies supporting pacification in I Corps, the Joint Coordinating Council had been formed on 30 August. Among the members were the Deputy Senior Adviser, I Corps; the Regional Director, USOM; the Refugee Representative, USOM; the Senior Field Representative, JUSPAO; and the G-5, III MAF. On 28 October, General Thi appointed a personal representative to sit with the Council. Later, General McCutcheon, as Deputy CG III MAF, was named permanent chairman. In addition to the parent council, there were a number of supporting committees: Public Health, Public Safety, Agriculture and Fisheries, Education, and so on, with both U.S. and Vietnamese membership.

Security of the Hamlets

It was recognized that, in spite of all these arrangements, pacification would not work without adequate security; the Viet Cong would see that it did not, by assassinating and kidnapping village and hamlet officials, burning schools, and tearing down, both psychologically and physically, whatever the government of South Vietnam, with the help of the Americans, attempted to build.

The III MAF had recognized early that the key to the kind of security that was needed was an effective, grassroots gendarmerie—self-defense at the hamlet and village level. This was no great revelation. Established doctrine for the Popular Forces was sound. So was the rule-of-thumb formula: a squad of PF for each hamlet, a platoon for each village. The difficulty was that the PF program wasn't working out the way it was intended.

At the root of that failure was the fact that the Popular Forces were at the bottom of the priorities list in the Vietnamese armed forces. For example, no one who was eligible for service in the Army of Vietnam could enroll in the Popular Forces. Furthermore, pay was low—1,200 piasters or less than ten dollars a month; weapons were scarce, usually limited to carbines and grenades; uniforms were often promised, but seldom delivered. (Many of the Popular Forces had the dismaying but unavoidable habit of wearing the peasant's traditional black pajamas, the uniform usually worn by the Viet Cong. Recognition of the PF under these conditions was sometimes fatally difficult. In desperation, officers sometimes briefed patrol leaders and pilots in words to this effect: "If you can see them, they are Popular Forces; if you can't see them, they are Viet Cong.")

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that the Popular Forces tended to become urbanized rather than rural—it was much safer and more comfortable in Da Nang; that many of the units became the personal bodyguards of the village or district chiefs, and offered little or no protection to the constituents; and that some units and individuals existed on the pay rolls but could not be found on the ground.

The surprising thing was that certain Popular Force units were as good as they were. Throughout the summer and fall they had shown that, properly trained and properly led, they could fight well and bravely. Their combat losses attested to this.

Combined Action Companies

At Phu Bai, the base from which 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William W. Taylor), was operating, an effective rapport with the surrounding hamlets had been established. During the summer, a "Joint Action Company" was established (later the name was changed to the more accurate "Combined Action Company" or "CAC"). A provisional platoon of hand-picked Marine volunteers, under Lieutenant Paul R. Ek, who spoke Vietnamese, was formed and given intensive training, not only in advanced counterinsurgency techniques, but also in Vietnamese language, history, customs, and military and governmental organization. One Marine squad, with a Navy corpsman attached, was then assigned to each of five Popular Force platoons.

These Marines entered into the life of the village where they were assigned, and became an integral part of its defenses. To the Popular Force platoons they could offer training in weaponry and tactics, and effective communications—vital for supporting fires or reinforcements; and to the communities involved, they offered a very real Marine-to-the-people civic action program, including medical aid.

At Phu Bai the Combined Action Company worked because the circumstances there were right for it, and General Chuan, CG of the 1st ARVN Division, gave it his interested and active support.

While informal reciprocal arrangements were being worked out elsewhere, the first full-fledged expansion of the Combined Action Company concept took place at Da Nang in January 1966. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, who had been transferred from Phu Bai, was the Air Base Defense Battalion. Drawing on his Phu Bai
experience, Taylor organized a second Combined Action Company. This new company paired off a Marine squad with each of seven Popular Force platoons located in the area roughly surrounding the air base. The quality of patrolling out to the limits of mortar range around the airfield improved immediately.

Harvest Moon

After the Vietnamese government forces withdrew from Hiep Duc in late November, the Viet Cong moved eastward into the Phuoc Valley, and the government garrisons at Viet An and Que Son came under pressure. To remove this pressure and, hopefully, to entrap the enemy, suspected of being the 1st Viet Cong Regiment reinforced with North Vietnamese heavy weapons units, a coordinated operation, Harvest Moon, was planned.

The scheme of maneuver was for an ARVN column to move into the Phuoc Valley from Thang Binh, a town on Highway One, about midway between Da Nang and Chu Lai. A lateral road going along the valley floor and linking Thang Binh, Que Son, Viet An, and Hiep Duc was to be the axis of advance. After the ARVN had developed a contact, two U. S. Marine battalions would be helilifted to the rear of the enemy. A third Marine battalion would be held in reserve.

Headquarters of the 5th ARVN Regiment, with its own 1st Battalion on the left of the road, and the 11th Ranger Battalion on the right, moved out on the morning of 8 December, and marched six kilometers without incident. There was a halt for lunch; the march was resumed; and at about 1330, the 11th Rangers found themselves semi-encircled and under heavy, close-in attack. The battalion commander went down, badly wounded, and was hit a second time as he was carried out on the back of the American adviser. In half-an-hour, the 11th Rangers were out of action and moving to the rear. The 1st Battalion, 5th ARVN, did a right face but could not get across the road. At 1434 Marine helicopters lifted 1st Battalion, 6th ARVN, into the Rangers’ position, and the Viet Cong broke contact.

Next morning, 1st Battalion, 5th ARVN, south of the road, was hit hard by the VC; the regimental commander, who, the previous month, had bravely fought his way back into Hiep Duc, was killed, and the battalion was driven south and east.

At this point, the Marine battalions entered the battle. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter), landed seven kilometers west of the line of contact, and the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Joshua W. Dorsey, III), was helilifted southeast of the original battle area to take the pressure off 1st Battalion, 5th ARVN. Next day, 10 December, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Hanifin, Jr.)—which was the Special Landing Force—came in by helicopter against heavy resistance, and landed about midway between the two Marine battalions already committed.

Control headquarters for the operation was Task Force Delta (commanded, first, by Brigadier General Melvin D. Henderson, and later by Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt), which had set up its command post, along with a bobtailed artillery battalion, at Que Son. General Lam, CG of the 2d ARVN Division, a figure familiar to the Marines in his black beret with silver badges, tanker’s jacket, and swagger stick, first established his field headquarters at Thang Binh, but later moved in side-by-side with General Platt.

The Marines started moving against the southern rim of the valley, while the ARVN moved to the northern rim. Between the 12th and 14th of December, B-52s made four strikes, the first in direct support of Marine operations, and the Marines were much impressed by the precision of the bombing patterns and their neutralizing effect.

By 16 December, VC resistance had faded away, and the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, started marching out to the northeast. By 18 December, it was out of the valley. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, followed in trace, and was out by 19 December. Meanwhile, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, a Chu Lai battalion, marched 23 miles to the east and at Ky Phu, west of Tam Ky, ran into an attempted ambush. The VC got the worst of it, with 105 counted dead. The Chu Lai Marines continued on and were also out on Highway One by 19 December. At dusk, the Viet Cong tried a small ambush, were promptly eliminated, and the operation was over. The tally was 407 VC dead, and 13 crew-served weapons, 95 individual weapons, and many stores (including an amazing amount of paper and uniform cloth) taken from a base area uncovered on the reverse slope of the ridge south of Que Son.

The Special Landing Force (2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and Medium Helicopter Squadron 261) reembarked. It had had three busy months. Before being landed in Harvest Moon, it had made amphibious raids against the coast at Vung Mu, Ben Goi, Tani Quan, Lang Ke Ga, and Phu Thu. On 20 December, the force went on up to Phu Bai and relieved 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, which rotated back to Okinawa.
NEW YEAR

Harvest Moon was over before the Christmas holiday. The Viet Cong said they would observe a 12-hour truce from 1900 Christmas Eve until 0700 Christmas Day. The United States and South Vietnam improved on this; they said they would observe a 30-hour truce from 1800 on the 24th until midnight on the 25th. The Marines were unenthusiastic about the truce and distrustful of Viet Cong observance. There were three small-scale attacks in the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORs, and it wasn’t clear whether or not the VC were observing the longer truce period. The Marines had hoped to signal the end of the truce with a maximum artillery barrage at 1201, 26 December. In this they were disappointed; the barrage had to be cancelled because, at the last minute, the truce was extended, for reasons not clear to the Marines, until later on the morning of the 26th.

As 1965 ended, there were 180,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam, and 38,000 of them were Marines.

There was another truce in January, at the time of the lunar New Year—“Tet” as it is called in Vietnam—a holiday to be taken more seriously than Christian Christmas. This time the Viet Cong said they would undertake no offensive operations from midnight 19 January until midnight 23 January. Saigon’s counter-proposal was for a truce from noon 20 January until 1800 on 23 January. The Year of the Snake was ending and the Year of the Horse was beginning, by tradition a good year for martial enterprise. An old man, asked for his thoughts on the subject, stroked his beard and said, “There will be a lot of fighting and killing.”

Better observed than the Christmas truce, the Tet truce was not seriously violated in I Corps, but close on the heels of the holiday, shortly after midnight on 25 January, there was a shelling of Da Nang air base and Marble Mountain Air Facility by 81-mm. and 120-mm. mortars. No aircraft were hit, but two Americans and two Vietnamese were killed and a number wounded. The disturbing thing was the use of the 120-mm. mortar. This caliber of weapon had been encountered in I Corps only once before, in an attack against Khe Sanh Special Forces camp, near the Laotian border.

First Marine Division

As a result of Secretary McNamara’s November visit and subsequent, more detailed conferences held at CincPac in January, the introduction of the 1st Marine Division into Vietnam was approved. The 7th Marines were already there, as were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Marines. The remainder of the 1st Regiment and the 5th Marines were scheduled to arrive at the rate of about one BLT per month through June.

In March, with two-thirds of the 1st Marine Division in place, Major General Lewis J. Fields would move his flag forward to Chu Lai. The zone of action assigned to the 1st Marine Division coincided with that of the 2d ARVN Division: the southern two provinces of I Corps, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai.

Double Eagle

Another Task Force Delta operation began on 28 January 1966. This was Double Eagle, the most ambitious yet tried, and coordinated not only with I Corps but with II Corps and the U.S. Army’s Field Force Victor. The target was the 325A PAVN Division, believed to be straddling the border between the provinces of Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh.

The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel James R. Young), and 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Rodolpho L. Trevina), came across the beach, 20 miles south of the town of Quang Ngai and close to Thach Tru, scene of the November fight with the PAVN, in the largest amphibious operation of the war up to that time. Commodore Maddocks was Commander, Amphibious Task Force. His flagship was the USS Paul Revere (APA-248), and there were two other attack transports, an attack cargo ship, three LSTs, two LSDs, an LPH, a cruiser, a destroyer, and two auxiliaries.

The Special Landing Force—now 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William K. Horn), and HMM-363 (Lieutenant Colonel James Aldworth)—was in floating reserve, aboard the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8), the Monticello (LSD-35), and the Montrose (APA-212). On D plus One, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, was helilifted from the Amphibious Ready Group to an objective area five miles west of the landing beaches.

On D plus Four, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William F. Donahue, Jr.), moved from a ready position at Quang Ngai airstrip into the mountains northwest of the beach, in exploitation of the first of three B-52 strikes.

It was a hopscotch kind of battle; contacts were intermittent and seldom solid. It soon became apparent that most of the North Vietnamese had moved south into Binh Dinh province. There—in an operation known first as Masher and, later, to sound less bellicose, as Operation White Wing—the 1st Air Cavalry Division and II Corps troops fought a larger battle north of Bong Son and on into An Lao Valley.
There were reports that the enemy was concentrating west of Tam Ky, north of Chu Lai. Phase I of Double Eagle ended (VC body count 312) on 19 February, and Task Force Delta moved by helicopter and truck to the new battle area to begin Phase II, which lasted until 1 March; the body count was 125 VC.

HONOLULU CONFERENCE

The Honolulu Conference, the meeting between President Johnson and Premier Ky, held from 6 to 8 February 1966, ended with a declaration which emphasized winning the war through a combination of military action and expanded civic reforms. The joint communique issued at the end of the conference included the statement:

“The leaders of the two governments received comprehensive reports on the intensified program of rural construction. The Government of Vietnam set forth a plan for efforts of particular strength and intensity in areas of high priority, and the President gave directions to insure full and prompt support by all agencies of the U. S. Government.”

Two of the points agreed upon as essential for rapid progress were:

“Continued emphasis by both Vietnamese and all forces on the effort to build democracy in the rural areas—an effort as important as the military battle itself.”

“Concentration of resources—both Vietnamese and American—in selected priority areas which are properly related to military plans so that the work of rural construction can be protected against disruption by the enemy.”

Ngu Hanh Son Program

Hoa Vang district, south of Da Nang, was a “selected priority area,” and the Ngu Hanh Son program planned in October was consistent with the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Honolulu. But a combination of factors had made progress in the first five villages disappointingly slow: the original schedule was over-ambitious; the government cadre was under-trained; there was dissension and a rapid turnover among the Vietnamese leaders charged with the program; liaison between Vietnamese security elements and surrounding Marine units was imperfect; and, finally—perhaps most important of all—there was the concentrated effort of the Viet Cong to make the plan fail.

In late February and early March, the program began to pick up momentum. One reason for that was that Lieutenant Colonel Lap, commander of the 51st ARVN Regiment, was placed in over-all charge of both the security and rural construction aspects of the program. A compassionate man, brought up in the classical Confucian ethic, Lap had an affinity with the people and a maturity of judgment which previously had been lacking.

A second reason was that the 9th Marines, charged with supporting the program, had evolved a number of new techniques. The most useful technique, and the one which eventually attracted the greatest attention, was the one called County Fair. The first County Fair, a kind of dress rehearsal, was held from 24 to 25 February in Phong Bac hamlet, just northwest of where the Phong Le bridge crosses the Song Cau Do. Many such operations followed. Just as “Golden Fleece” became associated with the protection of the rice harvest, so “County Fair” became a generic term and was used throughout III MAF’s area. U. S. Army units operating in II and III Corps subsequently developed a similar operation, and called it “Hamlet Festival.”

County Fair

A “County Fair” was essentially a fairly elaborate cordon and search effort combining U. S. and Vietnamese military and government elements. The objective was to break down the infrastructure of the Viet Cong, the local force cells of five to ten guerrillas who, when main forces left or were driven from an area, remained behind and continued to dominate the life of the hamlets. Before an area could be considered “pacified,” or ready for “rural construction,” there had to be a scrubbing action to get rid of these hamlet guerrillas. The procedure for a County Fair went something like this:

During darkness, Marines, or sometimes Marines and Vietnamese regulars, would surround the target hamlet, in order to seal it off: to prevent any Viet Cong in the hamlet from slipping out, and at the same time, to prevent their being reinforced from the outside. At dawn, the inhabitants were informed by loudspeaker and leaflets that the hamlet was to be searched, and that all residents must leave their homes and move temporarily to an assembly area.

Things were made as pleasant as possible at the assembly area. District and village officials met with the people (sometimes for the first time), and explained to them what was taking place. Other officials checked identity cards and conducted or verified the hamlet census. The first rule of population control is to know who is living where. In Vietnam, this is the sort of thing
that can best be done by Vietnamese. It is almost impossible for Americans to do it effectively.

A temporary dispensary would be set up to give the villagers medical and dental help, and they were assured that such aid would be continued. Something of a picnic atmosphere was sought: a community kitchen was established, candy and soda pop were distributed to the children, and entertainment was provided—movies, live entertainers, often either a Marine band or drum and bugle corps.

The villagers were held in the assembly area at least overnight. Meanwhile, the hamlet was being given a thorough going-over by the search party. This was another thing that could best be done by the Vietnamese. In almost every case, arms caches, propaganda materials, or the Viet Cong themselves were found. Most often, the VC were found underground and were pulled out or blasted out by the search party. If they elected to run, or tried to escape, as they sometimes did, they had to contend with the cordon.

**Hard Fighting**

In February and March, there was a series of hard-fought, violent actions.

Operation New York was a crisply executed response to an I Corps request for help. It began about 2000 on 27 February, when 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, was alerted that 1st Battalion, 3d ARVN Regiment, was being hard-pressed by the 810th Main Force Battalion of the Viet Cong northeast of Phu Bai. The first wave of a night helicopter assault was off the ground at Phu Bai at 2320; by 0200 three companies were in the objective area. The Marines attacked in line across the Phu Thu Peninsula; the VC positions were well-prepared and in depth, and the operation continued with intermittent contact until 3 March. Final count was 122 Viet Cong killed in action; 6 crew-served weapons and 63 individual weapons captured.

On the evening of 3 March, CG Task Force Delta, Brigadier General Platt, was told that elements of the 2d ARVN Division had made a successful contact a few miles northwest of Quang Ngai city, and prisoners they had taken reported the 36th (also called the 21st) PAVN Regiment in the vicinity of Chau Nhai village. Next morning, Operation Utah began when Marine helicopters covered by Marine close air support took the ARVN 1st Airborne Battalion to a point southwest of Chau Nhai (3) hamlets within the same village often bear the same name and are numbered for convenience. The landing zone was hot with automatic fire, a Marine F-4 was lost, but the Vietnamese battalion landed and went into the attack in good order. It was followed in mid-morning by 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter), which moved into the fight on the right flank of the 1st Airborne.

In mid-afternoon, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel James R. Young), was landed north of the action. The 2d ARVN Division was also putting in additional battalions, and the last opening in the ring was closed on the morning of 5 March when 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Paul X. Kelley), landed to the south. In mid-afternoon of that day, the Task Force reserve—the headquarters of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kelly), a company from 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and a company of ARVN scouts—took up blocking positions six kilometers southwest of Binh Son. Most of the action was over by dawn on 6 March. It had been a short, hard fight. The Marines claimed 358 killed, the ARVN 228; in all, about a third of the 36th PAVN Regiment's original strength was destroyed.

On the night of 9 March the Special Forces camp at A Shau, near the Laotian border, garrisoned by 17 Green Berets and about 400 various Vietnamese, came under heavy attack by, perhaps, three North Vietnamese battalions. (“Special Forces” camps were garrisoned by CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group—citizen militia recruited for the most part from local Montagnard tribes. The Vietnamese camp commander was advised by detachments from both U. S. and Vietnamese Special Forces.)

It turned out to be an ugly business. Many of the irregulars wouldn't fight. Worse, some went over to the enemy, and turned their guns on the defenders. The brunt of the attack was borne by the Americans and some native troops flown in the day before as reinforcements.

The fight went on for two days; the defenders were backed into a corner of their camp. In marginal flying weather typical of the tail end of the monsoon season, Marine air and the Air Force went all out; close air support, resupply, medical evacuation. The Marines lost three UH-34s and one A-4C. There was no saving the camp. On 11 March, evacuation began. There was panic among the irregulars. Some tried to rush the helicopters, had to be cut down by U. S. Green Berets and Marine crewmen. Evacuation continued on 12 March; in all, 12 Green Berets and 172 Vietnamese were located and lifted out.

Another call for assistance from the Vietnamese triggered Operation Texas. An Hoa, an outpost 30 kilo-
meters northwest of Quang Ngai, garrisoned with a Regional Force company, came under heavy attack on 19 March. On the morning of 20 March, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, and the 5th ARVN Airborne Battalion landed within a kilometer of the fort, while 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, landed seven kilometers farther south. The enemy, who appeared to be Chu Lai's old adversary, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, was sandwiched in between; in four days of fierce fighting 405 VC died.

Operation Indiana was a repetition of the pattern. On 28 March, the 3d Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment, was heavily engaged in almost the same location as the Utah battleground. General Lam asked for help. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, landed to the rear of the enemy; 69 VC were killed, 19 weapons were captured.

THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT

General Walt had left Da Nang on 10 February for a month's temporary additional duty in Washington— including consultations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, and the happy surprise of being nominated to the rank of lieutenant general by the President. When he returned to his command in Da Nang in mid-March, he found his counterpart, General Thi, in serious trouble.

On 10 March, there was a meeting of the National Leadership Committee, the military junta which had ruled since the previous June with Ky as premier. Thi, a member of the committee, was present. The other nine generals present voted to oust Thi on grounds of insubordination. Nguyen Van Chuan, the able commanding general of the 1st ARVN Division, was named 1 Corps commander.

Pro-Thi, anti-government demonstrations began to bubble up in Saigon, Da Nang, and Hue. On 13 March most of the shops in Da Nang closed down for half a day in protest at the dismissal of Thi. Longshoremen did not report for work. Students at the university in Hue went out on strike, and high-school students in Hue and Da Nang copied them. The leaders of the agitation began to call themselves the Military and Civilian Struggle Committee, shortened later to "Struggle Force." On the 15th, a general strike virtually shut down Da Nang.

On 1 April, Lieutenant General Pham Xuan Chieu, third ranking member of the government hierarchy, was detained by Buddhist students in Hue. He was quickly released, but his detention was accepted as a signal that the Saigon government no longer prevailed in I Corps. Two days later, 3,000 members of the 1st ARVN Division marched through the streets of Hue, behind their Division band, demanding the overthrow of the Saigon government.

In Saigon, Ky announced that he would use loyal troops to "liberate" Da Nang and Hue. On the night of 4-5 April he airlifted three Vietnamese Marine battalions—distinctive in their green- and black-striped utility uniforms—to Da Nang. The exact temper and inclination of the 1 Corps regular troops was not certain. The 1st ARVN Division seemed entirely in the Buddhist camp. The 51st Regiment and the Ranger battalions in and around Da Nang were divided. The troops in Hoi An were strongly pro-Struggle Force. Quang Ngai and the 2d ARVN Division were relatively quiet.

On 9 April, American noncombatants were evacuated from Hue and Da Nang. This was done smartly, some 750 being moved out by Marine helicopters under protection of U. S. Marine ground elements.

The same day, a mechanized column of Struggle Force adherents started up toward Da Nang from Hoi An. The column was cut in half at Thanh Quí bridge, some nine miles below Da Nang, by Company F, 9th Marines, who contrived to have a truck break down and block the bridge. There were similar, smaller confrontations between the U. S. Marines and both sides of the Vietnamese struggle. The mission of the Marines was simply to provide insulation, to do what could be done to prevent unnecessary bloodshed by either side.

This same day, 9 April, the reserved Major General Chuan resigned as Corps commander and was replaced by the more flamboyant Lieutenant General Ton That Dinh. The crisis seemed to be subsiding. One of the Vietnamese Marine battalions left Da Nang for Quang Ngai. The other two battalions returned to Saigon on 12 April.

But it soon became obvious that Dinh's sympathies were on the Buddhist side. On 15 May, Ky airlifted two battalions of Vietnamese Marines and two battalions of Airborne troops into Da Nang air base. 1 Corps headquarters was surrounded, Dinh was deposed and replaced by Brigadier General Huynh Van Cao. There followed a week of confused, nasty fighting in and around Da Nang.

On 17 May, anti-Ky ARVN forces took up positions on the east side of the Tourane River bridge. Vietnamese Marines took positions on the west side, then crossed the bridge. General Walt prevailed upon General Cao to withdraw the Vietnamese Marines. The anti-government forces then promptly moved forward and mined.
Four Vietnamese women are questioned by an interpreter just after they were taken from a ditch from which heavy sniper fire had been directed at Marines, on 6 December 1965.

the bridge. General Walt now negotiated in turn with the Struggle Force, got them to remove the demolition charges, and got both sides to agree to turn the security of the bridge over to a company of U.S. Marines.

On 21 May, a government plan to attack an ammunition dump in east Da Nang, almost across the road from III MAF headquarters, brought a counterthreat from the Struggle Force that they would blow up the dump (and possibly a good part of east Da Nang with it) if the attack was not called off. Again General Walt negotiated, and after a two-day parley, U.S. Marines moved in and took over security of the dump.

Meanwhile, the Struggle Force still held the center of the city. Cao was not moving fast enough to suit Ky, and he was replaced by Brigadier General Du Quoc Dong. The hard spots of Buddhist resistance were the three principal pagodas, and when they were taken, about 23 May, active resistance in Da Nang collapsed.

Attention shifted to Hue. For the second time, American noncombatants were evacuated. On 31 May, rioters sacked and burned the U.S. Consulate. The highway south of Hue was strewn with curious barriers; family altars were hauled out into the road to halt the northward march of Ky's tanks and personnel carriers. The road blocks were more picturesque than effective. Government troops moved north and into Hue. They had it under control by 19 June. Three days later Vietnamese Marines and paratroopers marched into Quang Tri, northernmost city of significance in I Corps. Resistance by the Struggle Force was virtually at an end.

It was probably the pacification effort that suffered most from the unrest. An obvious target of the Viet Cong was the Ngu Hanh Son program in Hoa Vang district. The district chief, never enthusiastic over the program, was one of those who had gone over to the Struggle Force. Not only had the VC reinfiltiration the hamlet cadres, but by a wave of terrorist acts, they had renewed their impact on the populace. There were also open Viet Cong attacks aimed at getting around or behind the Marines. Two companies of VC got as far as An Trach, four miles south of Da Nang air base and something of a civic action showplace, before they were intercepted and destroyed by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William F. Doehler).

The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, was brought up from Chu Lai and put into the five-village area to help repair the damage. The Battalion moved in by side with the badly shaken 59th Regional Force Battalion. Soon there was combined patrolling—the high-low silhouette of tall Marines and short RF troopers could be seen along the paddy dikes—and the security of the area improved dramatically.

**Ky Lam Campaign**

In March, when General Walt returned from Washington, Major General Wood B. Kyle also arrived and took command of the 3d Marine Division. A careful tactician, with a strong background in infantry operations and command, General Kyle wanted to clear up (in a literal sense) the situation south of Da Nang. This desire coincided with the long-term ambition of the 9th Marines to make a careful, thorough advance to Hoi An and the line of the Thu Bon–Ky Lam River. There followed a series of operations:

**Kings**, which moved the forward edge of the regiment to Route 14.

**Georgia**, which put 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, into An Hoa (another An Hoa, there are many in Vietnam), 20 air miles southwest of Da Nang, and important because a hydroelectric and chemical complex which had been begun there, became isolated when the Viet Cong cut off rail and highway communications, in late 1964.

**Liberty**, which broadened the front, by bringing the 3d Marines in on the 9th Regiment's right flank, and the 1st Marines on its left.

On Da Nang air base, the 1st Military Police Battalion (activated December 1965, one of the new formations made possible when 30,000 additional Marines
were authorized in August 1965) relieved 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, as Air Base Defense Battalion. The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, had served in Vietnam with the 4th Marines, 7th Marines, and 9th Marines, but never with the 3d Marines. When relieved from the air base, it returned to its parent regiment.

Operation Jay, conducted about 20 kilometers northwest of Hue, began 25 June and lasted nine days. The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, landed north of the 812th Main Force Battalion, and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, landed south. Caught in between, the enemy lost 54 dead the first day, and 28 more in the next eight.

South of Da Nang, the engineers, who had closely followed the advance—and sometimes preceded it—celebrated the Fourth of July by opening “Liberty Road” as far as Route 14. Before the end of August, the road was open as far as An Hoa, and once again there was land communication with the hydroelectric and chemical complex.

The Fourth of July also saw the beginning of Operation Macon. The principal adversary of the 9th Marines had been the Doc Lap Battalion, a Main Force battalion of great tenacity and skill, particularly adept at ambushes, mine warfare, and sudden, sharp ripostes against unwary units up to company size. The Doc Lap Battalion was now north of An Hoa and south of the Thu Bon River. Operation Macon was an open-ended operation that went on for three months. At one time or another, five Marine battalions had a crack at it, and at the end 507 dead VC had been counted.

INfiltrATION ACROSS THE DMZ

A larger, more violent action was being fought in the north. During the first week of July there were intelligence indications that a North Vietnamese division, probably the 324th Bravo, had moved across the DMZ into northern Quang Tri province. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Jack D. Spaulding), and a reconnaissance element were sent to investigate. What followed involved some 8,000 Marines and 3,000 South Vietnamese, and was the most savage battle of the war, up to that point.

Task Force Delta, this time commanded by Brigadier General Lowell E. English, launched Operation Hastings on 15 July. To begin with, three battalions were engaged: 2d Battalion, 1st Marines; 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Arnold E. Bench); and 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Sumner A. Vale). The airstrip at Dong Ha, 38 miles north of Hue, provided a convenient staging base. Contact was made in the vicinity of Cam Lo on Route 9, seven miles west of Dong Ha, near a 700-foot hill, the “Rock Pile,” which is a cork to the valleys leading down from the north and west. The SLF, then 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Bronars), landed at Pho Hai, and joined up with Task Force Delta two days later. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Van D. Bell, Jr.), was committed on 20 July; 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Dickey, III), on 22 July. Five Vietnamese battalions also entered the fight, and B-52s bombed the DMZ for the first time.

Hastings ended on 3 August, by which time 824 of the enemy had been killed, and 214 of his weapons captured. In Hastings, the Marines met a new kind of enemy—fresh North Vietnamese troops, fighting with their backs to their homeland. They found the well-trained light infantry tough and well-equipped with Chinese assault rifles, automatic weapons, and mortars. There was a savage satisfaction in meeting an enemy who stood and fought.

But why had the 324B Division crossed the DMZ? There is no way of knowing for certain, but two reasons suggest themselves.

First, perhaps the North Vietnamese were testing the short route into South Vietnam, to see if they could avoid the long, debilitating march through Laos.

Second, it might have been an almost desperate response to Marine successes in the Hue, Da Nang, and Chu Lai TAORs. Main force VC units had been badly mauled in engagements in the spring and early summer. Local force guerrillas were also hurting as the pacification effort and accompanying security operations regained the momentum they had lost during the Buddhist troubles.

Operation Prairie

When Hastings ended, three battalions stayed north to guard against a reentry by the North Vietnamese. Almost immediately, the 324B Division struck again. The new operation was called Prairie; the battleground was the same as for Hastings.

By the end of August, 110 more of the enemy had been killed, 60 more weapons captured. A fourth battalion was added to the operation in September. On
15 September, in a related operation, Deck House IV, the SLF (now the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, and HMM-363) went ashore north of Dong Ha. On 25 September, having added 254 more enemy to the lengthening list of the killed, the SLF reembarked. As September ended, the total killed in Prairie was 943. The operation lasted until 31 January 1967. At one time, seven Marine battalions and three ARVN battalions were involved, and the total of enemy killed went to 1,397.

**Fifth Marine Division**

The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, was the first element of the 5th Marine Division to reach the theater. Reactivation of the 5th Marine Division had been announced by the Secretary of Defense on 1 March 1966. The Division’s principal base was Camp Pendleton, where it filled in facilities left vacant by the departed 1st Marine Division. Regimental Landing Team-26—the 26th Marine Regiment with accompanying slices of Division troops, including a battalion of the 13th Marines, the 5th Marine Division’s artillery regiment—was activated first. The 27th Marines and 28th Marines followed in sequence.

First to command the reactivated 5th Division was Major General Robert E. Cushman, who was also the Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, and, since 7 February, Commanding General, 4th Marine Division. This last assignment resulted from the creation of a headquarters nucleus (29 officers, 69 enlisted men) to do mobilization planning for the 4th Marine Division which had not, of course, been called to active duty.

Manpower for the 5th Marine Division came out of an additional 55,000 spaces authorized for the Marine
Corps late in 1965. The Marine Corps was building toward a goal of 278,184 by 1 July 1967. Its peak during the Korean War had been 261,343, and its all-time high of 485,113 had been reached during World War II. In fiscal year 1966 the Marine Corps took in 80,000 volunteers and nearly 19,000 draftees.

**MANILA CONFERENCE AND PACIFICATION**

In Vietnam, the national election to choose members of the Constituent Assembly, who in turn would draft a new constitution, a step along the way to a return to civilian government, was held as scheduled on 11 September 1966. Experts guessed that perhaps 60 per cent of the 5,288,512 registered voters would go to South Vietnam’s 5,238 polling places. If as many as 70 per cent voted it would be considered a clear-cut victory for the Ky government. No one expected 80.8 per cent of the voters to turn out, which is what happened, despite VC terrorism (on election day alone, the VC killed 19, wounded 120) and Buddhist threats to boycott the election. In Hue, stronghold of the Buddhists, a surprising 84 per cent of the registered electorate cast ballots.

A month later, when he was in Australia and on his way to the Manila Conference, President Johnson, thinking perhaps of a growing list of military successes and of more political stability in South Vietnam, said, "I believe there is a light at the end of what has been a long and lonely tunnel."

Certainly, a part of the light at the end of the tunnel had been provided by III MAF operations. A balance sheet struck in mid-October 1966 would have shown:

—an 18-month build-up to close to 60,000 Marines.
—growth in Marine areas of responsibility from eight square miles and a population of 1,930 to nearly 1,800 square miles and almost 1,000,000 people.
—more than 150 regimental- and battalion-sized operations that accounted for a total of 7,300 of the enemy killed.
—more than 200,000 patrols, ambushes, and other small-unit actions that killed an additional 4,000 guerrillas.
—a cost to the Marine Corps and to the nation of 1,700 Marines dead and more than 9,000 wounded. (Over 80 per cent of the wounded returned to duty).

In October, General Greene said III MAF had "solid control of three separate coastal combat bases which we will eventually expand into one." Joining the three bases would give control of 2,700 square miles and nearly 2,000,000 people.

One of the efforts foremost in President Johnson's mind at Manila was pacification. A major change in policy was implicit in the low-key language of the communiqué issued at the end of the conference:

"The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built."

This represented agreement by Premier Ky that Popular Force and Regional Force units would not be the only ones assigned security missions; as many as half of the 120 regular ARVN maneuver battalions would be retrained for this kind of duty. (In August 1967 Ky announced the number would be 53.) Major General Nguyen Duc Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development, enthusiastically endorsed the new policy. A two-week orientation course was convened 2 November in Saigon, and each ARVN Division sent a 12-man team headed by a colonel or lieutenant colonel. The four corps headquarters and the elite General Reserve units—the Marine and Airborne Brigades—also sent representatives. Instruction was given by both Vietnamese and American officials.

At first it was envisaged that one battalion would be redeployed to each of the provinces in the respective ARVN divisions' zones of responsibility. Their job would be much like that performed by the 59th Regional Force Battalion and elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment in the Ngu Hanh Son program—primarily security for the work of the government cadres. In I Corps, 14 battalions would be so assigned.

When 1966 began there were about 15,000 trained cadres. During the year another 10,000 were graduated from the training center at Vung Tau. The total number was scheduled to go up to 60,000 in 1967. They were employed in 59-man teams, each of which, by rule of thumb, was supposed to be able to pacify two hamlets a year. Pacification entails eradication of the last vestiges of VC control, and the substitution of government control and services. When self-government and self-defense have been achieved, the team can move on to another hamlet. There are various indices by which a hamlet is judged "secure" or "pacified": one of the most pragmatic and useful is whether or not the chief sleeps in his hamlet at night. There are 11,000 hamlets in South Vietnam; 4,500 were considered to be under government control as 1966 ended, 3,000 contested, and 3,500 under Viet Cong domination.

On 23 November 1966 a directive placed all U. S. non-military agencies supporting revolutionary development under an Office of Civil Operations headed by
Deputy Ambassador William J. Porter, number two man in the U. S. Embassy in Saigon. A few days later it was announced that regional directors were being named for each of the four Corps areas. These regional directors would have under them all related civilian efforts; AID's program, JUSPAO's psychological operations and information services, CIA's pacification activities. Assigned to I Corps was Assistant Deputy Ambassador Henry L. T. Koren, 55, a career diplomat and number three man in the Embassy.

HEART OF THE MATTER

Over-all strategy had come around to recognizing what the Marines had insisted upon from the beginning: the overriding importance of the pacification effort. It was also beyond argument that, despite its special problems and setbacks—including the Buddhist Revolt and the North Vietnamese push across the DMZ—I Corps had made greater progress than the other Corps areas in coordinating Vietnamese and American approaches to pacification. The Joint Coordinating Council, the Golden Fleece and County Fair operations, and the Combined Action Companies could be cited as early experiments in cooperation that had worked.

By the end of 1966, for example, there were 58 Combined Action Platoons in being. In November one of these platoons got a rugged testing when An Trach, south of Da Nang, was hit by a North Vietnamese force guided by local guerrillas. The raiders got into the perimeter with small arms, rockets, grenades, and demolition charges. The defending platoon was battered but it held, and after a 40-minute firefight the attackers were driven off.

Near the end of 1966, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge said: "In this war, when we have beaten the army of North Vietnam and the main force battalions of the Viet Cong, we have simply won the opportunity to get at the heart of the matter, which is more than 150,000 terrorist guerrillas highly organized throughout the country and looking exactly like civilians."

General Walt said much the same. The battles against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong main force battalions were only a prelude. "Our most important job is eliminating the guerrilla." The ultimate solution lies in pacification. "I believe in all my heart that we are on the right track . . . but there are no dramatic changes in this war. It is slow because you are changing minds. That takes time."
Edwin H. Simmons
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps

Marine Corps Operations
In Vietnam, 1967

"More and more American units had to be moved into the battle zone, drawing them away from the task of gaining control of the rural population. 'The Marines are being stretched as taut as a bowstring,' wrote Giap."
In his essay, “Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1965–1966,” in Naval Review 1968, General Simmons began with the landing of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade at Da Nang on 8 March 1965—the first U. S. ground combat forces to be committed to the war—and ended with the large-scale operations of III Marine Amphibious Force in the fall and winter months of 1966 against North Vietnamese regulars who had crossed the Demilitarized Zone. In so doing, he traced the evolution of the Marine mission in Vietnam from the initially limited defensive role—that of defending the Da Nang air base—to a fully developed, balanced strategy involving five tasks:

1. Defense and development of secure base areas (specifically the coastal bases of Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Chu Lai).
2. Support of combat operations conducted by the South Vietnamese in I Corps (including the rules by which “co-ordination” was substituted for “unity of command” and how well this co-ordination worked).
3. Conduct of offensive operations against the Viet Cong (the respective merits of “search-and-destroy” and “clear-and-hold” operations were discussed).
4. Preparedness to provide forces elsewhere in South Vietnam (III MAF’s primary responsibility was I Corps Tactical Zone—the northernmost five provinces—but, when contingencies demanded it, the Marines had to be prepared for employment elsewhere).
5. Support of “Revolutionary Development.” (If there was a fundamental difference at this time in Army and Marine thinking as to how the war should be prosecuted, it lay probably in differences of opinion on the role U. S. forces should play in pacification. The Marine Corps was more sanguine about the chances of American success in this role, had gotten off to an earlier start, and had developed a number of procedures and techniques that showed promise.)

Last year’s piece ended on a cautiously optimistic note: gratification that the national strategies of the United States and South Vietnam had come to recognize—as explicitly stated at the Manila Conference—the overriding importance of the pacification efforts, sometimes called “the other war.”

---Editor.

AT YEAR’S BEGINNING

The Western calendar year 1967 began with a New Year’s truce, 48 hours of uneasy, distrustful stand-down, marred by 61 truce violations on the part of the enemy.

The 18 infantry battalions of the III Marine Amphibious Force (Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt) were engaged in a series of combat operations and continuing obligations that ranged the length and breadth of I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ), the northern five provinces of South Vietnam. Called “Marineland” by some, although this term was more in use in Saigon than in Da Nang, the area of operations stretched 225 miles, from the Demilitarized Zone south to the boundary with Binh Dinh Province and II Corps Tactical Zone.

Third Marine Division (Major General Wood B. Kyle) was all north of the Hai Van Mountains, the picturesque sharp-backed ridge which divides the northern two provinces from the rest of ICTZ. Four battalions were in Quang Tri Province, up against the DMZ; three were in Thua Thien Province. The 3d Division command post in October had displaced from Da Nang to Phu Bai, outside of Hue. A forward command post was set up at Dong Ha, where Route 9 crosses Route 1.

South of the Hai Van Mountains, 1st Marine Division (Major General Herman Nickerson, Jr.) had shifted its headquarters north in October from Chu Lai, moving into the bunkered command post, vacated by 3d Marine Division, on the reverse slope of Hill 327 three kilometers west of Da Nang. 1st Marine Division had seven battalions in Quang Nam Province.

At Chu Lai, 1st Marine Division had left behind Task Force X-Ray (Brigadier General William A. Stiles), a brigade-size force with two battalions in Quang Tin Province and two in Quang Ngai. Also in Quang Ngai were the Korean Marines—the 2d KMC “Blue Dragon” Brigade (Brigadier General Lee Bong Chool) with three infantry battalions, which were very much like the U. S. Marines in organization, training, and equipment.

(In the quantified war in Southeast Asia, the level of effort on the ground is measured by the number of infantry battalions involved, and the effort in the air by the number of tactical squadrons. This kind of statistical shorthand does the regiments, groups, and brigades a disservice, and makes the combat support and service support units almost anonymous, but its use is entrenched and convenient, and—with this note of apology—will be used here.)
To support the ground elements of III Marine Amphibious Force, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Major General Louis B. Robertshaw) was based at five principal fields: fixed-wing aircraft at Da Nang and Chu Lai; helicopters at Phu Bai, Marble Mountain near Da Nang, and Ky Ha at Chu Lai. From these airstrips the Wing also made its own significant, if unpublicized, contribution to the rest of the air war, making out-of-country as well as in-country strikes.

General Walt had at the year's beginning a total of 70,378 men under his command in III MAF—67,729 Marines and 2,649 sailors.

Sharing with III MAF the same five-province battlefield was the I Corps of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, whose operations were sometimes co-ordinated with, sometimes separate from, those of III MAF. Command relations officially prescribed between the two allies were based on co-operation and co-ordina-
Such a relationship does not diagram well and scarcely meets the classic requirement for unity of command, but it worked in ICTZ because the two commanders, Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam and Lieutenant General Walt, made it work.

The two northern provinces, Quang Tri and Thua Thien, where 3d Marine Division was engaged, continued to be the tactical area of 1st ARVN Division (Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong), which had now recovered from the dissensions of the Buddhist Revolt of the previous spring and summer and was once again a first-class fighting division. General Truong's headquarters was at Hue.

In Quang Nam, the center province, were the I Corps headquarters at Da Nang, the 51st ARVN Regiment—charged with pacification security south of Da Nang—and a number of separate battalions.

The southern two provinces, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai, continued to be the tactical area of the 2d ARVN Division (Colonel Nguyen Van Toan) with headquarters at the city of Quang Ngai.

As the year began, General Lam had 33 infantry battalions under his command, including the three Ranger battalions that made up his corps reserve and Vietnamese Marine battalions temporarily assigned from the general reserve. The present-for-duty strength of his battalions would average about one-third to one-half that of their U. S. Marine counterparts. Counting Regional Forces and Popular Forces, as well as regulars, General Lam had about 75,000 troops.

Monsoon Months

In northern Quang Tri Province, Operation Prairie, the battle which had begun in July 1966 as Operation Hastings, continued. At the height of the operation as many as six Marine battalions fought North Vietnamese Army regulars and Viet Cong. At the turn of the year there were four: 3d Marines (Colonel John P. Lanigan).
with its three organic infantry battalions, plus 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. The Marines were operating from a series of combat bases from Dong Ha west along Route 9 to Khe Sanh. The monsoon was just past its peak; the terrain was waterlogged, the rivers and streams swollen. Through the month of January contacts made were light.

On 31 January Prairie I ended, after 182 days: the longest and bloodiest Marine engagement of the war up to that time. Final Marine casualty lists showed 225 killed, 1,159 wounded, 1 missing in action. The enemy—NVA and VC together—lost 1,397 killed, 27 captured.

Prairie II was begun the next day, 1 February. The battleground was the same: the strip between Route 9 and the DMZ. With all evidence indicating that the NVA had withdrawn its major units north across the DMZ or west into Laos, Marine troop strength was reduced by one battalion and the mission was changed from search-and-destroy to clear-and-secure. Essentially, this meant countering NVA infiltration, suppressing VC activity in northern Quang Tri Province, and supporting the Revolutionary Development efforts of the 1st ARVN Division.

In Thua Thien Province, Operation Chinook, which had begun on 19 December 1966, was still being fought by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 26th Marines, under command of the 4th Marines headquarters (Colonel Alexander D. Cereghino). The mission was to block infiltration routes leading down from the mountains towards Hue and thus deny the Viet Cong access to the rice-rich coastal area. Late in the afternoon of 31 December a Marine reconnaissance patrol sighted a thousand enemy moving from the piedmont down into the Co Bi Than Tan Valley northwest of Hue. The New Year’s truce was on, but the enemy’s offensive intent was obvious. Within 30 minutes General Westmoreland had given permission to engage the enemy with air and artillery. The strikes and shoot looked good but it was difficult to gauge the results and heavy monsoon rains and the flooded valley severely hindered action on the ground.

On 19 January, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John M. Cummings) was returned to division control and the operation was continued by 3d Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Kurt L. Hoch). There was little additional contact until 27 January, when air and artillery killed 31 enemy.

The operation was ended with a bang on 6 February, the eve of the Tet truce: about 30 rounds of 81-mm. mortar fell that last day on the battalion command post, wounding five Marines. Action during Chinook killed 4 Marines and wounded 73; the enemy lost 159 dead, and 5 were taken prisoner.

January 1967 was a relatively quiet month for the 1st Marine Division. In Quang Nam Province there was only one large operation: Tuscaloosa, a four-day affair that began 24 January, 15 miles south of Da Nang. Seventy-nine enemy were killed and 17 weapons taken; the Marines had 17 killed, 52 wounded.

Further south, in Quang Ngai Province, Task Force X-Ray had begun Operation Sierra 12 December and continued it until 21 January. The enemy lost 111 killed, 9 prisoners, and 36 weapons. Marine casualties were 10 killed, 50 wounded. Then, on 26 January, Operation Desoto was begun 25 miles southeast of Quang Ngai City, involving two battalions: 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Dean E. Esslinger), and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Raymond J. O’Leary), with 7th Marines regimental headquarters (Colonel Charles C. Crossfield, II) in charge.

The idea behind Desoto was to insert elements of two battalions—about all that could be spared for the job—in the Duc Pho area and then work north and south along the axis of Highway One until the coastal area from Mo Duc south to the Binh Dinh border was cleared of VC. Much of the countryside was under water because of the northeast monsoon. A logistic support area was opened at Quang Ngai to which supplies could be trucked from Chu Lai. From Quang Ngai into Duc Pho supplies went by helo. When the weather was particularly bad, supply lines were shortened by stationing an LST as a supply ship off Duc Pho and using helicopters to bring supplies ashore.

Special Landing Force

Meanwhile, on 5 January, at the other end of South Vietnam, in IV Corps Tactical Zone, the Seventh Fleet’s Special Landing Force, at this time Battalion Landing Team 1/9 (1st Battalion, 9th Marines, reinforced) and Medium Helicopter Squadron HMM-362, landed 62 miles south of Saigon, between two mouths of the Mekong. The operation, called Deckhouse V, was the first use of U.S. combat troops in the Mekong Delta, and the SLF was working in conjunction with two Vietnamese Marine battalions. Intelligence proved bad and results were unimpressive: 21 enemy were killed, 7 Marines were killed, and 35 Marines were wounded. Fol-
An LVTP follows two Marines off the bow ramp of an LCM-8 during Operation Deckhouse VI. The core of the force conducting this amphibious landing was the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. When they re-embarked nine days later they had killed 204 enemy troops and lost five of their own.

PHOTOGRAPH BY JERRY L. MEANS

Following this first SLF operation of the year, there would be 22 more landings in 1967, all in I Corps, costing the enemy 2,113 dead.

ORGANIZATION

The day before the Deckhouse V landing, 4 January, Brigadier General Louis Metzger relieved Brigadier General Michael P. Ryan as Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade. The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, with headquarters at Okinawa and consisting essentially of a reinforced Marine regiment and composite Marine aircraft group, provided the battalion landing teams and helicopter squadrons which served afloat as the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force. It was also CinCPacFlt's strategic amphibious reserve for the Western Pacific, useful for contingencies not necessarily confined to Southeast Asia or Vietnam, and it offered a convenient, out-of-country base for battalions and squadrons rotated from South Vietnam for refitting and retraining.

The rotations that took place in January 1967 will serve to illustrate the cycle:

On 5 January, BLT 2/4 arrived at Da Nang from Okinawa. Four days later, 9 January, the battalion landing team it relieved, BLT 3/9, left South Vietnam for Okinawa. On 18 January, HMM-363 replaced HMM-362 (both were UH-34D squadrons) as the helicopter element of the Special Landing Force and HMM-362 came into Ky Ha Air Facility at Chu Lai. On 25 January, BLT 1/4 relieved 1/9 as the Special Landing Force. At the month's end, BLT 1/9 left Okinawa for Vietnam, relieving BLT 1/3 at Phu Bai. BLT 1/3, in turn, rotated to Okinawa on 8 February.

The infantry battalions as they moved in and out of the country came under various regimental headquarters. Rarely did a regiment command all its own battalions and no others. A regiment could have as few as one or as many as six battalions under its operational control. However, the tactical areas of responsibility assigned to a regiment tended to remain fixed. Thus, for the first part of 1967, 3d Marines was in Quang Tri Province along Route 9; 4th Marines was in Thua Thien Province north of Hue; 1st and 9th Marines were in Quang Nam Province, south and west of Da Nang; 5th Marines was disposed in Quang Tin Province, north of Chu Lai; and 7th Marines operated in Quang Ngai Province, south of Chu Lai. These areas of responsibility, while not rigid, were fairly constant. The advantages are obvious: the regimental commanders and their staffs got to know the terrain, their Vietnamese counterparts, the civilian populace, and the enemy very well.

In much the same way, although with a greater degree of permanence, the Marine aircraft groups continued to operate from the same air facilities, picking up and relinquishing operational control of the tactical squadrons as they moved in and out of country. The helicopter groups, MAG-16 and MAG-36, were at the air facilities at Marble Mountain and Ky Ha respectively. One fixed-wing group, MAG-11, was at Da Nang: two others, MAG-12 and MAG-13, were at Chu Lai.

NEW AIR ASSETS

On 31 December 1966 a detachment of 65 Marines from HMH-463 with four CH-53As arrived at Marble Mountain Air Facility. The detachment was declared operational on 7 January. The Sikorsky "Sea Stallions" replaced the few remaining CH-37s and for the first time in the war, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had an adequate heavy helicopter. It soon proved its value as a big lifter; it lifted disabled CH-46s as easily as UH-34s and UH-1Es. Before 1967 was over, 120 damaged UH-34s and CH-46s
would be retrieved by CH-53s. The CH-53A was the one new helicopter type to come into the active inventory during 1967.

An equally welcome new fixed-wing type had arrived on 1 November 1966, when VMA(AW)-242 (Lieutenant Colonel Howard Wolf) landed at Da Nang with twelve A-6As after a transpacific flight.

The A-6A, built by Grumman and called the “Intruder,” was lumpy and bulbous looking as a vintage 1950 attack aircraft. The crew of two sat side by side, the fuselage was rather fat, and the speed at which the two J-52 engines pushed it along was not particularly impressive. But on a typical mission, the A-6A could go out 400 miles with twenty-eight 500-pound bombs, loiter an hour, then drop its ordnance on a moving target hidden by darkness or weather. In the monsoon when nothing else could operate effectively, the “Intruder” came into its own. The A-6As were the first squadrons to get the designation “VMA(AW)” — Marine Attack Squadron, All-Weather.

The EA-6A, the electronic warfare version of the A-6A, had also joined the war in the fall of 1966. Largely unsung and unnoticed, partially because of the classified nature of some of its capabilities, the squadron using these airplanes, VMCF-1, had compiled an exceptional record since its deployment to Vietnam. A Marine composite reconnaissance squadron, or VMCF, operates two types of aircraft, one configured for photographic tasks and another for electronic countermeasures and reconnaissance. VMCF-1 had begun its operations in Vietnam with the RF-8A and EF-10B. Although aging, both craft had performed well until replaced by the RF-4B and augmented by the EA-6A.

On 20 January, VMCF-1’s unique contributions were recognized when the Secretary of the Navy approved the Navy Unit Commendation for “exceptionally meritorious service” from 17 April to 1 November 1965.

OPERATIONS EARLY IN 1967

In Quang Nam Province, Operation Independence involved two battalions of the 9th Marines (Colonel Robert M. Richards) from 1 February to 9 February. Most of the action, which was moderate, took place south of the Song Vu Gia. In all, 139 enemy dead were counted; 20 enemy were captured. Nine Marines were killed, 35 wounded.

Tet, the Lunar New Year holiday, caused a general stand-down from offensive operations. Even civic action activities were curtailed to avoid offending Vietnamese sensibilities. The enemy was more careless in his observance. During the supposed ceasefire, from 0700, 8 February, until 0700, 12 February, the Marines counted 141 enemy truce violations, ranging from sniper rounds to mortar barrages. Some of the “incidents” led to short, violent engagements. In the four-day period two Marines were killed, 37 wounded; 37 enemy soldiers were killed, 1 was captured.

At 0700, 12 February, 1st Marines (Colonel Donald L. Mallory) with three battalions began Operation Stone 12 miles south of Da Nang in a troublesome area much worked over previously. The operation was expected to last five days. Initial contact was light, but it increased and the operation went on until 22 February, by which time there were 291 enemy dead and 65 enemy prisoners. 1st Marines had lost nine killed, 77 wounded.

It was obvious that during Tet the enemy had been very busy north of the Ben Hai River. Aerial reconnaissance picked up formidable troop and supply movements headed south. All indicators pointed to a large-scale North Vietnamese offensive. On 25 February, 3rd MAF was given authority to fire artillery into the DMZ and the southern reaches of North Vietnam.

The 120-mm. mortar had been the heaviest weapon used against Marine air bases, but during the early morning hours of 27 February, about fifty 140-mm. Soviet-manufactured spin-stabilized rockets hit the three-square-mile area in and around the Da Nang main airfield, and hitting erratically, heavily damaged the hamlet of Ap Do close by, killing 32 civilians and injuring 40. The attack, as planned, apparently was to have been much heavier, for U.S. and Vietnamese patrols subsequently found 134 firing points within five miles of the base. The electrically-detonated weapon, reminiscent of the improvised rockets used by the Japanese against the beachhead at Iwo Jima, was so simple as to be primitive. The launcher was not much more than a tube fastened to a board planted in a shallow pit.

At Da Nang Air Base, 14 Air Force aircraft and 3 Marine F-8s were damaged, but were quickly repaired. Five U.S. Army communications vans were destroyed. Two airmen, eight soldiers, and one Marine were killed. Twenty-six other men were wounded.

To the south, the Special Landing Force, composed of BLT 1/4 (Lieutenant Colonel Jack Westerman) and HMM-363 (Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Huntington), landed on 16 February near Sa Huyn, at the southern tip of I Corps Tactical Zone, for Operation Deckhouse VI. On 25 February the SLF, commanded by Colonel Harry D. Wortman, re-embarked, leaving behind 204 enemy dead. Their own losses were five killed, 55
wounded. The Amphibious Ready Group dropped over the horizon and then came back again on the morning of 27 February, to land the SLF near Thach Tru. The 7th Marines had two battalions west of the landing area, engaged in Operation Desoto. Three ARVN battalions were similarly engaged. The situation was something of a replay of Double Eagle, fought on the same battleground a little over a year before. The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, re-embarked 3 March. The second phase of Deckhouse VI had accounted for 76 more enemy dead. One Marine was killed, 35 were wounded.

In mid-March, Desoto was reduced to one battalion: 3d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Bronars). On 24 March, the battalion combat base took 300 rounds of mortar and recoilless rifle fire, which killed three Marines, wounded seven and destroyed a large part of a fuel dispensing system as well as 20,000 gallons of jet fuel and 6,000 gallons of aviation gas.

Earlier, on the night of 14/15 February, the heroic defense by the ROK Marine Brigade’s 11th Company against a regimental-size attack southwest of Chu Lai triggered a series of actions, which resulted in the destruction of much of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment and perhaps some of the 21st NVA Regiment. With the enemy fixed in the hook of the Tra Khuc River, two ARVN airborne battalions were heloed into position to the west and behind the enemy, more ARVN blocked along the river to the south, a battalion of the 5th Marines went into position in the foothills to the northwest, and the ROK Marines pushed southwest from their base camps along Route 1. For their part in this operation, the 7th ARVN Airborne Battalion received the U. S. Presidential Unit Citation.

In Quang Tri Province, there were five Marine battalions in Prairie II when it was closed out at midnight, 18 March, after 46 days. Enemy losses were 693 killed, 20 prisoners, 137 weapons; the Marines lost 93 killed, 483 wounded, 1 missing. Prairie III began immediately with the same troops on the same battleground.

Next day, 20 March, 3d Marine Division got a new commanding general. Major General Kyle, who had commanded the division for a year, was returning to
Camp Pendleton to become Commanding General, 5th Marine Division. He was relieved by Major General Bruno A. Hochmuth, a tall, 56-year-old Texan.

Also on 20 March, the SLF—still BLT 1/4 and HMM-363—in co-ordination with Prairie III landed in Operation Beacon Hill, four miles south of the DMZ, near Gio Linh. That day Marine and ARVN positions near Gio Linh and Con Thien took about a thousand rounds of incoming mortar, rocket, and artillery fire, including 105-mm., 122-mm., and 152-mm. projectiles. Early the next day, 21 March, an ammunition convoy was ambushed two miles south of Gio Linh and severely cut up: seven trucks were destroyed, six other vehicles were badly damaged. During the evening of 30 March, about four miles northwest of Cam Lo, Company I, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was hit by two mortar barrages, then by a ground attack converging from north, west, and south. The enemy attacked three times before breaking off, leaving 67 dead and 23 weapons on the field. Marine casualties were 16 killed, 36 wounded.

On 1 April, Beacon Hill was ended and the SLF re-embarked. The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines claimed 334 enemy dead; 29 of their own had been killed, 230 wounded. Prairie III continued into April, but the fighting, most of which had taken place northwest of Cam Lo, seemed to be slackening. One Marine battalion was detached from the operation. On 19 April Prairie III was terminated. In the 30-day period, 252 enemy dead and 128 captured weapons had been reported; Marine losses were 55 killed, 529 wounded.

The Prairie series was not yet over. The scoreboard was wiped clean and Prairie IV began on 20 April, again at the same place and with the same four battalions. In some ways Prairie IV would prove most rugged of all. It was no longer called clear-and-hold: once again it was a search-and-destroy operation.

In Quang Nam Province, Operation Newcastle began on 22 March just north of An Hoa. In three violent days, 118 of the enemy were killed by 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Mallett C. Jackson). Five Marines were killed, 55 wounded. On 15 March there had been another rocket attack against Da Nang Air Base, with 140-mm. rockets, which wounded 16 U. S. servicemen and damaged three Air Force aircraft.

At the southern end of I Corps Tactical Zone, Operation Desoto was ended on 7 April. Enemy dead numbered 383, captured 9; the Marines had lost 76 killed, 573 wounded. Desoto was the Marines’ last big operation in Quang Ngai Province.
Arrival of the Army

On 9 April, the first of the Army brigades to arrive, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles, U. S. Army) with four battalions, flew in to Chu Lai from III Corps, mostly in C-130s. Heavy gear came in over the beach from LSTs. On 17 April, the 196th launched a three-day warm-up operation, Lawrence, to the west of Chu Lai along the ridge that forms the boundary between Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. There were no casualties on either side but it did give the Army troops the feel of the ground. On 20 April, a headquarters for all U. S. Army units operating out of Chu Lai, Task Force Oregon, was activated, under the command of Major General William B. Rosson, U. S. Army. Two days later, the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Colonel James G. Shanahan, U. S. Army), with two battalions, arrived by a combination of airlift and sealift to join Task Force Oregon. Supporting the two infantry brigades were four Army artillery battalions, an engineer battalion, and three light and one medium helicopter company. On the 26th, Task Force Oregon, under operational control of III MAF, took over responsibility for the Chu Lai tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) and the Chu Lai Defense Command.

On 12 April, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, told a Congressional committee that 40,000 more Marines were needed in Vietnam to do the job right. On 14 April, General William C. Westmoreland, ComUSMACV, told the press that his battle plan remained unchanged: “We’ll just go on bleeding them until Hanoi wakes up to the fact that his battle plan remained unchanged: “We’ll just go on bleeding them until Hanoi wakes up to the fact that they have bled their country to the point of national disaster for generations. Then they will have to reassess their position.”

Arrival of the Army troops allowed the 7th Marines with three battalions to move north from the Chu Lai TAOR to Da Nang.

Southern I Corps

The Viet Cong had one last stronghold between Chu Lai and Da Nang. Called variously Nui Loc Son Basin or Que Son Valley or Phuoc Valley, it was just south of the ridge that forms the Quang Nam-Quang Tin provincial boundary, west of Thang Binh, northwest of Tam Ky. It was an old battleground, much used by the ARVN, and the Marines had been there before, notably in Operation Harvest Moon in December 1965 and again in Operation Colorado in August 1966.

On 21 April, Company F from 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Marvin M. Hewlett), operating southward from Da Nang, brushed up against a Viet Cong battalion in prepared positions west of Route 1 not far from Thang Binh. The next day, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Esslinger), and 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Van D. Bell, Jr.), went into the valley in Operation Union.

In a scheme of maneuver reminiscent of Harvest Moon, the Marines landed in the valley by helo and drove northeast against the enemy while the 1st ARVN Ranger Group, with three battalions, attacked from Thang Binh southwest in an operation they called Lien Ket 102. Control was passed from 1st Marines (Colonel Emil J. Radies) to 5th Marines (Colonel Kenneth J. Houghton). There was a series of sharp clashes on 25 April. During the night of 27 April a Marine tripped a string of land mines and 33 Marines were wounded.

On 1 April, the Seventh Fleet had doubled its Special Landing Force capability by activating a second amphibious ready group and embarking a second battalion landing team and medium helicopter squadron from 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade. The two SLFs were designated “Alpha” and “Bravo.” On 28 April, SLF Alpha (Colonel James A. Gallo, Jr.), which included BLT 1/3 (Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Wickwire) and HMM-263 (Lieutenant Colonel Edward K. Kirby), landed 10 miles northwest of Tam Ky in Operation Beaver Cage, in concert with Union.

Toward the end of the month, enemy resistance slackened. The Vietnamese Rangers ended Lien Ket 102 on 29 April, having killed 15 enemy and losing 6 killed, 13 wounded. The 5th Marines’ count by this time was 282 confirmed killed, 290 probably killed, 34 prisoners.

Relative quiet continued during the first week of May, although on the 3d the Marines did receive 40 to 50 mortar rounds that wounded 27. Then on 10 May, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hilgartner), which had joined the operation, moved out in concert with 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, in an attack to the east around the flanks of Hill 110 on the north side of the valley. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, was north of...
Hill 110, moving along a valley, when they bumped into the enemy. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, came up to assist and ran into heavy fire from positions dug into Hill 110. In the day-long battle that ensued, there was much use of artillery and air. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines counted 91 enemy dead. Twenty-three of their own were killed.

On 13 and 14 May, the Marines fought a series of six engagements against small groups of the enemy, ranging up to company size. Enemy dead numbered 133: 12 Marines were killed, 59 wounded. On 15 May, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Esslinger) overran a fortified company position. Operation Union was terminated on 17 May, after 27 days. Enemies killed numbered 865, and there were another 777 "probable" battle deaths. In addition, the 5th Marines had picked up 173 prisoners and 70 enemy weapons. Marine losses were 110 killed, 473 wounded.

**Northern I Corps**

Concurrently with Operation Union, an even bloodier fight was going on in the northwest corner of Quang Tri Province; a fight which never got an official name of its own, but which could well be called the First Battle of Khe Sanh. Since September 1966, a Marine rifle company had been kept at Khe Sanh. On the morning of 24 April, 2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, working five miles northwest of Khe Sanh, brushed against an enemy force which at first seemed reluctant to fight. When the 1st Platoon of Company B, moving up to relieve the 2d Platoon, also made contact, the enemy attacked with great fury. The outnumbered Marine platoons lost 13 killed, 17 wounded. This fight seems to have caused the enemy to reveal prematurely his intention to attack Khe Sanh in force. His preparations were almost, but not quite, complete.

Next day, 25 April, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Gary Wilder) came into Khe Sanh by helo from Dong Ha. By 1830 that evening one of its companies was heavily engaged against an enemy who was entrenched on Hill 861 in at least battalion strength. The following day, 26 April, Colonel John P. Lanigan and Headquarters, 3d Marines, arrived from Camp Carroll and assumed command.

On 21 April, SLF Bravo—BLT 2/3 and HMM-164—had landed southeast of Quang Tri City in Operation Beacon Star. On 26 April, Beacon Star was broken off and 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. DeLong), was helilifted to Phu Bai, where it was picked up by Marine KC-130s and flown to Khe Sanh.

By nightfall, 28 April, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 3d Marines, advancing behind a curtain of air strikes and artillery fire, had taken Hill 861. On 30 April, the 2d Battalion moved out against Hill 881 North, two miles to the northwest; and the 3d Battalion went after Hill 881 South, three miles to the west. Two companies of the 3d Battalion reached the top of Hill 881 South by the evening of 30 April. Enemy fire was heavy and so were Marine casualties. The two companies were pulled back 750 meters to permit the objective to be pounded again with supporting arms. Next day, 1 May, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew 107 close air support and 45 direct air support sorties, a near record for support of one battalion in a single day. The assault was renewed on 2 May and by midafternoon Hill 881 South was taken.

Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion was heavily engaged on Hill 881 North with what was now estimated to be a regiment, well dug-in and well camouflaged. During the early morning of 3 May, Company E was hit by a heavy mortar attack, and then an assault by two NVA companies. A platoon from Company F reinforced Company E from the south; Company H counterattacked from the north. The enemy broke off and pulled back, pursued by air and artillery, leaving Hill 881 North to the Marines. The hill was secured 4 May and mopping up began the next day. The Marines found 35 sleeping bunkers with log and dirt overhead cover, many fighting holes, some weapons and ammunition, and 18 dead buried in hasty graves.

On 9 May, Company F, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, patrolling two and a half miles north-northwest of Hill 881 North, found 203 more enemy graves. Not all the enemy in the vicinity were dead, however. While engaged in counting graves, Company F came under heavy fire, and Company E moved up to take off the pressure. In this sharp fire fight, 24 Marines were killed and 19 wounded. The enemy body count was 31.

Just after midnight that night, a seven-man reconnaissance team patrolling five miles north-northwest of Hill 881 North was attacked. In an attempt to extract them, three CH-46s were hit, one pilot was killed and a co-pilot and six crew members were wounded.
ground, four of the Marines were dead. The three remaining, all wounded, were lifted out after daylight.

On 12 May, Beacon Star was ended. The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, was withdrawn from Khe Sanh and re-embarked aboard the Amphibious Ready Group. Next day, 13 May, the 3d Marines regimental headquarters (Lanigan) and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (Wilder), were relieved at Khe Sanh by the 26th Marines regimental headquarters (Colonel John J. Padley), which had arrived on 25 April at Da Nang from Okinawa, and the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Newton).

It was the beginning of a long tenure at Khe Sanh for the 26th Marines, and the end of the First Battle of Khe Sanh. Enemy losses were reported as 940 killed. There were also two prisoners and 41 captured weapons. Marine losses were 155 killed, 424 wounded.

Much credit for the victory at Khe Sanh must go to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Between 24 April and 6 May they flew 1,004 sorties in the Khe Sanh area and used 1,502 tons of ordnance in around-the-clock close and direct air support missions. Fortunately, the Wing's inventory of medium attack aircraft had been doubled on 1 April, with the arrival of a second A-6A squadron, VMA(AW)-533 (Lieutenant Colonel Williams P. Brown). Also, not to be overlooked was the tremendous airlift provided by Marine helicopters and the fixed-wing KC-130s, employed in their primary role.

Meanwhile, east of Khe Sanh, along Route 9, Prairie IV had been grinding away since 20 April. The frustrated North Vietnamese attack against Khe Sanh was obviously only part of a comprehensive enemy offensive. Route 9 was being cut repeatedly by ambushes and sappers trying to hinder the reinforcement of Khe Sanh. Marine and ARVN positions south of the DMZ, particularly the fire support bases at Gio Linh and Camp Carroll, were fired on repeatedly, as were the logistic bases and aviation facilities at Dong Ha.

Early on 8 May, on the thirteenth anniversary of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, there were particularly heavy mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks (fired in large part from sanctuary north of the DMZ) against Gio Linh, Con Thien, Camp Carroll, and Dong Ha. At Con Thien, following a 250-round mortar barrage, two enemy battalions and a sapper unit assaulted the position of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Theodore J. Willis). The main thrust hit Company D. Forty-four Marines were killed and 100 wounded, but the enemy lost 197 men killed and 10 taken prisoner, and over 100 weapons captured.

On 18 May the Marines began the ambitious task of ridding the southern half of the DMZ of enemy forces and installations in Operation Hickory, under control of 9th Marines (Colonel Edward E. Hammerbeck). It was the first time the Marines had ventured into the DMZ itself in force. Supported by a massive Navy-
Marine-Air Force air effort, executed in conjunction with a landing by SLF Alpha, and co-ordinated with a parallel sweep by the 1st ARVN Division, the planned scheme of maneuver was almost kaleidoscopic in its twistings and turnings.

Two Marine battalions—the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John J. Peeler) and 2d Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William J. Masterpool)—led off by moving northward from their attack positions near Con Thien. Almost simultaneously, a third battalion—the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Wendell N. Vest), which had just arrived at Dong Ha by KC-130s from Okinawa—was brought in by helicopter to positions northwest of Con Thien close against the Ben Hai River. The Marine thrusts precipitated heavy fighting that lasted 48 hours and killed 61 enemy.

Meanwhile, under cover of darkness, five battalions of the 1st ARVN Division in Operation Lam Son 54 moved north from Gio Linh along the axis of Route 1 to just below where Freedom Bridge crosses the Ben Hai, then peeled off the road to the right and left, and began sweeping southward.

Special Landing Force Alpha—still 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (Wickwire)—this same day made a co-ordinated amphibious assault, using helicopters and surface craft, into the northeasternmost corner of the DMZ, just below the mouth of the Ben Hai. The assault followed a tight time schedule to take advantage of the preparatory fires being delivered by five destroyers and two cruisers.

"The ARG accomplished its mission without a flaw," said Colonel Gallo, the SLF Alpha commander. "The beachmaster unit in conjunction with the shore party team also performed in an outstanding manner under heavy shelling by 85-mm. guns from north of the Ben Hai."

There was heavy resistance almost immediately. On the sandy, almost desert-like terrain, tracked vehicles played an important part. An attack westward along the river bank killed 61 enemy. The SLF then faced left and swept southward parallel to the ARVN sweep.

On 20 May SLF Bravo—2d Battalion, 3d Marines (DeLong)—joined Hickory in Operation Belt Tight, moving directly into the DMZ just south of the Ben Hai. The battalion took some fire in the initial landing zones,
Whether he's transported by boat or by helicopter, eventually the rifleman has to get out and walk, as these Marines of 1/4 are doing. The flat country along the coast in I Corps quickly gives way to hills and then to mountains.

but by moving a few hundred meters south found smoother going. Seventy-one of the enemy were killed in the first 48 hours.

Part of Hickory was the removal of an estimated 13,000 civilians from the buffer zone to the recently-constructed Cam Lo refugee center, by truck, amtrac, and helicopter. The Vietnamese Police Field Forces supervised the relocation.

The operation was over on 28 May. As complicated as it was, it seemed to have completely surprised the enemy. Half a dozen enemy battalions were caught off guard south of the DMZ. Landing 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, and 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, behind the NVA forces undoubtedly helped to crack the enemy's defenses and caused him to withdraw northwest into the hills and northeast across the Ben Hai. At least 815 of the enemy were dead; 445 killed by the Marines, 370 by the ARVN. The enemy had been served notice that the southern half of the DMZ would no longer be inviolate to ground operations. His command and control arrangements had been disrupted (what appeared to be a division command post bunker complex had been overrun), he had lost much in supplies and ammunition, and his fortification had been dismantled. But the Marines were under no illusions that the results of the operation were permanent.

After Hickory, seven Marine battalions returned to Prairie IV, which now included all of Quang Tri Province, except the area of operations around Khe Sanh.

On 29 May, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Vest), ran into heavy resistance on Hill 174, about five miles southwest of Con Thien. With the substantial support of mortars, artillery, and air strikes, the enemy was dislodged by 31 May. In mopping up, 20 bodies were counted. Marine losses were 6 killed, 91 wounded.

That was the last action of Prairie IV, in which 489 enemy had been killed, 9 captured, and 150 weapons seized. Losses to the Marines had been 164 killed, 999 wounded. The Prairie series was over.

The new operation, Cimarron, began 1 June with the same troops (now numbering six battalions), and in the same area, with action focused five miles southwest of Con Thien. Enemy action continued to be predominantly artillery and mortar attacks against Marine and ARVN combat bases, primarily Gio Linh and Con Thien. Our own actions were mainly counterbattery fires and heavy patrolling.

**COMMAND CHANGES**

A number of command changes took place in May and June. On 18 May, Brigadier General Jacob E. Glick relieved Brigadier General Metzger as Commanding General, 9th Amphibious Brigade, and Metzger became the assistant division commander, 3d Marine Division.

On 1 June, Lieutenant General Lewis "Uncle Lew" W. Walt, who had led III MAF for two years and was identified in the public's mind perhaps more than any other single individual with the Marine effort in Vietnam, was relieved by Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. Cushman, who had won a Navy Cross at Guam in 1944, had served for four years on the staff of Vice President Richard Nixon as Assistant for National Security Affairs. He had been Deputy Commander, III MAF, since April.

Major General Herman Nickerson, Jr., holder of the Army's Distinguished Service Cross for heroism in Korea and Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, since October 1966, became Deputy Commander, III MAF. Major General Donn J. Robertson, with a Navy Cross for Iwo Jima, became the new Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.

There was also a change of command for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Major General Norman J. Anderson, most recently Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, relieved Major General Louis "Ben" Robertshaw on 2 June.

**Marine Tactical Data System**

On 4 June Marine Air Control Squadron 4 (MACS-4) (Lieutenant Colonel Conrad P. Buschmann) arrived at Da Nang from Camp Pendleton to relieve MACS-7 (Major Thomas K. Burk, Jr.). On 19 June, the relief completed, MACS-7 departed for Camp Pendleton. This was, however, more than the routine rotation of like units. The mission of a MACS is to "install, maintain, and operate ground facilities for aerial surveillance and control of friendly aircraft and missiles, and for the detection and interception of hostile aircraft and missiles in conducting anti-air warfare in support of the Fleet Marine Force." MACS-4 brought with it a new and revolutionary capability to discharge this mission; namely, the Marine Tactical Data System (MTDS),
An Ontos, a vehicle peculiar to the Marine Corps, churns its way toward the hills. Intended for use against tanks, the Ontos has not found much employment in Vietnam, except against hostile field fortifications.

which was a mobile, land-based, semi-automatic air defense and control facility. Modular in design so that it could be brought ashore in increments, the MTDS at Da Nang was the first real-time air-transportable tactical data system to be employed in an active combat environment. The MTDS tied in with Seventh Fleet tactical data systems, and interfaced with in-country Air Force air control systems.

SPRING AND SUMMER WARFARE
Quang Tin Province

Fresh fighting broke out to the south, in Quang Tin Province, on 26 May when the 5th Marines with two battalions responded to intelligence reports that the 3d and 21st North Vietnamese Regiments were in the Nui Loc Son Basin. The new operation, called Union II, was co-ordinated, as before, with the 6th ARVN Regiment and the 1st ARVN Ranger Group. In the initial action, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Esslinger) made a helicopter assault on elements of the 3d NVA Regiment near Vinh Huy some 19 miles northwest of Tami Ky, and fought two stiff actions the first day, killing 171 North Vietnamese. Thirty-seven Marines were killed, 66 wounded.

The enemy’s 21st Regiment appeared to be to the southeast so the Marines faced around and reoriented their attack. The enemy’s main position proved to be in the hills along the southern rim of the valley. On 2 June elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, pushed up against a well-fortified enemy position. A co-ordinated assault was made, with much use of artillery and 138 air strikes. In bunker-to-bunker fighting, 540 of the enemy were killed. The Marines lost 73 killed, 139 wounded.

On 5 June, after 11 days, Union II ended. Together, Union I and Union II had accounted for 1,566 enemy dead, 196 enemy captured, and 184 weapons seized. Marine losses for both operations totalled 220 killed, 714 wounded. For action in Union I and II, the 5th Marine Regiment (Reinforced) won the Presidential Unit Citation.

Operation Adair followed Union II. It began 15 June when Company K, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, engaged what was estimated to be two companies near the railroad four miles south of Thang Binh. By nightfall, the 5th Marines, with two battalions, had cordoned off the area and 24 enemy were dead. SLF Bravo—2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Major Wendell O. Beard) and HMM-164 (Lieutenant Colonel Rodney D. McKitrick)—came ashore on 18 June in Operation Beacon Torch, landing six miles south of Hoi An. They pushed toward Pagoda Valley, a three-mile wide corridor much used as an avenue of approach by the Viet Cong. At noon, about two miles in from the beach, one company hit an estimated 100 enemy. Air and artillery were brought promptly to bear, the company closed, and 50 enemy were killed before the others broke off and faded away.

Adair was ended 25 June; closing count was 74 enemy dead, 11 Marines dead, 41 wounded. Operation Calhoun began the same day at the western end of the Nui Loc Son Valley, and in conjunction with Beacon Torch continued until both ended 2 July. The combined results were 115 enemy killed. Marine losses were 17 killed, 111 wounded.
**Quang Tri Province**

At Khe Sanh, operations—now named Crockett—continued. On 6 June shortly after midnight, about fifty of the enemy attacked a radio relay station on Hill 950, five miles north of the airstrip. A nearby reconnaissance team brought artillery to bear and the 18-man Marine radio detachment succeeded in driving the enemy off, although six Marines were killed and two wounded. The North Vietnamese left behind ten dead. More important, a prisoner was taken who confirmed the presence of the North Vietnamese 325C Division.

Next day, 7 June, Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, engaged two enemy companies a mile northwest of Hill 881 South. The Marine company was reinforced and there was a heavy, two-hour fight. The enemy broke contact, leaving 63 dead on the field. The Marines had lost 18 killed, 27 wounded.

In the face of the enemy's buildup around Khe Sanh, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines (Hoch), was moved in to join the 1st Battalion. With the increase in forces, 26th Marines was able to patrol and man outposts in the surrounding hills more extensively.

During the night of 26/27 June there were heavy mortar, artillery, and rocket attacks against five separate Marine positions, killing 5 Marines, wounding 125. A patrol from a combined action platoon, looking for mortar positions next morning, ran into two enemy companies on Hill 689, one mile west of Hill 881 South. Companies I and L, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, came up by foot and by helicopter, and Hill 689 was taken by nightfall. Twenty-eight enemy bodies were counted; Marines losses were 10 killed, 28 wounded.

This action appeared to end the enemy's probing. There were fewer contacts in the first two weeks of July and Crockett was terminated 16 July; since 13 May 206 enemy had been killed, 2 captured, 26 weapons taken. The Marines had lost 52 killed, 555 wounded. With Crockett ended, Operation Ardmore was begun.
Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, Operation Cimarron had gone on with five Marine battalions. During its course, a “firebreak” 600 meters wide and 13.5 kilometers long was cut from Con Thien through Gio Linh to the sea. The plan was to develop this cleared area, skinned of all significant vegetation, into a major obstacle to troop movement, using barbed wire, minefields, sensors, watchtowers, and strongpoints. By the end of June, the 11th Engineer Battalion had invested 10,000 man-hours and nearly 5,000 tractor-hours in its development.

On 2 July Cimarron was ended and Operation Buffalo begun. In its 31 days Cimarron cost the enemy 245 dead. The Marines lost 38 killed, 470 wounded. During the course of Cimarron, Marine aircraft flew 1,046 strike missions and naval guns fired 245 missions.

Buffalo was a short and violent operation. On the morning of 2 July, Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, patrolling about a mile and a half northeast of Con Thien, met an entrenched enemy force, apparently small. As Company B moved against it, the enemy riposted with heavy attacks against the Marine front and flanks. Company B was split by the action into three groups. Company C, on its way to help, also took heavy casualties. The enemy was supporting his attacks with massed mortars and artillery. The remainder of the 1st Battalion (Major Donald F. Fulham) joined the fight. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (Major William J. Woodring, Jr.), was brought in from Dong Ha by helicopter and at midafternoon jumped off in an attack against the enemy’s left flank.

Estimates of the size of the enemy force rose to five battalions. During the first day’s fighting 84 Marines were killed, 190 were wounded, one was reported missing. On the second day, 3 July, SLF Alpha—1st Battalion, 3d Marines (Wickwire), and HMM-362 Lieutenant Colonel Nick J. Kapetan)—landed one mile southeast of Con Thien. Next day, 4 July, SLF Bravo—2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Beard), and HMM-164 (McKitrick)—came in, landing near Cam Lo and attacking north.

The fifth of July was quiet. On 6 July, the enemy attacked the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, near Con Thien, and was beaten off, leaving 35 dead. While this was going on, Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, located some 200 North Vietnamese troops in a draw two miles northeast of Con Thien, brought artillery to bear, and then closed. Enemy dead were counted at 154; Company A had no casualties. About midnight on the same day, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, surprised an enemy battalion moving in column down a trail three miles northeast of Con Thien, and killed 155, losing three of their own. Fighting of almost equal intensity continued through 9 July, and then fell off. Between 2 July and 10 July, in support of Buffalo, Marine aviation delivered 1,066 tons of ordnance, Marine and Army artillery fired 40,000 rounds, and ships of the Seventh Fleet shot 1,500 rounds of five- and eight-inch shells. The operation was ended on 14 July. The enemy had lost 1,301 dead, two prisoners, and 100 weapons, including 21 mortars and machine guns; Marine losses were 159 killed, 45 wounded.

On the heels of Buffalo, a sweep of the southern half of the DMZ was ordered. Begun on 14 July and called Hickory II, its scheme of maneuver was almost identical with that of Hickory I. The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Beard), screened the left flank. Two other Marine battalions drove north toward the Ben Hai, wheeled around, and swept southward to the Cam Lo River, the idea being to clear the area south of the DMZ called “Leatherneck Square.” Three ARVN battalions moved up Route 1 to the Ben Hai, peeled off to the right and left, and started southward. On the coast, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Albert R. Bowman, II) churned northward through the sand from the Cua Viet. There was little resistance. The sharpest action took place on 15 July, when the 1st Amtracs just east of Gio Linh killed 25 of the enemy. Hickory II was over on 16 July. The enemy had lost 57 men and 19 weapons. Marine casualties were 4 killed, 99 wounded.

**Thua Thien Province**

During the spring and summer, things were relatively quiet for the 4th Marines in Thua Thien Province. The general mission of the regiment was to protect the Phu Bai base area, screen the enemy’s avenues of approach to Hue, and support the 1st ARVN Division’s Revolutionary Development efforts. Route 1 was to be kept open north to Quang Tri and south to Quang Nam. Chinnock II, which had begun 17 February, ended 4 April, with 104 enemy dead and five prisoners and 30 weapons captured. Shawnee, a three-battalion effort, began 22 April. By mid-May it was necessary to shift two battalions north to the heavier fighting along the DMZ. On 22 May Shawnee was cut back to one battalion and redesignated Choctaw. On 2 June, SLF Alpha—1st Battalion, 3d Marines (Wickwire), and HMM-263 (Kirby)—landed 18 miles northeast of Hue in Operation Bear Bite. The Choctaw battalion had strung itself out along Route 1 to act as a blocking force and SLF pushed
toward them, but results were slight. After ten days, the SLF re-embarked, claiming 21 enemy killed. Three Marines were dead, 29 wounded. Choctaw went on until 10 July. The tally for Shawnee and Choctaw together was 292 enemy killed, 27 prisoners, 124 weapons. Marine losses totalled 31 killed, 292 wounded.

Since early spring it had been apparent that the enemy was developing a major logistics base in the A Shau Valley west of Hue. They had held virtually uncontested control of the valley since the fall of the Special Forces camp at A Shau in the spring of 1966.

On 3 June, the 4th Marines (Colonel Roy H. Thompson) with one battalion and engineers, set out in Operation Cumberland to establish a firebase base some 17 miles west of Phu Bai to counter the threat in the A Shau Valley. The first step was to open Route 547. There was very little enemy interference and by the end of June 20 kilometers of road had been rehabilitated. On 3 August elements of two batteries of long-range U. S. Army 175-mm. guns went into action from the new fire base. Cumberland went on until 15 September, when it was closed down because of the impending monsoon.

**Quang Ngai Province**

Meanwhile, on 7 May, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson, U. S. Army), had closed Duc Pho in southern Quang Ngai Province, adding three more battalions to Task Force Oregon’s strength, making it equivalent to a division. Four days later Operation Malheur was begun. Since Desoto, Viet Cong main force and North Vietnamese Army units had been lingering just west of Duc Pho. In a series of company size actions, the Army, working west of Route 1, drove northward as far as Mo Duc. Malheur I ended 8 June and Malheur II was begun the same day. Movement was now southward; the area west of Route 1 was cleared to the Binh Dinh border. Malheur II ended 2 August. Breathing room had been created for Revolutionary Development in southern Quang Ngai Province and III MAF could boast that Route 1 was open for the full length of I Corps Tactical Zone. In the Malheur series, the U. S. Army killed a total of 480 enemy, took 28 prisoners, and seized 308 weapons. American losses were 45 killed, 565 wounded.

Malheur II was succeeded by Hood River. This Task Force Oregon operation, in conjunction with the Korean Marine Brigade’s Dragon Head V and 2d ARVN Division’s Lien Ket 110, lasted 11 days in an area 25 miles west of Quang Ngai City. When the operation closed out on 13 August, enemy losses stood at 78 killed, 7 prisoners, and 45 weapons. Army losses were 3 killed, 38 wounded.

**Late Summer Battles**

South of the DMZ, in Quang Tri Province, Kingfisher was begun 16 July with five battalions. Succeeding the Prairie-Cimarron series, its mission was the same: to deny the enemy’s entry into the province. Contact was insignificant until 28 July when the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William D. Kent), working in the DMZ, discovered an unoccupied enemy base at Thon Cam Son, five miles northwest of Con Thien. With tanks and other tracked vehicles to provide crushing action, the battalion systematically destroyed over 150 bunkers. Next morning, Company H, at the head of the battalion column moving south, ran into heavy resistance. Companies F and G joined the fight. Company I from the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, came up from the south against the enemy’s rear. The North Vietnamese troops broke off, leaving 48 dead. Marine losses were 24 killed and 142 wounded seriously enough to require evacuation.

For the next several weeks skirmishes were small and scattered. Then on 21 August, at about noon, a Marine convoy was caught in an ambush where Route 9 passes through a defile just north of Ca Lu. One Marine company from the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, came down from Thon Son Lam, another moved up from Ca Lu, and the NVA ambushed—estimated to be a battalion—were themselves caught. Air and artillery support were liberally used during the six-hour fight. At dusk the enemy broke off and fled into the mountains to the west. One hundred and nine enemy were confirmed killed and it was guessed that an additional 305 were dead. Three U. S. Marines and three soldiers were dead, 35 others wounded.

On 7 September there was a replay of the attempted ambush at almost exactly the same site. Again, this time at mid-morning, a Marine convoy was ambushed in the defile; Marine companies again closed from north and south. This time the fight lasted eight hours and when it ended 92 NVA were confirmed dead, 93 more were probably dead; five Americans were dead and 56 wounded.

West of Ca Lu, at Khe Sanh, things were singularly quiet. The 26th Marines (Padley), engaged in Operation Ardmore through the month of August, made no significant contact.

In Quang Nam Province, the enemy made a heavy rocket attack on the Da Nang Air Base shortly after midnight, 15 July, landing fifty 122-mm. rockets on tar-
get. Within three minutes, an Air Force C-47 "dragon" on air alert had the launching sites under fire. Two minutes later artillery counterbattery fires were underway. The launchers were in Hoa Hung Village, six miles southwest of Da Nang. There were five firing sites, each with six positions. Eight U. S. airmen were killed, 138 wounded; 37 Marines were wounded. Material damage was considerable. The Marines lost two F-8Es, and a third was badly damaged. The Air Force lost two C-130s and six F-4Cs. Several other Air Force aircraft were badly damaged. This was the first time the Russian-made 122-mm. rocket—lighter, more accurate, and with a longer range than the 140-mm., 10,100 meters compared to 8,800—had been used south of the DMZ in I Corps, and it soon became the enemy's favorite weapon for stand-off attacks.

The densely populated area south of the river at Hoi An and east of Route 1 continued to be a problem. On 1 August, the 1st Marines (Radics) in Operation Pike boxed off the area with two battalions, then conducted a sweep. One hundred enemy were killed; Marine casualties were 8 dead, 60 wounded.
Each one keeping his distance from his neighbor, Marines cross slippery dikes in rice paddies not far from Thang Binh about twenty-five miles south of Da Nang during Operation Union in April 1967.

South and west of here, in the familiar Thang Binh–Tam Ky–Hiep Duc triangle, the enemy was recovering from the damage done by Union II. On 11 August a new operation, Cochise, was mounted by the 5th Marines (Colonel Stanley Davis), using three Marine battalions including SLF Alpha. As before, the new operation was co-ordinated with the 2d ARVN Division and Ranger elements. On 12 August, a Ranger battalion engaged two enemy battalions 16 miles west of Tam Ky; the Rangers killed 197, took seven prisoners and 42 weapons. Four days later, on the night of 16 August, the enemy probed Marine defensive positions twice and was turned back. The next morning, 17 August, a Marine helicopter crew spied a Viet Cong company eight miles west of Tam Ky. Company L, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, was hel'lifted into the area after Company I. 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, established blocking positions; 40 Viet Cong were killed and 15 weapons captured. Cochise was ended on 28 August. Of the enemy 156 were killed and 13 captured; 41 weapons were taken. Marine losses were 10 killed, 81 wounded. The ARVN in their accompanying operation, Lien Ket 112, killed 206 enemy soldiers and captured 42 weapons. Eighty-two ARVN were reported dead, 170 wounded and 3 missing.

South of the Cochise area, Task Force Oregon was concurrently conducting Operation Benton. This brigade-size operation had begun on 14 August with a helo landing against a suspected enemy base area. The Army then drove south and east. The enemy avoided any large-scale action but there were numerous skirmishes involving platoons and companies. By the end of the operation, 1 September, the enemy had lost 397 men killed and nine prisoners, and 158 weapons. U. S. Army losses were 41 killed, 263 wounded.

The results of Cochise and Benton had scarcely been posted when fresh fighting flared up in the Nui Loc Son Basin. At daybreak, 4 September, Companies B and D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Hilgartner), were heavily engaged by an enemy battalion near Hill 63. Companies K and M from the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Webster), moved by helo at 0900 into an attack position northeast of the action while Company I, with tanks, came overland from Thang Binh. In 36 hours of fighting, the Marines killed 190 enemy soldiers and captured 54 weapons. The new operation was named Swift. There was heavy fighting again on 6 September, this time three miles east of Nui Loc Son. Companies of the enemy moved against Marine positions in a series of probes; the Marines retaliated with a night counterattack. At 0200 the enemy broke off, leaving 150 dead on the field. On 7 September, Task Force X-Ray (Brigadier General Foster C. Lahue, U. S. Marine Corps) was activated to take over command and control of the fighting in the Nui Loc Son Basin and on 10 September, the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Peter P. Petro, U. S. Army) joined the operation. Swift went on until 15 September; the final count being 571 enemy dead, eight prisoners, and 85 captured weapons. American casualties were 127 dead, 362 wounded.

Enemy Attacks on U. S. Bases

The end of August and beginning of September saw additional attacks by fire on III MAF's major bases. On 28 August Dong Ha was hit by three separate attacks, totalling perhaps 150 rocket and artillery rounds, which destroyed two aircraft and damaged 24. A fuel dump and an ammunition dump exploded. One Marine was killed; 17 were slightly wounded. The same night, Marble Mountain Air Facility was hit by twenty-four 140-mm. rockets. Three helicopters were destroyed and 20 were damaged to varying extent. Five Marines were dead, 84 wounded. Two days later, on 30 August, 50 mortar rounds hit Phu Bai, causing significant damage to four helicopters, light damage to 14 more. Three Marines were killed and 13 wounded. On 2 September, at Da Nang, the air base and also the Force Logistic Command area were hit by 140-mm. and 122-mm. rockets. Three Air Force transports were heavily damaged; 9 U. S. airmen were wounded. At the Force Logistic Command, one Marine was killed, 61 wounded. Fortunately, the majority of the wounds caused by all these rocket and mortar attacks were slight. Judging from the number of positions and amount of abandoned ordnance found by patrols working out of Dong Ha and Da Nang, there was reason to believe that the bombardments, if they had not been interrupted by swift American reaction, might have been much heavier.

“Mcnamara’s Wall”

On 7 September, Defense Secretary McNamara announced a decision to construct a barrier along the northern border of South Vietnam, the equipment for
the barrier to range from “barbed wire to highly sophisticated devices.” Secretary McNamara declined to say whether the barrier would extend westward into Laos across the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

President-elect Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon was more outspoken. He stressed that the barrier would only be in South Vietnamese territory, “not across the border of Laos. I don’t believe the Laotian government will allow it, unless they change their policies. . . . We already have a barrier between Gio Linh and Con Thien that is 11 kilometers—7 miles—and now we would like to extend it to the west and make it better.”

Mr. McNamara accompanied his announcement with a restriction barring any further public discussion of the barrier by members of the Defense Department, military or civilian.

In the August hearings by the Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness, chaired by Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, the value of a barrier system had been discussed as an alternative or supplement to the bombing of North Vietnam. Even from the heavily censored transcripts which were eventually released it was obvious that military opinion of the barrier plan was mixed. General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave a qualified endorsement. General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army, was more pessimistic. “I think it is going to have minimum effectiveness for the cost that has been associated with it. . . . My own description of it is that it is like closing the window and leaving the door open.”

General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Marine Commandant, was characteristically direct in his evaluation. “From the very beginning I have been opposed to this project.” he testified.

The concept of a physical barrier across the waist of Vietnam was not new, of course. During the spring and summer months discussion and conjecture in the press increased as the beginnings of a fortified system south of the DMZ became more obvious. The “firebreak” from Con Thien to Gio Linh and the fortification of strong points along Route 9 were visible for all to see.

“McNamara’s Wall,” as it was quickly labeled, brought quick and facile comparisons in the press to other defensive systems, including the Great Wall of China, the Maginot Line, and most pertinent comparison of all—the two great walls of Dong Hoi and Truong Duc which run about 25 miles north of the DMZ and which were erected in the seventeenth century by the Nguyen dynasty to hold off the invading Trinh emperors.

There was very little enthusiasm for the barrier among the Marines deployed south of the DMZ. “Hell,” said a lance corporal, “They’ll just walk around it.” A Marine officer expanded on this thesis. “With these bastards, you’d have to build the zone all the way to India and it would take the whole Marine Corps and half the Army to guard it,” he said. “Even then they’d probably burrow under it.”

### THE SIEGE OF CON THIEN

On 11 September, Task Force Oregon began Operation Wheeler, 20 kilometers west of Tam Ky, with four battalions under the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. On 22 September the semi-permanent combination of elements composing Task Force Oregon was given permanent cohesion as the 23d Infantry—or Americal—Division. On 4 October, the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (Colonel James O. McKenna, U. S. Army), arrived by air at Chu Lai, relieved the 5th Marines of its responsibilities, and on the same day began Operation Wallowa in the much-fought-over area west of Thang Binh. The 5th Marines moved to Da Nang, making it possible for the 1st Marine Division to detach the 1st Marines, which would move north to join the 3d Marine Division.

The 3d Marine Division in September focused its attention largely on what was called the Kingfisher area, specifically the defense of Con Thien. Represented in the press as a beleaguered fortress—a “little Dien Bien Phu”—this hill, 158 meters high, scraped bare down to the raw red laterite, was never occupied by much more than a battalion. Most of the fighting was actually some distance from it, as the enemy tried to maneuver into an attack position.

The number of contacts with the enemy increased in the first few days of the month. Then on 4 September a platoon from Company I of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Lee R. Bendell), came up against a North Vietnamese company about four miles south of Con Thien. The rest of Company I joined the fight, and Company M came up with tanks. Thirty-seven enemy soldiers were killed. Three days later, on 7 September, an almost exact repetition took place: Company I from the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Alderman), ran into heavy enemy resistance.
three miles south of Con Thien. Company K joined the
fight with tanks. Fifty-one NVA soldiers were killed in
a five-hour fight. Then on 10 September, the 3d Bat-
talion, 26th Marines, engaged what appeared to be an
entire regiment three and a half miles southwest of
Con Thien. The fight began in the early evening and
lasted four hours. The enemy broke off at about 2200,
having lost 140 men confirmed dead, and probably an
additional 315.

About 0330 on the morning of 13 September, an
enemy company, after a heavy artillery attack, probed
the northeastern sector of the Con Thien perimeter
itself, but was thrown back. At 0750 on 21 September,
Companies E and H of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieu-
tenant Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr.), ran into heavy
automatic fire from an entrenched enemy. In the hard
day’s fighting that followed, 39 enemy soldiers were
confirmed dead and 149 were suspected dead. During
the six-day period, 18 to 24 September, Con Thien was
shelled 24 times. On 23 September, Brigadier General
Metzger, the assistant division commander, told the
press that the North Vietnamese were “there in strength
and our firepower isn’t going to drive them away.” He
went on to say that if the enemy did assault Con Thien
they would pay a “high price.” On 25 September,
Marines in the Kingfisher area counted 1,190 incoming
rounds of mortars, artillery, and rockets, most of them
hitting Con Thien.

Perhaps the enemy was only emptying his magazines
before withdrawing, because after this day of heavy fire
the pressure against Con Thien subsided. On 4 October,
MACV headquarters in Saigon announced that Ameri-
can firepower, including a monumental effort by B-52s,
had broken the back of the month-long siege of Con
Thien and that the enemy was in retreat. General West-
moreland added that the enemy had suffered a “crush-
ing defeat.”

THE CH-46 HELICOPTER AND THE M-16

On 28 September, the New York Times ran a story
announcing that about two-fifths of the Marine helicop-
ters used to carry food, water, and ammunition to the
outposts along the DMZ had been grounded because of
a structural deficiency. According to the story, all
CH-46As were grounded because “their tail assemblies
were falling apart.”

There were two series of CH-46 with the Marines in
South Vietnam—the CH-46A and the CH-46D—and they
had given excellent service since they were deployed in
April 1966. There had been a number of accidents. The
first helicopter was lost September 1966 at Marble
Mountain Air Facility. Another was lost in October and
in May 1967 a CH-46D went down at sea southeast of Da Nang. In all, eight accidents had occurred in Southeast Asia and four in the continental United States. The causes, when they could be determined, were varied. A modification program was begun in October 1967. It addressed itself to general structural strengthening and systems improvement and was completed in December.

A much less complicated piece of equipment—the M-16 rifle—was also the subject of debate and criticism during the summer and fall of 1967.

On 22 May, Congressman James J. Howard of New Jersey had read to the House of Representatives a letter from an unidentified Marine contending that jammed M-16s had been responsible for many American deaths in the fight for Hill 881 north of Khe Sanh.

On 27 May, General Greene replied that the Marine Corps had found the M-16 “ideally suited for the jungle type of environment” encountered in Vietnam.

The decision to equip Marine forces in the Western Pacific with the M-16 had been made in March 1966, after consideration of the request by Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, made in December 1965, for a lightweight weapon with a high rate of fire to replace the M-14. The Marine Corps had been testing other lightweight weapons systems, but the fast-firing, hard-hitting M-16 was in production, readily available, and the choice of the Army. Therefore, after further testing by the Marine Corps, the rifle—manufactured by Colt—was procured in quantity from the Army at a cost to the Marines of $121.00 per rifle, and issued to maneuver units in March and April 1967, in time for the heavy fighting at Khe Sanh.

Congressman Richard H. Ichord of Missouri was named chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee to investigate the weapon’s performance. Mr. Ichord spent the first eleven days of June in Vietnam studying the weapon’s alleged deficiencies.

He found many reasons to suspect that the M-16A1 was giving less than the best performance. The kind of lubricant being used was challenged, as was the type of powder used in the ammunition. Working with a new weapon, issued on the battlefield, the Marines hadn’t built up a reservoir of experience. Training and familiarization had been necessarily limited. There was some shortage of cleaning gear.

In July, General Cushman told the press that the Marines were “well on their way” to solving any problems resulting from the introduction of the M-16. He said the weapon was “not as forgiving as the other one we used to have,” and noted that “no weapon will for-give you if you neglect it.”

By the end of October, all the M-16s in the hands of Marines in Vietnam had been fitted with a modified buffer group to reduce the cyclic rate of fire. By the end of the year, a program to fit all weapons with chrome-plated chambers to improve extraction was also well under way. These modifications, together with improved training, more attention to care and cleaning, and improved quality control of the 5.56-mm. ammunition brought the malfunction rate down to about one every 2,000 rounds. In any case, no real evidence was found to support the earlier contentions that the weapon’s shortcomings had caused American deaths. In fact, the commander of the company that made the final assault against Hill 881 stated that he could not have taken the hill without the M-16.

FALL FIGHTING

On 5 October, the 1st Marines (Colonel Herbert E. Ing, Jr.) with two battalions moved north from Da Nang to Quang Tri. On 11 October they launched Operation Medina in the rugged Hai Lang National Forest south of Quang Tri City. This was an enemy base area, suspected of harboring elements of the 5th and 6th NVA Regiments. Special Landing Force Alpha, in conjunction with Medina, executed Operation Bastion Hill, landing BLT 1/3 (Lieutenant Colonel Alfred I. Thomas) to join the 1st Marines. Also co-ordinated with Medina were the operations of two ARVN airborne battalions. Contact was light at the start. A few caches of rice and ammunition were uncovered. Then on 20 October, the Marines flushed a North Vietnamese company which fled headlong into the ARVN. The Vietnamese airborne troopers, with the help of Marine air and artillery, killed 197 enemy soldiers.

The same day, 20 October, BLT 1/3 disengaged itself, re-embarked, and moved down to Thua Thien Province to join in Operation Fremont. In the joint operations Medina and Bastion Hill, 64 enemy soldiers had been killed; 35 Marines were killed, 174 wounded. 1st Marines continued to work in Hai Lang Forest, in a new operation called Osceola.

On 29 October the POL dump at the Force Logistic Support Unit at Dong Ha was hit by 60 artillery rounds. Five Marines were killed, and 10,000 gallons of aviation fuel were lost.

Third Marine Division closed the books on Kingfisher on 31 October. Since 16 July, 1,117 enemy had been killed, 5 prisoners taken, 155 weapons captured. The Marines had lost 340 killed and 3,086 wounded.
West of Kingfisher, in the Khe Sanh area, Operation Ardmore also ended on 31 October. Pressure against Khe Sanh during Ardmore, which covered the same span of time as Kingfisher, had been strangely light. Final casualty figures were 113 enemy dead; 10 Marines died in action, 39 Marines were wounded.

To the south in Thua Thien Province, another 3d Marine Division operation, Fremont, which had begun on 10 July, also terminated on 31 October. Conducted in two-battalion strength for most of its duration, Fremont screened the western approaches to the Hue-Phu Bai area. It accounted for 123 enemy killed. Marine losses were 17 dead, 260 wounded.

At the far end of I Corps Tactical Zone, the 198th Light Infantry Brigade (Colonel J. R. Walldie, U. S. Army) arrived by air and sea at Duc Pho on 28 October with three maneuver battalions, and joined the American Division.

Replacing those operations which had been terminated at the end of October, a new series was begun on 1 November.

The old Kingfisher area was divided into two parts. The eastern half, encompassing Dong Ha, Gio Linh, Con Thien, and Cam Lo became Operation Kentucky, involving four battalions under the control of the 9th Marines (Colonel Richard B. Smith). The western half, including Camp Carroll, the Rockpile, and Ca Lu, became Operation Lancaster, under 3d Marines (Colonel Joseph E. Loprete) with two battalions.

Defense of the Khe Sanh area was now designated Operation Scotland and continued under the 26th Marines (Colonel David E. Lownds) with one battalion.

The job of screening the approaches to Hue, formerly called Fremont, was designated Operation Neosho, conducted by the 4th Marines (Colonel William L. Dick) with one battalion.

In general, everything west of Highway One in the northern two provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien was the tactical responsibility of the 3d Marine Division; everything east of the road, the responsibility of the 1st ARVN Division.

An exception was Operation Napoleon, begun 4 November in an area blocked out at the mouth of the Cua Viet River by the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion reinforced by Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

Security of this area was essential to safe waterborne transportation in the two northern provinces, the means by which the greatest tonnage of supplies and equipment was now being moved.

As these new operations were getting underway, III MAF was visited on 1 November by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey. The Vice President, who was ending a three-day visit to Vietnam, flew within five miles of the DMZ in a four-engined transport, close enough to see U. S. artillery fire. On the ground at Da Nang, he presented the Presidential Unit Citation to the 3d Marine Division, Reinforced, for "extraordinary heroism in action against hostile forces in the five northern provinces of Vietnam, during the period 8 March 1965 to 15 September 1967."

On 6 November, Operation Essex was begun six miles south of An Hoa in the so-called "Antenna Valley" by the 5th Marines (Colonel Robert D. Bohn) with one battalion, west and north of their old Union area, where the Army was now operating. On 11 November, American Division combined operations Wallowa and Wheeler into a single operation.

On 2 November and again on 8 November the Viet
Badger Hunt. At 1400 the same day, 3d Battalion, 7th
Foster. At 0900, 13 November, Cong launched vicious raids against the district head-
quar ters and refugee settlements at Dai Loc and Hieu Duc 15 miles southwest of Da Nang; 22 civilians were
killed, 42 wounded, and 57 counted as missing. The raids destroyed 559 houses, and left 625 families home-
less. In retaliation, the Marines launched Operation
raids destroyed 559 houses, and left 625 families home-
less. In retaliation, the Marines launched Operation
Foster. At 0900, 13 November, 3d Battalion, 7th
Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Roger H. Barnard) moved
in just west of Dai Loc and north of the Thu Bon River.
Initially, Foster and Badger Hunt closed on nothing,
but on 26 November there was a heavy engagement. By
the time the operation was over on 30 November, 125
enemy had been killed, at a cost of 21 Marines dead,
137 wounded.

Operation Essex in Antenna Valley, opposing ele-
ments of the 2d NVA Regiment, had ended on 17 No-
November with 72 enemy dead, 37 Marines killed, and 122
Marines wounded.

To the north, in the 3d Marine Division's area of
operations, Major General Hochmuth was killed on
14 November when a UH-1E carrying him to Dong Ha
exploded and crashed five miles northwest of Hue.
Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins, winner of the
Navy Cross at Saipan and Commanding General of the
Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island, was
named to replace General Hochmuth. Brigadier General
Metzger was acting division commander until Tomp-
kins' arrival on 28 November.

On 29 November, the 3d Marine Division began
clearing the area between Con Thien and Gio Linh in
preparation for further development of the barrier,
using three Marine battalions in conjunction with three
ARVN battalions. The next day one of the battalions,
2d Battalion, 9th Marines, found and attacked a North
Vietnamese company entrenched two miles northeast of
Con Thien. The fight began about 1345 and was over by
1800, with the Marines taking the position, killing 40
NVA soldiers, and picking up 21 weapons.

December saw the continuation of the operations
begun in November. As the year ended, the books were
still open on the largest of them.

Most of the action near the DMZ was in the Kentucky
area, centered around Con Thien. Two SLF operations
were run in December. Fortress Ridge was a landing ten
kilometers northeast of Dong Ha, 21 to 24 December,
made by BLT 3/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Max McQuown)
and HMM-262 (Lieutenant Colonel Melvin J. Steinberg).
Ten Marines were killed, 28 wounded; only 10 enemy
dead were counted. Badger Tooth was a landing by the
same Marine units against the coast near the Quang Tri–
Thu Thien provincial boundary. Again the cost was
high for the results gained: 48 Marines died, 87 were
wounded; enemy dead numbered 40.

West of Kentucky, both the Lancaster and Khe Sanh
areas were quiet. Almost no contacts were being regis-
tered, but aerial reconnaissance indicated that north of
the DMZ troops and supplies were being positioned,
apparently for a fresh thrust at Khe Sanh. To meet the
new threat, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant
Colonel Robert C. Needham), was added to the Khe
Sanh defenses.

On 19 December the 11th Infantry Brigade (Brigadi-
ger General Andy A. Lipscomb, U. S. Army) arrived at
Duc Pho and was added to the Americal Division,
bringing the number of brigades in the Division to five,
at least for the moment. Operation Muscatine was
begun the same day. By the end of the month, U. S.
soldiers in Muscatine had killed 58 of the enemy and
captured 34 weapons. The omnibus Army operation
west of Tam Ky, Wheeler/Wallowa, also continued
with results posted, as of 31 December, at 3,188 enem-
dead, 126 prisoners taken, and 743 weapons captured.
U. S. Army losses for Wheeler/Wallowa stood at 258
U. S. dead, 964 wounded.

Arrival of additional U. S. Army forces in the Ameri-
cal Division area of operations made it possible to move
the Korean Marine brigade northward from Chu Lai.
The Koreans since 10 November had been executing
Operation Dragon Tail 16 kilometers northwest of
Quang Ngai City. This was terminated on 21 December
and next day the Blue Dragon Brigade moved north to
a new operating area south of Da Nang and west of
Hoi An, and began Operation Flying Dragon.

THE YEAR ENDS

Military Progress

The strength of III MAF on 31 December 1967 stood
The net increase for the year was 10,737 Marines and
sailors. The year had started with 18 Marine infantry
battalions in country; it ended with 21 Marine bat-
talions. In addition to the Marines, there were 31 ARVN
battalions, 15 U. S. Army battalions, and 4 Korean
Marine battalions (a new one had been activated), so
that altogether there were now 71 Free World infantry
battalions in I Corps Tactical Zone.
The 3d Marine Division now had five infantry regiments in the northern two provinces. In Quang Tri Province, the 26th Marines continued to hold Khe Sanh; the 9th Marines were at Dong Ha, the 3d Marines west of Dong Ha, and the 1st Marines at Quang Tri City. In Thua Thien Province 4th Marines were north and west of Hue.

The 1st Marine Division had two regiments, 5th and 7th Marines, in Quang Nam Province.

To the south, the Americal Division had the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, operating west of Tam Ky in Quang Tin Province. Operating from Chu Lai and Duc Pho in Quang Ngai Province were the 198th Light Infantry Brigade, the 11th Infantry Brigade, and the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (the redesignated 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division). (The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division had departed 23–26 November.)

The year had begun with the Marines spread out through all five provinces; now they were concentrated in the northern three, with four of the seven Marine infantry regiments deployed essentially along Route 9 south of the DMZ in Quang Tri Province.

Summing up the year's combat operations before the U. S. Senate's Committee on Armed Services on 14 February 1968, the new Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., had this to say:

"During 1967 Marines conducted:

"Over 110 major operations, of battalion size or larger, and each one of those which resulted in major contact with the enemy produced a victory for the Free World.

"More than 356,000 small unit operations—the company actions, the platoon and squad-sized patrols and ambushes, which go on constantly, day and night, in order to deny freedom of movement to the guerrilla and to sever his connections with the people.

"In these two types of Marine operations alone, there were 17,876 enemy soldiers destroyed during 1967."

Summarizing the contribution of Marine aviation before the same committee, General Chapman said:

"In all of 1967, Marine fighter/attack aviation flew 63,000 sorties in direct support of the III MAF ground forces and 10,000 in support of other Free World forces. This element of our air/ground team also flew 11,000 strike missions over North Vietnam. It expended a total of 134,000 tons of bombs, 166,000 rockets, and 2,100,000 rounds of 20-mm ammunition.

"Four hundred ninety thousand helicopter sorties lifted 732,000 troops and performed other yeoman service in their support."

But Marine Corps accomplishments, General Chapman noted, were not without cost. Marine losses for 1967, he testified, were 3,452 killed and 25,994 wounded, compared to 17,876 enemy dead.

Other casualty reports indicate that of the 13,089 Marines wounded in 1967 requiring hospitalization, 12,436 were returned to duty. Total casualties for the Marine Corps, cumulative since the first Marine was wounded in 1962, had reached 5,479 dead and 37,784 wounded. In terms of casualties, this made Vietnam the Marine Corps' second most costly war, exceeded only by World War II, in which 19,733 Marines were killed and 67,207 wounded.

During the course of the year, General Lam's I Corps forces had killed over 8,000 of the enemy—including nearly 3,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in the DMZ area. This was a more than creditable performance, particularly since half of his battalions had been re-assigned to protection of Revolutionary Development programs in accordance with the decisions reached by President Johnson and Premier Ky at the Manila Conference in October 1966.

Civic Progress

In November 1966, all U. S. non-military agencies in South Vietnam supporting Revolutionary Development* had been placed under an Office of Civil Opera-
tions headed by Deputy Ambassador William J. Porter. Four regional directors, one for each corps tactical zone, had been named. Assistant Deputy Ambassador Henry L. T. Koren, a career diplomat, had been assigned to I Corps.

In the spring of 1967 U. S. military and non-military support of Revolutionary Development was merged. On 11 May, Robert W. Komer, a presidential assistant, was named Deputy to ComUSMACV for Revolutionary Development, with the rank of ambassador. The new organization combined the old Office of Civil Operations with MACV's Revolutionary Development Support Directorate and was called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support or CORDS. This was at the Saigon level.

At the level of the corps area, or region, there was to be a deputy to the field commander supported by a civilian and military staff element at the general staff level. Accordingly, on 7 June, Mr. Koren, the former Region I Director, was redesignated Deputy to CG, III MAF, for CORDS. Below him was designated one senior provincial advisor for each of the five provinces. The districts within the provinces, in turn, were given senior district advisors.

The chief effect and purpose of this new organization was to bring together the U. S. civil and military efforts to support Revolutionary Development, which until then had been parallel but not necessarily coincident.

In mid-November 1967, General Westmoreland, visiting the United States, told the American public over television that with continued military success, U. S. forces could begin to shift the burden of combat to South Vietnamese forces in about two years, and that token U. S. withdrawals could then be made. Ambassador Komer, asked about this estimate on 21 November, said that the phase-out of U. S. support of the pacification effort was further away than a military phase-out.

In I Corps, 1967 had shown both successes and failures in pacification and Revolutionary Development.

North Vietnam's Defense Minister, General Vo Nguyen Giap, the almost legendary figure who is usually credited with masterminding the Viet Minh victory over the French in 1954, including the climactic battle of Dien Bien Phu, in September 1967 published a series of curiously revealing articles in Hanoi's armed forces newspaper, Quang Doi Nhan Dan.

In his over-all evaluation of the war since large scale U. S. intervention began in 1965, Giap said the United States had been forced into a stalemate which left President Johnson two alternatives: an invasion of the North or a continuance of present strategy with limited reinforcements. Giap argued that neither alternative offered success to the American cause. Invasion of "a member country of the Socialist camp" would enlarge the war and "the U. S. imperialists would meet with incalculable serious consequences." As for reinforcements, "Even if they increase their troops by another 50,000, 100,000 or more, they cannot extricate themselves from their comprehensive stalemate in the southern part of our country."

Giap, without directly acknowledging the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the northern provinces, stated that the purpose of the battles along the frontiers was to pull away American strength from the populated areas and thus frustrate efforts at pacification. According to Giap, the American effort had been dealt a strategic setback by the intensified attacks against the 3d Marine Division in Quang Tin and Thua Thien provinces. More and more American units had to be moved into the battle zone, drawing them away from the task of gaining control of the rural population.

"The Marines are being stretched as taut as a bow-string," wrote Giap.

Undeniably, the diversion of most of the Marine combat strength to the northern two provinces and its involvement in the battle of the DMZ did cause an attenuation of cherished Marine Corps pacification programs in the heavily populated coastal region. Vietnamese success at taking over some of these programs can only be rated as fair. An exceptionally experienced and mature Vietnamese officer, asked to evaluate ARVN participation in Revolutionary Development, with specific reference to the area south of Da Nang, said that central planning was uninformed and unrealistic, that there was too much turnover of personnel, and that the retraining of the ARVN for Revolutionary Development had been poor. Elaborating on the last point, he said that "security" for Revolutionary Development was translated by the ARVN into terms of strongpoints, foxholes, and ambushes.

The refugee population almost doubled in the course of the year. There had been an estimated 280,000 refugees in I Corps in January 1967. By December the number had grown to 530,000. Of these, about a quarter of a million were in refugee camps. The growth in refugee population was largely a result of the heavy fighting in three areas: south of the DMZ, southwest of Da Nang, and in southern Quang Ngai Province. It can be argued, with a fair degree of conviction, that the growth in numbers of refugees was not an entirely nega-
tive indicator; that these persons, uprooted by the war, chose to place themselves under the control of the South Vietnamese government, rather than withdraw to areas still under Viet Cong domination.

A more positive indicator of increasing government control was the successful conduct of the 1967 elections. There were four of these. In April elections were held for village officials. In I Corps, 82.3 per cent of those eligible to vote turned out. This was followed in May by hamlet elections. The voter turn-out was 78.8 per cent. On 3 September the presidential election in accordance with the new constitution took place. In I Corps, despite an intensive Viet Cong terror campaign to disrupt the election—involving 272 acts of violence in which 672 civilians were killed or kidnapped—86 per cent of the eligible voters cast their ballots. This election named Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu president and Air Vice-Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky vice president. The 60-member senate was also filled. A fourth election was held on 22 October to fill the national assembly, the government’s lower house. In this last election, voter participation was 77.9 per cent in I Corps.

There were other obvious signs of success. The civilian populace enjoyed much more freedom of movement. Highway One was open from the DMZ to the Binh Dinh border. Even the lateral roads moving westward from the coast could now be travelled in great part with relative safety.

**Combined Action Program**

One of the Marine Corps’ most successful efforts in 1967 in support of Revolutionary Development was the continuance and expansion of the Combined Action Program. This program, which combined a Marine rifle squad and a Navy hospital corpsman with a Popular Force platoon to provide security at the hamlet and village level, had begun informally at Phu Bai in the summer of 1965. At the beginning of 1967 there were 57 combined action platoons; at the end of the year there were 79 platoons organized into 14 combined action companies which in turn were subordinate to one of three combined action group headquarters, located at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai.

As 1967 came to a close, 59 villages were being protected by combined action platoons. Their mission was to deny the assigned area to the enemy and to encourage civic action; the long-term objective was to develop self-sufficient local security forces. During the year, combined action platoons had conducted an average of over 4,000 ambushes and patrols monthly, killed 456 enemy, and captured 256.

**The Outlook**

There was reason for optimism as 1967 ended. The enemy had elected to make the northern provinces of I Corps Tactical Zone the main battle area and each time he had attempted to take the offensive he had been badly beaten. With the movement of U. S. Army troops into I Corps, an acceptable troop density had been achieved. Pacification efforts, slowed down by the Buddhist Revolt of 1966 and the overt entry of North Vietnamese forces across the DMZ, appeared to be regaining momentum. South Vietnam had shown technical competence in the conduct of a series of elections, which in turn had resulted in what promised to be a democratically-based government.

But not all was bright. A major invasion appeared to be in the making across the DMZ. And the year ended almost exactly as it had begun: in I Corps the 36-hour New Year’s truce was marred by 16 major incidents.

By Edwin H. Simmons, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
U.S. Marine helicopters swoop in to a dusty landing near the "Rock Pile" to embark troops for Operation Lancaster 11 on 17 June 1968.
"But by the middle of February, he was through. He had not gained the popular support he expected. The American presence was unshaken. The Vietnamese armed forces...had done surprisingly well...not a single ARVN unit defected. He had won no battlefield victories, held no new territory, and in I Corps alone had used up the equivalent of three divisions."

Third in a series of accounts, by General Simmons, of the Marine Corps in action in Vietnam, this article picks up the narrative from last year's Naval Review at Christmas 1967, when the threat of greatly expanded enemy offensives loomed ahead for the American field commanders. We begin with the clearing up of loose ends, and the new disposing of allied forces to meet enemy initiatives anticipated by intelligence reports.

General Simmons deals principally with events generated by the Tet offensive, and the consecutive weaker enemy offensives of the year. He recounts and evaluates the strong enemy strikes at Da Nang, Hue, and just south of the DMZ; and he discusses the other actions. He describes the allied response to the foe's offensives, and he examines allied command relations in I Corps Tactical Zone, where the Marines had two thirds of their infantry battalions, but where large ARVN, ROK, and U.S. Army units shared the fighting of a powerful concentration of enemy forces.

Perhaps more than anything else, the author, in recounting the actions that took place, projects simultaneously the sense of wave and wash in the war, and a grasp of the tactical situation in the roughest year of enemy action yet. In turn, this understanding may increase the reader's knowledge of the enemy's limited military alternatives which perforce established his patterns of action. One might collect from this account the idea that the adversary hoped that the proximity of his bases and sanctuaries would allow him to win in I Corps merely with the refinement of his tactics, as there were few alternative military strategies the enemy could select. For to have strong strategic military alternatives, one needs far greater strength and variety of force than the Communist opponent had at his disposal in 1968.

—Editor.

General Westmoreland calls 1968, "the year of decision." In his Report on the War in Vietnam, he writes, "As the new year opened, I had planned to continue to pursue the enemy throughout the Republic, thereby improving conditions for the pacification program to proceed at an ever-increasing pace . . . . In December of 1967, information of massive enemy troop movements had prompted me to cancel these plans . . . . As 1968 began, events verified this intelligence, as the enemy continued the forward movement of his main forces toward Saigon, Da Nang, Hue, Khe Sanh, the DMZ, and a number of provincial and district capitals. During January, we began to receive numerous reports about a major offensive to be undertaken just before or immediately after Tet . . . ."

The Situation Before Tet

In I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ), the year began with a shuffling of U.S. ground units. The plan, named "Operation Checkers," had for its main purpose the relief of 3rd Marine Division units from covering the western approaches to Hue. That division could then concentrate its full attention on the problem at hand in northernmost Quang Tri Province. To accomplish this the 1st and 5th Marine regiments were moved into Thua Thien Province under Task Force X-ray com-
manded by Brigadier General Foster C. Lahue. Before this move took place, other moves first had to be made in the very south of ICTZ.

On 19 December 1967, the 11th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General Andy A. Lipscomb, USA) had arrived at Duc Pho, almost at the southern tip of Quang Ngai Province. This fresh American brigade made it possible for the Korean "Blue Dragon" Marine Brigade (Brigadier General Kim Yun Sang) to move north from Quang Ngai to the vicinity of Hoi An on 22 December. In turn, the 1st Marine Division (Major General Donn J. Robertson) could start sending battalions north. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Vandenberg, Jr.) moved to the Phu Loc area above Hai Van pass the day after Christmas.

The prime reason for all this concern and movement were the two North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions operating along the DMZ: the 324B Division along the eastern half, and the 325C Division, hanging in at the northwestern corner of Quang Tri province, threatening Khe Sanh. To counter this threat, most of the 3d Marine Division was strung out in a series of combat bases and strong points along the general line of Route 9, tied in large part to the defense of the anti-infiltration barrier.

While "Checkers" was in progress, General Westmoreland, believing that the enemy's next major effort would be in the northern part of ICTZ, ordered the redeployment of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, to Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. The two Army divisions were to be under the operational control of the III Marine Amphibious Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman. The III MAF's area of operations would continue to be all of ICTZ, the northern five provinces of South Vietnam.

The U.S. Army was already liberally represented in I Corps with a total of about 32,000 men, including artillery units serving along the DMZ with the Marines, the majority of the advisory effort, and, largest of all, the Americal Division. Literally formed on the battlefield the previous summer, the Americal, or 23d Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Samuel W. Koster, USA, now had responsibility for all U.S. ground operations in Quang Tri and Quang Ngai, the southern two provinces in ICTZ. Already with the Americal Division was the 3d Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

So when the Army reinforcements arrived there would be five American divisions in ICTZ—three Army divisions and the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. When 1968 began, there were already some quarter-million Free World forces in I Corps with a cutting edge of 73 infantry battalions.

In terms of infantry battalions—that convenient, if inexact denominator of ground combat strength—21 of the Marine Corps' 36 battalions were in Vietnam. In air strength, the percentage of tactical units was almost equally high: 14 of our 33 fixed-wing squadrons and 13 of our 24 helicopter squadrons. In all, there was a total of 475 aircraft, over one-third of the Corps' inventory. A strength return for 1 January 1968 indicated that 81,249 of the Corps' 298,498 Marines were serving in Vietnam. Proportionally, no other U.S. service had anything approaching this investment in the war.

The U.S. Navy had over 22,000 men, two-thirds of its in-country strength, in ICTZ. Of these, about 500 officers and 3,000 bluejackets were included in III MAF, mostly doctors, chaplains, and hospital corpsmen. Nearly half the remainder were in the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang. Most of the rest were Seabees. The 30th Naval Construction Regiment was working five battalions in the Da Nang area and two at Chu Lai. The 32d Naval Construction Regiment had three battalions operating out of Phu Bai and one at Dong Ha.

The U.S. Air Force had over 7,000 men in ICTZ, mostly at the Da Nang air base.

The Republic of Korea's 3d Marine Brigade had four infantry battalions. Including supporting units, it totalled 6,000 men.

The Republic of Vietnam itself had nearly 81,000 men under arms in ICTZ. Led by the durable I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, these included 51 battalions of regular Vietnamese Army troops (the "ARVN"), two airborne battalions from the General Reserve, 21,000 Regional Forces (the "RFs"), and 23,000 Popular Forces (the "PFs").

Enemy strength, including North Vietnamese regulars, Viet Cong main force, and hard-core guerrillas was thought to be from 75,000 to 90,000. Of this total, the guerrillas, in many ways more of a problem than the regulars, numbered about 20,000 for all of I Corps. In addition, the enemy was soon to demonstrate, once again, his capability of building up his strength rapidly from sanctuary bases just across the borders.

**Situation Along the DMZ**

By mid-January, the 304th Division had come across the border from Laos and had joined the 325C outside Khe Sanh. The 320th NVA Division next was identified, apparently poised for an attack against Camp Carroll. On 21 January, interrogation of a raider from the 325C Division indicated that elements of the 308th and 341st NVA divisions were also south of the DMZ.

With Task Force X-Ray filling in behind him, Major General Tompkins on 10 January moved his headquar-
ters forward from Phu Bai to Dong Ha, now grown into a major base. The Division rear remained for the time at Phu Bai; later it would move forward to Quang Tri.

Route 9 stops at Dong Ha, where it intersects with Highway No. 1, but in prolongation of the same line is the Cua Viet River, flowing eastward to the South China Sea. Operation Napoleon, begun 5 November 1967, was being conducted here by the reinforced 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Toner) to give security to the Cua Viet River, by way of which the 3d Marine Division and Army units in Quang Tri province were now receiving the preponderance of their supplies and equipment from NavSuppAct Da Nang.

The Seventh Fleet’s Special Landing Forces were also working in the northern provinces.

North of the Cua Viet estuary, Special Landing Force Bravo (Colonel Maynard W. Schmidt) on 2 January ended Operation Badger Tooth. Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Max McQuown), built around 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, and supported by HMM-262 (Lieutenant Colonel Melvin J. Steinberg), had gone ashore the day after Christmas. A month later, on the evening of 23 January, the battalion landed again farther south, this time lifted by HMM-165 (Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Romine). Making a night crossing of the Cua Viet River in amphibian tractors, the main body of the battalion continued northward on the next day. A heavy fight that took place in the vicinity of My Loc confirmed our intelligence estimate that the enemy—identified as the 803d NVA Regiment—had established a line of fortified hamlets above the north bank of the Cua Viet from which to interdict traffic on the river. The operation (Badger Catch) as such, ended on 26 January. BLT 3/1 stayed ashore as part of Operation Saline in the same area.

Special Landing Force Alpha (Colonel Bruce F. Meyers) executed Operation Ballistic Armor on 22 January. This put BLT 2/4 (Lieutenant Colonel William Wise), lifted by HMM-361 (Lieutenant Colonel Daniel M. Wilson), in Thua Thien province close to Camp Evans, the base being upgraded for the impending arrival of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The operation lasted until 26 January; contact was small. Next day, 27 January, the battalion redeployed to a position four miles north of Cam Lo on a one-day operation called Fortress Attack.

These were the first of the 13 Special Landing Force operations conducted in 1968.

The 1st Marines (Colonel Herbert E. Ing, Jr.), one of the regiments of the 1st Marine Division, had been moved north in October and placed under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division. With two battalions—1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines—it was engaged in Operation Osceola in Hai Lang Forest, west and south of Quang Tri city.

In 3d Marine Division usage, operation nicknames had come to be used as designators for tactical areas of responsibility. They continued for a considerable period of time and did not begin and end at the frenetic pace which had characterized the search-and-destroy operations carried out earlier in the war.

Farther north, just west of Highway No. 1, “Leatherneck Square,” formed by Gio Linh, Con Thien, Dong Ha, and Cam Lo, generally defined the geographic limits of Operation Kentucky, begun 1 November 1967. Kentucky was the business of the 9th Marines (Colonel Richard B. Smith) with four battalions under the regiment’s operational control.

West of Kentucky was Operation Lancaster, an area including Camp Carroll, the Rockpile, and Ca Lu, under 3d Marines (Colonel Joseph Loprete) with two battalions: the 2d and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines.

As explained in “Marine Corps Operations in Viet Nam, 1967” in Naval Review, 1969, Marine regiments were being used more and more like brigades, in that infantry battalions were moved in and out from under their operational control, both to meet the exigencies of the tactical situation and the demands of the schedule which rotated battalion landing teams out of the country for re-fitting at Okinawa and service with the Seventh Fleet as Special Landing Forces. This practice was more or less parallel to the practice of moving tactical squadrons back and forth among Marine aircraft groups. It demonstrated the interchangeable nature of Marine battalions and gave the division commanding generals great flexibility in shifting their combat strength. Most infantry regimental commanders, while recognizing the need for and advantages of this system, nevertheless preferred to have their own organic battalions. Command lines were much more clear-cut; the distinctions between operational control and administrative command were avoided. Tactical integrity was preserved and efficiency and effectiveness tended to be greater. One regimental commander estimated that it took about two weeks of working with a new battalion to iron out problems of procedures, and communications.

**Defense of Khe Sanh**

Khe Sanh had been relatively quiet since the heavy fighting of April and May of the previous year. The area was now the location of Operation Scotland, initially the concern of the 26th Marines (Colonel David
E. Lownds). This was a regiment belonging to the 5th Marine Division which had been moved to the Western Pacific in August 1966, and assigned to the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade headquartered in Okinawa. The 26th Marines had been ashore in Vietnam and had been under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division since April 1967. On 1 December 1967, the regimental headquarters and 1st Battalion were at Khe Sanh, the 2d Battalion was at Camp Evans, and the 3d Battalion was at Phu Bai. Colonel Lownds had disposed the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel James B. Wilkinson) as follows: one company on Hill 881 south, one company on Hill 861, one platoon on Hill 950, and one company on the perimeter of the combat base itself. This left him a reserve or "interdiction force" of two platoons.

About 1400 on 13 December 1967 General Cushman called General Tompkins on a secure-voice circuit and said that, as he assessed the situation, there were four enemy regiments within 20 kilometers of Khe Sanh, and consequently, he thought another battalion should be added to its defense. At the moment, Tompkins thought the Camp Carroll area was more vulnerable than Khe Sanh—he had one battalion stretched from

I Corps Tactical Zone—five provinces in the northern part of South Vietnam. The coastal area is mainly flat, the inland area mainly mountainous. The map shows where military action occurred in ICTZ, along with the principal arteries, routes 1, 4, and 9. The only operable part of the railroad is between Hue and Da Nang.
Marine Operations in Vietnam

Khe Sanh, in the mountains near both the DMZ and the Laotian border. Route 9 originates at Dong Ha, where Khe Sanh’s logistic support came ashore from amphibious vessels sent from Da Nang. But during the siege the road was unusable, both because of the monsoon rains and because of hostile action. Hence Khe Sanh lived on a short-haul airlift.

Ca Lu to Cam Lo. Cushman appreciated Tompkins’ concern but directed that another battalion be sent to Khe Sanh, suggesting the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Alderman), which Tompkins had just moved forward from Camp Evans to Dong Ha. Five hours later, the battalion, less one company, had closed Khe Sanh. The remaining company plus a platoon of 155-mm. howitzers arrived the next afternoon.

Westmoreland has made the following evaluation of the importance of Khe Sanh:

"Were we to relinquish the Khe Sanh area, the North Vietnamese would have had an unobstructed invasion route into the two northernmost provinces from which they might outflank our positions south of the Demilitarized Zone—positions which were blocking North Vietnamese attacks from the north."

Critics of the decision to defend Khe Sanh presuppose that there was an acceptable alternative to defending Khe Sanh. The only alternative was to withdraw. But what kind of a withdrawal could have been executed? The men could have been evacuated by air, probably in neat fashion, with little or no loss. But what about the tons and tons of equipment and supplies? They would have had to go overland and Route No. 9 was closed and would not reopen until the monsoon season ended.

In the last analysis, Khe Sanh was defended because it was the only logical thing to do. We were there, in a prepared position and in considerable strength. A well-fought battle would do the enemy a lot more damage than he could hope to inflict on us.

Cushman proposed a battle plan for Khe Sanh which Westmoreland approved: essentially, it was to reinforce the garrison modestly and to depend upon our massive air and ground firepower to destroy the enemy, all with the realization that Khe Sanh would, logically, have to be supported from the air during a season when flying weather would be marginal at best.

Along the Coast

To the east, at Phu Bai on 13 January, Task Force X-Ray had been activated, as planned, and with the arrival of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr.), on 15 January, assumed responsibility for the Phu Bai tactical area of responsibility (TAOR).

In this series of essays, Task Force Delta and Task Force X-Ray have appeared, disappeared, and reappeared. Later, mention will be made of Task Force Hotel. These designators are used when it is found wise to form a portion of a division into a provisional command larger than a reinforced regiment. Sometimes, a task force is activated to pursue a specific operation, as was the case with Task Force Delta in Operation Double Eagle, and sometimes to take care of a geographically separated area, as was the case when the 1st Marine Division moved forward to Da Nang, but left Task Force X-Ray behind at Chu Lai.

Relieved of the responsibility for the Phu Bai TAOR, Tompkins could send the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Heath, Jr.), from Phu Bai to Khe Sanh. This move was completed on 16 January and made the 26th Marines something of a curiosity: a regiment with all three of its organic battalions.
On 20 January, a Marine company made contact with a North Vietnamese battalion entrenched between Hill 881 South and Hill 881 North, two miles northwest of Khe Sanh itself. The 3d Battalion, 26th Marines (Alderman), attacked, killing 103 of the enemy. The second battle of Khe Sanh had begun. Next day, 21 January, the enemy overran the village of Khe Sanh. Refugees came crowding into the perimeter. The outpost on Hill 861 and the base itself came under attack. The largest ammunition dump at Khe Sanh blew up under the mortar and artillery barrage.

Colonel Lownds asked for another battalion. General Tompkins told General Cushman that, unless otherwise directed, he intended to send his Division reserve, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, from Quang Tri to Khe Sanh. But this was one of the battalions scheduled to revert to Task Force X-Ray, so General Cushman directed Tompkins to send the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John F. Mitchell), a 3d Marine Division battalion, which was at Camp Evans. Mitchell's battalion arrived at Khe Sanh that same day, 21 January. Over one thousand civilian refugees were moved out by air.

On 26 January, General Lam agreed to send a Ranger Battalion to Khe Sanh and promised to send another one later if needed. The 37th Rangers, their on-board strength down to 318, came in on the 27th from Phu Loc. That same day, two more batteries of Marine 105mm. howitzers joined the garrison.

There were now five infantry battalions at Khe Sanh, supported by three batteries of 105mm. howitzers, a battery of 4.2-inch mortars, and a battery of 155mm. howitzers. Three batteries of 105s fell short of the rule-of-thumb ratio of one battery to each infantry battalion. More guns could have been moved into the perimeter, but this would have increased the congestion within the base. Further, it was foreseen that the controlling factor in direct support artillery would not be the number of tubes, but rather the number of artillery rounds that could be supplied by air.

Offsetting this slight deficiency in direct-support artillery were 18 long-range U. S. Army 175mm. guns within supporting range: 14 of them at Camp Carroll, and 4 at the Rockpile (Thon Son Lam).

Also at the Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB), there were six 90mm. gun tanks, ten ONTOS with their 106mm. recoilless rifles, two Army M-42s mounting dual 40mm. "dusters," and two Army M-55s with quad caliber .50s.

**Army Reinforcements.** Meanwhile, the promised U. S. Army reinforcements had begun to arrive in I Corps. The first element of the 1st Air Cavalry Division north of Hai Van Pass was the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, which came into Phu Bai on 17 January. The 4th Marines (Colonel William L. Dick), who had been screening the western approaches to Hue, terminated Operation Neosha on 20 January. This turned out to be a bit premature; the operation was reopened as Neosha II and continued until 24 January to provide a little overlap for the arriving Air Cavalry. The 1st Air Cavalry began Operation Jeb Stuart on 22 January, fifteen miles west of Hue.

That same day, the first elements of the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Colonel John H. Cushman, USA) began to arrive in Quang Tri. Osceola, the 1st Marines (Ing) operation west and south of Quang Tri was ended on 20 January. To give the airborne troopers a little time to get acclimated, Osceola II was begun, a one-battalion effort, and continued on through 16 February.

All of this tended to blur the original provisions of the "Checkers" plan which called for the exchange of the 1st Marine Regiment in Quang Tri province for the 4th Marine regiment in Thua Thien province. The two regimental headquarters were shifted more or less on schedule, but transfer of the battalions and some of the companies lagged. The upshot of it was that Task Force X-Ray, with the mission of protecting the base at Phu Bai, screening the western approaches to Hue, and keeping open Highway No. 1 from Hai Van Pass to Hue, found itself on the eve of Tet with two regimental headquarters (1st Marines and 5th Marines) and three understrength battalions. Also at Phu Bai, MAG-36 (Colonel Frank E. Wilson), having moved up from Chu Lai, was operating one light and four medium helicopter squadrons.

In Hue itself was the headquarters of the 1st ARVN Division (Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong). Truong's tactical zone included both Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. Of his 12 organic infantry battalions, six were assigned Revolutionary Development missions, five were providing area defense; only one was available as a mobile reserve. His dispositions were generally along the axis of Highway No. 1 from Gio Linh south to Phu Bai. Temporarily in Hue were two airborne battalions from Saigon's general reserve.

As the month of January drew to a close, the Viet Cong announced a seven-day Tet truce to last from 0100, 27 January until 0100, 3 February. The Allied Tet cease-fire was to be only 36 hours, beginning at 1800 on the evening of 29 January.

**Situation in Quang Nam.** Most of the trouble for the Marines in Quang Nam province was concentrated in the triangle bounded by Da Nang to the north, Hoi An to the south, and An Hoa to the west. Endemic to the area were the phoenix-like Doc Lap Battalion and writh-like sapper units who were indisputably the most
adroit and deadliest anti-personnel mine experts in the war. A further unpleasantness had been added by the arrival of the North Vietnamese 368B Artillery Regiment whose rockets and heavy mortars continued to plague Da Nang’s densely packed installations.

The first of the 1968 rocket attacks had come on 2 January when Da Nang air base received about 30 rounds. An Air Force AC-47 “Spooky” on station saw the rockets being fired and took the firing position under attack with his mini-guns. Our patrols closed on the position, found three enemy dead and various odds and ends of 122 mm. rocketry.

Da Nang air base was still the headquarters of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, now commanded by Major General Norman J. Anderson. Also on the field was MAG-11 (Colonel Arthur O. Schmagel), operating a composite reconnaissance squadron (RF-4Bs, EF-10Bs, and EA-6As), an all-weather fighter F-8E squadron, a fighter-attack F-4B squadron, and an all-weather attack A-6A squadron. Across the river, at Marble Mountain Air Facility, MAG-16 (Colonel E. O. Reed) had an observation squadron equipped with UH-1Es, three medium helicopter squadrons—two with CH-46As and one with UH-34Ds—and a heavy helicopter squadron with CH-53As.

Three kilometers west of Da Nang air base on Hill 327, the 1st Marine Division (Robertson) had its headquarters. Behind Hill 327, and along what had been Red Beach, stretched the supply and maintenance installations of the Force Logistics Command (Brigadier General Harry C. Olson). In all, there were about 35,000 Marines in Quang Nam province. But in infantry strength, the 1st Marine Division, less Task Force X-Ray, had only five battalions. The 7th Marines (Colonel Ross R. Miner) with its three organic battalions had the TAOR fanning out west and southwest of Da Nang. The 5th Marines (Colonel Robert D. Bohn), when it went north to Phu Bai to join Task Force X-Ray, left behind its 3d Battalion and 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, in the pie-shaped wedge south of Marble Mountain, bounded roughly by the sea and Highway No. 1.

The Korean Marine Blue Dragon Brigade was pursuing Operation Flying Dragon astride the Quang Nam/Quang Tin provincial boundary.

The 51st ARVN Regiment with its four battalions was continuing its long-time mission of supporting Revolutionary Development along the axis of Highway No. 1 south of Da Nang.

As Corps reserve, Lieutenant General Lam had his much-used 1st Ranger Group, one of its three battalions already committed to Khe Sanh.

Situations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. All Marine ground strength having moved to the northern three provinces, U. S. ground operations in the southern two provinces, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai, were now the business of the Americal Division.

West of Tam Ky, in the old, much fought over, Que Son Valley area, the big Wheeler/Wallawa operation, begun 11 November 1967, was being fought by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Colonel Louis Gelling, USA) and the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Colonel Hubert S. Campbell, Jr., USA). The enemy was principally the 2d NVA Division.

Farther south, a few miles northwest of Quang Ngai city, the 198th Light Infantry Brigade (Colonel James R. Waldie, USA), with two of its four battalions, was prosecuting Operation Muscatine, begun 19 December 1967.

Down in the lower tip of Quang Ngai province, west of Duc Pho, the newly arrived 11th Infantry Brigade (Lipscomb), with its three battalions, was going after the 2d and 22d Regiments of the 3d Viet Cong Division.

Two Marine fixed-wing aircraft groups continued to operate from the field at Chu Lai. MAG-12 (Colonel Dean Wilker) had three light attack squadrons flying the Douglas A4E and an all-weather medium attack squadron flying the Grumman A-6A. MAG-13 (Colonel Edward N. Lefaivre) had three fighter-attack squadrons equipped with the McDonnell F-4B. In all, there were about 6,000 Marines still at Chu Lai.

The 2d ARVN Division (Colonel Nguyen Van Toan), headquartered at Quang Ngai city, had four of its 12 battalions assigned to Revolutionary Development missions. Of Toan’s remaining eight battalions, five were providing area defense, leaving three available as mobile reserve.

The rule-of-thumb, derived at the Manila Conference in October 1966, was that as many as half of the ARVN maneuver battalions would be retrained for Revolutionary Development; that is, pacification, duty. At the beginning of 1968, 14 of General Lam’s 28 regular ARVN infantry battalions were dedicated to RD.

Tet Offensive

On 29 January, the MAG-11 area at Da Nang was hit by about 42 rounds of 122 mm. rockets. Across the river at Marble Mountain Air Facility, MAG-16 was mortared. With these rocket and mortar salvos, the enemy opened his Tet offensive in I Corps. There is evidence that the attacks of 29 January were premature; that the full coordinated weight of the offensive was to have fallen on the Allies on 30 January.

There was a second rocket and mortar attack on the 30th against Marble Mountain Air Facility. A section
of runway was briefly knocked out. Chu Lai was also hit; about 25 122 mm. rockets impacted there.

The main outlines of the enemy's battle plan were obvious:

The attacks by fire against U. S. air bases were to reduce our tactical mobility and our close air support capability by hitting at our helicopters and our fighter-attack aircraft. At the same time, the enemy also moved to cut our ground lines of communication. His own attack columns were in position; some had already infiltrated into their objective areas, their movement masked by the holiday traffic. The enemy had marked off all the provincial capitals for attack.

On 30 and 31 January, he moved against Tam Ky in Quang Tin province. The defenders, mostly ARVN, some U. S. Army, after a wild fight threw him out. In Quang Ngai city, the story was much the same.

At the other end of the Corps' tactical zone, two NVA battalions came at Quang Tri city from the northeast on 31 January. Elements of the 1st ARVN Division, with a big assist from the 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, had them out of the city by noon.

But the Communists were reserving their main effort for Hue and Da Nang.

**Attack Against Da Nang**

At Da Nang, the enemy had successfully moved a Trojan horse element into position outside the ARVN I Corps headquarters compound just east of the air base. In the early morning hours of 30 January, behind a screen of mortar shells and rockets hitting indiscriminately at U. S. and ARVN installations, he made his try at the Corps headquarters. The duty section with help from an adjacent Combined Action Platoon blunted the initial attack. Help came roaring up in the form of Vietnamese military police and Rangers, and U. S. Marine military police from the airfield. In a formless cops-and-robbers fight, the attackers were all killed or melted back into anonymity.

South and west of the city, units of the 2d NVA Division, set for a full-scale offensive against Da Nang, were themselves intercepted. Reconnaissance elements of the 1st Marine Division had picked up the movement of their columns as they debouched from the foothills west of An Hoa and brought them under air and artillery fire. Closer at hand, on the morning of 30 January, General Cushman himself, airborne in his command helicopter, spotted 200 enemy just across the river southeast of Da Nang air base. He radioed his sighting to Major General Robertson who, in turn, committed the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William K. Rockey). Rockey's battalion went to the rescue of two Regional Force companies heavily engaged near the Catholic hamlet of Thon Trung Luong. They were followed into action by the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Davis).

Farther south, in Hoi An, the enemy made a temporary lodgement in Hoi An, but was held by the stubborn defense of an ARVN engineer battalion and ejected by a blistering counterattack by the 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment.

Fighting continued along the axis of Highway No. 1. The enemy effort trailed off and then came back strong on 5 February. He got back into Hoi An and was thrown out once again. The 51st ARVN Regiment command post and battalion compounds midway between Hoi An and Da Nang were also hit. By this time, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Gelling) had moved up from Quang Tin province and had come under operational control of the 1st Marine Division.

General Robertson summed it up in a congratulatory message sent to his Division on 10 February:

"Commencing 29 January 1968 enemy forces have made repeated attempts to occupy the city of Da Nang and to destroy or control installations in the Da Nang vital area. Employed in these attacks were the 2d NVA Division, the 402d Sapper Battalion, four independent infantry battalions, one artillery rocket regiment and local guerrilla forces.

"I view with great pride the stalwart defense of the Da Nang area by all Division units and, in particular, the efforts of the 11th Marines; the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines; the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines; and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, USA, which units bore the brunt of the enemy's main effort. . . . The enemy has been unable to occupy a single objective in the Da Nang area while he has suffered in excess of 1,100 casualties."

**Battle For Hue**

Always, Hue had some of the aspects of an open city in recognition of its place as the ancient imperial capital and cultural seat of Viet Nam. There was a considerable U. S. civilian presence and some military, principally related to the MACV advisory effort, but no U. S. garrison, no significant U. S. military installations as at Da Nang. Security within the city was largely a National Police responsibility. The 1st ARVN Division had its headquarters in a corner of the Citadel; there was also the Black Panther Company, an elite and much-used unit; but that was about the substance of the regular Vietnamese Army strength within the city. The 3d ARVN Regiment with three battalions was based five miles northwest of Hue. A fourth ARVN battalion was operating some miles southwest of the city.

The enemy must be given high marks for his infiltration into the city and for the surprise he subsequently achieved. Some of the infiltrators literally waited, in
The Imperial City of Hue, untouched through years of war, became the most dramatic victim of the Communist Tet Offensive early in 1968. Marines were called in to help ARVN forces in the recapture of the once beautiful city. The Hue and Perfume rivers are one and the same stream. It was up this narrow waterway that much logistic support came despite determined hostile efforts to interdict it.

civilian clothes, in Hue's tea rooms and bars until midnight when they changed into their uniforms. When the enemy signalled his occupation of Hue on 31 January with a mortar and rocket barrage, he had virtual control of the city. He had all of the Citadel with the exception of the 1st ARVN Division headquarters. South of the Perfume River, he had the province headquarters, the public utilities, the jail, the hospital, the University; almost everything of consequence, except the MACV compound and some isolated pockets of U.S. and South Vietnamese resistance.

Early that first morning, 31 January, Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was dispatched from Phu Bai by truck with orders to reinforce the MACV compound. Following in trace was the command group of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Marcus J. Gravel) with Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. They were joined on the road, providentially, by a tank platoon. The bob-tailed battalion fought its way through scattered resistance, got to the MACV compound about 1445. They were now ordered to cross the Perfume River with the objective of watching the 1st ARVN Division command post. With the help of the tanks, they got across the bridge but at great cost. They could not breach the Citadel wall, so, as darkness closed on them, they withdrew back across the river to the MACV compound.

Companies F and H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines joined them on the 1st and 2d of February from Phu Bai. At first the Marine role was defensive; there was great reluctance to use U.S. troops in the counter-attack, a point of honor on the part of the ARVN and also recognition that Marine firepower could do irreparable damage to the city and that there also would be unavoidable civilian casualties. Then Lieutenant General Lam, I Corps commander, hard pressed north of the river, asked the Marines to clear that part of Hue south of the river. The Marines, attacking westward from the MACV compound and moving parallel to the river, went systematically to work.

By 4 February, the counterattack was under regimental control of the 1st Marines (Colonel Stanley S. Hughes). The command group of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Cheatham) had arrived as had Company B, 1st Marines. The companies were sorted out and the two reduced battalions went forward, Gravel with two companies, Cheatham with three.

It was a house-to-house business, with all odds against the attacker. To minimize damage and civilian casualties, fire support was largely limited to direct fire weapons: rocker launchers, recoilless rifles, and tank guns. Use was also made of CS tear gas. By 6 February, the Marines had retaken the province headquarters, the jail and the hospital. Last organized resistance south of the river was extinguished on 9 February. The count of enemy dead had reached 1,053, and it was estimated that two enemy battalions had been destroyed.

North of the river, the 3d ARVN Regiment reinforced with three airborne battalions from the strategic reserve, attacking from the northeastern corner of the rectangular old city towards the southwest corner, was making slow, steady progress. The Marines were now asked to cross the river and help in the final assault.

On 12 February, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Thompson) joined the attacking ARVN, moving into the city from the north by helicopter and landing craft. The Marines went in on the left flank; the 3d ARVN Regiment was in the center; and the Vietnamese Marines, who had replaced the airborne battalions, were on the right flank. The attack ground inexorably forward. On 22 February, the Marines seized their final objective, the southeast wall of the Citadel. By prior agreement, the Marines stayed out of the fight for the Imperial Palace. At dawn on the
24th, the Vietnamese flag went up over the Citadel; and that afternoon, the Black Panther Company went into the now deserted Imperial Palace. Mopping up of the NVA remnants went on from 25 February until 2 March when the battle was declared over.

The North Vietnamese had committed at least eight battalions, perhaps eleven, to the battle. Command of this division-size attack had been given to the 6th NVA Regiment. Against them, three under strength U. S. Marines battalions and thirteen Vietnamese battalions were eventually used. West of Hue, five U. S. Army battalions had operated to cut the enemy's lines of supply and withdrawal. Throughout the battle the weather had been vile and the use of tactical air greatly limited. General Cushman has estimated that with a break in the weather the battle could have been fought and won in half the time. It is also quite likely that the North Vietnamese took this into consideration. The rain-laden clouds of the northeast monsoon strike the barrier of the Hai Van mountains and curl back, making the Hue area one of the wettest spots in Viet Nam.

February at Khe Sanh

At Khe Sanh, the Marines were told by General Tompkins (who was an almost daily visitor) to dig in and to confine their patrolling to local security. He set an arbitrary limit of 400 meters for patrols and constantly belabored Colonel Lownds with the admonition that "there is no such thing as too much wire or a position that is strong enough."

Not all the defenders were on or within the Khe Sanh perimeter itself. The chain of hills to the north was extensively organized. Two companies less a platoon of 3d Battalion, 26th Marines (Alderman) were on Hill 881 South. Company K of the 3d Battalion plus two platoons was on Hill 861. Hill 861A had Company E of the 2d Battalion. The rest of the 2d Battalion (Heath) was on Hill 558. Hill 950 had a reinforced platoon from the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines (Wilkinson). With the exception of this detachment, the 1st Battalion reinforced with Company L, 3d Battalion, was on the perimeter around the airstrip along with the 37th Rangers. The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (Mitchell) was on the hill just west of the base where the rock quarry was located.

Tactical air support flown by marine, Air Force, and Navy, made an immediate ring around Khe Sanh. Farther out, B-52s were used. Westmoreland personally decided where the B-52s would strike.

During the early morning hours of 5 February, sensor devices warned the Marines on Hill 881 South that the enemy was trying to get within assaulting distance. Air and artillery struck the enemy with devastating effect. Another prong of the attack, an NVA battalion, tried to assault the west slope at Hill 861A. Company E, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines threw back the attack; 109 enemy dead were left hanging on the barbed wire.

On 6 February, there was an artillery and mortar attack against Khe Sanh and the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei, six miles southwest of the air strip. During the night, some or all of the 66th NVA Regiment, 304th Division, accompanied by flame throwers and nine Russian-made PT-76 amphic forces, assaulted and took Lang Vei. Of the 20 U. S. Special Force Green Berets at the camp, 14 were rescued by Marine helicopters and were safe within Khe Sanh's perimeter by nightfall, along with 70 to 100 of the Montagnard CIDGs. U. S. air and Marine artillery pounded the abandoned base. At least three of the PT-76s were destroyed.

The enemy's siege tactics against Khe Sanh were classic: trenches, zig-zags, and parallels, some indications of mining and tunneling.

On February, again behind a rocket and mortar preparation, an NVA battalion hit the southwest edge of the defenses, penetrated the position of Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. A counterattack drove him out. After that, ground contact became more sporadic, limited to light enemy probes. Shelling reached a peak on 23 February when a counted 1,307 mortar and artillery rounds impacted on Khe Sanh.

More Reinforcements, New Commands. General Westmoreland had asked for additional troops from the States while the full shape of the Tet offensive was still unresolved and the threat against Khe Sanh was still building. He also established a MACV Forward command post at Phu Bai on 9 February, and positioned his Deputy, General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., USA, there.

This move was taken by some as evidence that General Westmoreland had taken the conduct of the battle in the northern two provinces out of the operational hands of Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force. Such was not the case. MACV Forward functioned the same as any forward command post—no different, for example, than an advance command post sent forward by landing force headquarters in an amphibious operation. General Abrams, the rugged, 53-year-old former Vice Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, was scrupulous in refraining from giving orders directly to any unit, Army or Marine, under General Cushman's command.

The requested reinforcements, the U. S. Marine Corps' Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 27 and the 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, now began to come into the country. President Johnson had given them a personal send-off.

RLT-27's deployment was planned as temporary, hopefully not to remain in country more than three
or four months. The reinforced landing team, essentially half of the uncommitted remainder of the 5th Marine Division, was formed around an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion: the 27th Marines (Colonel Adolph G. Schwenk) and the 2d Battalion, 13th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Rhys J. Phillips, Jr.). They began loading exactly 48 hours after notification by Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, that they would be moving. In that time, in order to meet deployment criteria they transferred out 1,400 men and brought in 1,900. Except for his executive officer who was an old hand with the regiment, Colonel Schwenk literally met his staff on the aircraft.

The first unit to arrive in Da Nang by air was the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Bacher), from Camp Pendleton on 17 February. Next to come, also by air and from Camp Pendleton, was 3d Battalion, 27th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Tullis J. Woodham, Jr.) on 20 February.

The 27th Marines were given the old but still troublesome coastal sector south of Marble Mountain and north of Hoi An. They moved into the area immediately and began working with the half of the 5th Marines (Bohn) that was operating there. In a week they took over responsibility for the TAOR.

Service support troops, formed up into a provisional battalion, arrived from Okinawa on 26 February. The remaining battalion landing team, built around 1st Battalion, 27th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John E. Greenwood)—which Schwenk had never seen—was part of the Hawaii-based 1st Marine Brigade and had been at sea on an amphibious exercise when the order to proceed to Vietnam was received. It arrived in Da Nang on 28 February.

The 5th marines could now concentrate on operations from Hai Van pass north to Phu Bai. Both the Tet offensive and the monsoon had taken a toll of Highway One. The new operation, Houston, was begun on 26 February with 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Davis) and 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Rockey).

Meanwhile, on 19 February, HQ, 101st Airborne Division (Major General Olinto M. Barsanti, USA) with its 1st Brigade (Colonel John W. Collins, USA) had arrived at Phu Bai. Two days later, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (Colonel Alex M. Bolling, Jr., USA) began coming into Chu Lai and was shuttled north to Phu Bai where it joined the 101st, giving that Division three brigades.

**Tet Assessment**

The enemy’s ambitions for the Tet offensive had been large. He had told his troops and his political cadre that the time had come for a general offensive and a popular uprising. In Hue, he had announced the for-
sion direction" of Commanding General, 7th Air Force. General Westmoreland says the shift of control was made to alleviate the problem of "progressively complicated coordination of this indispensable air support provided by U. S. Air Force, U. S. Marine Corps, U. S. Navy, and Vietnamese Air Force tactical aircraft in addition to the B-52s one of the 3d Air Division in the Strategic Air Command."

The "single manager" concept for tactical air had been approved by CinCPac on 8 March. General Westmoreland's stated objective was to combine into a single system "the best features of both the Air Force and Marine tactical air support systems . . . "

By the time 7th Air Force control actually got underway, 1 April, the Tet offensive was over, the battle for Hue was fought and won, and the siege of Khe Sanh had just about petered out.

Relief of Khe Sanh

Meanwhile, round-the-clock bombing, well-named Operation Niagara, continued to interdict the enemy's approaches to Khe Sanh. By now, the verdant green hill sides, once the site of the best coffee plantations in Indo-China, had been pounded into a red-orange moonscape as unprecedented tonnages of aerial ordnance were delivered.

Meanwhile, the choppers and C-123s and C-130s continued to do their job of keeping the base supplied and getting the wounded out. The NVA, in turn, pushed his trenches further forward; did what he could to cut the aerial supply line; hammered away at the base with his mortars and artillery, getting back ten shells for every one he threw in; and occasionally risked infantry action. The Marines at Khe Sanh, chafing at restrictions placed on their own ground counteractions, patrolled out to prescribed limits, occasionally brushed with the NVA, and found considerable grisly evidence of the death and destruction being worked upon the enemy.

On 7 March, a C-123K Provider, making its approach to Khe Sanh from the east, was hit by NVA ground fire a few miles out and went down. All were killed: 43 Marines, a sailor, and the four Air Force crew members.

The enemy's most serious attack of the month came on 18 March. He tried to breach the portion of the

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1968: QUANG TRI PROVINCE


KENTUCKY (1 Nov 67-Continuing). 9th Marines' operation in vicinity of "Leatherneck Square" formed by Gio Linh, Con Thien, Dong Ha, and Cam Lo. At year's end, enemy dead stood at 3,839; Marine losses at 502 killed, 2,331 wounded.


SCOTLAND II (15 Apr-Continuing). Task Force Horel operation at Khe Sanh subsequent to PEGASUS. By year's end enemy had lost 3,115 dead. Marine casualties: 383 killed, 1,918 wounded.

NAPOLEON/SALINE (3 Nov 67-9 Dec 68). NAPOLEON, begun 5 Nov 67, and SALINE, begun 30 Jan 68, were combined on 29 Feb Operation begun by 1st Amtrac Bn and continued by various Marine and U. S. Army infantry units was to provide security for Cua Viet river. Altogether 3,405 enemy were killed at a cost of 395 Americans dead, 1,680 wounded.

DAWSON RIVER (28 Nov-Continuing). 9th Marines. At year's end, the operation had killed 60 enemy. Marine losses stood at three killed and 40 wounded.
Marine Operations in Vietnam

The perimeter held by the 37th ARVN Rangers and lost. Early on the morning of 30 March, Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines assaulted an NVA battalion entrenched a mile south of the base. On that same day, Operation Scotland was declared over.

**Operation Pegasus**

With the end of the monsoon in sight, Cushman had proposed a three-phase Spring counteroffensive to begin in April and to include the relief of Khe Sanh, an attack into the DMZ, and a raid into the A Shau valley. Westmoreland approved the plan.

Accordingly, 1st Air Cav’s first major operation in I Corps, Jeb Stuart, was brought to a close on 31 March to free the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Major General John H. Tolson, III, USA) for the relief of Khe Sanh.

Operation Pegasus was launched on 1 April. The ARVN portion of the operation was called Lam Son 207; the ARVN had long since given up trying to give each operation a gutsy, evocative nickname. 1st Air Cavalry Division, with an ARVN airborne battalion moving with them, was to leap-frog into successive positions east and then south of Khe Sanh. Less dramatically, the 1st Marine Regiment (Hughes) and three ARVN battalions were to move overland westward from Ca Lu to open up Route 9 itself.

On the first day out, 1st Marines, moving against very little resistance, got to their objective west of Ca Lu; and 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry (Campbell) established a fire support base five miles east of Khe Sanh.

On 4 April, 26th Marines attacked southeast from Khe Sanh itself. First link-up between the Marines and cavalrymen came on 6 April when 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (Mitchell) met the approaching 1st Air Cav troopers. Later that same day, 1st Air Cav and ARVN airborne elements reached Khe Sanh. On 9 April, for the first time in 45 days, no shells fell on the base; and U.S. forces went back into Lang Vei Special Forces camp, meeting virtually no resistance. By 12 April, Route 9 was open to truck traffic.

Two days later, on 14 April, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John C. Studt) took Hill 881 North. Operation Pegasus was now declared over.

The battle for Khe Sanh had been fought according to plan: the Marines had buttoned up their defenses; the enemy had been engaged with massive firepower, air and artillery; the defenders had been adequately re-supplied by air; land communications were restored with the return of good weather.

Write General Westmoreland: “The key to our success at Khe Sanh was firepower, principally aerial firepower. For 77 days, Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft provided round-the-clock, close-in support to the defending garrison and were controlled by airborne Forward Air Controllers or ground-based radar. Between 22 January and 31 March, tactical aircraft flew an average of 300 sorties daily, close to one every five minutes, and expended 35,000 tons of bombs and rockets.”

During the same period, Strategic Air Command’s B-52s had flown 2,602 sorties and dropped over 75,000 tons of bombs. Marine howitzers at Khe Sanh and Army 175s supporting from Camp Carroll and the Rockpile had fired over 100,000 rounds, nearly 1,500 shells a day.

Between 21 January and 8 April, 14,000 or more tons of supplies were delivered by Marine and Air Force air to Khe Sanh. Sixty-five percent of the deliveries were by parachute drop from C-130s and C-123s. In all, there were some 679 drops. During the same period, 455 aircraft landed at Khe Sanh. Television may have given the American public the impression that anything attempting to land at Khe Sanh was shot down. Actually only four fixed-wing aircraft—a C-130, a C-123, an A-4, and an F-4—appear to have been destroyed by enemy action.

Perhaps a tougher problem in aerial logistics than the air drops on KSCB (the main drop zone was between the perimeter and the rock quarry) was the re-supply of the two Marine battalions occupying the hills to the north. This was done by Marine helicopters flying in “gaggles” averaging seven aircraft and coming straight from Dong Ha to each of the hill positions. Coming down on these minuscule landing zones was like placing the chopper on the center of a bull’s eye and was only feasible because of the covering close air support provided by Marine fixed-wing aircraft using smoke, napalm, and bombs. Exact helicopter losses are elusive but it appears that at least 17 choppers were destroyed or received “strike damage” and that perhaps twice this number received some degree of battle damage.

In any case, there was never a serious supply shortage. General Westmoreland rightly called the logistic air effort the “premier air logistical feat of the war.”

In no way was Khe Sanh another Dien Bien Phu. The Marines had never thought that it would be.

**Raid into A Shau Valley**

With the relief of Khe Sanh accomplished, III MAF could turn its attention to the next phase of Cushman’s spring counteroffensive: a raid into the A Shau valley, held strongly by the enemy since the fall of the Special Forces camp there in March 1966.

Operation Delaware Valley was to be a spoiling attack by the 1st Air Cavalry (Tolson) and 101st Airborne Divisions (Barsanti) with the mission of finding and destroying the NVA/VC logistic bases from which
operations against Hue and the coastal area were being supported. The coordinated ARVN portion of the attack was Lam Son 216.

Major General Davis, the Marine deputy commander of ProvCorpsV had been very favorably impressed by the airmobile portion of Pegasus. To study Army techniques closer at hand, he had himself attached to the 1st Air Cavalry for the A Shau operation. He would find much to admire.

There were two prongs to the initial entry. On 19 April, the 1st Air Cavalry with five battalions and the 3d ARVN Regiment with three battalions made an airmobile assault into the valley. On the same day, 101st Airborne Division with three battalions and an ARVN Airborne Task Force of three battalions started westward along Route 547, axis of Operation Cumberland the previous year. Landing against well-prepared anti-helicopter defenses, the Army on that first day suffered a number of helos destroyed and damaged.

On 22 April, 196th Light Infantry Brigade (Gelling) moved up from the Americal Division to Camp Evans to take over rear area security and to act as a reserve. On 1 May, the air strip at A Luoi, another abandoned Special Forces camp, was re-opened to take C-123 Providers supporting the operation. On 12 May, the ARVN Airborne task force chopped out of Lam Son 216.

On 16 May, the operation was declared over. Ground action had been formless, many small actions, no major clashes. Added up, there were 735 enemy dead. More important were his materiel losses, the largest yet inflicted upon him in I Corps Tactical Zone. He lost 2500 individual weapons, 93 crew-served weapons, and heavier stuff including a number of artillery pieces ranging from a dozen 37mm AA guns to several 75mm and 122mm howitzers and nearly a hundred trucks.

Coincident with Operation Delaware Valley, the remainder of the 101st Airborne Division was conducting Carentan II northwest of Hue. Begun 1 April, it lasted until 16 May.

**Battle for Dong Ha**

The third phase of III MAF's spring counteroffensive—a cleansing attack into the DMZ—was pre-empted by an enemy thrust in strength against Dong Ha. By late April it was obvious that Hanoi had committed the 320th NVA Division to a serious effort to take the 3d Marine Division command post and major combat base. On 29 April elements of the 2d ARVN Regiment engaged an NVA regiment four miles north of the base. General Tompkins dispatched his Division reserve, Task Force Robbie, to help out. This action set off a six-day fight centered on Dai Do hamlet, a mile and a half northeast of Dong Ha. The Communist main body was met there by 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William Weise). After three days hard fighting, Weise's battalion (he was among those wounded) was relieved by 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Charles V. Jarman).

While this violent action was going on at Dai Do, the ARVN in Lam Son 218 had moved to block enemy escape routes to the northwest; 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Lamontagne) had attacked enemy units withdrawing westward; and 3d Battalion, U. S. 21st Infantry had completed the encirclement of the enemy to the northeast. Heavy fighting continued until about 16 May. As always, lines on the map were tighter than they were on the ground and the 320th NVA Division succeeded in momentarily breaking off contact.

They came back into the attack in late May. Once again the main force was met by the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Louis A. Rann), this time near the hamlet of Nhi Ha six miles northeast of Dong
Marine Operations in Vietnam

Ha, on 25 May. Beginning that same day, the ARVN engaged an enemy column further to the west, just off Highway 1. Meanwhile, the 9th Marines (Colonel Richard B. Smith) with its own battalions plus 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel James W. Marsh) had also joined in the battle. By the end of the month the 320th NVA Division had been rendered, for the time, combat ineffective.

Mini-Tet

The enemy himself had launched his second major offensive for the year on 5 May, signalled by 119 rocket and mortar attacks ranging the length and breadth of the Republic of Viet Nam. In I Corps Tactical Zone within 24 hours the airfields at Da Nang, Marble Mountain, Quang Tri, and Chu Lai; the headquarters of both III MAF and I Corps in Da Nang along with the headquarters of the Force Logistics Command; the MACV compound in Hue; and the command post of the 101st Airborne Division were all hit. These attacks by fire continued on 11 and 13 May. Marble Mountain air facility took 20 or 25 rocket rounds.

On 19 May the enemy engaged the U. S. Army base at Camp Evans with a singularly lucky rocket attack. With 12 rocket rounds he hit an ammo dump. The resulting explosions destroyed several helicopters, and inflicted varying degrees of damage on a number of other aircraft. Some 80,000 gallons of fuel also went up.

On the 20th, MAG-16 at Marble Mountain was hit again. On 21 May, Camp Hochmuth at Phu Bai took 150 rounds of mortar fire. On 25 May, Cua Viet Naval Facility was pounded by 111 rounds of mixed rocket and mortar fire. Sixteen 10,000-gallon fuel bladders went up in flames. On 27 May Phu Bai was again attacked by fire.

Although the enemy had once again demonstrated his ability to coordinate wide-ranging attacks by rocket and mortar fire against Free World bases and inflict stinging damage in the process, his May attacks were but a pale shadow of his February Tet offensive. On 27 May he did make a fairly serious thrust at Tam Ky, following his mortars with a ground assault. Three hundred houses were destroyed. Fifty civilians were reported dead.

Allen Brook. While 3d Marine Division was battling at Khe Sanh and Dong Ha and the 1st Air Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions had been fighting their fights in the A Shau Valley and west of Hue, things had been fairly quiescent for the 1st Marine Division in Quang Nam province.

On 12 March, 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonels William J. Davis and Charles E. Mueller) and the 3/5 Armored Cavalry Squadron (Lieutenant Colonel Hugh J. Bartley, USA) had launched Operation Worth 15 miles southwest of Da Nang. By late April, it was apparent that the enemy had fed in the equivalent of an NVA division south of Da Nang. At the year's beginning the 31st NVA Regiment had been found in western Quang Nam province. In April, the 141st NVA Regiment was identified and a little later there was reason to suspect that the 36th NVA Regiment was in "Go Noi island," a delta west of Hoi An, formed by the meanderings of the many-named Ky Lam river, and bisected by Highway One and the railroad.

At this point, 1st Marine Division (Robertson) made a definite shift in tactics. The defense of the Da Nang complex against rockets and mortars, and sapper attacks, had resolved itself into a thickly-manned, heavily-patrolled "rocket belt" extending in a semi-circle around Da Nang. With the additional troops now available plus thinning-out the rocket belt somewhat, it was decided to fan out in deeper-reaching, more mobile operations which would keep the NVA forces at arm's length from Da Nang.

On 4 May, Operation Allen Brook was launched by 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Mueller) under control of 7th Marines (Colonel Reverdy M. Hall). The battalion went in on the western edge of Go Noi island and attacked eastward toward the railroad. For the first four days resistance was scattered. Then on 9 May the Marines ran into a large enemy force in the vicinity of the ruined railroad bridge over the Ky Lam near Xuan Dai. There was a hot fight, and 80 NVA were killed.

Four days later, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Roger H. Barnard) relieved the 2d Battalion, reversed direction, and started to sweep westward. On 16 May the enemy was met at Phu Dong, two miles west of Xuan Dai, in well-bunkered positions. Heavy fighting followed.

Control of Allen Brook now passed from 7th Marines to 27th Marines (Schwenk). Next day, 17 May, 3d Battalion, 27th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Tullis J. Woodham, Jr.) heli-assaulted two miles west of Phu Dong, ran into a dug-in enemy almost immediately. In the next ten days the Marine battalions converged on the enemy, now identified as the 36th and 38th Regiments of the 308th NVA Division, with the fighting finally concentrating at Le Bac and Cu Ban, fortified hamlet complexes about five miles east of An Hoa.

In a coordinated ARVN operation, Hung Quang 1-38, two battalions of the 51st Regiment (Colonel Truong Tan Thuc) plus the 21st and 37th Ranger Battalions operated in the eastern part of Go Noi island, from 16 May to 25 May.
Mameluke Thrust. A companion operation to Allen Brook was Mameluke Thrust, launched by the 7th Marines (Hall) on 18 May after passing control of Allen Brook to 27th Marines. The Mameluke Thrust area was west and south of Da Nang, north of An Hoa, fan-shaped blanketing the corridors leading down from the mountains and pointed at Da Nang.

The enemy had been probing at Thuong Duc Special Forces camp in late April and early May. He was identified as the 31st Regiment, 308th NVA Division. Mameluke Thrust was begun with the entry of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William J. Davis) into “Happy Valley.”

To screen the large area, extensive use was made of the “Sting Ray” concept, the pre-eminently successful technique worked out by the Marines, which introduces small reconnaissance teams into the objective area to bring down air and artillery fire on observed enemy.

Operations in Quang Tin Province. Southwest of the Allen Brook area, Americal Division had begun Operation Burlington Trail on 8 April. Three U. S. Army battalions would be used and it would last until 11 November.

Kham Duc, a Special Forces camp on the western edge of Quang Tin province, was the object of the 2d NVA Division’s main attention in the May mini-Tet. First to be hit was Ngok Tavak outpost. Engaged by an NVA battalion on 10 May, the garrison, CIDG Montagnards reinforced by a section of Marine 105mm howitzers, resisted for twelve hours before pulling out.

General Cushman first elected to reinforce the main camp. A battalion of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade was flown in from Quang Tri by C-130; a rifle company came in from Chu Lai by helicopter. On 12 May the NVA attacked in regimental strength. The outposts on the surrounding high ground were all gone.

Two alternatives were open to General Cushman: to continue to reinforce or to withdraw. He saw no advantage in making a major battle of it, one that would have to be supported logistically entirely by air. He recommended that the camp be evacuated and General Westmoreland concurred.

In all, some 1,400 persons were taken out. In the process one C-130 with 150 Vietnamese aboard, was shot down on take-off; all were killed. Large quantities of supplies and equipment had to be abandoned or destroyed in place.

Marine Air Operations

Throughout late Spring, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, trying to adjust to the new rules for single-management of tactical air support, continued to provide all aviation services, acting much like a composite air force.

Bombing north of the 19th Parallel had halted 1 April following President Johnson’s dramatic televised message to the Nation on the night before, in which he had announced the reduction in bombing, plans for preliminary peace talks, and his own decision not to seek re-election.

Marine Aircraft Group 36 (Wilson) had been operating its helicopter squadrons from both Phu Bai and Quang Tri. On 16 April, the Quang Tri squadrons were formed into provisional MAG-39 (Colonel John E. Hansen).

On 14 May, VMF(AW)-235 (Lieutenant Colonel Carl R. Lundquist) the last of the Marine F-8 squadrons in-country, left Da Nang for Iwakuni and staging to Kancobe in Oahu where it would be redesignated VMFA-235 and re-equipped with F-4Bs. There had been three F-8 squadrons at Da Nang. First deployed in December 1965, the three Crusader squadrons—VMF(AW)s 312, 232, and 235—had flown a total of nearly 21,000 sorties.

The only new airplane to come into the Marine fighting inventory in 1968 was the long-awaited OV-10A—the North American Bronco. It was also called a “COIN” aircraft (For “counterinsurgency”) or “LARA” (for “light armed reconnaissance aircraft”) but it could do much more than these two descriptors would indicate. It had been designed and built to meet a Marine Corps requirement for a light, simple airplane that could operate from the deck of an amphibious assault ship, that could land and take-off from unimproved airfields, or a stretch of road if need be, and that could still perform a wide variety of missions: visual reconnaissance and surveillance to be sure, but also helicopter escort, ground attack, airborne tactical air coordination, artillery and naval gunfire spotting, battlefield illumination, and enough cargo and passenger space for liaison and utility use.

Six OV-10As, under command of Major Simon J. Kittler, arrived at Cubi Point in the Philippines on 22 May and passed to the operational control of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. They came into Marble Mountain Air Facility on 6 July and flew their first combat mission four hours later. The OV-10As’ arrival was particularly opportune. Marine O-1 light reconnaissance aircraft assets had declined to the vanishing point and U. S. Army O-15 were spread thin. Further, the OV-10A could share the demands for helicopter escort and ground fire suppression then being borne by the TA-4F and UH-1E gunships.

By the end of the year, 26 of the new aircraft had been added to the complements of the two Marine observation squadrons, VMOS 2 and 6, and had racked up a total of 3,000 sorties.

With its twin tailbooms and its two big three-bladed
propellers, the OV-10A looked like something out of World War II; but it soon proved it could do the jobs for which it had been designed to do, with speeds well over 200 knots, good loiter time, and a respectable combat radius.

Command Changes

On 10 April, President Johnson had announced that General Abrams would succeed General Westmoreland in July. This was no surprise. General Westmoreland had been ComUSMACV since 1964. For a year General Abrams had been his Deputy. Best judgment was that President Johnson had delayed General Westmoreland's departure until the Tet offensive was demonstrably over and Khe Sanh no longer under siege.

In III MAF, May was a month of command changes. Major General William J. Van Ryzin, Deputy Commander, III MAF, returned home for promotion to lieutenant general and assignment as Chief of Staff at Headquarters, Marine Corps. Major General Tompkins, who had commanded the 3d Marine Division since the death of Major General Hochmuth, through the Tet offensive and the battles for Khe Sanh and Dong Ha, moved up to Deputy Commander, III MAF.

Major General Davis, was shifted over from Deputy Commander, Provisional Corps, Vietnam, to command

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III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1968: U.S. ARMY OPERATIONS

- **CARENTAN II (1 Apr-17 May 68)**: 101st Airborne Division. Enemy dead counted at 2,096. U.S. Army losses were 156 killed, 884 wounded.
- **DELAWARE VALLEY (19 Apr-17 May 68)**: Large scale U.S. Army and ARVN raid into A Shau valley. Enemy lost 735 dead, much materiel. U.S. Army losses were 142 killed, 731 wounded. ARVN losses were 26 killed, 132 wounded.
- **JEB STUART III (16 May-3 Nov 68)**: Resumption of JEB STUART. Enemy losses were counted at 2,016. 1st Cav losses were 213 killed, 1,337 wounded.
- **CONCORDIA SQUARE (9-17 May 68)**: Eight-day battle by 1st Air Cavalry killed 349 enemy. U.S. losses were 28 dead, 116 wounded.
- **NEVADA EAGLE (17 May-Continuing)**: 101st Airborne Division. At year's close, enemy dead listed at 2,581. U.S. Army casualties stood at 175 dead, 1,161 wounded.
- **FAYETTE CANYON (15 Dec-Continuing)**: 196th Light Infantry Brigade.
- **WHEELER/WALLOWA (11 Sep 67-10 Nov 68)**: Long-term Americal Division Operation in Que Son valley. Enemy dead counted at 10,020. U.S. Army casualties were 682 killed, 2,548 wounded.
- **BURLINGTON TRAIL (8 Apr-10 Nov 68)**: Brigade-size Army operation antecillary to WHEELER/WALLOWA. Enemy dead, 1,948. U.S. Army losses were 129 killed, 747 wounded.
- **GOLDEN VALLEY (10-12 May 68)**: Evacuation of Kham Duc. Enemy losses estimated at 300 killed. American losses 12 killed, 103 wounded, 21 missing.
- **MUSCATINE (19 Dec 67-10 Jun 68)**: 11th Light Infantry Brigade. Enemy lost 1,129 killed. U.S. Army losses were 186 killed, 417 wounded.
- **VERNON LAKE (25 Oct-2 Nov 68)**: 11th Light Infantry Brigade. Enemy lost 96 killed. U.S. losses were 1 killed, 4 wounded. Followed by VERNON LAKE II (2 Nov-Continuing).
of the 3d Marine Division. Major General Clifford B. Drake, newly arrived from Headquarters, Marine Corps, where he had been Director of Reserve, became Deputy Commander, Provisional Corps, Vietnam.

But the most significant change of command of all was one that occurred earlier. On 1 March, Clark McAdams Clifford was sworn in as the new Secretary of Defense, replacing Robert Strange McNamara.

**Shift to More Mobile Operations**

After the link-up at Khe Sanh, General Westmoreland, meeting with Lieutenant Generals Cushman and Rosson at the Provisional Corps, Vietnam, headquarters at Phu Bai, asked that a study be made of how to maximize troop use in the good weather. Cushman had been advocating more mobile operations for Quang Tri province since 1967, but had lacked the resources and had also been tied to the anti-infiltration system. Now both he and Rosson recommended Khe Sanh be abandoned, saying it could be covered by mobile forces working out of Landing Zone Stud, the new airfield and logistic base developed at Ca Lu for the support of 1st Cavalry Division during Pegasus.

Westmoreland agreed in principle but said that implementation should be deferred for two reasons. First, evacuating Khe Sanh might siphon off resources needed to support Operation Delaware Valley to be launched in the A Shau. Second, as he was scheduled to depart shortly, he preferred that the final decision be made by General Abrams.

Cushman and Rosson also recommended that modifications be made to the strong point obstacle system which had tied up so much of the 3d Marine Division’s resources. Again, Westmoreland approved Cushman’s and Rosson’s recommendations in principle but asked that a detailed plan be developed. In his Report, General Westmoreland says “... the enemy’s artillery and rocket fire had been so intense that the construction of the originally planned physical obstacles was not feasible.”

**Scotland II.** At Khe Sanh, with Pegasus over, Scotland II was begun on 16 April. The troop list was impressive: the 1st Marines (Hughes) with six Marine infantry battalions and the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Campbell) with two Army battalions. The tactical headquarters was Task Force Glick, named for the commander, Brigadier General Jacob E. Glick, and originally established for the purpose of closing down the Khe Sanh base. On 25 April General Glick was relieved by Brigadier General Carl W. Hoffman. The command was briefly known as Task Force Hoffman, then became Task Force Hotel, a designation which would persist.

There were sharp actions radiating out from Khe Sanh in May against a resurgent 304th NVA Division. On the 14th of the month, the enemy tried to ambush a convoy moving west from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh. In turn, the ambusher were pounced upon by 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Davis). Three days later, on 17 May, Company H, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines cut their way through another ambush, this one west of Khe Sanh, half-way along Route 9 to Lang Vei. That same day, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Lee R. Bendell) began a two-day fight in the vicinity of Hills 689 and 552 west of Khe Sanh.
The plan was for 1st Marines (Hughes) to move in first, attack northward (Robin North); 4th Marines (Miller) would follow, then attack southward (Robin South).

There were five days of preparatory air and artillery fires into the objective area; and then on 2 and 3 June, 1st Marines helo-lifted 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rann) and 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (Gravel) into Loon and Robin. These battalions then attacked northward against blocking positions established south of Route 9 by 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Davis). They met little opposition, found many abandoned positions. By 12 June, Robin North was over.

Meanwhile, on 3 June, 4th Marines had moved its 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel James H. MacLean), reinforced with engineers and artillery, into Loon and Robin. At dawn, 6 June, the NVA attacked Companies C and D at Loon. On that same day, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (Lamontagne) moved by helo into a new landing zone, Torch, three miles southeast of Loon and close to the Laotian border. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 4th Marines, then followed 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, into Torch. On 11 June the enemy tried a company-size attack against the first support base. They were stopped after reaching the 105mm howitzers of Battery C, 12th Marines.

On 16 June there was a heavy action between 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Bourne, Jr.) and a North Vietnamese battalion. Two days later, on 18 June, the enemy tried to breach the 3d Battalion's position once again and were severely handled. Next day, 4th Marines re-deployed to Khe Sanh and Robin South was over.

In all, Robin North and South had cost the enemy
over 725 troops killed or captured, and large amounts of weapons, ammunition and equipment. During these actions, the two reinforced Marine regiments, including eight batteries of artillery, were totally resupplied by helicopter. It was the first use of mountain-top fire bases by the 3d Marine Division and they worked well. The newly arrived 308th NVA Division had lasted only two weeks against the Marine assault; it withdrew and went north to re-fit.

**Abrams For Westmoreland**

On 10 June 1968 General Westmoreland held his last press conference in Saigon as ComUSMACV. It was a set-piece conference; the General reviewed the “benchmarks” of the war as he saw them. Then a reporter asked the last, final, question:

“General, can the war be won militarily?”

“Not in a classic sense, because—” Westmoreland paused briefly, “—of our national policy of not expanding the war.”

But, said General Westmoreland, even if the United States could not win a “classic” victory, “the enemy can be attrited, the price can be raised—and is being raised to the point that it could be intolerable to the enemy.”

**Base for Krulak.** A little earlier, on 1 June, there had been another change of command of at least equal interest to the Marines in Viet Nam. At ceremonies at Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe, Oahu, Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, Jr. relieved Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Diminutive, brilliant, sometimes controversial, "Brute" Krulak was ending 34 years in the Corps. Not in the operational chain of command, he nevertheless had had great influence on the size and shape of Marine Corps operations in Vietnam. He was presented the Distinguished Service Medal by Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp. Admiral Sharp himself would retire on 31 July from his post as Commander in Chief, Pacific, relieved by Admiral John S. McCain.

In III MAF, during June, Major General Carl A. Youngdale, who on a previous tour had been J-2 on the MACV staff, relieved Major General Donn J. Robertson as Commanding General, 1st Marine Division; and Major General Charles J. Quilter relieved Major General Norman J. Anderson as Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

**Special Landing Force Operations**

On 7 June, BLT 3/1 (McQuown) lifted by HMM-164 (Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Rick) went ashore ten miles northwest of Da Nang in Operation Swift Saber. Swift Saber was kind of an amphibious passage of lines; BLT 2/7 (Mueller) re-embarked in amphibious shipping and, along with HMM-265 (Lieutenant Colonel William L. Whelan), became Special Landing Force Bravo. Swift Saber operations ashore continued for a week, but did not develop any significant contacts.

The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, since landing in the Badger Catch operation east of Gio Linh on 23 January, had been singularly active. Operations against the 803d NVA Regiment in the fortified hamlets of the Cua Viet River had continued through February. Then, on 5 March, the battalion had been moved to the Camp Carroll area as part of Lancaster II, its mission, substantially, to keep its portion of Route 9 open and protected. This had continued until 19 April when the battalion was redeployed to Ca Lu.

**Khe Sanh Evacuated**

With highly successful Robin North and South actions behind them, the next Task Force Hotel mission was the evacuation of Khe Sanh. As discussed earlier, Cushman and Rosson had argued for such a move immediately after Operation Pegasus. Westmoreland had concurred in principle but had questioned the timing of the withdrawal, asking for a detailed plan and indicating that the decision to execute should come from his successor, General Abrams. Westmoreland had left Saigon on 11 June.

**Razing the Base.** Meanwhile, the base itself was being dismantled and razed by the 1st Marines (Colonel Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.) and 11th Engineer Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Victor A. Perry). Everything of value that could be removed was removed: supplies, ammunition, salvageable equipment and vehicles, fortification and building materials, airfield materiel. Everything else was buried by bulldozer, or burned, or blown up. Working eastward from Khe Sanh to Ca Lu along Route 9, the engineers took out six tactical bridges (the components could be flown back in by helicopter, if needed for a future operation), left the culverts and by-passes in place. The job was completed 5 July.

There was fighting in and around Hill 689 some two miles west of the base. Heaviest contact was on 7 July when Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines ran into a dug-in NVA company just west of the hill. The NVA came back in a night attack shortly after midnight, hitting Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, on Hill 689 itself. After that, things were relatively quiet.

1st Marines, mission completed, left Khe Sanh and redeployed to the Napoleon/Saline operational area, radiating out from Cua Viet.

The obvious questions were asked: Why, if Khe Sanh
were worth defending, virtually at any cost, earlier in
the year was it being abandoned now? What had
changed? Did the decision have major strategic impli-
cations? Were we abandoning the northeast corner of
South Vietnam to the Communists?

At the White House, the press secretary, George
Christian, announced that the abandonment of Khe
Sanh had not been decided by President Johnson but
was a military decision.

Hanoi was quick to claim that the "fall" of Khe Sanh
was a "grave defeat" for the Americans, with "disastrous
political and psychological consequences." Nguyen
Thanh Le, spokesman for the North Vietnamese dele-
gation at the Paris peace talks, said that American expla-
nations that the base was no longer essential were just
"sour grapes."

"The United States military commanders once de-
cided to defend the base at all costs," said Mr. Le. "They
are now forced to retreat from the base. The high com-
mand pretends the retreat was ordered because the base
is unessential now. That makes me think of the La
Fontaine fable of the fox and the grapes."

The official MACV explanation to the press was as
follows:

"...there have been two significant changes in the
military situation in Vietnam since early this year—an
increase in friendly strength, mobility and firepower and
an increase in the enemy's threat due to both greater
flow of replacements and a change in tactics."

"Mobile forces not tied to specific terrain must be
used to the utmost to attack, intercept, reinforce or take
whatever action is most appropriate to meet enemy
threats."

"Therefore, we have decided to continue the mobile
posture we adopted in western Quang Tri Province with
Operation Pegasus in April. The decision makes the
operation of the base at Khe Sanh unnecessary."

In a nutshell, Khe Sanh could be abandoned because
the Marines now had enough troops and helicopters,
and enough latitude of action, so that they could
operate in a mobile mode, dominating the whole re-
region, rather than being tied to the fixed defense of a
base in the center of it.

Extending this high mobility concept to the whole
3d Marine Division, General Davis laid down some
ground rules. Unit integrity would be reestablished; not
only would organic battalions work with their parent
regiments, but this would also apply to normal support
units, particularly direct support artillery. Unessential
combat bases and strongpoints would be closed, and
those that were not closed would be made defendable
by no more than one reinforced company. The recon-
naissance effort was also to be upgraded, with from 30
to 35 teams to be kept out in the field at all times.

**Operation Thor.** Along the rest of the 3d Marine
Division front, the principal trouble came from enemy
shellings of base areas during June. The fuel dump at
Camp Kistler, Cua Viet, had been hit and sixteen
10,000-gallon fuel bladders had gone up. Worse yet, on
20 June at Dong Ha, light shelling set off an ammun-
tion dump fire which cost the Marines a quarter-million
artillery and mortar rounds.

Operation Thor was conceived with the purpose of
getting at the enemy's artillery positions and also at his
sanctuary, by means of a massive application of air,
artillery, and naval gunfire. It was begun on 1 July. The
impact area was bounded by the southern edge of the
DMZ, then north along the coast ten miles to Cape Mui
Lay, then straight west for 16 miles, then a closing leg
due south to the DMZ. Marine, Navy, and Air Force
attack aircraft; Strategic Air Command B-52s; two cruis-
ers and six destroyers; and some 118 pieces of Marine
and Army artillery were all brought to bear in a seven-
day barrage.

Exploitation of the barrier of fire created by Opera-
Thor was essentially the delayed third phase of
General Cushman's spring counteroffensive; a general
cleansing of the area north of Route 9 to the DMZ.

In the Cua Viet area, in continuation of Napoleon/
Saline, 3d Marines (Colonel Milton A. Hull), attacked
north on 5 July. On their left, in a coordinated action,
2d ARVN Regiment advanced astride Route 1 in Lam
Son 234. First solid contact was by 1st Battalion, 3d
Marines (Major Edward J. Rochford, Jr.) that first day
at Lai An hamlet, six miles north of Dong Ha. They
secured the hamlet by nightfall. July 6 was spent patrol-
ing, seeking new contact. Mid-morning, 7 July, a
Marine patrol developed an NVA company position a
mile north of Lai An. This led to a fresh action.

Meanwhile, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Davis), ad-
vancing on the right of 1st Battalion, found the enemy
on 7 July in the vicinity of Ben Lan and drove through
the hamlet in an attack supported by naval gunfire.

West of Highway 1 in the Kentucky area of opera-
tions, 9th Marines (Smith) also sought to exploit Thor,
working north and east of Con Thien. Contact was
frequent, but small gauge. The largest fight was on 11
July when 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (Lamontagne)
captured an NVA platoon in the open three miles north
of Con Thien.

Further west, in the Lancaster II area, a three-regi-
ment attack was begun on 17 July; 9th Marines on the
east flank, 3d Marines in the center, and 2d ARVN
Regiment on the west flank. The scheme was to land
close to the DMZ, then push south against Route 9.
The enemy did not elect to defend in strength. The
biggest action took place on the first day, eight miles
northwest of Camp Carroll, where the 3d Battalion, 9th
Marines met an enemy company dug in along a ridge-
line. Working behind close air support provided by four
Marine A-4s and two Marine F-4s, the 3d Battalion
assaulted and took the position. The total action was
concluded on 31 July. Dozens of fortifications and
considerable amounts of supplies were found and destroyed.

Provisional Corps, Vietnam

On 1 July, the 101st Airborne Division was redesign-
ated the 101st Air Cavalry Division. The 101st, has
in fact, lost its parachute identity in Vietnam and has
become, essentially, a helicopter-borne division. How-
ever, apparently, no one was quite satisfied with the
new designation; because on 26 August, the 101st
became the 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile).

On 31 July, the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division
(Colonel Richard J. Glikes, USA) arrived in I Corps
Tactical Zone from its home base at Camp Roberts,
Colorado. The terrain east and west of the axis of
Highway One from Dong Ha north to Giao Linh offered
good ground for mechanized operations; and the 1st
Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division, was put in there.
Initially, the new brigade was deployed to the quiet
Quang Tri city area for training and acclimatization.

On a unit-for-unit basis, it was scheduled to relieve the
temporarily deployed RLT-27, which was scheduled to
return to the United States in September.

On 1 August, Major General Richard G. Stillwell,
USA, relieved Lieutenant General Rosson as Command-
ing General, Provisional Corps, Viet Nam. The Deputy
Commander continued to be Major General Drake,
USMC. On 15 August, the Provisional Corps was re-
designated the XXIV Corps, an historic U. S. Army
designation.

Third Offensive

While these events were taking place in the northern
two provinces, the Communists' main effort was shifting
to the central province of Quang Nam with Da
Nang as the ultimate target.

Two major operations, Allen Brook and Mameluke
Thrust, continued to screen the enemy's avenues of
approach to Da Nang.

The 27th Marines (Schwenk), in Allen Brook, with
its command post near Liberty Bridge, continued to
move its two battalions, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines,
and 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, about in checkerboard
fashion in the "Go Noi Island" territory south of the
Ky Lam-Thu Bon River against elements of the 308th
NVA Division's 36th and 38th Regiments.

On 5 June, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant
Colonel Frederick J. McEwan) had a fight just west of
Go Noi itself. Three days later, they met an NVA
battalion at My Loc, three miles northeast of An Hoa.
They then, on 11 June, moved north of the Thu Bon
into "Dodge City" to cover the 7th Marines command
post on Hill 55; there was a sharp fight on 15 June
two miles south of the hill.

As Allen Brook reduced its radius of action, the 5th
Marines (Colonel Paul G. Graham), shifted the focus
of Mameluke Thrust southward to An Hoa. By now,
it was evident that the enemy was preparing the battle-
field for a foray against Da Nang.

On 16 August, 5th Marines with its 2d and 3d
Battalions (Lieutenant Colonels Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr.,
and Donald N. Rexroad) launched a sweep eastward
from An Hoa through the old battleground previously
worked by 7th Marines in Allen Brook. In blocking
position, 13 miles west of Hoi An, was 2d Battalion,
7th Marines (Mueller). BLT 2/7 had come ashore on 23
July in Swift Play, a one-day Special Landing Force
operation. Swift Play was the second landing for BLT
2/7 since their becoming SLF Bravo in June; the first
had been Eager Yankee in which they had been landed
by HMM-265 (Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Edwards) on
9 July east of Phu Bai.

Blocking for the 5th Marines' thrust gave more satisfying
results than either Swift Play or Eager Yankee.
On the second day, 17 August, 200 enemy were pushed
by the drive into BLT 2/7's position; fifty were killed.

The action continued through the next day; the enemy
ricocheting back and forth between the 5th Marines and
BLT 2/7, with at least fifty more being killed.

East of the Mameluke Thrust area, in the general
vicinity of Hoi An, Korean Marines and elements of
the Americal Division were also engaged.

Despite these spoiling operations, the enemy did
succeed in getting his attack force within striking
distance of Da Nang. August 18 is the date used to
mark the beginning of the North Vietnamese "Third
Offensive" of 1968. The pattern was familiar: rocket
and mortar attacks against provincial and district head-
quartres and military installations, followed in some
cases by sapper raids. The enemy's main target in I CTZ
was Da Nang. His evident scheme was to move his
regular units into the city, once its defenses had been
breached by VC sappers. By curious and unrelated coin-
cidence, there were troubles of another kind in Da Nang
at this time. From 16 through 18 August, there was
rioting in III MAF's briq, troubles rooted supposedly
in protests against cold food and long delays before trial.

Mid-morning, 22 August, the ARVN 21st Rangers
made contact with the 38th NVA Regiment eight miles
south of Da Nang. Reinforced by 37th Rangers, they
killed 82 NVA. But while the North Vietnamese had,
for the moment, been intercepted, the more elusive Viet
Cong were literally inside the city gates.
Marine Operations in Vietnam

**III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1968: THUA THIEN—QUANG NAM PROVINCES**


HUE CITY (2 Feb-2 Mar 68). 1st Marines. Three U. S. Marine battalions and 13 Vietnamese battalions engaged eight to eleven NVA/VC battalions. Marine losses: 142 killed, 857 wounded. ARVN losses: 384 killed and about 1,800 wounded. Enemy dead counted at 5,113; captured weapons at 1,632. Of these, 1,543 enemy dead and 657 captured weapons are credited to the U. S. Marines.

HOUSTON (26 Feb-12 Sep 68). 5th Marines; later, 26th Marines. U. S. losses: 121 killed, 848 wounded. Enemy dead, 702.


ALLEN BROOK (4 May-24 Aug 68). 7th Marines; after 18 May, 27th Marines. Enemy lost 1,017 killed. Marine losses were 172 dead, 1,124 wounded.


MEADE RIVER (20 Nov-9 Dec 68). 1st Marines’ classic cordon-and-search operation. Marine losses were 107 killed, 385 wounded. Enemy losses counted at 841 killed.

TAYLOR COMMON (7 Dec-Continuing). Task Force Yankee operation with 5th Marines and BLT 2/7.

**Fight at Cam Le Bridge.** In the pre-dawn hours of 23 August, the 402d VC Sapper Battalion had gotten across the river, behind a cloud of mortar and rocket shells, had routed the Popular Force detachment guarding Hoa Vang District headquarters south of the air base, and had seized a foothold on the south end of Cam Le bridge.

Cam Le bridge is a long, narrow one-way concrete span, one of two bridges that carries Highway One in from the south into Da Nang. Marine MPs from Company C, 1st Military Police Battalion, moved quickly to the north end of the bridge and stopped the enemy there. At first light, Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines attacked the Viet Cong rear and pinned him loose from the bridge.

At Hoa Vang district headquarters, two platoons of ARVN Rangers came charging up to rally the Popular Force defenders and the VC were driven off.

Four miles south of the river, the 38th NVA Regiment was caught between the ARVN and the Marines. After their fight with the Rangers, the 38th next collided with the 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment. The ARVN, supported by Marine air and artillery, made a dawn attack on 24 August. Company F, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, got into it on the next day, 25 August.

In the closing days of the month, as the 38th NVA Regiment sought to break off and withdraw, it had to run the gauntlet of ARVN and Marine elements. In all, from 22 to 31 August, the North Vietnamese lost some 1,072 dead south of Da Nang.

Further south, there had been a three-day battle for Tam Ky. The enemy, identified as the 1st VC and 21st NVA Regiments from the 2d NVA Division, was first intercepted five miles west of the Quang Tin provincial capital on the morning of 24 August. With heavy air and artillery support, the 2d Battalion, 1st U. S. Infantry; the 4th Battalion, 21st U. S. Infantry; and the 4th ARVN Cavalry Regiment ripped up the attacking columns.

**Along the DMZ.** The 3d Marine Division’s tactical area of responsibility, Quang Tri province, was almost quiet during August.

On 19 August, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (Duncan)
made a raid into the DMZ in the Kentucky area on the heels of intensive B-52 strikes, landing 4,000 meters west of Hill 56 where Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, reinforced by tanks, was emplaced. There was also fighting in the Lancaster area, some three miles southwest of Con Thien, on 19 August. Two companies of the 9th Marines got into a smart action which went on for three days.

The 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Infantry, now thoroughly warmed up, on 26 August, was assigned responsibility for the Kentucky and Napoleon/Saline tactical areas. This permitted the 1st Marines (Colonel Robert G. Lauffer), who had been operating there since redeploying from Khe Sanh, to move back down south and rejoin their parent 1st Marine Division in Da Nang. This, in turn, was a necessary prelude to freeing up the 27th Marines (Schwenk) so that they could depart in September.

**September**

The 1st Marines’ 3d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J. Quick) was already at Da Nang. The regiment now moved into old, familiar, dangerous ground: the triangle fanning out southward from the air base and Marble Mountain, bounded generally by the railroad and the sea, an area in which they had worked in 1966 and 1967.

Just north of Da Nang, Operation Houston, a two to three battalion effort in the Hai Van pass area and in the Phu Loc district lowlands, begun on 27 February to keep Highway One open and permit rehabilitation of the railroad, was ended on 12 September. Traffic was moving freely and almost without impediment between Da Nang and Hue.

Withdrawal of RLT-27 (Schwenk) began on 10 September, lifted off in commercial contract aircraft with an assist from Marine KC-130s. The two battalions and regimental headquarters, reduced to cadre strength and destined for Camp Pendleton, arrived in San Diego on 16 September. Next day, BLT 1/27 (Major Kenneth J. Skipper), also down to a cadre, was back to its Hawaiian base at Kaneohe. RLT-27’s vehicles and equipment left Da Nang on 22 September in SS Seatrain Florida, arriving in San Diego on 10 October. BLT 1/27’s cargo similarly followed in USNS Brostrom, getting to Pearl on 29 September. The 27th Marines and BLT 1/27 now had to be rebuilt to be ready for other possible contingencies.

South of Da Nang and west of the 1st Marines’ sector, 7th Marines (Colonel Herbert L. Beckington) continued its operations north of the Thu Bon-Ky Lam River. There was a sharp action on 20 September, three miles south of the regimental CP on Hill 55. An NVA battalion was caught in a box made up of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines; the 37th Rangers; and the 4th Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment. Trapped in a killing zone near the intersection of the railroad with Route 4, the Communists lost 101 dead.

The 5th Marines (Graham), further west and south in the wider ranging Mameluke Thrust operation, fought no decisive engagements; but it was evident that the 21st NVA Regiment, after its defeat at Tam Ky, had entered the An Hoa Basin. There were small, sharp fights north of the Thu Bon and south of the Vu Gia.

The 3d Marine Division meanwhile was preempting an offensive across the DMZ by all three regiments of the rejuvenated 320th NVA Division. There was a two-pronged spoiling attack in the Lancaster area launched from the Rockpile. Moving out on 31 August, 9th Marines (Colonel Robert H. Barrow) went up the Nui Tia Pong ridge, five miles west of the Rockpile, then swung north against Dong Tien Mountain, taking it on 9 September. The 3d Marines (Colonel Richard L. Michael, Jr.) went against Mutter’s Ridge, three miles north of the Rockpile on 2 September, then swung left against Hill 461, securing it on 11 September.

Further to the east, on 13 September, a task force from the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Infantry, jabbed an armored thrust into the DMZ in concert with the 2d Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment, supported by two platoons of Marine tanks. Boundary between the two columns was Highway One.

Next phase was a sweep by Task Force Hotel, now commanded by Brigadier General William C. Chip, between Mutter’s Ridge and the Ben Hai River; this five-battalion effort yielded over 500 weapons, nearly 5,000 mines, 20,000 mortar rounds, 13 tons of explosives, and a million and a quarter rounds of small arms ammunition. The planned offensive by the 320th NVA Division had been thoroughly gutted.

**USS New Jersey.** To the delight of the Marines, the long-awaited USS New Jersey (BB-62), with its nine 16-inch rifles and twenty 5-inch guns, took station off the DMZ on 29 September. The 16-inch rifles with their 24-mile range extended the naval gunfire fire almost as far inland as Camp Carroll. The 2,700 pound armor-piercing and 1,900 pound high-capacity 16-inch projectiles were eight times the weight of the 8-inch shells thrown by the heavy cruisers. First fire mission for III MAF was fired on 30 September; 29 16-inch shells and 116 5-inch shells were delivered against eight targets north of the DMZ.

The first mission within sight and sound of the Marines came a little later. On 4 October, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel William F. Sparks), operating six miles north of the Rockpile, ran into a small, but well-entrenched enemy unit. USS New Jersey
(BB-62) laid in twenty-eight 16-inch rounds, collapsed two bunkers, damaged two others.

BLT 2/26, lifted by HMM-362 (Lieutenant Colonel Walter H. Shaver, Jr.), had landed on 18 August near the mouth of the Cua Viet River in Operation Proud Hunter. The operation had lasted three days and was a zero on both sides. They had landed again on 28 August in Operation Swift Pursuit, with the same negative results. Control passed then to 3d Marine Division operational control, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, found more profitable employment.

October

In general, October was a quiet month along the DMZ. The 4th and 9th Marines had fanned out in regimental-size sweeps west and south of Khe Sanh, making almost no contact with the enemy.

Meanwhile, the northeast monsoon was adding its seasonal problems to the conduct of operations throughout I Corps Tactical Zone. On 14 and 15 October, 12 inches of rain came down on Dong Ha, 10 inches on Da Nang. On 15 and 16 October, there were 15 more inches at Da Nang, six inches at Chu Lai.

On 23 October, a task force from the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division, in concert with a task force from the 2d ARVN Regiment made another armored thrust into the DMZ; essentially, a repeat of the September maneuver. By mid-morning, the ARVN column, supported as before by two platoons of Marine tanks and operating on the right of Highway 1, had made heavy contact two miles northeast of Gio Linh. The next morning, the Army task force operating on the left, sliced eastward. It hit the enemy hard and fast, killing 298 of them, and taking a remarkable total of 268 weapons.

1st Cavalry Redeploys. With the situation along the DMZ no longer critical, ComUSMACV ordered the redeployment of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) from ICTZ to III Corps Tactical Zone. On 28 October, the 3d Brigade moved out; last increments of the Division were gone by 12 November. Troops and light equipment went out by 7th Air Force transport aircraft; heavy gear, by Seventh Fleet amphibious ships. The 3d Marine Division and 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile) adjusted their boundaries to fill in the vacated TAOR. The 1st Cavalry, in their time in I Corps had added some solid battle honors to their standards: Operations Jeb Stuart, Pegasus, Concordia Square north of Dong Ha, Delaware Valley, and Comanche Falls, the last an operation in enemy Base Area 101, begun on 11 September and concluded on 7 November.

Another redeployment from ICTZ was the 2d Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Gunther) which departed from Chu Lai on 11 October to return to its home base at twenty-nine Palms, California, without ever having been put to the test of firing one of its Hawk missiles in anger.

Thuong Duc and Maui Peak. Thuong Duc Special Forces camp, another of those camps garrisoned largely by CIDG, commanded by ARVN Special Forces, and advised by U. S. Green Berets, had been established in 1966. It stood in the Vu Gia river valley which is the natural line of drift from A Shau into central Quang Nam province. The enemy started pressuring it hard in late September. On the 28th, there was an attack in which two outposts were captured and then retaken. The enemy had undoubtedly optimistically taken into account the worsening weather, as the northeast monsoon set in, to neutralize, at least partially, tactical air support of the camp. He was wrong. Fire power (artillery and bombing, much of the latter delivered by Marine A-6As guided by radio beacons) broke up his attack.

To clean up the situation further, 1st Marine Division launched Maui Peak on 6 October, a regimental-sized relief under control of the 7th Marines (Beckington).

The enemy was known to be in strength on the high ground on three sides of the camp. A column moving along Route 4 which parallels the Vu Gia River would have to pass between the enemy on Hill 163 and other enemy positions across the river. It was a classic, predictable enemy tactic: to attack an outpost and then prepare an ambush for the relieving column. To take advantage of the obvious, 7th Marines' plan of attack was to send a column down the axis of the road to develop and fix the enemy, and then to land behind him in strength while he was so engaged.

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel James W. Stemple) coming overland had, by noon of 6 October, run into a semi-circle of fortified positions four miles east of the camp. Meanwhile, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Neil A. Nelson) followed by 1st and 2d Battalions, 51st ARVN Regiment, went in, unopposed, at Landing Zone Vulture, three miles northwest of the camp. 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Rufus A. Seymour), destined for Landing Zone Sparrow, three miles southeast of Thuong Duc, found it too hot with anti-aircraft fire and after three tries diverted to an alternate landing zone three miles further east. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, not impressed by the quality of the enemy defenses in front of them, drove through and went up next day onto Hill 163, two miles east of the camp. Fighting in the vicinity of the hill continued through 8 October.

The last solid clash was on 12 October when two NVA companies attempted to overrun Company E's position on Hill 163. The two battalions of the 51st
ARVN Regiment also had a fight on 12 October, two miles north of Thuong Duc. The operation continued until 19 October.

Mameluke Thrust Ends. South of Thuong Duc, Mameluke Thrust, which had begun on 18 May, was brought to a close on 23 October and replaced by Henderson Hill. In its five months, Mameluke Thrust had claimed 2,728 enemy killed. A high percentage of the kills were attributed to the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Broman C. Stinemetz until 26 July, and after that by Lieutenant Colonel Larry P. Charon, using Sting Ray techniques.

The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion had become expert at quiet insertions and lying silent in its observation posts awaiting enemy movement. In October alone, they put out 104 patrols, killed 389 North Vietnamese and had no fatal casualties themselves. The best shot of the month was made by a 21-man patrol inserted on a hilltop above the Vu Gia River some 21 miles southwest of Da Nang. On 22 October, after an eight-day wait, they brought down artillery fire on an NVA company marching along in route column. Next day, the main body of presumably the same NVA battalion entered the killing zone. Air and artillery was brought to bear. Unbelievably, on the following day another NVA company marched unheedingly into the impact area. The reconnaissance team, having directed 15 air strikes and 12 artillery missions and having killed by their count, 204 enemy, was taken out on 24 October without losses.

The BLT 2/26 (Sparks) landed south of Marble Mountain on 25 October in Eager Hunter. It was a one-day operation and bloodless. The BLT 2/26 then married up with 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John E. Poindexter) in Operation Garrard Bay, essentially a series of cordon-and-search actions. There were no great number of kills, but several wanted persons were scooped up, and Da Nang was notably free of mortar attacks from that direction while Garrard Bay was going on. It lasted until 16 November.

Logistics Operations

In October, Brigadier General James A. Feeley, Jr., an aviator with a strong logistics background, relieved Brigadier General Harry C. Olson, a supply officer, as Commanding General, Force Logistics Command. The original Force Logistic Support Group (or FLSG) which had landed with the 3d Marine Division in 1965, had been built around the Division’s Service Battalion with augmentation derived from the 3d Force Service Regiment based on Okinawa. When the 1st Marine Division joined III Marine Amphibious Force in 1966, it brought along the 1st Force Service Regiment; and the FLG was expanded into the Force Logistics Command, or FLC.

The command itself and the largest of its installations were at Da Nang. Two subordinate FLSGs were maintained. The FLG A (Colonel Horton E. Roeder) was divided between Da Nang and Phu Bai. FLG B (Colonel Harold L. Parsons) was at Dong Ha and Quang Tri. Logistic Support Areas (LSA), predicated on amphibious logistic doctrine, were opened and closed as required to support operations. Force Logistic Support Units, or FLSUs, operated from these LSA.

The whole logistic system stood up well to the tests imposed by the Tet offensive, the transition to more mobile tactics, and the vile monsoon weather in late 1968. III MAF’s Marines were better fed, better clothed, and better supplied than any expeditionary force ever fielded by the U. S. Marine Corps. (The multiplicity of tasks performed, and performed well, by the FLC deserves far more space than is available in this article.)

Bombing Halt

On 29 October, General Abrams, called back to Washington for consultations, conferred with the President. Presumably, he was asked if he could accept from a military standpoint a cessation of attacks by fire against North Vietnam. Presumably, he gave his reluctant consent. On 31 October, President Johnson told the nation and the world that he was halting all air, naval, and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam, commencing 8 a.m., eastern standard time, 1 November 1968. The President added the caveat that General Abrams would have the right to retaliate against enemy attacks across the DMZ if he deemed it necessary.

On 3 November, the Vietnamese communists announced in Paris they were ready to participate in peace talks. But then on 5 November, they refused to attend the talks, accusing the United States of breaking its promise by continuing its reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam. The United States, in turn, announced that the reconnaissance flights revealed intensified North Vietnamese efforts to resupply forces in the south, particularly along the routes through Laos.

The bombing halt and accompanying political maneuverings in Paris were not enthusiastically received in III MAF, particularly in 3d Marine Division which had to bear the brunt of North Vietnam’s use of the staging areas immediately north of the Ben Hai River.

Translating into terms of Marine air operations, the bombing halt did not reduce the number of sorties flown by Marine tactical air. Close air support requirements in ICTZ went up, not down. There were also
more missions to be flown against NVA base camps and lines of communication feeding into I Corps.

**Accelerated Pacification**

The 1st of November marked not only the beginning of the bombing halt; it also was the beginning of the Le Loi campaign. This U.S. supported South Vietnamese campaign was designed to regain by 31 January 1969, the pre-Tet level of security within the rural population, offsetting the damage done to the pacification effort by the enemy's three 1968 offensives. A parallel program was the Phoenix campaign, aimed at eradicating the Viet Cong infrastructure infesting the hamlets and villages. The objective was to be in the best possible posture by Tet 1969.

Of the 1,000 hamlets designated throughout the Republic of Vietnam as Le Loi targets, 141 were in I Corps. The technique, not dissimilar from previous pacification campaigns, was to introduce Revolutionary Development cadre, representing a cross-section of Government of Vietnam services, into the target hamlet, with its bamboo and thorn hedges and its streams, honeycombed with caves and tunnels; each hamlet, with its bamboo and thorn hedges and its drainage ditches indistinguishable from fighting trenches, was a potential fortified position.

1st Marine Division tactics were classic cordon and search; County Fair techniques raised to the nth degree. To form the cordon, six Marine battalions were used; five organic to the 1st Marine Division and both battalion landing teams from the SLFs. The cordon was literally almost shoulder-to-shoulder, three-man fire teams being positioned every 15 meters around the perimeter.

The 1st Marines (Lauffer) was the designated command element. Participating battalions were 1st Battalion, 1st Marines; 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines; 3d Battalion, 26th Marines; BLT 2/26 from SLF Alpha; and BLT 2/27 from SLF Bravo.

Enemy forces—elements of the 36th, 38th, and 368B NVA Regiments—within the target area were estimated at about 1,300. In addition, there were over a hundred named members of the Viet Cong political infrastructure known to be present.

Initially, the fighting was low-intensity, as small disorganized groups of the enemy tried to break out of the cordon. These were easily handled. By 25 November, the Government of Vietnam forces operating within the cordon had evacuated 2,600 civilians to the joint US/ARVN interrogation center.

Fighting became more hectic in the first week of December as the Marine cordon tightened on pockets of last-ditch defenders. The heaviest fighting was on 8 and 9 December when 3d Battalion, 26th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel J. W. P. Robertson) killed 251 enemy caught in a loop of the La Tho River, midway between the railroad and Highway 1.

The 9th of December was also the last day of the operation; the score stood at 841 NVA/VC killed, 182 captured (including 71 of the previously identified Viet Cong infrastructure), and 182 weapons taken. A later, more leisurely, count indicated a total of 1,210 enemy killed.

Almost simultaneous with the close of Meade River, Henderson Hill, the 5th Marines' (Colonel James B. Ord, Jr.) follow-on to Mameluke Thrust, was ended on 7 December.

**Quang Tin-Quang Ngai Provinces**

On 10 November, the Marine Corps Birthday, Special Landing Force Bravo—BLT 2/7 (Nelson), lifted by HMM-165 (Lieutenant Colonel George L. Patrick) had executed Operation Daring Endeavor, landing across the Cua Dai River from Hoi An and driving against blocking positions established along Highway 1 by elements of the Americal Division and the ROK Marine Brigade. It was the anniversary of Blue Marlin, executed in the same area with a similar scheme three years before.

On 11 November, Americal Division (Major General Charles M. Gettys, USA) declared its year-long Wheeler/Wallowa operation over. The enemy had largely been forced out of rice rich Que Son valley, first entered in force by III MAF in Operation Harvest Moon in December 1965.
New Operations. Taylor Common was the successor to Henderson Hill in the An Hoa basin area. Control headquarters was the newly activated Task Force Yankee (Brigadier General Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.), and assigned troops included six Marine infantry battalions. The venture had a two-phase mission: first to clear An Hoa basin and then to penetrate Base Area 112 in the high ground to the west and southwest.

The prospective enemy was the long-present 21st NVA Regiment, the 141st NVA Regiment, and elements of the 368B NVA Artillery Regiment. It was also hoped that the operation would get at the Viet Cong command and control structure for the southern three provinces in I Corps. Cooperating with the Marines was the 1st Ranger Group (21st, 37th and 39th Battalions).

Taylor Common got underway on 7 December. As of the year's end, the enemy had made no determined defense. The largest fight was that of the 1st Ranger Group, which in four days, 26 through 29 December, killed 286 enemy.

Elsewhere in Quang Nam province, Fayette Canyon was started on 15 December. Also on 15 December, the SLFs made the last of 13 landings for the year. BLT 2/26 (Sparks) landed south of Hoi An in Operation Valiant Hunt. By the end of the year, it had counted 242 enemy killed, 20 weapons taken; our losses were only 2 killed, 4 wounded.

North, along the DMZ, enemy activity continued at a low ebb. Dawson River was launched on 28 November. Also in Quang Tri province, Marshall Mountain was begun on 10 December.

At the other end of the Corps' tactical zone, the Army had a new series going: Vernon Lake.

Out with the Old

Changes were occurring in Washington. The Johnson Administration was in its last days. On 11 December, President-elect Nixon announced that the next Secretary of Defense would be Congressman Melvin R. Laird.

On 28 December, Camp J. J. Carroll was deactivated. Now that 3d Marine Division was freed of the yard-by-yard defense of the strong point/barrier system, the artillery bastion which had contributed so much to the defense of Khe Sanh was no longer needed.

Also on 28 December, the Free World Forces announced there would be no New Year's Truce, that normal operations would continue. On 30 December, the Viet Cong announced that they were observing a 72-hour cease-fire.

As the sands of the old year ran out, there were a series of command changes within III MAF. Major General Ormond R. Simpson had arrived from the States where he had been Commanding General of the Recruit Depot at Parris Island. He took command of the 1st Marine Division. Major General Youngdale moved up to Deputy Commander, III MAF. Major General Tompkins, his tour over, returned to the United States to become Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune.

Summing up for 1968

The year 1968 in I Corps Tactical Zone divides itself sharply into two halves. Certainly, the first half was the period of greatest combat activity of the war with the enemy's main effort centered on the northern two provinces. III MAF, together with the ARVN, defeated him in his excursions across the DMZ, expelled him from Hue, and beat him badly at Khe Sanh. By mid-May the enemy had shifted his main attack southward, moving against Da Nang. Again he was defeated as he was also in August.

In the second half of the year, there was a marked change in his strategy and tactics. After his August failure, he pulled his major units back to his bases along and behind the borders. He gave up on his pursuit of military victory through large-scale attacks and reverted to small-unit attacks and harassment with mortar and rocket fire.

Statistics document the shift in enemy tactics. III MAF for the first six months of 1968 claimed 40,144 enemy dead; for the second six months, 22,093 dead. Weapons captured from January through June totalled 14,744; for the period July through December, the number dropped to 7,207. Our own casualties were 3,057 Marines killed, 18,281 wounded during the first half of 1968; 1,561 Marines killed, 11,039 wounded during the second half.

Roughly speaking, then, the intensity of ground combat for the second half of the year was about half of what it had been the first half.

Marine air operations, on the other hand, continued to show an increase. Fixed-wing combat sorties went up slightly, from 44,936 to 47,436; helicopter sorties almost doubled, from 388,000 to 639,194. These increases in part reflect the shift to more mobile tactics and our pursuit of the enemy into his remote base areas along the fringes of his border sanctuaries.

Until mid-1968, troop strength in III MAF continued its gradual but steady climb until a peak of 85,520 Marines was reached in September. This trend was reversed with the departure of BLT-27. The number of Marine infantry battalions dropped from 24 to 21; and by the year's end, Marine and Navy strength in III MAF stood at about 81,000.

On the other side, the number of NVA battalions estimated to be in I Corps had increased from 42 in
December 1967 to 68 at the end of 1968. Many of the Viet Cong main force and local forces, old opponents of III MAF, had been shredded by the long war and had been dropped from our estimates of his order of battle as being no longer combat effective. More and more, it was a North Vietnamese foe who was encountered, some of them moving into old Viet Cong units, some fighting under their own colors. Even with the NVA, quality was down. North Vietnamese prisoners were often extremely young and poorly trained. Battlefield discipline had declined. Dead and wounded were being left behind and so were weapons.

General Lam’s I Corps had continued to improve. The ARVN had stood up to the test of the Tet offensive well. In 1968, they accounted for 26,688 enemy killed, more than double the 12,488 attributed to them in 1967. The ROK Marine Brigade in its Victory Dragon series had killed another 2,504 enemy.

Added together, the Free World Military Forces in I Corps in 1968 had killed over 100,000 of the enemy, taken nearly 35,000 weapons.

Pacification Progress. At the year’s end, the Le Loi Accelerated Pacification campaign seemed well on schedule. Of the 141 targeted hamlets, 116 were rated as “secure.” Some 4,000 of the VC hard-core cadre (“infrastructure”) had been reported as eliminated, a good proportion of this number a direct consequence of the highly successful Meade River operation.

Another index of progress was the Chieu Hoi or Open Arms program for returnees to governmental control. There were 3,118 ralliers in ICTZ in 1968, 535 of them in the months of November and December. The total was 23 per cent higher than the 2,539 former Viet Cong who rallied in 1967. These returnees brought with them 723 weapons. Also significant was the defection of 119 NVA soldiers, five times more than the 22 who had voluntarily surrendered in 1967.

One of the most successful U.S. contributions to the pacification effort continued to be the Combined Action Program wherein a Marine rifle squad was combined with a Popular Force platoon to provide local hamlet security. There were 79 Combined Action Platoons or “CAPs” at the year’s beginning. They were organized into 14 companies under three Group headquarters: 1st CAG at Chu Lai, 2d CAG at Da Nang, 3d CAG at Phu Bai. During the year, a 4th CAG was activated to take over responsibility for coordination in the Quang Tri-Dong Ha-Cam Lo area. Five more company headquarters, and 23 more platoons were organized for a year-end total of 102 platoons, organized into 19 companies, under four Group headquarters. In addition to the Vietnamese Popular Forces involved, some 1,800 Marines and 120 Navy Corpsmen were invested in the program. During the year, the CAPs counted 2,368 enemy killed, 678 prisoners captured, and 780 weapons taken.

Related to the Combined Action Program was the successful introduction of Revolutionary Development cadre, protected by Popular Force and Regional Force units, into an additional 116 hamlets during 1968.

By the end of the year, it could be said that of the three million Vietnamese living in I Corps Tactical Zone, the proportion living in secured areas had increased from one half to two-thirds (the official percentage was 69 per cent secured). The remainder of the population was divided about evenly between areas under Viet Cong control and those areas being contested.

Commandant’s Assessment. General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., became the 24th Commandant of the Marine Corps on 1 January 1968, succeeding General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. He left almost immediately for a visit to Southeast Asia. In the summer of 1968, he made a second visit to the war zone as Commandant; and in January 1969, a third visit.

Reporting to the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Senate’s Committee on Appropriations on 23 July 1969, he had this to say:

“The Marine Corps has consistently advocated the principle that the war in South Vietnam can be conclusively won only through convincing the South Vietnamese people in the villages and hamlets that their hope lies with freedom, not with communism. Today, while the search for a negotiated settlement to the war continues, this becomes even more important.”
On 30 April 1971, at Camp Pendleton, California, more than six years after the first ground combat Marines landed at Da Nang, the President of the United States welcomed home members of the 1st Marine Division on the Division’s "official" return to the United States. From 1965 through 1971, nearly half a million Marines served in Vietnam. And after 1971 was long past, some Marines were still at war in that country.

General Simmons began his series of essays on Marine Corps participation in the Vietnam War with "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam 1965-1966," which appeared in Naval Review 1968. This first piece began with the landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da Nang on 8 March 1965 and ended with the large scale actions of the III Marine Amphibious Force against North Vietnamese regulars who had crossed the Demilitarized Zone in the fall and winter of 1966. The second article in the series appeared in Naval Review 1969 and covered the events of 1967, a year which saw Marines fighting in all five provinces of I Corps Tactical Zone and III MAF grown to the equivalent of a field army with the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, and the U. S. Army's Americal Division, supported by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, under its operational control. It was a year that also saw the first battle for Khe Sanh fought in April and heavy fighting around Con Thien. The third article, published in Naval Review 1970, covered 1968, the year of the momentous Tet offensive, the bitter fight for Hue, the climactic battle for Khe Sanh, and successively weaker enemy offensives. During this year the U. S. 1st Air Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division were deployed to the northern provinces and came under the operational control of III MAF. Marine strength in Vietnam peaked in September 1968 at over 85,500 Marines, more than had served ashore at either Iwo Jima or Okinawa. Strengths began to turn downward in that month with the departure of Regimental Landing Team 27.

"Marine Aviation in Vietnam" by the late General Keith B. McCutcheon, USMC, appeared in Naval Review 1971 and in the following year, Naval Review 1972 included "A View From FMF Pac of Logistics in the Western Pacific, 1965-1971" by Colonel James B. Soper, USMC (Ret.). Taken together, these articles and General Simmons' series—including this concluding article, which discusses the systematic withdrawal of Marine air and ground forces—provide a valuable record of Marine Corps operations in Vietnam.

As 1969 began, III Marine Amphibious Force, then commanded by Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., estimated that there were about 90,000 enemy either in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) or poised on its borders. III MAF's assessment of the enemy order of battle showed 89 battalions of widely varying strengths within ICTZ itself.

Along the DMZ, Major General Raymond G. Davis' 3d Marine Division was enjoying its quietest month since it entered Quang Tri province in July 1966. Davis' estimate was that the three independent North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiments out in front of him were charged with screening the DMZ but were avoiding serious contact. The 3d Marine Division was under the immediate operational control of the U. S. Army's XXIV Corps which also had the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Infantry Division in eastern Quang Tri province and the 101st Airborne Division in Thua Thien province.

In Quang Nam province, Major General Ormond R. Simpson's 1st Marine Division guarded the approaches to Da Nang, and the 2d Brigade, Korean Marine Corps, continued its responsibility for its own area of operations radiating from Hoi An. Further south, the large Americal Division was operating in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Backing the ground troops, Major General Charles J. Quilter's 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had fixed wing groups at Da Nang and Chu Lai and helicopter groups at Marble Mountain, Phu Bai, and Quang Tri.

Also present in the northern five provinces, but somewhat overshadowed by the overwhelming U. S. presence, was the Army of Vietnam's I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam and including the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Division in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, the 51st ARVN Regiment in Quang Nam province, and the 2d ARVN Division in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces.

Taylor Common

South and southwest of Da Nang, Operation Taylor Common, begun 7 December 1968, was continuing.
under control of 1st Marine Division's Task Force Yankee, commanded until 14 February, by Brigadier General Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., and then by Brigadier General Samuel Jaskilka. Task Force Yankee at this time included Colonel James B. Ord, Jr.'s 5th Marines and the 1st and 3d Battalions of Colonel Michael M. Sparks' 3d Marines, the latter regiment being on temporary loan from the 3d Marine Division. Cooperating with TF Yankee was the 1st ARVN Ranger Group and the two Civilian Irregular Defense Groups at Thuong Duc and Nong Son. Taylor Common's area of operations included the An Hoa basin (the area drained by the convergence of the Thu Bon and Vu Gia rivers which combine to form the Song Ky Lam), as well as the high ground to the west and southwest of An Hoa which harbored the enemy's Base Area 112. Most of the resources and effort of Taylor Common were devoted to a deep thrust into this base area using fire support base techniques. The purpose, of course, was to destroy enemy base camps and caches and in this the operation was reasonably successful. Heaviest enemy contact however was in the "Arizona Territory," a piedmont agricultural area made desolate by the war, lying between the Vu Gia and Thu Bon rivers northwest of An Hoa.

On 15 January, Colonel Sparks and Lieutenant Colonel Ermil L. Whisman, who commanded Sparks' direct support artillery battalion, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, were killed southwest of An Hoa when their helicopter was brought down by enemy ground fire. On 23 February, the 3d Marines were returned to Quang Tri province, and, on 8 March, Taylor Common was brought to an end, TF Yankee headquarters was dissolved, and responsibility for the An Hoa area was returned to the 5th Marines.

**Bold Mariner**

Meanwhile, on 13 January 1969, Battalion Landing Teams 2/26 and 3/26 had landed by helo and landing craft in the Van Tuong area on the northern face of Barangan peninsula, 12 miles south of Chu Lai. It was the old Starlite battlefield revisited and this operation, called Bold Mariner, with both Special Landing Forces Alpha and Bravo involved, would be the largest Special Landing Force effort of the war. The Americal Division, in a coordinated operation, Russell Beach, moved a two-battalion task force onto the peninsula to cut off the southern exits. The soldiers and Marines joined hands in a cordon and together swept toward the sea, scooping up as they went all Vietnamese civilians for screening. Resistance was minimal, and as usual when operating in populated rural areas, most casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines. By 24 January, Battalion Landing Team 2/26 had been squeezed out of the tightening perimeter and reembarked in its Seventh Fleet amphibious shipping. BLT 3/26 followed aboard on 9 February. The joint Army-Marine effort had killed 239 enemy. In addition, some 12,000 Vietnamese had been screened and 256 of them identified as Viet Cong infrastructure or cadre (VCI).

There would be eight more SLF operations during the course of 1969, all in three southern provinces of I Corps Tactical Zone.

**Dewey Canyon 1**

Also, as the year began, the enemy was busy filling up Base Area 611 in Da Krong valley in Quang Tri's southwest corner. Base Area 611 was fed by Route 922 coming in from Laos and, in turn, fed Route 348 through A Shau valley, from where men and supplies could be funneled eastward toward Hue or southeasterward toward Da Nang. The enemy must have felt relatively immune to ground action. Not only was the area a remote one, but also the monsoon weather continued to mask his activities.

On 22 January, General Davis sent three battalions of the 9th Marines into the Da Krong in Operation Dewey Canyon. Colonel Robert H. Barrow's 9th Marines were to be completely dependent upon helicopters for logistic support, a particularly disquieting prospect in view of the always uncertain flying weather. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, with a tonnage requirement only a fraction of the Marines, had usable trails and roads running back into Laos. The convolutions of the Laotian border protected the enemy's back and a portion of his flanks from ground attack and he had—something of a rarity for in-country operations—a number of artillery pieces of up to 122-mm. caliber. His base area was also well-seeded with light antiaircraft weapons.

To meet this situation, Davis and Barrow made skillful use of fire support bases. The 9th Marines

1 Under the fire support base (FSB) concept, pioneer and reconnaissance elements would go in first. A helo landing zone would be quickly cleared. Infantry would come in to provide security. Engineers would land to develop the site, first with hand tools and demolitions, and then with helicopter-transportable power equipment including a remarkably useful and versatile mini-dozer. No two FSBs were exactly alike, either in Dewey Canyon, Taylor Common, or elsewhere, but typically an FSB would provide room for a battery of artillery (often a mixed battery of 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers and 4.2-inch mortars), an infantry battalion command post, a logistic support area, and an aid station. When perched on top of a mountain, these FSBs were easy to defend, seldom rising up more than a platoon of infantry.
Initially developed FSBs Shiloh, Razor, and Riley, and then, as the regiment advanced, other FSBs were opened in leapfrog fashion. Enemy resistance began to stiffen on 2 February, with the heaviest fighting taking place between 18 and 22 February, involving the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, in the center of line. Soon some of the largest caches of the war were being uncovered. By the time the operation ended on 19 March, the base area was cleaned out, at least for the time being. Enemy dead had been counted at 1,617, and 1,461 weapons and hundreds of tons of ammunition, equipment, and supplies had been taken.

There were two near-concurrent complementary operations. The 101st Airborne Division had moved into the A Shau valley on 22 February and commenced Massachusetts Striker. On 15 March, the 3d Marines, under Colonel Paul D. LaFond had begun Maine Crag south of Khe Sanh (where the Laotian border makes a curious loop, creating a salient). Maine Crag went on until 2 May. Not as spectacularly successful as Dewey Canyon, it nevertheless cost the enemy a considerable price in men, weapons, and rice.

### Tet 1969

Tet 1969, when it came, was only a pale shadow of the violence of Tet 1968. The 24-hour Tet truce began at 1800 on 16 February. There were the usual Tet season terrorist acts, rocket and mortar attacks, and scattered ground action. The enemy’s major effort in ICTZ came on 23 February when he attempted, once again, a full-scale coordinated attack against Da Nang, a nut he had never been able to crack. His attack plan contained few surprises: as it had been during Tet 1968 and again in August 1968, the city was infiltrated, an attack was made up from the south through the heavily populated lowlands, and a thrust with major units came out of the mountains west of Da Nang.

Shortly after midnight the enemy attempted to seize the two highway bridges which carry Route One over the Song Cau Do in Hoa Vang district south of Da Nang airfield. Infiltrators north of the river formed one prong of the attack while other columns emerged from the endemically Viet Cong hamlets south of the Cau Do. The attackers were met and roughly handled by the 1st Military Police Battalion and elements of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, and by morning were on their way south again, pursued and harassed by the ARVN and Colonel Robert G. Lauffer’s 1st Marines.

Meanwhile, sappers had tried unsuccessfully to get to the command posts of the 1st Marine Division and 26th Marine regiment on the reverse slope of Hill 327, hoping apparently to disrupt command and control while their heavier columns debouched from the hills to the west and crossed the valley drained by the Tuy Loan river. This attempted crossing precipitated a three-day fight with Colonel Robert L. Nichols’ 7th Marines which cost the enemy 289 killed.

### Pacification and Rural Development

The Government of Vietnam’s 1969 Pacification and Development Program began on 1 February, close on the heels of 1968’s generally successful Le Loi or Accelerated Pacification Campaign. As the 1969 program got underway, 86% of ICTZ populated area was considered to be under government control and 74% of the population was judged to be living in secure areas. The objective for the year was to bring all populated areas of the five provinces under Government of Viet-

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4This same attack pattern against Da Nang was tried during Tet 1968 and again in August 1968. Naval Review 1970, pp. 299 and 313-314.
5The Le Loi campaign had as its primary objective the mending of the damage done to pacification by the 1968 Tet offensive. Naval Review 1970, p. 318.
The goal of ICI'Z was 300,000 PSDF, only a fraction of whom, however, would be armed. The recruiting base was more urban than rural and the objectives more psychological than military.

Pacification plans tended to work well in the northern two provinces, Quang Tri and Thua Thien, where security was good and the population generally prosperous and pro-GVN; but not so well in the southern three provinces, Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. Prime movers for the program were the Rural Development (RD) teams. There were not enough of these 59-man cadres to go around so the number of teams available was doubled by halving the size to 30 men and assigning to each team a Regional Force, Popular Force, or National Police Field Force team to perform the security function. The 30-man RD teams could then concentrate on identifying Viet Cong infrastructure, establishing the People's Self Defense Force, starting self-help programs and organizing local elections. During the four successive Sundays in March, elections were held for village council members and hamlet chiefs. In ICTZ, 88% of the eligible voters turned out.

Of all the efforts by III Marine Amphibious Force to provide security to the rural areas and to assist in pacification, perhaps the most successful was the Combined Action Program. The building block for this program was the combining of a specially selected and trained Marine rifle squad with a Popular Force platoon so as to enhance hamlet and village security. From its beginnings in 1965 at Phu Bai, the program by 1969 had grown to four battalion-sized Combined Action Groups, one each at Da Nang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, and Quang Tri. Under the Groups were 19 Combined Action Companies and these in turn administered 102 Combined Action Platoons.

Nickerson for Cushman

On 26 March 1969, Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., succeeded Lieutenant General Cushman as Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force. This was General Nickerson's second Vietnam tour. On his first tour he had commanded the 1st Marine Division from October 1966 until May 1967 and then had been Deputy Commander, III MAF, until October 1967. (General Cushman, after his return to the States, would become the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and on 1 January 1972, the 25th Commandant of the Marine Corps.)

3d Marine Division Operations

Things had remained relatively quiet along the DMZ for the first three months of 1969. On 28 February the books had been closed on the long-term area operations, Kentucky and Scotland II—Kentucky being in the vicinity of Con Thien and Scotland II in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. In March, the USS New Jersey (BB-62) left the firing line for good. Since arriving at the end of September 1968, she had fired 3,615 16-inch shells and nearly 11,000 rounds of 5-inch, mostly in support of 3d Marine Division operations along the DMZ. Her departure was somewhat offset by the arrival of sufficient self-propelled 175-mm. guns, M107, to re-arm the three separate gun batteries which until now had been equipped with the aging 155-mm. gun, SP M53.8

Virginia Ridge

In April, in the central DMZ, the 36th Regiment, 308th NVA Division (not to be confused with the 36th Regiment, 4th Front, in Quang Nam province) replaced the battered 27th NVA Regiment. First contact with the fresh regiment was on 9 April northwest of Cam Lo. Action was sporadic until the 21st when the 9th Marines encountered heavy resistance between Cam Lo and the Rockpile. The operation was formalized as Virginia Ridge beginning 30 April.

The 3d Marine Division's second front continued to be the Laotian border, at right angles to the DMZ. Base Area 611 did not go long unattended. Passing control of Virginia Ridge to the 3d Marines, the 9th Marines, now commanded by Colonel Edward F. Danowitz, went back into the Da Krong valley with two battalions on 10 May in Operation Apache Snow, while to the south a brigade of the 101st Airborne and a regiment of the ARVN re-entered the A Shau. The Marine portion of the operation ended 31 May.

8The 175-mm. M107 has now replaced the 155-mm. M53 as the Marine Corps' heavy gun. Range for its 147-pound shell is 32,700 meters as compared to the 95-pound 155-mm. shell with its range of 23,500 meters. Tube life was originally 300 rounds; this has now been improved to 1,200 rounds as compared to the M53's tube life of 700 rounds. The 175-mm. weighs a third less than the 155-mm.—62,100 pounds as opposed to 99,000. Nevertheless, both are big, cumbersome guns. Both, however, can be carried in LCUs and thus can travel in LSDs. They can also be loaded and unloaded across the stern gate of the new 1179-class LSTs.
with the commitment of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 9th Marines to a new operation, Cameron Falls, against elements of the resurgent 304th NVA Division in the old familiar Khe Sanh salient south of Route 9. The Army and ARVN stayed in the A Shau another week, coming out on 7 June.

On 12 June, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines teamed up with a task force from the 1st Brigade, 5th U.S. Mechanized Division, near Khe Sanh itself for Operation Utah Mesa. This operation was directed by Brigadier General Regan Fuller from his Task Force Hotel headquarters at Vandegrift Combat Base. It would be 1st Battalion, 9th Marines' last battle in the Vietnam War. On 23 June, the battalion (which had landed at Da Nang on 17 June 1965) moved to Vandegrift combat base to get ready for embarkation to Okinawa.

The first major troop withdrawal had been announced: 25,000 American servicemen were to be out of Vietnam by 31 August. Of these, 8,388 would be Marines. Scheduled to leave were the 9th Marines, along with proportional shares of combat support and service troops, and a slice of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The 3d Marine Division would be left with the 3d and 4th Marine Regiments in Quang Tri province.

**Air Operations**

From the Wing, VMFA-334 departed with its F-4J McDonnell Phantoms for Iwakuni in Japan, and HMM-165, with its CH-46A helicopters, left for Futema on Okinawa. Both squadrons would be joined to MAG-15, air component of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade. Another August departure was the 1st LAAM Battalion, a light antiaircraft missile unit armed with the Hawk, which had been in-country since February 1965 without ever having to be called upon to fire against a live target. HMM-362 the last of the UH-34 squadrons in-country, also left in August but this was a rotation rather than a redeployment. The Marine Corps had begun the war with the UH-34 as it standard medium helicopter and the rough old birds had logged nearly a million combat sorties. HMM-362's place was taken by HMH-361 which brought up to three the number of squadrons equipped with the heavy CH-53.

Earlier, in April, the first detachment of AH-1G Bell Cobras had arrived. These were the Army-model, single-engine, two-place helicopters armed with 7.62-mm. mini-guns and 40-mm. grenade launchers. Before the end of the year the Marines would have 24 Cobras
in-country, they would have flown over 20,000 missions, most of them as transport helicopter escorts or for close-in supporting fires, and would more than have proved their worth.

On 11 July 1969, Major General William G. Thrash relieved Major General Quilter as Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The Wing at the time of the change in command had six aircraft groups with 26 flying squadrons and was operating from five major airfields. Farthest north was Provisional MAG-39 at Quang Tri with two CH-46 squadrons and VMO-6, a light observation squadron equipped with the UH-IE "Huey" and the fixed-wing OV-10A "Bronco." MAG-36 was at Phu Bai with three medium, one light, and one heavy helicopter squadron. MAG-16 was at Marble Mountain with a similar mix of three medium, one light, and one heavy helo squadron plus VMO-2.

From the big field at Da Nang, MAG-11 operated an F-4 squadron, two squadrons of A-6As, and VMCJ-1 with its mixed complement of long-legged reconnaissance aircraft. (In October the last of the old EF-10Bs, the durable "electronic whales," would be phased out in favor of an increasing number of EA-6As, the reconnaissance version of Grumman's highly successful A-6 Intruder.) MAG-12 and MAG-13 were both at Chu Lai, MAG 12 with three squadrons of A-4 Douglas Skyhawks and one squadron of A-6As and MAG-13 with four squadrons of F-4s. In all, as of mid-summer 1969, the Wing inventory totalled about 225 helicopters and 230 fixed wing aircraft.

1st Marine Division Operations

There was a visible sign of better times in Quang Nam province when, on 30 March, the 825-foot Seabee-constructed Liberty Bridge was opened across the Thu Bon river just south of Dai Loc. The bridge replaced a 60-ton pontoon ferry which the 1st Bridge Company had been operating since October 1967 when the monsoon flood had washed away an earlier bridge. The new bridge, designed to be monsoon-proof (but lacking sufficient length during periods of high water), completed a direct highway link between Da Nang and An Hoa.

The same day that the bridge was opened to traffic, Colonel Nichols' 7th Marines began Operation Oklahoma Hills up on Charlie Ridge, thought to be the base area of the 31st, 141st, and 368th NVA Regiments. Two battalions of the 51st ARVN Regiment cooperated with an attack northward against the ridge from Thuong Duc corridor. The scheme was to form a box around the suspected base area with an FSB roughly at each corner of the quadrangle. The Marines encountered few fire fights but many mines. A regimental-size base camp was found and destroyed.

There was some logistics bad luck on 27 April when a grass fire ignited in Ammunition Supply Point One, two miles southwest of Da Nang airfield. The whole ASP went up, 38,000 tons of ammunition, valued at approximately $75 million, was destroyed, along with 20,000 drums of fuel. This was about 40% of the Force Logistic Command’s ammunition.

On 5 May, south of the 1st Marine Division’s area of operations, below Hoi An, Special Landing Force Alpha—now made up of BLT 1/26 lifted by HMM-362—landed on "Barrier island" in an area boxed off on the land side by a cordon of ARVN, Korean Marine, and elements of the Americal Division. Barrier island, a sandy waste dotted with poverty-stricken fishing villages, had been swept repeatedly, but the Viet Cong presence was never completely eradicated. This operation was called Daring Rebel and the SLF stayed ashore 15 days. Like Bold Mariner, Daring Rebel was an amphibious application of the County Fair concept and it proved once again the effectiveness of large-scale cordon-and-search operations in disrupting Viet Cong control. A substantial number of prisoners and significant amounts of rice and weapons were captured. Regrettably, the results were not permanent.

On 9 May, while Daring Rebel was rampaging on Barrier island, the 5th Marines, now commanded by William J. Zaro, intercepted a large enemy force attempting to cross the "Arizona territory." This familiar area was not only a much-traveled route for the enemy as he debouched from the mountains but also the site

of rice and corn "markets" from which he drew his sustenance. Surveillance of the Arizona required the continuing attention of at least a battalion. In this particular action the enemy seemed headed for Hill 67, a 7th Marines' combat base across the river. By 12 May, the focus of the fighting had shifted to the axis of Route 536 which runs from An Hoa to Liberty Bridge. Flight after flight of Marine air pounded the bewildered and pocketed enemy. For the three days fighting, the 5th Marines claimed a body count of 233; Colonel Zaro was certain in his own mind that enemy casualties were much higher.

An attack force next surfaced immediately south of Da Nang in the corridor formed by Highway One on the east and the railroad on the west. It was the old familiar attack route, leading to the Cau Do bridges and thence to Da Nang airfield. In a two-day battle, 12-13 May, the 1st Marines, the 51st ARVN Regiment, the 59th RF Battalion, and the 21st and 39th Ranger Battalions engaged the attackers and killed 292 of them.

Then, on 7 June, the 5th Marines made contact with the newly-arrived 90th NVA Regiment in the Arizona territory. In the next 11 days, 320 enemy dead were counted. After that, the sorely-mauled 90th NVA withdrew into the hills to regroup.

**Pipestone Canyon**

The 1st Marine Division had begun Operation Pipestone Canyon in the Go Noi island area on 26 May. Go Noi had been fought over before, most notably in Operations Allen Brook and Meade River. It was the portion of the Ky Lam delta which lay between Route One on the east and the abandoned railroad on the west, roughly five miles long by two miles wide.

The objective of Pipestone Canyon was to rid it of the 36th NVA Regiment and to clear it once and for all. In terms of maneuver battalions involved and the complexity of the scheme of maneuver and fire support, it was probably the most significant 1st Marine Division operation in 1969.

Four Marine battalions were used in coordination with the 37th and 39th Rangers, two battalions of the 51st ARVN Regiments, and a battalion of the Korean Marine Brigade. The "clearing" operations were literal: a U.S. Army engineer company with gigantic Rome plows followed behind the Marines, and the land was cleared and plowed under at the rate of 200 acres a day.

At this time, mid-summer 1969, the 26th Marines were west of Da Nang and the 1st Marines south of the airfield and Marble Mountain, the two regiments concentrating on saturation patrolling of the "Rocket Belt," the arc swung around Da Nang at the extreme range of the 122-mm. and 140-mm rockets. The 7th Marines had its command post on Hill 55, well south of Da Nang, and its operations fanned out from there. The 5th Marines was south of the Vu Gia and Thu Bon rivers operating from its combat base at An Hoa.

On 20 July, the 5th Marines began Operation Durham Peak, pushing up into the Que Son mountains south of An Hoa with three battalions. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, obligingly covered the Arizona for the absentee 5th Marines, and, on 12 August, ran into two battalions of the resurgent 90th NVA Regiment and a battalion of the 368th Rocket Regiment. A two-day fight ensued in which 255 North Vietnamese were killed at a cost of 20 Marines dead, 100 wounded and evacuated.

Durham Peak was brought to an end on 13 August. The boundary between the 1st Marine Division and the Americal Division was being shifted southward as of 20 August so as to give the Marines responsibility for the new area.
Marines of B Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, are engaged in a brief firefight with a North Vietnamese platoon in the "Arizona territory," four miles northwest of the An Hoa combat base, in January 1969.

for most of Que Son valley, first entered by them in December 1965. This called for a major rearrangement of the respective areas of operation for the 5th and 7th Marines.

The geography of southern Quang Nam province requires some study if the problem facing the 1st Marine Division is to be understood. The Que Son mountains are a spur running from southwest to northeast toward Hoi An from the main mountain mass. Green, incredibly beautiful, with hundreds of sparkling streams and tumbling waterfalls, and honeycombed with thousands of caves, the mountains offered the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese a ready-made bastion from which to sally forth against the lowlands. The Que Sons, effectively, are the natural geographic boundary between Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces, but the actual political boundary goes along the valley floor, following the trace of the Song Ly Ly, and this was the new boundary between the Americal and 1st Marine Divisions.

Near the head of Que Son valley (or the Nui Loc Son basin as it is also called) a number of streams come together to form the Song Thu Bon which then passes northward through the western Que Sons into Nong Son valley and then north through another cut into An Hoa basin. Two roads come off at right angles from Highway One into Que Son valley. The southern road, Route 534, starts at Thang Binh and, during the period under discussion, was in the Americal zone. The parallel northern road, Route 535, begins at the intersection of the Ly Ly with Highway One and goes just beyond Que Son district headquarters where it branches. Route 535 goes south and joins Route 534. The northern fork is Route 536. Unused by vehicles and degenerated into a foot path, Route 536 goes through a saddle in the Que Sons, then drops down into "Antenna" valley (no one seems to remember how it got that name) which in turn comes in at right angles to Nong Son valley.

The 7th Marines began moving into Que Son valley on 15 August, displacing the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. There were two major combat bases to be taken over from the Army: LZ Baldy, at the intersection of Highway One and Route 535, and FSB Ross, west of Que Son village, where Route 536 forks off to the northwest. By the 18th, the 7th Marines had joined the 196th Brigade in a major fight outside Hiep Duc, another district headquarters, some 18 kilometers southwest of Ross. The enemy was the 2d NVA Division and, by the end of the month, the united Army and Marine effort had killed more than a thousand of them. Meanwhile, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, operating from Baldy, had joined a Regional Force company in still another sweep of Barrier island.

3d Marine Division Redeploys

In the north, Colonel LaFond's 3d Marines had been continuing Operation Virginia Ridge in the central DMZ area. There had been a sharp action on 17 June near Gio Linh in which the 3d Battalion had killed 193 enemy at a cost of 18 Marines dead, 26 wounded and evacuated. Virginia Ridge was brought to a close on 16 July and succeeded by Idaho Canyon in the vicinity of Con Thien and the Rockpile. There was a last nasty fight above the Rockpile on 17 September in which 48 enemy dead were counted against a total of 25 Marines killed, 47 wounded, and the operation

Both Baldy and Ross had long since outgrown their original respective designations as a "landing zone" and a "fire support base." A landing zone, by definition, is simply a place where aircraft can land. In Vietnam it came to have the specific meaning of an improved landing site for helicopters. A fire support base, in the Vietnam context, usually meant an artillery battery position. Once, however, a location was labeled on "LZ" or "FSB" the appellation tended to stick, as in the case of Baldy which had grown into a full-fledged brigade or regimental-size combat base and Ross which easily accommodated a battalion.
was ended on 25 September. It was now time for the 3rd Marines to stand-down and get ready to sail for home. The 4th Marines would not be far behind. The 1st Brigade, 5th U.S. Mechanized Division, would be left in Quang Tri province along with about half the 1st ARVN Division to guard the DMZ and the Laotian border approaches into ICTZ.

The second increment of the U.S. troop withdrawal had been announced on 16 September. Of a total of 45,000 Americans to be redeployed by mid-December, 18,483 would be Marines, essentially the rest of the 3d Division together with a proportional share of aviation and service units. Headquarters, 3d Marine Division, and the 4th Marines were to go to Okinawa; the 3d Marines to Camp Pendleton. For its 40 months of combat, 3d Marine Division could claim 28,216 enemy killed, 499 prisoners taken, and 9,626 weapons captured.

Major General William K. Jones, Commanding General of the 3d Division, left for Okinawa on 7 November where he would also be Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force. I MEF, a counterpart of III MAF, was established to control those Fleet Marine Force air and ground elements in the Western Pacific that were not committed to Vietnam. Also on 7 November, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear) was activated at Iwakuni under command of Brigadier General William G. Johnson. Headquarters, MAG-36, under Colonel Noah C. New, was moved from Phu Bai to Futema on Okinawa where it would pick up control of the helicopter squadrons plus VMO-6 and the KC-130s of VMGR-152. Colonel Owen V. Gallentine's Provisional MAG-39 at Quang Tri was deactivated. VMA(AW)-533 took its A-6As from Chu Lai to Iwakuni where it joined MAG-15. HMM-265 went to Santa Ana with its CH-46s. HMM-364, another medium helicopter squadron, went to Okinawa along with HMH-462, a CH-53 squadron.

All helicopter squadrons remaining in Vietnam were now under MAG-16, commanded by Colonel James P. Bruce, at Marble Mountain. For the time, three squadrons would continue to be based at Phu Bai, but responsibility for operating the airfields at Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Phu Bai had been passed to the Army.

**Special Landing Force Operations**

During this time, as the III Marine Amphibious Force regrouped, combat operations continued at a low ebb. The enemy had reverted almost completely to guerrilla and terrorist activity. Most of the contact, such as it was, with main force units was in the area held by the 7th Marines, particularly in the Que Sons and in Antenna valley.

**SPECIAL LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS, 1969**


**DEFIANT MEASURE (10–16 Feb 69)**. BLT 3/26 landed by HMM-164. Negative results.

**EAGER PURSUIT (1-10 Mar 69)**. BLT 2/26 lifted by HMM-362. Five Marines killed, 60 wounded. Nine enemy killed, two taken prisoner.

**DARING REBEL (5–20 May 69)**. BLT 1/26 lifted by HMM-362. Two Marines killed, 51 wounded. Total of 105 enemy killed, 73 prisoners.

**GALLANT LEADER (23–25 May 69)**. BLT 1/26 landed by HMM-362. Negative results.

**BOLD PURSUIT (27 Jun-6 Jul 69)**. BLT 1/26. Four Marines killed, 37 wounded. Enemy casualties: 42 killed, eight taken prisoner.

**MIGHTY PLAY (10-20 Jul 69)**. BLT 1/26 landed by HMM-265. Two Marines killed, 28 wounded. Enemy casualties: 31 dead.


**BOLD MARINER (13 Jan 69–9 Feb 69)**. BLTs 2/26 and 3/26 landed on Batangan peninsula. Five Marines killed, 32 wounded. Enemy casualties: 60 killed, 26 taken prisoner.

On 21 April 1969, this Marine machine gunner and his assistant approached a shattered house from which they had been fired upon during Operations Oklahoma Hills in Quang Nam, the central province of the five in I Corps Tactical Zone.

Defiant Stand

On 7 September, BLT 1/26, lifted by HMM-263, landed south of Hoi An on Barrier island in what would be the last Special Landing Force operation of the war. Operation Defiant Stand was unique in that it was a combined landing with the Korean Marines. The 3d Battalion, 2d ROKMC Brigade, had established a blocking position across the island. BLT 1/26 had landed by helo on LZ Eagle and across Green Beach by landing craft, south of the blocking position, and had swept north, joining the 3d ROKMC Battalion. A provisional Korean Marine battalion landing team then landed on the north edge of the island and swept south against the combined, U.S.-Korean blocking position which had faced about. In all, 293 enemy were killed, 121 weapons captured, 2,500 civilians processed—of whom 11 were classified as VCI. SLF Alpha re-embarked on 19 September and reverted to Pacific Command reserve. The ceiling strengths placed on the number of Marines in-country by the withdrawal plan were not an absolute bar to the future employment of the SLF Vietnam. If the situation had so required it could have been landed, and, in fact, in the next two years, did frequently cruise close to the coast so as to be ready if needed, but such an emergency never arose.

Since 1965, the Seventh Fleet had conducted 62 Special Landing Force operations against the Vietnamese coast. Of this number, 53 had been in I Corps. The enemy never elected to do more than lightly harass a landing. There were no classic beach assaults, no great flaming battles fought at the water’s edge.

On the other hand, the computer recorded that the landings had resulted in 6,527 enemy killed, 483 prisoners taken, and 774 weapons captured. The most successful operations had been those where the SLF had been used as a highly mobile and self-sufficient reserve with which to exploit opportunities developed by on-going, in-country operations. This was particularly true of the big battles fought by the 3d Marine Division along the DMZ in 1967 and 1968. Coastal operations, such as the repeated visits to Barrier island, helped keep these areas sanitized and rounded off the Navy’s Market Time blockade of infiltration from the sea. Barrier island and Barangan peninsula, for example, with their Viet Cong-oriented fisherman populations were long-time transshipment points for supplies landed from the sea and then moved inland to mountain base areas. The SLF landings undoubtedly did much to dry this up.

Most important of all, perhaps, was that the landings not only kept the amphibious art alive, but also actually advanced it by providing testing and training in a combat environment. A large number of Marines and Navy men were exposed to the doctrine, procedures, and techniques of amphibious operations which they otherwise would have missed.

ICIPPs and CAPS

Once again it was monsoon season in I Corps. Pipestone Canyon which had begun on 26 May 1969, was brought to an end on 7 November 1969. One easily perceived result of the five-and-a-half-month effort to cleanse the Dodge City-Go Noi island area was that Route 4 was open to traffic, relatively free of harassment, from Hoi An to Dai Loc—and more venturesome types could proceed west from Dai Loc to Thuong Duc.

In November also, the 1st Marine Division had begun an augmentation of the Combined Action Program named, somewhat clumsily, the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program (ICIPP). Under the ICIPP concept, rifle companies (the Americal Division was pursuing a similar experiment) would be assigned the primary mission of pacification and deployed much like CAP units, the chief difference being that regular Marine rifle squads would be used, with a modicum of orientation, rather than specially selected and trained Combined Action Platoon squads. The program began with Company M, 1st Marines, sending squads into three contested hamlets near Hill 55, to be paired off, CAP fashion, with the local RFs and PFs.

The Combined Action Program itself had grown
during the year by another company headquarters and 13 platoons for a total investment of 1,710 Marines and 119 Navy corpsmen. During the year, the CAPs had made nearly 150,000 short-range patrols, three-quarters of them at night, and together with their PF and RF counterparts had killed 1,938 enemy, taken 425 prisoners, and captured 932 weapons.

On 15 December, Major General Edwin B. Wheeler, who, as a colonel, had commanded the 3d Marines when it first came into the country in 1965 and who had been back in Vietnam since June 1969, serving as Deputy Commanding General, XXIV Corps, succeeded Major General Simpson as commander of the 1st Marine Division.

Summing Up for 1969
Throughout I Corps, the pacification program seemed well on course. The year's goal of having 90% of the population secure was reached in October and the percentage was up to an estimated 94% at the end of the year.

Nearly 60,000 enemy dead had been counted in I Corps during 1969. American forces, Army and Marine, had submitted a total count of 30,803. The Vietnamese and Korean combined count was 27,440. In addition, 10,567 enemy had been captured or defected. These losses, unfortunately, were not reflected proportionately in the estimate of the enemy's remaining strength in ICTZ. At the end of the year, his strength was put at 77,000 in I Corps, of whom some 51,000 were considered combatants. The number of infantry battalions (more properly thought of as the equivalents of a rifle company) was believed to have grown from 89 to 97.

On the American side, troop withdrawals had changed not only the size but also the makeup of III Marine Amphibious Force. The year had begun with 79,844 Marines, 3,378 Navy, and 59,403 Army in III MAF. It ended with 54,541 Marines, 2,144 Navy, and 61,792 Army.

1970: The New Year
Shortly after midnight on 6 January 1970, about a hundred members of the 409th NVA Sapper Battalion, up from Quang Tin province, attacked FSB Ross, which was occupied chiefly by the headquarters of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, two rifle companies, and two batteries of supporting artillery. It was a rainy night, in the dark of the moon, and three sapper teams got through the perimeter wire behind a barrage of about 250 rounds of mortar and RPG fire. Of the sappers, 38 were killed and three were captured. Marine losses amounted to 13 killed and 40 wounded and evacuated. There was a lesson there. Although the enemy more and more was avoiding large-scale engagements and limiting himself mostly to terrorist and harassing actions (the Tet surge when it came was minimal) he still had a capacity for nastiness.

The Government of Vietnam's 1970 Pacification and Development Plan had gotten underway officially on 1 January. The goal for the year was security for 100% of the population. A revised Hamlet Evaluation System, with more stringent criteria, had caused a statistical drop in I Corps security. Even so, by the end of January, 86% of the five provinces' 3,021,633 persons were living in hamlets considered secure. Of the remainder, 8% were in contested areas, 2% were in areas under Viet Cong control, and 4% were in hamlets or villages which were unrated.

The new system attempted to measure political, social, and economic gains as well as physical security. The dimensions measured by the new system, in addition to territorial security, included numbers of VCi neutralized, progress in the training and arming of the Peoples' Self Defense Force, progress in the development of local government, successes in the Chieu Hoi or "open arms" program for returnees, psychological operations, and a broad effort to provide a better life called "Prosperity for all."

In January also, Colonel Theodore E. Metzger, who had been the Director, Combined Action Program, was redesignated the Commanding Officer, Combined Action Force (CAF). Thus, the four Combined Action Groups were put under a regimental-equivalent headquarters. Colonel Metzger found it a much more effective organization, one that very profitably could have been established earlier.

The companion Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program was given the more manageable title of Combined Unit Pacification Program, or CUPP. Company M, 1st Marines, had expanded its share of the program to eight hamlets around Hill 55. Company A, 7th Marines, had nine squads in place along Highway One from Ba Ren bridge south to Baldy and from Baldy west along Route 535 to Ross. Company K, 26th Marines, had six squads out in hamlets south and west of Nam O bridge, and Headquarters Company, 5th Marines, had three squads in hamlets along Route 4 west of Dai Loc. In all, then, the 1st Marine Division had 26 rifle squads, roughly two-thirds of a battalion, deployed as CUPPs.

Third U. S. Redeployment
Preparations for the Marines' share of the third increment of U. S. withdrawal also began in January. This time there was to be a reduction of 12,900 Marines
by 15 April 1970. The core of this reduction would be Colonel James E. Harrell's 26th Marines which had been operating west and north of Da Nang and which now would be going home to Camp Pendleton for deactivation. Among the reinforcing units which were also being redeployed was the 1st Antitank Battalion (the Ontos with its six 106-mm. recoilless rifles was fast nearing the end of its service life and the possibility of the enemy using armor was increasingly remote), the 1st Tank Battalion (less one company of M-48 medium tanks which would remain in-country), the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion (six LVTH-6 tractors mounting 105-mm. howitzers would stay behind), and the 1st Shore Party Battalion (less one company which would remain, chiefly to work helicopter landing zones).

This redeployment took out most of the tracked vehicles remaining to the 1st Marine Division and this recognized that they had little role to play in the low-intensity combat of Quang Nam province. The remaining tanks and the 105-mm. howitzer amphibians were mainly for the support of the Korean brigade who liked them and whose sandy area of operations between Marble Mountain and Hoi An was well-suited to tracked vehicle operation. Departure of the Shore Party Battalion and the Amphibian Tractor Battalion underscored how far the Division had moved from its original amphibious configuration and mission. The Tractor Battalion's LVTP-5s were also nearing the end of their service life, having been in the Marine Corps' inventory nearly 20 years. Early in the war they had been used experimentally as substitutes for armored personnel carriers. This had proved too dangerous; their soft underbellies made them easy prey for mines. They had then settled down to a useful life as cargo-carriers; they could swim and they were good at crossing sand and mud. At home, their successor, the LVTP-7, was beginning to come off the assembly lines.

Four tactical squadrons—one of them a helo squadron, the other three fixed-wing—left the country as part of the third increment. VMA-223 with its A-4Es and VMFA-542 with its F-4Bs flight-ferried home to El Toro. HMH-361 embarked its CH-53s in the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) and went to Santa Ana. MAG-12's headquarters, commanded by Colonel James R. Weaver, and VMA-211 with its A-4Es went to Iwakuni.

This left the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing with three operating groups. MAG-11 at Da Nang had VMCL-1, two A-6A squadrons—VMA(AW)-225 and VMA(AW)-242—and VM0-2 with its OV-10As. MAG-13 at Chu Lai had VMA-311 and three F-4B squadrons—VMFA-115, VMFA-122, and VMFA-314. The last two medium helicopter squadrons at Phu Bai had come down to Marble Mountain Air Facility so that MAG-16 had at that field four medium squadrons equipped with the CH-46D, one heavy squadron with the CH-53, a light squadron with UH-1Es, and another light squadron with AH-1Gs. In all, the Wing had about 170 fixed-wing and 210 helicopters after the deployments were completed. The Wing also continued to operate Air Support Radar Teams (ASRTs) at five sites: Quang Tri, FSB Birmingham in Thu Thien province, Da Nang, An Hoa, and Chu Lai. These ASRTs provided a radar bombing system, incorporating ground-controlled flight path guidance and weapons release, which ensured all weather direct air support coverage throughout ICTZ.

A Navy departure in the third increment was the USS Repose (AH-16), near and dear to the Marines. She had come on-station 16 February 1966 with her 560-bed hospital. She left on 13 March 1970 for home and deactivation. In her nearly four years in Vietnamese waters, she had admitted nearly 25,000 patients, mostly Marines, of whom close to 10,000 had been battle casualties. Many of the rest had had malaria or fevers of undetermined origin.

Command Changes

At its peak in 1968, before the redeployments had begun, III Marine Amphibious Force had included two Marine divisions plus two Marine regimental landing teams, a very large Marine aircraft wing, a large Force Logistics Command, a U.S. Army corps headquarters, three Army divisions, and an Army mechanized infantry brigade. After the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, the Army, not the Marine Corps, was the dominant U.S. service, in numbers, in I Corps. The third increment redeployments further increased the disparity in size between the Army and Marine Corps components.

In recognition of this, on 9 March 1970, upon the detachment of Lieutenant General Nickerson as Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, the roles of XXIV Corps and III MAF were reversed, with XXIV Corps becoming the senior U.S. command in ICTZ and picking up most of the functions which hitherto had been performed by III MAF. Lieutenant General Melvin Zais, U.S. Army, moved his Corps headquarters from Phu Bai to the old III MAF compound at Camp Horn, and Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon, the new commanding general of III MAF, in turn, moved to Camp Haskins on Red Beach. This would be a second Vietnam tour for General McCutcheon.13 From June 1965 until June 1966 he

had served as Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Deputy Commander, III Marine Amphibious Force.

III MAF would continue as a separate service command under MACV but for operations in ICTZ it was essentially a division-wing team, under the operational control of XXIV Corps, with its area of responsibility limited to Quang Nam province. In the air, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing would continue to roam farther afield with its fixed-wing aircraft, strike and reconnaissance operations continuing under the single manager-ship of the Seventh Air Force. For the time, also, MAG-13 would continue to be based at Chu Lai.

A Smaller Battlefield

The actual TAOR, or tactical area of responsibility, assigned III MAF included not only Quang Nam province but also a slice of Thua Thien province on the north, so as to include all of Hai Van pass, and a bit of Quang Tin province in the south in Que Son valley. The total area was 1,054 square miles. In the TAOR lived an estimated 970,000 people including 418,000 in Da Nang. Most of the rest in the coastal lowlands or river valleys, with a very few—Montagnards—in the mountains.

Redeployment of RLT-26 had brought the 1st Marine Division down to a more normal configuration and strength. It had its three organic infantry regiments, the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines; its artillery regiment, the 11th Marines; and the usual combat support and combat service support battalions. It had been somewhat denuded, as described earlier, of its amphibious capability but had been beefed-up with extra engineers, artillery, and motor transport. Strength was about 21,000 Marines and 1,200 Navy men.14

The Division’s over-riding mission continued to be that of providing a shield for the populated area of Quang Nam province, which meant keeping the North Vietnamese forces at arm’s length from Da Nang. The Division had no responsibility for the Da Nang vital zone itself. This responsibility continued to be discharged by III MAF, primarily through the 1st Military Police Battalion as airfield base defense force and by coordination of all the myriad Free World Military Force tenants in the Da Nang area.15

The Division’s responsibility picked up at the boundary of the Da Nang vital zone. The Division’s dispositions were roughly a series of concentric circles. First, there were the Northern and Southern Sector Defense Commands, forming a belt extending from the Cau Do bridges clockwise around to the Force Logistic Command at Red Beach. The spine for this defense was the high ground, beginning with Hill 327, called “Division Ridge,” a 12-kilometer ridgeline which offered almost the school solution to defending the western approaches to Da Nang. This high ground had first been occupied by the Marines when they came in-country in March 1965, and, although it had been probed by the enemy, it had never been seriously threatened. The ridgeline’s defenders came primarily from Division headquarters and service units. Located at Hill 34 within the Southern Sector was the base camp of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, which had been designated as the Division reserve. During the spring and summer of 1970, its most important contribution was in Pacifier operations, quick-response helicopter operations of platoon or company size. The Pacifier "package" was used on an average of four times a week against pre-planned or immediate targets.

The next ring beyond the Defense Sectors was the so-called Rocket Belt. With the departure of the 26th Marines, the 1st Marines had the whole belt. This meant drawing in a little tighter towards Da Nang. The 1st Marines turned over their old CP on Hill 55 (which had been a Marine regimental command post since being occupied by the 9th Marines in the spring of 1966) to the 51st ARVN Regiment and moved to the CP vacated by the 26th Marines close to the Division headquarters.

South of the 1st Marines, the Korean Marine Brigade continued to hold sway in its own TAOR, almost autonomous in its operations although "operational guidance" by III MAF continued. West of the ROK Marines and southwest of the 1st Marines, the 5th Marines, (less the 1st Battalion), with its CP and combat base at An Hoa, continued to cover the Arizona territory and the Thuong Duc corridor. And finally, the 7th Marines, with its CP at Baldy, continued to work its battalions in the Que Sons and Que Son valley. (There was a ground attack against Que Son district headquarters, a mile and a half from FSB Ross, early on the morning of 6 May. Marines from 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, counterattacked and drove out the attackers, killing 40.)

Major General Wheeler broke his leg in a helicopter crash on 18 April. The new Division commander, who arrived on 27 April, was Major General Charles F. Widdecke. He had won the Navy Cross on Guam and had commanded the 5th Marines when it first came in-country in 1966.

Go Noi Resettlement

In March 1970, the Quang Nam province chief announced the government’s intention to resettle the
Go Noi island area. It was believed that the rich alluvial soil, which had once been planted in mulberries for silkworm culture, would support a market garden economy. The plan called for housing 17,000 refugees in three hamlets before the beginning of the fall monsoon. The area actually lay in the Korean TAOR and security was to be provided by the Koreans, the ARVN, and the RF and PF. General Zais asked the 1st Marine Division to assist in getting things going. General Widdecke, in turn, assigned the project to his ADC, Brigadier General William F. Doehler. Execution got underway in late May. By 25 June, Marine engineers had opened a road from Highway One and put a 346-foot pontoon bridge across the Song Chiem Son. The Marine contribution was essentially complete by the first week in August. Eight kilometers of road had been pioneered, two defensive compounds had been built, and a portable saw mill had been set up which cut a quarter-million usable feet of lumber for housing from salvaged dunnage. Meanwhile, the Seabees had improvised a 440-foot permanent bridge from surplus components.

On 11 June, not very far from Go Noi, the Viet Cong struck at Thanh My on the south side of Ba Ren bridge. Behind a curtain of 200 rounds of mortar fire, two companies of sappers came into the hamlet, shooting, throwing grenades, and dropping satchel charges into the villagers' bunkers. Defending the hamlet was a mixed bag of RF, PF, PSDF, RD cadres, and National Police, plus a Marine CUPP. Two more CUPP squads arrived as reinforcements but before the attackers could be driven out, 300 houses had been destroyed. In addition to three Vietnamese combatants being killed and 19 wounded, 74 civilians lost their lives and 63 more men were wounded. Marine losses were one killed and 10 wounded.

On 28 June, province council elections were held and in Quang Nam there was an 83% turn-out of eligible voters. Municipal council elections were conducted in Da Nang the same day with a 73% turn-out. This was taken as an indicator of increasing government effectiveness.

The Force Logistic Command turned over the Hoa Khanh Children's Hospital to the World Relief Commission on 30 June. The 120-bed hospital, beautifully designed and of masonry and tile construction, was probably the finest children's hospital outside of Saigon. Built near Red Beach within the Camp Brooks perimeter, the hospital was FLC's principal civic action project and had cost $300,000 in donations and countless hours of volunteer work.

On 2 July, President Thieu, with the objective of improving unity of command and territorial security, announced that henceforth the Corps Tactical Zones would no longer necessarily be tied to provincial boundaries, and the RF and PF would become part of the Army of Vietnam. I Corps Tactical Zone became Military Region 1 and, in Quang Nam province, the province chief was given greater responsibility for territorial security. In addition to these changes, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups at Thuong Duc and Nong Son were to be reorganized into Ranger Border Defense Battalions.

**Summer Offensive**

General Lam, knowing that further U.S. troop withdrawals from Military Region 1 were imminent, gave much thought in the early summer months of 1970 to what might well be the last large-scale combined offensive in his military region. With the concurrence and support of Lieutenant General James W. Sutherland, Jr., U.S. Army (who on 18 June had succeeded Lieutenant General Zais as CG XXIV Corps) General Lam decided upon a generally westward attack on a broad front throughout Military Region 1 into the enemy's base areas. In Quang Nam province he had the 51st ARVN Regiment, his Ranger Group, and, temporarily, the 258th Vietnamese Marine Brigade, which was fresh from successes in Cambodia. The Vietnamese Marines were veterans of much fighting in the deltas in the south but new to the mountains of the northern provinces. General Lam launched his attack on 6 July. The 51st ARVN Regiment sent its battalions into Base Area 127 on Charlie Ridge above Thuong Duc. The 258th Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the Ranger Group were helo-lifted into the western edges of Base Area 112, the mountains drained by the Song Cai, west and southwest of Thuong Duc.

**Pickens Forest**

Colonel Edmund G. Derning's 7th Marines, with two battalions, followed behind Lam's westward thrust in a supporting operation, Pickens Forest. The 7th Marines were going into the western and southern part of Base Area 112 with the expectation of disrupting the enemy's logistics flow. Some 1,500 enemy were thought to be in the objective area, members mostly of the 38th NVA Regiment, the 577th Rocket Battalion, and the 490th Sapper Battalion. Beginning at 0730 on 16 July, Derning, with a regimental command group, a rifle company, and a 105-mm battery, entered the Song Thu Bon valley south of Nong Son and set up FSB Defiant. The same day, the 1st and 2d Battalions went into Fire Support Bases Mace and Dart in the mountains to the west and began their company-size
sweeps. On 9 August, the 2d Battalion made a long jump westward to FSB Hatcher above the Song Cai. Pickens Forest ended on 24 August. Contact was limited, but the 7th Marines had found a sizable number of caches of weapons and supplies.

Fourth U.S. Redeployment

On 20 April 1970, President Nixon announced a 150,000 reduction in U.S. authorized troop strength to be accomplished by 1 May 1971. A total of 41,800 of these reductions were to be Marines. The original plan was for III MAF to reduce 18,600 Marines by 15 October 1970 (Increment IV), another 10,600 by 1 January 1971 (Increment V), and the remaining 12,600 by the deadline of 1 May (Increment VI). That would clear out all Fleet Marine Force Marines from Vietnam. The Marines planned to organize the 12,600 who were to stay until May into a Marine Amphibious Brigade with an activation day fairly soon after 15 October. The principal ground unit scheduled to leave in the fourth increment was the 7th Marines, now commanded by Colonel Robert H. Piehl. This meant that after 15 October two Marine regiments in Quang Nam province would have to do what four Marine regiments had been doing prior to April. This recognized, of course, that the enemy had been greatly weakened and the ARVN was growing progressively stronger.

Imperial Lake

But, before the 7th Marines left, it would begin one more named operation. Between 0702 and 0928 on 31 August, attack aircraft of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing delivered 77 tons of ordnance, mostly 1,000-pound bombs and napalm, into the Que Sons in 27 sorties. This followed an all-night drumfire artillery preparation in which Colonel Edwin M. Rudzis' 11th Marines had shot 13,000 rounds into the target area. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, then was helo-lifted into a ring of landing zones which had been quietly reconnoitered by the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. Imperial Lake would keep the Que Sons neutralized for the remainder of the 1st Marine Division's stay in Vietnam. It also would yield some spectacular intelligence finds as to the Viet Cong infrastructure in Quang Nam province.

Catawba Falls

The 7th Marines operations in Pickens Forest had developed some inviting fixes as to the location of the 38th NVA Regiment in the rugged country west of Nong Son. Colonel Clark V. Judge, commanding the 5th Marines, recommended an attack with his regiment against the 38th. There was a complication in that the stand-down of the 7th Marines began on 7 September and the 5th Marines were scheduled to move into their vacated area of operations on 21 September.

The Division order for Catawba Falls resembled that for Imperial Lake. It called for a two-phase operation; first a heavy air and artillery attack by fire beginning 18 September, and then an infantry assault by the 5th Marines on 21 September. A composite battery of 105s and 155s was lifted up onto FSB Digger, a spectacular flat-topped peak 1,051 meters high, called Ban Co by the Vietnamese. In the three-day attack by fire, 11,346 artillery rounds were shot and 141 tons of bombs dropped. Then, on 21 September, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines moved, not west to Digger but southeast to Baldy and Ross, to take up positions vacated by the 7th Marines. Meanwhile the 38th NVA Regiment's base area was being given a final pounding by five B-52 strikes. Later intelligence indicated that the 38th Regiment had been numbed by the unexpected ferocity of the attack by fire and bewildered by the failure of the expected infantry assault to materialize.

Change in Redeployment Plans

Meanwhile, with Increment IV redeployments fairly well underway, it was learned that available Army manpower could not support the originally planned Army troop level in Vietnam and Marine redeployments would have to be stretched out. The Marines who were scheduled to leave in Increment V, that is, from 15 October until 1 January, now were to stay until Increment VI, from 1 January until 30 April 1971. The brigade would then be formed of the residue and there was no firm decision on how long it would remain in-country, perhaps it would be out by 1 July 1971, perhaps it would be staying longer.

All of this caused a last minute reshuffling of units as III MAF geared itself for a longer stay in-country than planned. The actual number of Marines to be reduced by 15 October was changed to 17,021. By the time these decisions were reached it was already too late to modify the departure of some of the heavier support units. On 22 August, the last two Force Engineer Battalions, the 9th and most of the 7th, had begun embarkation. This left the Marines with the 1st Engineer Battalion organic to the 1st Marine Division and Company A, 7th Engineers, in general support of III MAF. Increment IV also saw the departure of the last battery of 175-mm. guns and the last company of tanks.

Aviation Changes

On the aviation side, Major General Alan J. Arm-
Members of the 1st Marine Division at a fire support base watch a CH-53 helicopter as the big aircraft brings in more supplies for the troops, in September 1970.

gunships continued to be maintained at Marble Mountain for the 1st Marines. Both would get much use against the small, elusive, and transitory targets that characterized the waning war in Quang Nam province.

Profitable close air support missions in support of the 1st Marine Division were becoming increasingly scarce, but MAG-11's attack and fighter aircraft still had their share of the war. Marine F-4s continued to fly combat air patrols over Laos in support of the 7th Air Force and over the Gulf of Tonkin for Task Force 77 of the Seventh Fleet. Marine A-6s, because of their all-weather capability, were a great favorite of the Seventh Air Force for targeting against "movers"—NVA trucks on their way south along the Ho Chi Minh road complex in Laos. Both the F-4s and the A-6s were also used for interdiction missions in Laos, particularly against the choke points offered by the passes at Mu Gia, Ban Karai, and Ban Raving.

Combined Action Program Reduced

The Increment IV redeployments had brought about a drastic constriction in the Combined Action Program. The 4th CAG, headquartered at Quang Tri, was disestablished in July. By the end of August, 1st CAG in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces and 3d CAG in Thua Thien province also had been deactivated. On 1 September, operational control of the Combined Action Force, which had gone to XXIV Corps on 26 March, reverted to III MAF control. Scope of operations was now down to 2d CAG in Quang Nam province with six companies and 38 platoons. On 21 September, Colonel Ralph F. Estey's Combined Action Force headquarters was dissolved.

There were also rearrangements in the complementary CUPP program. With the 7th Marines going home, the 5th Marines picked up its CUPP mission, replacing Company A, 7th Marines, with Company G, 5th Marines, along the road from Ba Ren Bridge to Baldy to Ross. Actually, over 50% of 7th Regiment's CUPP Marines, as individuals, stayed in place, simply being transferred from the 7th Marines to the 5th Marines. (As with all the redeployments, there was a "mixmaster" of personnel in accordance with redeploy-
ment criteria. This assured equity insofar as individual
tour lengths went but played hob with unit integrity.)

To fill in behind the two battalions of the 5th
Marines which had gone south to Baldy and Ross, the
area of operations for Colonel Paul X. Kelley’s 1st
Marines was extended to include Charlie Ridge, Hill
37 at Dai Loc, and Hill 65 in the Thuong Duc corridor.
Company M, 1st Marines, stayed in place with its CUPPs
near Hill 55 but operational control reverted from the
5th Marines to the 1st Marines, Company M getting
back to its parent regiment after a lapse of nearly a
year. The 1st Marines also picked up the three CUPPs
west of Dai Loc from the 5th Marines.

Typhoon Kate

Elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment were to take
over at An Hoa from the 5th Marines. They did not
immediately arrive. Besides, the ARVN wanted only a
quarter of the sprawling combat base and, according
to the rules then applying to the disposal of facilities, the
rest of the base had to be dismantled completely.
The work at An Hoa soaked up a good portion of
the remaining engineer capability. The monsoon rains
had begun, the ground was bull-dozed into a sea of
red mud, and the engineers barely got their heavy
equipment out before the rains made the road and
Liberty Bridge impassable.

The October rains came to a climax with Typhoon
Kate which caused Quang Nam to have its worst
floods since 1964. From the Cau Do river south to
Baldy and as far west as Thuong Duc was almost an
uninterrupted lake. Most of Routes 1 and 4 were under
three feet or more of water. The wooden-piling "Lon-
don Bridge" just north of Dai Loc on Route 540 was
badly damaged. Liberty Bridge proved virtually mon-
soon-proof, but there was as much as 25 feet of water
over its decking. The 1st Wing’s helicopters, assisted
by Division units, particularly the 1st Reconnaissance
Battalion, evacuated perhaps 30,000 civilians to safety.
The Quang Nam province chief later estimated that
as many as 10,000 Vietnamese might have perished if
it had not been for the American rescue effort.

The floods probably hurt the enemy in Quang Nam
more than they did the government. His supply lines
were disrupted. Many of his rice caches were flooded
and spoiled. There was much evidence of low morale.
Marines working in the Que Sons in Imperial Lake
began finding increasing numbers of unburied bodies
and unprotected caches of food, equipment, and docu-
ments.

Hoang Dieu

The effects of the monsoon were in addition to the
results General Lam was getting with Operation Hoang
Dieu. After bringing the 51st ARVN Regiment and the
Ranger Group back from their foray into the enemy base
area, Lam concentrated them, along with his Re-
gional and Popular Forces, in a lowlands saturation
campaign which had as its objective the systematic
search of every hamlet in Quang Nam province for
VCI. Virtually all of the 1st Marine Division’s efforts,
other than Imperial Lake and deep reconnaissance, were
dedicated to the support of Lam’s operation which
began on 22 September. By the time Hoang Dieu
ended on 30 November, there was a total count of 1,180
enemy killed, 200 weapons captured. General Lam then
began Hoang Dieu 101 which the Marines joined on
17 December.

1971: The Final Year

III MAF had celebrated the 195th birthday of the
Corps on 10 November with a tremendous pageant
staged in one of the hangars on the west side of Da
Nang airbase. Lieutenant General McCutcheon had
been nominated by the President for a fourth star and
to succeed General Walt as Assistant Commandant of
the Marine Corps on 1 February 1971.

Then, on 11 December, General McCutcheon, who
had been feeling unwell since about the time of the
Marine Corps Birthday, returned to his headquarters
from on board the USS Sanctuary, where some exhaust-
tive tests had been taken. He called together the general
officers assigned to III MAF and told them he was
leaving on 13 December for hospitalization at Bethesda.
His plane left at 0755 on Sunday. It was a fine bright
morning with a fresh breeze blowing. General Mc-
cutcheon had asked that there be no departure cere-
mony, but there was no preventing a spontaneous,
sincere send-off. Always slight; he looked gaunt and
tired as he shook hands and said good-bye.17

Donn J. Robertson, who had commanded the 1st
Marine Division in 1967 and 1968 and who was now
the Director of the Marine Corps Reserve, was quickly
promoted to lieutenant general and moved to the
Western Pacific, arriving in Da Nang on 23 December
and assuming command of III MAF the next day.

The level and intensity of ground combat for the
1st Marine Division, even after allowing for the re-
duced strength of the Division, had declined almost
as a straight-line progression during 1970. Of the 403
members of the Division killed in 1970, 283 had died
in the first six months of the year. Similarly, of the
3,625 men wounded during 1970, 2,537 were hit dur-
ing the first six months. The 1970 casualties, 403 killed

17Keith Barr McCutcheon, one of the Marine Corps’ most distinguished
aviators, was placed on the retired list with the rank of four-star general
on 1 July 1971, and died of cancer 13 July 1971.
and 3,625 wounded, in turn were less than half the
1969 casualties, 1,051 killed and 9,286 wounded.

The enemy had also lost fewer men. The Division
claimed 9,643 killed in 1969, 5,225 killed in 1970.
Enemy strength in Quang Nam province had declined,
by Division estimates, from 15,500 in January 1969 to
8,325 in January 1971.

Division artillery, with 174 tubes in January 1969,
-fired 178,200 rounds (and a total of 2,017,700 rounds
for the year) as compared to 35,400 rounds from 74
tubes in January 1971 (and a total of 1,333,000 rounds
for 1970).

**Quang Da Special Zone**

On the Vietnamese side, the ARVN forces in Quang
Nam province needed, but never had, a division-equivalent
headquarters to direct their action, a need
the Marines had perceived as soon as they entered
ground combat in the province in 1965. While I Corps
headquarters never really did relinquish operational
control of ARVN units in Quang Nam province, a
headquarters called Quang Da Special Zone (pairing
off with Da Nang Special Zone and somewhat confus-
ing because the Viet Cong also called their head-
quartes Quang Da Special Zone or Sector) had come
into being, which, while not adequately staffed to
perform division-level command and control, did exert
coordinating control over assigned ARVN units. Nur-
tured by III MAF, and most particularly by 1st Marine
Division, combined weekly conferences were held by
the commanders of Quang Da Special Zone, 2d ROKMC
Brigade, and 1st Marine Division, at which agenda items of mutual interest were considered. These
conferences were paralleled by combined staff action.

Quang Da Special Zone suffered a notable setback
in August when its commander, the highly-capable and
well-liked Colonel Nguyen Van Thien, was killed in
an air crash on his way to Saigon to receive his star
as a brigadier general. Then, on 1 January 1971, Quang
Da Special Zone was redesignated the 1st Mobile Task
Force and given clear-cut operational control of the 51st
Regiment, the 1st Ranger Group (21st, 37th, and 39th
Battalions), a squadron of the 1st Armored Brigade,
and the 78th and 79th Border Ranger Defense Battal-
ions (successors to the CIDGs at Thuong Duc and
Nong Son).

**Campaign Plan 1971**

The great change in the Combined Campaign Plan
for 1971 was the conceptual one that substituted “tacti-
cal areas of interest” (TAOI) for “tactical areas of respon-
sibility.” Henceforth, TAOIs, not TAORs, normally
would be assigned to the Free World military assistance
forces (FWMAF). The essential difference between a
TAOI and a TAOR was that the commander was not
charged with primary tactical responsibility and was not
expected to conduct operations throughout the TAOI
on a continuing basis. Instead he would have an "area
of operation" (AO) for a specific operation for a specific
period of time. The TAOI would include the secure area,
the consolidation zone, the clearing zone, and the
border surveillance zone. The secure area and consolid-
ation zone would be under command of the province
chief. The clearing zone and border surveillance zone
would be under the ARVN field commander. FWMAF
areas of operation could be in any of the zones.

For the 1st Marine Division, this meant that they
no longer, in theory, would bear primary responsibility
for security of Quang Nam province (for years their
TAOR had been the eastern third or practically all the
populated area of the province). The Marine rifleman,
patrolling the paddy dikes south of Da Nang and
stepping high to avoid tripwires, probably never heard
of the shift from TAORs to TAOIs, but he was soon
aware that he no longer was ranging quite so far afield.

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18 By JCS Dictionary definition, tactical area of responsibility is "A defined
area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander
of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination
of support. Commonly referred to as TAOR." Thus a division, regiment,
or battalion could have a "TAOR," however, in the Vietnam context the
term ordinarily applied to the area of operational responsibility assigned to
a U.S. division.
and he was conscious that there were more ARVN patrolling the "villes" and out in the bush.

The Hoang Dieu series of operations, which had already moved the ARVN toward an increased responsibility for territorial security, had continued, although at somewhat reduced vigor. Hoang Dieu 101 ended 19 January. The combined effort had resulted in a claimed 538 enemy killed, 87 prisoners, 45 Hoi Chanhs, and 171 weapons captured. Hoang Dieu 103 began 3 February and ended 10 March. III MAF's participation added 82 enemy killed to the totals. Tet 1971 had brought a slight increase in combat over preceding months but nothing like the surges experienced in previous years.

Visit by CG FMFPac and CMC

Lieutenant General William K. Jones, who had succeeded Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, Jr., as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on 1 July 1970, was in Vietnam from 9 to 11 January 1971 on one of his periodic swings through the Western Pacific. Most of the conferences centered on Increments VI and VII and the tidy departure of III MAF from Vietnam.

At the beginning of 1971, III Marine Amphibious Force was authorized 24,811 Southeast Asia Program Marines. (Actual III MAF strength on 31 December 1970 was 24,715 Marines plus 1,010 Navy men.) For reasons already discussed, there had been no redeployments of Marines in Increment V. For Increment VI, 11,207 would be redeployed during the period 1 January to 30 April. The remaining 13,604 would be organized into the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. By the first of the year, Increment VI seemed firm: RLT-5 with corresponding slices of aviation and logistic support would go home. III MAF headquarters would also depart. But what of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade? Would it be out of Vietnam by 30 June 1971 as part of Increment VII or would there be a requirement to stay? This was an unanswered question.

Close on General Jones' heels came General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., for his last visit to the combat zone as Commandant. Visiting III MAF from 15 to 17 January, he, too, charged that the Marines would come out of Vietnam in good order, leaving nothing behind worth more than "five dollars."

There was also a great deal of more formal guidance forthcoming on how the Marines would come out of Vietnam. For example, on 30 January, FMFPac told III MAF that "It is policy that all principal end items with future economic potential for the Marine Corps be retrograded or redistributed to other WestPac units . . . ."

Upshur Stream

Colonel Kelley's 1st Marines on 11 January began an operation called Upshur Stream, the 1st and 3d Battalions moving up into the Charlie Ridge area to look for the elusive rocketeers of the 575th NVA Artillery Battalion. The operation went on until 29 March. Contact was small (13 enemy killed, 32 weapons captured) and most of the friendly casualties were from "surprise firing devices," the euphemism for the enemy's diabolical collection of land mines. But the number of rocket attacks against the Da Nang vital area remained low, possibly because of this and other vigorous actions to get at the rockets before they could be moved into launching position. (There was a standing

MAJOR 1st MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS, 1970-71


SCOTT ORCHARD (7-12 Apr 71). Four enemy killed.
offer that any Marine finding a rocket got a mini-R&R
to Hong Kong or Bangkok.) In 1970, a total of 228
rockets was flung against Da Nang and its environs.
(This total is less impressive when it is realized that
the 122-mm. and 140-mm. rockets are nothing much
more than self-propelled artillery shells.) None were
received in January 1971, 21 in February, and 36 in
March (the rise probably being the inevitable result of
the thinning of American forces in the Rocket Belt).

Lam Son 719

By mid-January, ARVN preparations for some kind
of a large scale offensive were highly visible.

But the first the III MAF subordinate commanders
and their staffs knew officially about the impending
incursion into Laos was on 30 January when they were
briefed on the essentials of the operation. I Corps was
going to enter Laos, they were told, to clean out Base
Areas 604 and 611. There were thought to be 24,000
North Vietnamese in the objective area including the
2d NVA Division and a total of 11 regiments. Lam Son
719 was to be a spoiling action to offset what increas-
ingly appeared to be an intention on the enemy’s part
to launch a large-scale offensive into the northern prov-
inces of Military Region I. There were to be four
planned phases to the operation. In Phase I, which
began at 0001, 30 January, the 1st Brigade, 5th U.S.
Mechanized Division, would open Route 9 from Vande-
grift to abandoned Khe Sanh and thence to the Laotian
border. This was to take five days. In Phase II, I Corps
would move west along the axis of Route 8, cutting
cross the many-channeled Ho Chi Minh trail complex
in a series of essentially heliborne operations as far as
the ruined town of Tchepone 40 kilometers inside of
Laos. In Phase III, I Corps would conduct systematic
search-and-destroy action in Base Area 604 in the vicin-
ity of Tchepone. Phase IV would be the withdrawal,
looping southward through Base Area 611.

General Lam (who had operated along Route 9 in
Laos as a junior officer under the French) moved his
command post up to Dong Ha initially and then west
to Khe Sanh. For the Laos incursion, he had the 1st
ARVN Division, the 1st Armored Brigade, his Rangers,
and sizable formations of Airborne troops and Viet-
namese Marines. Support of the operation (initially
called Dewey Canyon II) by XXIV Corps was to stop
at the border except for air. This meant, amongst othe-
rs, that the American advisers had to be left behind.

Marine Corps involvement was to be small. The 1st
Marine Division was asked to provide extra security
along Route One, particularly in the Hai Van pass area,
to prevent harassment of the north-south lines of com-
munication, and a company of five-ton trucks from the
11th Motor Transport Battalion along with some fork-
lifts and operators was to go north. The 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing was to provide a heavy-lift capability
by way of its CH-53s, and, through Seventh Air Force,
would be tasked for tactical air support.

1st Marine Aircraft Wing support of the operation
began on 31 January with CH-53Ds from HMH-463
moving gear for the 101st Airborne Division (Air-
mobile) into staging areas near Quang Tri. Subse-
quently they worked westward to Camp Carroll and
Khe Sanh, which were re-opened for the operation.

On 8 February, the ARVN crossed over into Laos,
initially against little or no opposition. Within a few
days, however, elements of three NVA divisions, four
artillery regiments, and a tank regiment materialized.
On 8 February, eight Marine CH-53s lifted over a mil-
lion pounds of cargo into Khe Sanh. Throughout
February, Marine-provided lift continued at a level of
from two to eight CH-53s. (The Army had no exact
equivalent of these heavy lifters. The CH-54 Crane was
a special-purpose helicopter. The CH-47 Chinook did
not have the capability of lifting 155-mm. howitzers
and D-4 bulldozers as was done routinely by the CH-53.)

A typical daily "package" provided Lam Son 719 was
four CH-53s escorted by four AH-1G Cobras or newly-
arrived AH-1F Sea Cobras. The four AH-1Fs had arrived
for combat "evaluation" on 17 February and were
attached to HML-367. The twin-engined Sea Cobra could
fly higher and faster than the single-engined AH-1G and
it could stay in the air if one engine failed. Its three-
barreled 20-mm. "Gatling Gun" in a chin turret gave
it significantly more firepower than the original Cobra’s
7.62-mm. machine gun and 40-mm. grenade launcher.
The Sea Cobra’s first combat mission was flown 2
March with Lam Son 719 providing a relatively high
intensity ground fire environment. The Sea Cobras,
with their heavier firepower and twin-engined reliabil-
ity, quickly proved their combat worth.

The package would leave Marble Mountain early in
the morning and stage through LZ Kilo near Khe Sanh.
Escort by the Cobras was in keeping with Marine
doctrine and, although there were many heavy lifts into
Laos (the farthest west being to FSB Sophia near
Tchepone, 40 kilometers inside the border) only one
Marine heavy helicopter was lost to enemy fire. That
was by a chance mortar round as the CH-53 sat down
in a "hot" landing zone. In February the CH-53s flew
a total of 2,045 sorties lifting 4,436 tons of cargo and
968 passengers in support of Lam Son 719.

By the end of February, General Lam could rea-
sonably claim to have preempted the expected large

¹⁹Debates as to the success or failure of the Laos Incursion and its conse-
quences, military and political, lie outside the purview of this article.
scale offensive into the northern provinces. He had cut the Ho Chi Minh trail complex and had engaged the enemy in a major battle. The pull-back, which now began, also required Marine heavy helo lift to get out guns and other heavy equipment. In March the CH-53s flew 980 sorties in support of the operation, lifting 1,491 tons of cargo and 1,556 troops.

Marine fixed wing aircraft meanwhile were flying 509 sorties and dropping 1,183 tons of ordnance in February in support of Lam Son 719, followed in March by 436 sorties and 1,447 tons of ordnance. The Quang Tri Air Support Radar Team was helo-lifted to Khe Sanh on 23 February. Put into operation the same day, it controlled nearly a thousand sorties, flown by the full gamut of Free World aircraft, before returning to Quang Tri on 31 March.

Some of the problems of supporting Lam Son 719 were never solved. The enemy seemed to know every move in advance. Aerial support was hampered by the weather which delayed getting started each day. Enemy antiaircraft fire, although limited to light AA guns and automatic weapons, was never adequately suppressed. NVA artillery hammering away at the bull's eyes of the ARVN fire support bases was difficult to locate and never silenced. The absence of American advisers on the ground created some difficulties in battlefield liaison and communications.

Ultimate casualties for Lam Son 719 were reported, as of 9 April, as being 13,636 enemy killed, 5,066 individual and 1,934 crew-served weapons taken; 1,483 ARVN killed, 5,420 wounded, and 691 missing. U.S. support of the operation had cost 176 Americans killed, 1,048 wounded, and 42 missing.

Increment VI

The 5th Marines were returning to Camp Pendleton, but after the usual personnel "mixmaster," in nothing more than cadre strength. On 15 February, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, stood down, coming out of the Que Sons and moving its rear from FSB Ross to Hill 34, south of Da Nang, which was to be used as a staging area for the infantry battalions as they got ready to leave country. Ross was turned over to I Corps. FSB Ryder, the superb artillery battery position on the ridge above Ross overlooking Antenna valley, was razed for lack of a tenant. (Directives from MACV and XXIV Corps concerning disposition of unwanted facilities used the term "abandon;" 1st Marine Division, however, was insistent that it was "dismantling" facilities and "razing" tactical installations. Nothing of possible value to the enemy was left behind and a high standard of police was rigidly enforced.) The 3d Battalion was followed in short order by the 2d Battalion and the 5th Marines regimental headquarters from Baldy.

As yet there had been no adjustment in the size of the Division's area of operations. The 1st Marines, the sole remaining infantry regiment, put a bob-tailed battalion into the Que Sons to continue Imperial Lake and also to provide security at Baldy until the Vietnamese were ready to take over the base.

As late as the end of February, MACV was asking for changes to the Marine aviation forces remaining in-country. With Lam Son 719 still going on, MACV was concerned over the impending departure of additional Marine helicopters and attack aircraft and the loss of the radar bombing capability embodied in the ASRTs. Some departures were already irreversible.

VMPA-115, the last Marine F-4 squadron in-country, flew its last mission on 22 February and then stood down preparatory to moving to Iwakuni. In three tours in-country since October 1965, the squadron had flown 30,083 sorties and dropped 583,345 tons of ordnance.

HMM-364 redeployed to Santa Ana with its CH-46s on 11 March. HMM-364 also had three tours in-country (the first two while equipped with the UH-34) and since February 1964 had flown 256,450 sorties, lifting 377,600 passengers and 14,425 tons of cargo, and making 25,570 medevacs.

VMO-2, the aerial eyes of the 1st Division, departed for Camp Pendleton on 8 April, leaving behind a detachment of four OV-10As for duty with the Brigade. While in Vietnam, VMO-2 had logged over 120,000 sorties and controlled more than 3,000 air strikes plus spotting for innumerable artillery missions.

Headquarters, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, stood down officially on 28 March but continued flight operations and essential staff functions. The Wing's Direct Air Support Control Center (DASC), which was collocated with the Division's Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), had controlled at least 150,000 helo missions and was staying in Vietnam as part of the Brigade.

On 15 March, the major ground ammunition supply point, ASP-2, was turned over to the U.S. Army. On 27 March Camp Faulkner near Marble Mountain, home of the 1st Engineer Battalion, went to a mechanized cavalry element of the 23d (Americal) Infantry Division. Baldy, a great sprawling combat base, went to the Vietnamese on the same day.

Battle for Duc Duc

Toward the end of March, there was hard intelligence that the enemy was going to launch his "K-850" offensive in Quang Nam the night of 28/29 March. "Open fire," it was said, was to be from 2300 on the 28th to 0200 on the 29th. Despite the forewarning and reasonably effective countermeasures (including the incentive mentioned earlier of an R&R for every Marine
who found a rocket), the enemy managed to sprinkle Da Nang and its environs with 23 rockets during the course of the night, the highest daily total in a year. There were also mortar and ground attacks against four district headquarters: Dien Ban, Dai Loc, Que Son, and Duc Duc. The explicit propaganda message was "If we can do this while the Marines are still here, what will it be like when they have gone?"

The most serious attack was against Duc Duc.

On 29 March, the 38th NVA Regiment surfaced for the first time in months. Coming out of the hills beyond An Hoa in a two battalion attack, the 38th tried to seize Duc Duc district headquarters. Phu Da and Thu Bon hamlets were heavily damaged—1,500 dwellings were destroyed, 103 civilians were killed, 96 wounded, and 37 kidnapped—and the VC flag was advanced almost to the gates of the District headquarters compound, defended at a cost of 20 PPs killed, 26 wounded. The 51st ARVN Regiment counter-attacked and in four days of fighting, without help from U.S. ground forces, ejected the 38th NVA Regiment.

Scott Orchard

Partially in response to the attack against Duc Duc, the 1st Marines on 7 April made a last foray, called Scott Orchard, into the base area in the wild country west of An Hoa. Combining some of the aspects of Pickens Forest and Catawba Falls, a composite 105-mm. and 155-mm. battery was set up on precipitous FSB Dagger and five companies under control of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, were inserted into the target area. There was almost no contact, four enemy were killed and 12 weapons captured, and the raid was ended on 12 April.

III MAF Departs

The 14th of April 1971 was the day that III Marine Amphibious Force, after just short of six years in-country, left Vietnam. Lieutenant General Robertson took his flag and headquarters to Okinawa. Major General Widdecke departed with the 1st Marine Division, 1st Marines, and an artillery firing battery had stood down on the 13th, so the brigade had actually lost a third of its ground combat strength a day before it became operational. VMA(AW)-225, the last A-6 squadron, stood down on 20 April and by the end of the month was flight-ferrying all of its planes back to El Toro.

The operational life of 3d MAB would be short. On 7 April, President Nixon announced the numbers of American troops to be out of country by 30 June. The 3d MAB would be amongst those to be redeployed. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and an artillery firing battery had stood down on the 13th, so the brigade had actually lost a third of its ground combat strength a day before it became operational. VMA(AW)-225, the last A-6 squadron, stood down on 20 April and by the end of the month was flight-ferrying all of its planes back to El Toro.

The CUPP program ended in April with the redeployments. The CAP program was down to three companies with 18 platoons and all were to be deactivated by 7 May. Possibly because of the thinning out of Americans at the hamlet and village level there was an upsurge of terrorist activity in Quang Nam province: 28 assassinations, 101 kidnappings, and 15 bombings in March; 16 assassinations, 132 abductions, and 5 bombings in April.

End of Combat

On 1 May, 3d MAB responsibility receded to Phase Line White, essentially Hoa Vang District.

The one named operation still underway was Imperial Lake. As the Marine’s area of operations had contracted, the focus of the operation had shifted from the Que Sons to Charlie Ridge. It terminated on 7 May 1971.

Along with Imperial Lake, all ground and air combat ended for the 3d MAB on 7 May. On that day, the
2d Battalion, 1st Marines, the last infantry battalion in the field, stood down. Raymond Davis, now a four-star general and Assistant Commandant, was visiting and had lunch with Company F south of the Song Cau Do, close to where the 9th Marines had first crossed the river in July 1965. Also at noon, two companies of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade relieved the Provisional Company from 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, which had been manning Division Ridge (where Company I, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, had first climbed on 10 March 1965) and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, drove away from Hill 55 with its six 105s and two 155-mm. in convoy. Last rounds had been fired the day before by Battery C at the Northern Artillery Cantonment. As soon as the last two firing batteries' 105-mm. howitzers were cleaned and inspected they were turned over to the Vietnamese Marines. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, in its more than five years in-country had shot over 2.5 million rounds. On this same day, 7 May, 16 A-4s from VMA-311 flew their last strike into Laos, the four remaining OV-10As flew their last reconnaissance, HMM-262 stood down its CH-46s, the ASRT on Hill 327 began to dismantle its radars,\(^22\) the 1st Military Police Battalion relinquished its airfield security mission to a Regional Force group, and 2d CAG pulled in its last CAPs from Dien Ban district. On 7 May also, the 3d MAB headquarters cantonment was transferred to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade although the 3d MAB headquarters would stay on as tenants until 26 June.

On 10 May, the Northern Artillery Cantonment was transferred to the government of Vietnam as was Camp 14, which had been the picturesque and comfortable base camp for the now-departed 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. On 15 May, the remaining ammunition supply point, ASP-1, was turned over to ARVN. On 21 May, Colonel Pommerenk released MAG-11's facilities on the west edge of the Da Nang air base (developed to a point where they would have been unrecognizable to the original Shu Fly occupants) to the U.S. Air Force. New home for MAG-11 would be El Toro where it would become part of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.

By 26 May, all of the last infantry unit, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, were off of Hill 34, and on their way to Camp Pendleton. The 26th of May was also the last day for helicopter operations, remaining CH-33s of HMH-463, UH-1Es of HML-167, and Cobras of HML-367 standing down. On 1 June the transfer of Marble Mountain Air Facility by Colonel Street's MAG-16 to the U.S. Army was completed and the last members of the Group headquarters were on their way to Santa Ana where MAG-16, like MAG-11, would be assigned to the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. On 4 June, Brigadier General Jones released the Force Logistics Command's Camp Books—its remaining Butler buildings now starkly empty—to the ARVN 1st Area Logistical Command.

With all operations over, there was now nothing left for the service and service support units to do but complete their own preparations for departure. The last surface element sailed on 25 June in the USS Saint Louis (LKA-116) and included some members of Company A, 1st Medical Battalion (who had maintained a 60-bed hospital through the operational life of the Brigade) and hard-working Company A, 7th Engineers, acting as cargo riders for their administratively-loaded equipment. On 26 June, Major General Armstrong boarded a Marine KC-130F with the last ten members of 3d MAB's headquarters. His destination was Okinawa, first leg to Hawaii and deactivation.

This left only a "transitional-support" force of about 500 Marines still in Vietnam. The largest number were members of the 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, parceled out in teams from just below the DMZ down to the southern tip of the peninsula. There was also a Marine advisory unit of about 60 officers and men with the Vietnamese Marine Corps which had grown to a three-brigade light division. The rest, except for a few in the MACV structure, were guards with the U.S. Embassy and consulates. There would continue to be a scattering of casualties, but those who remained were performing essentially liaison, advisory, staff, and guard functions. It was thought that the air-ground war for the Marines in Vietnam had ended. Then came the North Vietnamese Eastern offensive.

\(^22\) The Quang Tri and Da Nang ASRTs stood down on 8 May but the ASRT at FSB Birmingham remained operational until 30 May to support ARVN and U.S. Army units in Lam Son 720 being run in A Shau Valley.
Sanh, Camp Carroll, Con Thien, Gio Linh—began to fall, one by one.

At this time, two Vietnamese Marine brigades were under the operational control of the 3d ARVN Division. Brigade 147\(^{22}\) was operating out of Mai Loc, west of Dong Ha, and Brigade 258 was operating out of Dong Ha. Brigade 147 was heavily hit at Mai Loc and Nui Ba Ho and at FSBS Holcomb and Sarge. By 2 April, the brigade commander, out of contact with the 3d ARVN Division, had come to a reluctant conclusion that he would have to fall back to Quang Tri city. Meanwhile, Brigade 258 was hit hard at Dong Ha but held all positions. The 3d VNMC Battalion was holding the bridgehead at Dong Ha and on 2 April, as the enemy’s armored column reached the bridge, Captain John W. Ripley, the battalion’s advisor, personally blew that structure and won himself the Navy Cross. Brigade 258 then withdrew to positions near Quang Tri city.

On 3 April, the Joint General Staff ordered the Marine Division headquarters and Brigade 369 north from Saigon. The Vietnamese Marine Division at this time was commanded by Lieutenant General Nguyen Le Khang. His senior U. S. advisor was Colonel Joshua W. Dorsey, III, who had commanded the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, in Vietnam in 1965–66. The Division located its command post in the Hue Citadel where it was joined by Brigade 147 which required re-fitting. Brigade 369 went into action near FSBNancy.

Elsewhere in South Vietnam the other two prongs of the NVA general offensive were making themselves felt. In the south, three NVA divisions came out of Cambodia along the axis of Route 13 and were stopped at An Loc. In the center, in mid-April, two NVA divisions launched themselves from Laos against the Central Highlands, moving south through Dak To toward Kontum.

The 3d ARVN Division, including Brigade 147 which had gone up to relieve Brigade 258, now occupied a rough line along the Cua Viet river and it held until 27 April when it broke under a fresh NVA attack. On 30 April, Brigade 147 was given the mission of covering the withdrawal of the 3d ARVN Division from Quang Tri city. Quang Tri city fell on 1 May. Brigade 369 took up a line along the My Chanh river which marks the boundary between Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. On 2 May, Brigade 147 moved through Brigade 369’s defensive positions and on into Hue to regroup. By 4 May, all of Quang Tri province was lost. By this time the 3d ARVN Division was no longer combat effective and was falling back, eventually to reform in Quang Nam province, moving into camps once occupied by the 1st Marine Division.

Brigade 258 was now moved into the My Chanh line west of Brigade 369’s positions. In addition to its own three brigades, the Vietnamese Marine Division now had operational control of the 1st Ranger Group and the 2d Airborne Brigade. These were all that stood between the North Vietnamese army and the northern approaches to Hue.

**U. S. Marine Support**

At sea, by the end of the first week in April, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade under Brigadier General Edward J. Miller, four battalion landing teams and two composite helicopter squadrons embarked in Seventh Fleet amphibious shipping, had taken station. No ground combat troops were to be landed. The Brigade was there to provide helicopter and amphibian tractor support to the embattled Vietnamese Marines.

On 6 April, MAG-15, commanded by Colonel Keith O’Keefe, was ordered to move with two F-4J squadrons to Da Nang. The Group arrived with VMFAS 115 and 232 began combat operations on 9 April. A third squadron, VMF-212, came in from Kaneohe on 14 April. Most of MAG-15’s sorties would be flown in Military Regions 1 and 2. VMA(AW)-244 with its Grumman A-6A Intruders was on board the USS Coral Sea (CVA-43) at Yankee Station, but most of its missions were being flown to Laos and North Vietnam.

For naval gunfire support, every available cruiser and destroyer in the Seventh Fleet took its turn on the line. ANGLICO teams were involved in all four military Regions but most were working in Military Region 1. MAG-12, under the command of Colonel Dean C. Macho, was alerted on 12 May to move with two of its A-4 squadrons, VMAS 211 and 311, to Bien Hoa airbase in Military Region 3. This was not a field from which Marine air had worked before. The move to Bien Hoa began on 16 May and first combat sorties were flown three days later. MAG-12 would concentrate its operations on the southern half of South Vietnam and along the Cambodian border while MAG-15, flying out of Da Nang, would concentrate on the northern half of the country and along the Laotian border. With few exceptions, all close air support missions were being controlled by airborne forward air controllers. It was estimated that half the enemy tanks destroyed and half his personnel casualties were the result of tactical air.

After taking Quang Tri province the enemy paused to regroup. Toward the end of May he resumed his drive against Hue, but was stopped along the line of

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\(^{22}\) Vietnamese Marine brigades take their designations from their original infantry battalions; thus, in the case of brigade 147, it would be the 1st, 4th, and 7th Battalions. However, as with U. S. Marine regiments, Vietnamese battalions are often moved in and out of the operational control of their parent brigade. For example, on 30 March, Brigade 147 had the 1st, 4th and 8th Infantry Battalions and the 2d Artillery Battalion.
the My Chanh by the determined defense of the Vietnamese Marines and Airborne troopers, and to the west of the city by the veteran 1st ARVN Division, all supported by great quantities of U.S. naval gunfire and tactical air. On 24 May, the Vietnamese moved north of the My Chanh with an amphibious assault by Brigade 147, landing at Wunder Beach, 16 kilometers from Quang Tri city, and sweeping south between the sea and Highway One.

Marine air support continued to expand. Task Force Delta was reactivated under Brigadier General Andrew W. O'Donnell, the Assistant Wing Commander of 1st MAW, and sent to northern Thailand to open an airfield at Nam Phong. First echelons of the Marine logistic support group and the 30th Naval Construction Regiment arrived there in mid-May. Nam Phong, 300 miles from Da Nang and about the same distance from Hanoi, had been begun five years earlier as a stand-by facility. Never completed, it offered a 10,000-foot runway, taxi strip, parking apron, six nose docks (which were being used as improvised barracks by the Thais), and not much else. The Marines promptly named it the "Rose Garden" in derisive reference to the current recruiting slogan,24 but the Seabees went to work in (temperatures of 110 degrees) and soon there were "Wonder-Arch" rocket shelters for the aircraft, a chapel, 300 strong-backed tents, and a mess hall which boasted better food than Da Nang.

VMFA-115 re-deployed from Da Nang to Nam Phong on 16 June and combat flight operations began the next day. MAG-15 headquarters and VMFA-232 followed on 20 June. VMFA-212 was detached to return to Kaneohe, but VMA(AW)-553 arrived at Nam Phong with its all-weather A-6s and flew its first combat mission on 24 June.

Something new was added in the way of sea-based tactical air on 20 June when a detachment from HMA-369 began operating its AH-1J Sea Cobras from the decks of the USS Denver (LPD-9) off the North Vietnamese coast. Prime targets for the Sea Cobras were the lighters being used to ferry cargo ashore from the ships anchored outside the minefields.

Counterattack

By 28 June, the South Vietnamese forces north of Hue were ready to begin their counteroffensive. A two-division attack jumped off, Airborne Division on the left flank, Marine Division on the right flank, next to the sea. The attack rammed its way back up Highway One and then slowed in the face of North Vietnamese determination to hold Quang Tri city and its Citadel. Twice during July the Saigon government announced, prematurely, the recapture of the provincial capital. The Airborne Division was relieved on 27 July and the burden of completing the fight for Quang Tri fell to the South Vietnamese Marines.

Then, southwest of Da Nang, a fresh NVA column came out of the mountains into Que Son valley (of bitter Marine Corps memory) and, on 19 August, the 5th Regiment, 2d ARVN Division, withdrew from Combat Base Ross and Que Son district headquarters. The North Vietnamese were eventually driven out of Ross and the town of Que Son, but the valley remained infested with their presence.

In the north, the Vietnamese Marines were literally up against the 15-foot walls of the 50-acre Citadel. As September began, Brigade 258 was on the Division's left front, Brigade 147 on the right; the brigades separated by the Vinh Dinh river. On 7 September, the 1st Ranger Group was moved into Brigade 147's positions, freeing 147 to attack Quang Tri from the northeast. The jump-off for the final assault came at 0500 on 9 September, six battalions from the two brigades in the attack. By 11 September, a platoon from 6th Battalion, Brigade 258, had found its way through a hole blasted by American jets in the south wall. The rest of the battalion followed and took the southeast quadrant of the fortress. Other Marines came over the north and east walls. By nightfall on the 15th the Citadel had been cleared and at noon on Saturday, 16 September, the red-striped yellow flag of the Republic of Vietnam went up over the ruined west gate.

As The Year Ended

As 1972 neared its end and as Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho continued their meetings in Paris, at least a state of equilibrium if not victory had been reached in South Vietnam: An Loc and Kontum had survived, the threat to Hue had been pushed back, and Quang Tri, the only provincial capital to fall to the North Vietnamese, had been recaptured.

Vietnam had been the longest and, in some of its dimensions, the biggest war in Marine Corps history. At its peak strength in 1968, III Marine Amphibious Force had had 85,755 Marines, more than a quarter of the Marine Corps and more Marines than were ashore at Iwo Jima or Okinawa. In World War II, our largest war, 19,733 Marines had been killed and 67,207 wounded. In Vietnam, from 1 January 1961 through 9 December 1972, enemy action had caused the death of 12,936 Marines—28.4% of the 45,915 U.S. killed or dead as the result of enemy action. Another 1,679 Marines had died of non-battle causes. Wounded in action total 88,589, of whom 51,389 required hospitali-
zation—33.5% of the 153,256 U.S. W1As hospitalized. Only 26 Marines were known to be prisoners—4.7% of the 554 known U.S. prisoners. Another 93 were MIA—8.0% of the 1,156 Americans missing in action. Fourteen more were simply "missing"—12.0% of the 117 Americans thus accounted for.

In turn, the Marines had taken 4,098 prisoners (judged bona fide enemy fighting men, not just detainees) and 22,879 weapons. Moreover, they claimed 86,535 enemy killed in the period from March 1965 to May 1971.

The Corps' peak strength during Vietnam was 317,400, far under the peak of 485,113 reached in World War II, but during the six years of Vietnam some 730,000 men and women served in the Corps as opposed to some 600,000 in World War II. The reason for the lower peak strength yet higher total number serving was, of course, that Vietnam was fought using peacetime personnel policies. A man was not held for the duration; he served his time and then was discharged. Marines served a 12- or 13-month tour in Vietnam and then came home. Some 9,000 to 10,000 replacements were needed each month in the Western Pacific. To keep this going, some 85,000 to 120,000 Marines entered and left the Marine Corps each year. It is estimated that nearly half a million Marines served in Vietnam itself.

Most of these Marines, as they went up the ship's gangplank or the aircraft's ramp on their way home, probably left Vietnam with a feeling that they and the Marine Corps had done the job assigned to them. Most may also have left with a feeling of cautious optimism insofar as the future of Vietnam was concerned. Few, however, would take exception to the judgment of Keyes Beech (himself a Marine Combat Correspondent in World War II) leaving Vietnam after ten years of reporting on the war:

"In closing I would like to offer a salute to that skinny little Viet Cong somewhere out there in the jungle shivering in the monsoon rains . . . . He is one hell of a fighting man."

Elliott W. Simonson
A COMPANY COMMANDER REFLECTS ON OPERATION HUE CITY

By Capt G. R. Christmas

The best lesson learned was that imagination and aggressiveness are the best weapons in a commander's arsenal.

Calmly smoking a cigar, the Skipper sits on a metal chair on the second floor hallway of the bullet-pocked headquarters of the newly recaptured ARVN armory. His platoons have just overrun a vast walled compound crammed with U.S. weapons and equipment for the South Vietnamese forces.

He reflects on his next objective: clearing out several blocks of tiled roof houses across the street and finding an American VIP.

The radio crackles. It is the leader of the 1st Platoon. The Skipper listens, then says: "You need more C-4 to breach walls? Can you go ahead without it? Okay, then go ahead. We'll try to get it up fast as possible."

Just then a stream of Vietnamese, mostly middle class citizenry by the look of their clothes, come out of a side street into the avenue the Marines are about to attack across.

The Skipper passes the word to guide them to the rear. Then a grimy Marine climbs a broken staircase, prodding a young tightlipped Vietnamese in ARVN uniform and wearing pajamas underneath.

"Is he VC or what?" asks the sniper sergeant. "You never know."

The order is given: "Treat him as a POW until we turn him over to battalion; let them handle it."

The Skipper checks his platoons by radio. "All ready," he says. "Okay, tiger, go get 'em."

Accompanied by the ear shattering explosions of C-4 breaching charges and a blast from a supporting Ontos, the Marine squads run quickly across the street; every man is hunched over, bulky as a football player in his armored vest, helmet, bandoliers, and pack.

There is no wild firing. The Marines blow holes in the whitewashed walls, then quickly move into the next yard. "It's a squad leader's war, this kind of fighting," says the captain, observing the scene from a window.

Adapted from a report by Peter Braestrup
The Washington Post, 12 Feb 1968
IT has been more than three years since I commanded H/2/5 during the seizure of the southern portion of the Hue City. As I reflect on those days, I realize I learned a great deal about house to house fighting, much of it through trial and error.

Hue is the ancient imperial capital of Vietnam and lies one hundred kilometers south of the 17th Parallel. It is the third largest city in South Vietnam. Hue is not built like a typical Oriental city. As a result of this, Gen Trong, Commanding the rest of the country commenced 24-36 hours earlier. The NVA did not miss the opportunity. This, of course, was ideal for the construction of fortified positions. The NVA did not miss the opportunity.

During the night of 30-31 January 1968, the enemy, mostly NVA troops, entered the city of Hue and the battle was begun. They took advantage of the Tet holidays, confident that the Allied defenses would surely be relaxed. One thing about the battle of Hue, however, was that it did not commence until the 31st of January, while the remainder of the enemy offensive throughout the rest of the country commenced 24-36 hours earlier. As a result of this, Gen Trong, Commanding General, 1st ARVN Division, had placed his forces on 100% alert. This precautionary act was instrumental in preventing the NVA from gaining control of the entire city.

The NVA used a total of about 10 battalions in the battle. These included the 4th and 6th Regiments, which had under their control, the 810th, 806th and 802nd Battalions on the northern side of the river; and the 804th, K4C and K4D Battalions on the southern side. In addition to these units, there were two sapper battalions, six local force companies, and several unidentified mortar battalions. Elements of other unidentified units also became involved in the subsequent action.

The enemy appeared to have two prime objectives—the MACV compound in the southern portion of the city and the 1st ARVN Division headquarters in the Citadel. By morning of 31 January, they had seized the entire city except for their two prime objectives. These objectives were never seized.

This account of the battle will consider only Marine Corps participation. However, it should be noted that the 1st ARVN Division and later the Vietnamese Marines fought extremely well within the Citadel and on the northern outskirts of the city. Their casualties reflect this—384 killed and 1,800 wounded.

On the 31st, elements from 2/5 (LtCol Ernest Cheatham) and 1/1 (LtCol Marcus Gravel) were sent to relieve pressure on the MACV compound located on the southern side of the Perfume River. The 1/1 command group accompanied them. The U.S. and ARVN plan of attack at this point was really a reaction operation. There did not seem to be any set plan, perhaps because so little information was really available at this time.

Marine units were tasked with a threefold mission:

(1) Destroy as many of the enemy as possible.
(2) Keep their own casualties to a minimum.
(3) Spare as much of the city from destruction as was humanly possible.

(Everyone understood the first two; but accomplishment of the third task seemed impossible.)

At about 0830 in the morning of the 31st, A/1/1 tried to reach the MACV compound. They met heavy resistance in the area of the An Cuu Bridge on Route One. About 1027, G/2/5 (Capt Chuck Meadows) and the 1/1 command group were ordered into the battle. They picked up Company A en route and arrived at the compound about 1445. At 1515, the senior advisor of the 1st ARVN Division met with LtCol Gravel and told him that everything at the Citadel was in good shape, but he was concerned about the safety of U.S. nationals. He wanted the Marines to assist in their evacuation. Company G started across the Perfume River on the bridge which led to the Citadel. Two platoons made it across under heavy fire, but it soon became obvious that we had no understanding of what the situation was at the Citadel—and there were a lot more bad guys in there than we anticipated from the initial report. At 2000, after nearly five hours of sustained fighting, G/2/5 was ordered to return across the bridge; and the two companies and command group spent the night around the MACV compound.

On 1 February, F/2/5 (Capt Mike Downs) reinforced the compound and was joined on 2 February by H/2/5. On 3 February, the command group of 2/5 arrived and clearance of the southern portion of the city was begun in earnest. During those two days, however, A/1/1 and G/2/5 had been fighting a holding action, waiting for the rest of the task group to arrive.

The axis of advance for 2/5 on 3 February was generally along Lei Loy Street which runs parallel to the Perfume River. It is my impression that the NVA expected the relieving forces would be
OPERATION HUE CITY

ARVN and would arrive in APC's with tanks; and move directly up Lei Loy to the Province Capitol building or the city jail. The way they set their defenses indicated this.

The defenses were set in strong points several blocks apart. The strong point was normally a three-story building, surrounded by a courtyard, with a stone fence. Snipers were placed in the upper stories (as well as throughout other buildings along the route of advance); automatic weapons in the lower floor. Spider holes surrounded the courtyard. Each spider hole had an NVA soldier equipped with both an AK-47 assault rifle and a B-40 rocket launcher. It was obvious that the enemy planned to cut off the relieving force at either end of the convoy after it had passed the first strong point unopposed. The task force would then be annihilated. Of course, the other streets on the southern side were also defended, usually with snipers and bunkers. The City Treasury, the battalion's first objective, was also heavily fortified. But the primary defenses appeared to be along Lei Loy Street.

When we advanced on the enemy by house to house fighting, we defeated the enemy tactics. Instead of walking into a trap, we gained the advantage of a coordinated attack—one unit covering for another.

By this time, the CO, 1st Marine Regiment (Col Hughes) had taken charge of all Marine units in the city.

1/5 (LtCol Thompson) entered the fight around the 11th of February. They passed through 2/5 and 1/1, who had secured most of the southern portion of the city and were beginning to operate across the Song Loi Nong. 2/5 and 1/1 continued clearing the entire southern side of the Perfume River, while 1/5 joined the fight to secure the vital Citadel walls.

Marine armor was left open to direct rocket and recoilless rifle fire on the long, straight streets of the Citadel as well as on the streets of the south-ern side. Their movement was completely canal-ized; and because enemy fire was from several blocks away, the close-in protection provided by the Marine companies had little deterrent effect. The thick, stone walls of the Citadel were ideal places for the enemy's automatic weapons.

Even the weather favored the NVA, since the overcast skies allowed no support by air during the first week of the battle. 1/5 slammed into the enemy on the northeast wall on the 14th and began to move, with the ARVN, toward seizure of the Citadel. (It is interesting to note that on the 16th the enemy commander was killed and his replacement immediately requested permission to withdraw. He was instructed to remain in place.)

On 21 February, the U.S. 1st Cavalry (Air Mobile) began operations northwest of the city and then took up blocking positions along the enemy's likely avenues of retreat. They were thus in perfect position when the remnants of the enemy began to flee. By 25 February the battle was over.

There is no doubt in my mind that the enemy had fully expected to hold Hue. His plans were spoiled for two basic reasons. First, he had expected the people to welcome him with open arms. They did not! Second, he didn't expect us to attack house to house and was too inflexible to cope with our tactics. "Charlie" lost a great battle, and he still feels the effects.

Let's consider some of the practical lessons learned by H/2/5. The first area of interest is the
A Marine of H/2/5 carries an old woman out of the danger zone.

use of supporting arms:

► Although the 3.5 rocket launcher and the LAAW are organic to the rifle company, they should be discussed here. We found the 3.5 was invaluable, and in most cases, better than the LAAW. It packed a much greater punch which enabled us to breach the many stone walls of the city. We didn’t have this success with the LAAW.

► In addition, we learned that when firing at a window with either weapon, it is better to hit just below the window rather than through it. This creates the desired shrapnel effect, instead of the round sailing through the room and not eliminating the man at the window.

► The 106mm recoilless rifle was our real workhorse. We found that in addition to its normal uses, it could be used to cover a force crossing a street because of the dust and smoke which the blast creates.

Too often, when we were about to attack across a street into the next building complex we found that the NVA occupied a flanking position several blocks away which provided accurate grazing fire down the street we were to cross. As previously indicated, 2/5 was composed of just three companies, leaving little flexibility of response and an exposed flank.

Well, the NVA has read our FM’s, so that when we “popped smoke” as cover to cross the street, they would open up. The tactics we developed was to use the back blast smoke of the 106 to cover and conceal our movement across the street. We did this by popping smoke to determine where the fire was coming from and, once this was done, moving a “mule-mounted” 106 partially into the street and firing a round toward the NVA position. This caused the NVA soldiers to pull down their heads and the lead element would cross the street concealed by the back blast smoke. Once a foothold was gained in the next block, fire could be directed from our new position to eliminate the NVA fire.

► Another weapon which proved invaluable was the mortar, both the 60mm and the 81mm. I realize that doctrine indicates that the mortar is generally not effective in built up areas; however, in Hue, this was not the case. We developed two tactics with our mortars that were extremely effective. The first one was a “willie peter screen.”

On several occasions we were called upon to cross the bridges over the Song Loi Nong. Usually these crossings were contested and several times units were forced back with heavy casualties because of the good fire that the NVA had on the bridges. What we developed was simply to register a white phosphorus round on the street about 200 meters across the bridge. After registering, we called for a concentration of WP followed by HE, and under this cover crossed the bridge. The WP concealed our movement, while the HE made “Charlie” pull in his head.

Another important use for our mortars was in attacking a building complex. Once we had gotten a foothold in a contested building, the enemy would flee out the rear windows and into the next block. This brought a tremendous control problem for us, because when a Marine sees an enemy soldier fleeing out the back he runs as fast as he
can to a rear window to shoot him. It looked like Keystone Cops. However, we learned that by pre-registering on both the objective and the street to the enemy's rear we could inflict heavy enemy casualties by shifting fire from the objective to the rear street as we assaulted.

As the book says, artillery is not too effective in a built-up area because it usually cannot be observed. However, we did use it effectively for harassing and interdicting enemy movement. Often, intelligence from refugees indicated a large concentration of enemy in a particular area or building complex such as the city's yacht club. In that case, H&I fires were directed there for two nights prior to our arrival with good results.

The second area of interest is our effective use of riot control agents—CS (tear gas and smoke). On 5 February, we came up against the heavily fortified Thau Thien Province Capital building. We were attacking from a hospital complex that we had seized the day before. The capital building was defended as a strong point such as I have previously described. We were receiving a heavy volume of fire not only from the building, but from a recoilless rifle located down the street. Our advance was completely canalized because of the nature of the hospital buildings and the fact that most of the private homes were surrounded by six-foot stone walls. To seize the capital building our lead elements would have to cross first an open street, and then 40-50 meters of open courtyard. Early in the day, we attempted to dislodge the enemy with CS from E-8 launchers. Although the fire from the capital building lessened, we were still receiving a heavy volume of fire from buildings down the street. We brought our supporting arms to bear and later, under the cover of CS from the E-8 launchers, we assaulted the building complex and seized it with only light casualties. The enemy fled the building and we found both weapons and gas masks that he had dropped. The CS and smoke that we used in the street provided excellent cover for our attacking unit.

We later found CS grenades very effective in clearing out enemy bunkers. Often, when a bunker was attacked, all fire would cease from it, but the enemy remained within, just stunned by our heavy volume of fire. Initially, we would toss a grenade into the bunker, but found that this did not always eliminate the defenders and the first Marine into the bunker often came eyeball to eyeball with a live enemy soldier. We then began
to toss in CS grenades and found it drove the enemy from the bunker, tears streaming from his eyes. This gave us prisoners, which our S-2 needed badly, and saved on our frag grenades which were in very short supply.

► As I have previously indicated, we used smoke (any color) initially as cover for crossing streets. We found, however, that the NVA had already laid their automatic weapons to provide grazing fire on the streets from positions a few blocks away. They simply fired into the smoke because they knew we used it as cover. Our reaction was to throw smoke grenades into the street to draw fire. We then pinpointed the fire and used our direct fire weapons to suppress their fire. We usually moved under the cover of the smoke and dust caused by the direct fire weapons.

The next area that comes to mind concerning lessons learned is control. Of all the problems you face when fighting in a built-up area, this is the greatest. You have seen the cartoon about fighting in built-up areas where one Marine charges in one door and a second Marine through another and have a shoot-out because of the lack of control. Well, this actually happens, and did happen in Hue.

► When your small unit leaders lose control, and you lose control, this type of thing occurs. You must have strict adherence to the principles of control and coordination between adjacent units. You must be able to decentralize this control down to the squad and fire team level. Additionally, your control efforts will be greatly hampered by your lack of visibility in a built-up area.

An interesting sidelight to the control problem is the map that we used in the southern portion of the city. It was an Esso road map, very similar to the type handed out in Washington, D.C. for use by tourists. One side pictured all the historical and government buildings, showing their shape and location with a number designation for each one. The map index, of course, listed the name, by number, of each building. This proved invaluable because the frontline company commanders, with the battalion commander monitoring, could tell exactly where each unit was located. Hotel Six could tell Fox Six that he was in building 68, while Fox Six could reply that he was in building 67; and everybody knew exactly where the other unit was located.

To assist control, we developed another procedure which worked very well. We found that the company command group was much too large to follow the company commander as he attempted to assess the situation of his forward units. With the addition of an extra PRC-25 radio, we established a CP Rear under the command of the Company Gunny (we had no company XO). The CP Forward consisted of the CO's two radio operators and a runner. This enabled the CO to move freely, but he maintained quick access to anyone of his supporting arms forward observers via the extra radio.

► Finally, a major problem area that we faced was that of refugees. There are three areas that should be considered when we discuss the control of civilians. First is the intelligence which can be gained from these refugees. Second is the interference of these folks when you are in the attack; and, finally, enemy infiltration within their ranks.

One evening during the battle we had held up about 1700 and were preparing night defensive positions. We were drawn up in a square perimeter, since we were slightly ahead of Company F on our left flank. A platoon from Company G had been attached to cover our right flank along the Perfume River. My first platoon was located on the forward edge of the square. The platoon commander called back and indicated that there were approximately five or six civilians across the street asking to pass through our lines: We knew that there was a heavy NVA concentration forward of us, somewhere on the right flank near the Yacht Club, which could partially observe our movements. However, the Company G platoon was in position and would be able to cover the flank. With this in mind, the order was given to have a squad cross the street and assist the civilians in moving through our lines. Just a few moments later "Hotel One" called back to revise his estimate to 25 civilians. "Fine, let's get them back." At this point, the enemy concentration in the Yacht Club began to take them under fire. Fortunately, the Company G platoon was in position to return fire and suppress that of the enemy. A few minutes later, I received another call from "Hotel One" again revising his estimate. Well, several hundred civilians later the building complex to our front was cleared of refugees.

There were five Americans within this group who, being quickly moved to the Company CP, gave us some valuable immediate information concerning "Charlie." From this information, we learned what was directly to our front. We only wish this had happened more often.

► From these same five Americans, we learned that within the hospital complex, which was in the axis of advance, the VC were throwing the patients out of bed and were taking their spots. I'm sure they expected to trap some unsuspecting Marines who would be required to search the wards as we moved through the hospital complex. Because of this information the troops from Company G who entered the hospital were fully aware of what to expect from some of the "patients."

These are just some of the lessons learned by my unit during the Battle of Hue. Perhaps the best lesson is that imagination and aggressiveness are the best weapons in our arsenal. The Marines who fought the battle used those weapons.
DEFEAT of the 320th

By MajGen R. C. Davis and 1stLt H. W. Brazier
In early August of 1968, North Vietnam's 320th Division was poised south of the Ben Hai River prepared to launch attacks into South Vietnam.

Opposing this force was the 3d Marine Division. It was not the first time that the two divisions had met on the battlefield.

Earlier, during April and May, the 320th Division had conducted two major operations in the flat terrain north of Dong Ha, both of which culminated in fierce battles in the Dai Do area. These operations had cost the enemy a total of 3800 killed from 29 April to 30 May.

Now, in August, a revised strategy was evident as the 320th deployed westward in an attempt to infiltrate south via the well-worn trails which interlace the area north of Route 9 between Cam Lo and the Rockpile.

The 3d Division, reacting quickly to this new NVA offensive, engaged each of the enemy regiments as the forward screening elements came into contact—the 64th Regiment north of Cam Lo; the 52nd Regiment west of the Rockpile, and, finally, the 48th Regiment north of the Rockpile.

Subsequent operations against the 320th NVA Division became among the most successful conducted in the I Corps Tactical Zone, and are indicative of the type of aggressive Marine operations conducted against the NVA in the Republic of Vietnam.

Encounters with the enemy were exploited to their fullest by the deep insertion of Marine forces supported by forward artillery fire support bases constructed atop key terrain features. Battalion-size units were helilifted into zones progressively further north, thereby blocking the exfiltration routes and causing the NVA regiments to segment into smaller groups and complicating effective command and control. Enemy lines of communication throughout were completely disrupted.

The 320th Division was defeated before it could strike civilian settlements or military bases in the 3d Marine Division area of operations. In addition to loss of personnel, the NVA lost extensive staging, transient and infiltration facilities as well as enormous stockpiles of munitions and supplies which had been pre-positioned for their use. These bold, aggressive operations by the 3d Marine Division, combined Marine ground and air units into a smooth working team which reacted quickly and decisively to inflict a bitter defeat upon the enemy.

During the early stages of the 320th Division's drive to the south, the 64th NVA Regiment anchored the Division's eastern flank attacking south via the Mutter's Ridge area with a three-part mission which included the interdiction of Route 9, the initiation of ambush and counter-sweep operations south of Route 9 as well as attacks upon the Cam Lo and Mai Loc resettlement areas.

The 52nd Regiment was deployed in a wide area extending from the Razorback area to the Nui Tia Pong Massif, thereby flanking Route 9 as it curved around the Marine Base at the Rockpile.

The 48th Regiment, last to enter the battle, was engaged in early September just northwest of the Razorback area when it reinforced elements of the 52nd Regiment just northwest of the Razorback area in early September.

The 3d Marines was the first unit to contact the
DEFEAT OF THE 320th

enemy. This regiment, conducting company size operations during early August north of the Cam Lo River, began to find enemy equipment and munitions cached in newly-constructed bunkers on the valley floor and northwest along the trace of the high ground. Then on 12 August, a North Vietnamese soldier rallied to Marines at Con Thien, a strongpoint north of Cam Lo, and informed the Marines that the 64th NVA Regiment was to attack south in two days along Mutter’s Ridge. This information was confirmed by aerial observer reports and other surveillance reports which indicated increased enemy activity in that area. On 12 and 13 August elements of the 3d Marines were rapidly deployed to meet that attack.

The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines attacked north from Cam Lo on the 12th and immediately encountered two companies from the 8th Battalion, 64th Regiment on Mount Kho Xa. Forty-three enemy soldiers were killed in the initial battle. The next day, August 13th, 1/3 made a helicopter assault on Mutter’s Ridge, attacking to the east, while the 3d Battalion, lifted from Camp Carroll, established a blocking position north of Hill 124. Thirty-seven more of the enemy were killed as they attempted to bring mortar fire upon the attacking Marines.

In a further effort to close the noose, 1/3 was moved by helicopter to a position northwest of the enemy.

With 1/3 containing the enemy movement north, 2/3 pushing from the south and 3/3 maintaining positions on the high ground to the northeast, the enemy unit could only turn east or west. A move east by the NVA was discouraged by the rolling, open terrain in this direction which afforded little cover or concealment. Finally, artillery batteries located at Thon Son Lam, Camp Carroll, C-2, and the Cam Lo District Headquarters sealed off the enemy’s east-west routes of egress with massive fires.

At this point, the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, observing that 1/3’s assault had split the 64th Regiment, committed the 9th Marines in a further effort to block the enemy’s attempts to reinforce and to cut off his line of retreat.

9th Marines Join the Battle

The 9th Marines joined the battle on the morning of 17 August, with two battalions, 1/9 and 3/9, committed by helicopter. The 1st Battalion landed southwest of Con Thien and, with Company “A,” 3d Tanks in direct support, launched an attack to the west. Driving elements of the 64th Regiment before it, this battalion uncovered and destroyed 120 enemy bunkers containing NVA equipment and supplies. By August 19th, the 1st Battalion was rapidly closing with the 3d Battalion which was in position on high ground 2000 meters north of Mutter’s Ridge. Two companies of the 7th Battalion, 64th NVA Regiment were in the middle. It remained only for the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines to spring the trap. A total of 44 enemy were killed in the process.

While the 9th Marines were fighting to the north, the 3d Marines on Mutter’s Ridge were finding large numbers of North Vietnamese Army packs hidden along trails leading south. These packs contained personal effects, rice, and 82mm mortar rounds. Other fresh signs of enemy activity included recently constructed bunkers, ammunition caches, and new mortar positions. 1/3 made contact with an estimated platoon of the enemy on the 18th and UH-1E gunships peppered enemy units fleeing north from this contact. Twelve fresh graves were found the next day. As 1/3 moved down the southern slopes of Mutter’s Ridge, numerous new platoon and company size bunker complexes were found, each complex leading to a more sophisticated one farther south along the slopes.

The most significant finds were a storage area for an enemy supply battalion and what appeared to be a regimental command post. The supply cache included over 1500 82mm mortar rounds, 119 RPG rounds, 15,000 AK-47 rounds, and 1600 rounds of 12.7 ammunition. The complex contained messhalls, kitchens, and 60 and 82mm mortar pits. A Chinese field phone communications system and extensive ammunition storage bunkers were also found. Four hundred pounds of captured TNT were required to destroy the ammunition and the bunkers.

While 1/3 was clearing out Mutter’s Ridge, 2/3 was operating south against frequent, sharp contacts with small units of the 64th Regiment. Then, on the 19th, 3/3 was lifted to a position north of the Razorback, with two companies positioned on either side of the Cam Lo River. The 3d Battalion was supported at this time by artillery located at Camp Carroll and Thon Son Lam.

With 3/3 in place, 1/3 advanced down Mutter’s Ridge and proceeded west along Helicopter Valley toward 5/3, destroying rocket sites, antiaircraft positions, ammunition, and living bunkers along
DEFEAT OF THE 320th

the route. As their searches were completed, both 1/3 and 2/3 were refurbished at Thon Son Lam and Camp Carroll before deploying on 3 September to halt a reinforcing thrust by the 52nd NVA Regiment north and northwest of the Razorback. 9th Marine units also completed their search to the north and returned to Vandegrift Combat Base.

The Battle Shifts Westward

During the latter part of August, the enemy fired 150mm artillery and 122mm rockets at Thon Son Lam and Camp Carroll as suppressive fire while attempting to maneuver and attack Marine positions north of Route 9.

On 26 August, 1/9 and 2/9 were inserted west of 3/3's position near the Razorback, as intelligence from a variety of sources indicated that the enemy was moving in the west. The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was lifted into the Giang Thoang Valley southwest of the Rockpile as 2/9 was inserted into the next valley to the north; both units immediately drove up the ridges to establish positions on the high ground. The 1st Battalion's landing was unopposed, but 2/9 met stiff resistance and one CH-46 helicopter was shot down in the landing zone. Marine gunships fired suppressive fires to enable the Marines to land and secure the zone. The 2d Battalion initially focused its attention on the low ground, but few contacts were made and no significant caches were found. It was later, on the higher ground, that major caches were discovered.

Exploitation

September brought exploitation of those Marine attacks which had been initiated in late August to the north and west of Thon Son Lam. The 320th NVA Division was routed, and enormous stockpiles of enemy food, weapons and munitions were captured. The Marine success was attributed in large measure to the teamwork between ground, air and artillery units with a major contribution being the introduction of artillery fire support bases. These bases were arranged so as to make possible the insertion of infantry units progressively further northward without sacrificing artillery support, and they proved to be the key to the entire scheme of maneuver.

Fire Support Bases

The fire support base concept has been one of the most significant developments to evolve from the fighting in the mountainous I Corps Tactical Zone. In the main, artillery fire support bases had previously been tied to locations near roads which facilitated both construction and resupply. Since June 1968 however, the mobility of the Marine Corps Air-Ground Team has been exploited more fully, and artillery fire support bases have been almost exclusively established on forward hill positions from which they more effectively support maneuver units.

A fire support base is essentially a forward artillery position located atop a key terrain feature which can be defended by a minimum of infantry personnel. Normally, an infantry battalion CP also occupies the base as Marine rifle companies operate under the protective fan of the artillery. These fire bases are constructed approximately 8000 meters apart which provides for an overshoot of approximately 3000 meters in order to cover the enemy mortar belt around such bases. The fire support bases provided mutually supporting fires as well as overlapping artillery support covering all helicopter landing zones and infantry positions within the fans.

A key gain in this concept was that it was necessary to occupy and hold only those fire bases which met current tactical needs. Fire bases were displaced to keep pace with the maneuver units being supported. With these mutually supporting fire bases, for example, it was possible to move "leap-frog" fashion over great distances in mountainous terrain with no break in artillery support.

Before establishing the fire support base, the ground commander made a helicopter reconnaissance of the proposed site with the artillery liaison officer, the engineer commander, the air officer, a representative from the Helicopter Support Team, (the individuals who will direct the air traffic at the landing zone) and a representative from the helicopter group which was to provide the lift. Each major helicopter assault, during the operations described, was preceded by extensive reconnaissance and scouting by an Army Air Cavalry Troop.

Intensive artillery fires and airstrikes were directed at the proposed landing zone, both to discourage the enemy and to remove obstacles from the landing zone. In the event that a zone was not sufficiently cleared, a reconnaissance team accompanied by an engineer unit was inserted (utilizing a smaller helicopter) to enlarge the zone. Each zone was required to accommodate at least one CH-46 assault helicopter.

Following the initial assault, the engineers and the assigned security force continued to clear the area providing room for the artillery pieces, a COC bunker, a FDC bunker, as well as ammunition bunkers. Helicopter-transportable tractors, M450 or M58 and at times a back hoe, were available to be lifted into the site to assist in digging and backfilling.

Close coordination and planning by the ground commander and the air, artillery, and engineer liaison personnel ensured that the fire base was
constructed as quickly as possible, that it was properly defended, that it met basic artillery requirements, and that it could be efficiently resupplied by helicopter. When construction was completed by the engineer and security troops the artillery pieces were brought in by helicopter and the fire support base activated.

During Marine operations against the 320th NVA Division (15 August-26 October) a total of 10 new artillery fire support bases were utilized. These bases ranged in description from FSB Sandy, a needle-point pinnacle located west of the Rockpile atop Dong Ke Soc Mountain employing one battery of 105mm howitzers to FSB Winchester north of Sandy which was occupied by two batteries of 105mm howitzers and a platoon of 155mm howitzers. Reinforcing fires were brought to bear from FSB Pete (near the Rockpile) by 8" howitzers which had been moved into position by road, fording two rivers in the process.

The Enemy is Outmaneuvered

The establishment of these fire support bases enabled Marine units to mount a series of leapfrog-type offensive operations extending into the DMZ which unhinged the 320th Division from its huge stockpiles of supplies and destroyed enemy combat elements. At the same time, a minimum of Marine casualties were sustained.

With 3/3 in heavy contact north of the Razorback against enemy units of the 52nd NVA Regiment, 1/3 was inserted to the north on Mutter's Ridge. 2/3 was inserted to secure the high ground west of 1/3.

The 48th NVA Regiment appeared at this time northwest of the Rockpile to reinforce the scattered elements of the 52nd Regiment. 1/3 fought a series of sharp engagements along Mutter's Ridge (8-11 September) killing 48 enemy soldiers.

To the southwest 2/9 turned its attention to two peaks, Nui Tia Pong and Nui Ba Lao, and uncovered the first of several caches which the enemy had staged on ridgelines progressively farther south. 2/3 uncovered over 55,000 pounds of rice, 11,000 pounds of salt, 4,000 pounds of TNT, 3,400 82mm mortar rounds, and 390,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition while killing 106 of the enemy.

3/9 assaulted the ridgeline to the north of 2/9 against heavy contact initially before attacking west. This drive killed 209 enemy soldiers and uncovered one of the largest enemy caches of the Vietnam war. The enemy employed delaying tactics, utilizing the DH-10 claymore mine and mortar fire, but was forced to abandon tons of supplies to the advancing Marines. 3/9 also found what appeared to be a regimental supply area located along a high narrow ridge. This cache included over 10,000 82mm mortar rounds; 13,000 Chinese Communist hand grenades; plus 8,000 anti-personnel mines and hundreds of 122mm, 140mm, and 107mm rockets.

9th Marines Move Forward

A key fire support base named Winchester was developed at this time and the 9th Marines Regimental CP displaced to it on 16 September. From this position, Colonel Robert H. Barrow, Commanding Officer, 9th Marines, directed six battalions (including 1/4, 2/26, 2/3) during the critical phase of operations against the 320th Division. Commanding General, Task Force Hotel (Brigadier General William C. Chip followed by Brigadier General Frank E. Garretson), exercised operational control of the 3d and 9th Marines from Vandegrift Combat Base.

The Special Landing Force, 2/26, was inserted north of FSB Winchester 16 September and suffered severely from a heavy volume of mortar fire as they pushed north. 2/9 and 3/9, engaging the enemy to the west, continued to uncover significant caches, while units from 3d Marines continued in heavy contact north of the Razorback. 3/3 pushed north in the valley floor killing 37 of the
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enemy as 1/3, on Mutter's Ridge, accounted for 76 additional enemy soldiers. 2/3 driving north in conjunction with 2/26, added to the enemy's losses by killing 42 NVA soldiers northwest of Hill 461 on September 19th.

The combined firepower of Marine ground, air, and artillery units was brought against the enemy. A total of 10 B-52 strikes, each dropping 150 tons of ordnance preceded the Marine assault into the Western Nwi Tia Pang area. These strikes combined destructive power with a tremendous shock effect which often caused the enemy to lose command and control at a critical time, thereby reducing his ability to respond effectively to the Marine assault.

The enemy's continued use of delaying tactics (very limited objective attacks, small unit ambushes employing claymore mines, harassing mortar fire) indicated that the 320th Division was attempting to gain time in order to escape north. The Division had been broken into a number of smaller units, each of these units working independently while attempting to return north of the DMZ. It was apparent that the situation was ripe for the lift of two battalions into the DMZ to trap as many of these scattered units as possible.

On 16 September three B-52 strikes were employed to prepare the DMZ for the insertion. On 17 September, six more bombing strikes were scheduled. Following the second series of strikes, 1/9 and 1/4 were inserted into the DMZ near the banks of the Ben Hai River. 1/4 landed in a quiet zone, but 1/9 made light contact. Both battalions immediately attacked south toward 2/26 and 2/3.

Helicopters contributed to the attack by transporting 2,080 Marines and 322 tons of equipment and supplies to 21 different landing zones throughout the area of operation.

Pushing south, 1/9 and 1/4 captured five prisoners who confirmed that their units were moving north, attempting to reach North Vietnam. They further indicated that their units were plagued by low morale as well as a severe food shortage. One of the prisoners reported that his unit had been seriously hurt by a B-52 strike.

Continuing south, both 1/9 and 1/4 engaged small groups of the enemy with 1/9 finding mass graves containing over 168 enemy soldiers (attesting to the effectiveness of air and artillery support); 1/4 found large stores of arms and ammunition including 320 Soviet-made Mosin Nagant rifles, over 30,000 rounds of .50 cal. ammunition and 26 122mm rocket warheads. Further south their finds included over 305,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 3,000 pounds of TNT, and over 5,000 pounds of rice.

By the 23rd of September, there were indications that the enemy forces, reversing their movement, were attempting to extricate themselves by moving to the east and west. In order to increase the pressure against these forces and destroy them, 1/9 and 1/4 shifted the direction of attack with 1/9 driving west while 1/4 pushed east. This maneuver was coupled with an attack on 26 September from Con Thien by the U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry and by two ARVN battalions driving west from C-2. 1/3 attacked east along Mutter's Ridge toward the advancing ARVN battalions as 2/3 and 2/26 attacked north.

Operations west of the Rockpile by 2/9 and 3/9 ended late in September and these units returned to Vandegrift Combat Base to prepare for upcoming operations.

In expanding operations in the DMZ during October, the Marines were to uncover a newly-built NVA road, underwater bridges crossing the Ben Hai River, and the first 152mm artillery positions ever found south of the Ben Hai River.

On 1 October, 2/26 replaced 1/4 in the DMZ, and 1/4 was withdrawn to prepare for operations near Khe Sanh. 2/3 was inserted into the DMZ west of 1/9, and continued to search 8,000 meters to the west establishing another artillery fire support base just south of the DMZ. 1/9 was soon to follow its sister battalions to Vandegrift. 2/26, the Special Landing Force, with its recent training in employment in an amphibious role applied certain of these techniques in their DMZ attack of 1 October.

Amphibious Techniques

The assault of 2/26 along the Ben Hai River is typical of Marine operations in Vietnam and shows clearly Marine Corps' continued employment of amphibious techniques.

The Division requested the return of the Battleship New Jersey which supported an attack by 2/26 in the DMZ on 4 October by firing her 16-inch guns into enemy bunkers 1,000 meters to the front of the advancing Marines. The 16-inch gun, especially effective against "hard targets" (bunkers, weapons positions) which are found both in the DMZ and to the north, was the only naval gun available with adequate range. New Jersey's support was utilized just as is naval gunfire support in an amphibious assault.

During the final efforts against the 320th Division, it was discovered that the NVA had constructed a road, 1022 South, which generally followed the trace of the Ben Hai River before cutting south and reaching within 2,000 meters of the southern boundary of the DMZ. It appears to have been built entirely by manual labor with logs placed on the road to provide better traction for vehicles. Base camps including thatched huts, underground bunkers, and kitchen facilities were located along the road and were ringed with fighting positions. TNT caches were established in the area for use in road construction. While
Helicopters use good weather to accomplish critical re-supply.

building the road, the North Vietnamese left as many trees standing as possible to conceal the road from aerial observation.

Initially, 2/26 attacked along the road destroying all enemy structures as they searched for the North Vietnamese who had apparently fled. They soon found signs indicating the use of tracked vehicles and one night 2/26 reported hearing heavy engine noises to the north.

On 4 October, 2/26 found two 152mm artillery positions 1,600 meters south of the Ben Hai River and captured a total of 200 rounds of 152mm ammunition. Northeast of the 152mm positions were two 85mm howitzer positions with accompanying anti-aircraft guns. The gun positions were oriented in such a way that one gun fired toward Thon Son Lam while the other fired toward Cam Lo. These artillery positions, which were solidly constructed so as to afford protection from anything but a direct hit, were the first such found within the DMZ. The depth of the gun pits was seven feet and the two 8-foot wide entrances were oblique at a 30 degree angle. An underground bunker was located outboard of the gun pit and afforded protection for the gun crew. Opposite the crew bunker was a small ammunition storage area with a capacity for 8-10 rounds. The artillery positions and the road indicated the extent to which the 320th Division had committed its forces to support the attack into South Vietnam.

2/26 continued to attack east along Route 1022 with high hopes that they might locate the artillery pieces themselves. On 6 October they found a Soviet-made tracked vehicle which had been destroyed by an airstrike. This vehicle was a prime mover and capable of towing a 152mm artillery piece. On 12 October, 2/26 found another vehicle, this one a Soviet-made Medium Tracked Artillery Tractor ATS-59. 2/26 continued along Route 1022 until 16 October when it became necessary to return aboard ship as the Special Landing Force. 1/3 was inserted in place of 2/26 and soon found a third 152mm artillery position on 17 October further north. They discovered an additional 250 152mm rounds and 55 85mm rounds which brought the total of 152mm rounds destroyed to over 450. 1/3 also found a vacated truck park and additional support camps which they destroyed. The North Vietnamese road continued to the Ben Hai River crossing the river at three different locations. The enemy had built up shallow fording areas with rock, hence utilizing "underwater bridges" for their vehicular traffic. The effectiveness of these crossings was proven as the Marines threatened to overrun the gun positions. Tractors were heard withdrawing the guns, and they were successful in spite of an all-out artillery and air assault designed to block their removal. 1/3 labored for many days to make the enemy road more visible by blasting many holes in the canopy cover and to create blocks by felling large trees over it throughout its length.

By 26 October, all Marine units were out of the DMZ and the series of successful Marine operations against the 320th Division which had begun in August were terminated. The 320th Division had failed for the third time since April to achieve a significant victory over elements of the 3d Marine Division and was again decisively defeated. The enemy losses for the period 15 August-26 October include 1,585 enemy killed with Marines capturing 696 individual weapons and 35 crew-served weapons. The enemy lost huge stockpiles of food, munitions, weapons, and rockets as Marines found their caches in the mountains and destroyed them. Supporting arms destroyed additional amounts of munitions as evidenced by the large secondary explosions which were frequently observed. Marine casualties by comparison, were 182 killed in two months of heavy combat operations.

All elements of the 320th Division had retreated to the north by late October and the 3d Marine Division turned its efforts toward an expanding pacification program in a number of Vietnamese communities.

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned as the campaign progressed were numerous and resulted in the implementation of certain tactics and newly developed techniques which greatly increased the effectiveness of Marine operations. Enemy capabilities, of course, also influenced Marine tactics to a substantial degree. It was soon apparent that earlier defeats had weakened the 320th Division infantry units to such an extent that they appeared no longer capable of systematic coordinated attacks such as those the Marines had faced previously. This offered many opportunities for increased boldness in the employment of Marine infantry. Battalions were moved by helicopter out to the limit of artillery range. Rifle companies were separately inserted at distances of three to four kilometers

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from other rifle companies. In short, supporting distance between adjacent units of rifle company size or larger was limited only by the range of light artillery coverage, normally 8,000 meters. These tactics permitted the rapid blanketing of the entire battle area with rifle companies.

Experience had indicated that enemy forces rely very heavily on prepared trail networks and established way stations and supply caches for their mobility. These way stations and cache sites were generally located one night's march apart. The enemy porters apparently carry supplies at night and hide in way station bunkers during the day before returning for another load. By keeping Marines astride these trails, searching them out very carefully, locating and destroying all the enemy supplies, necessary ingredients in the enemy campaign are eliminated.

When searching for these caches and way stations each rifle company was normally expected to operate in and search out an area about two kilometers on a side. Once the search is completed and necessary landing zones prepared for resupply and medevac, the company is lifted to another area to again sweep and search. A company would seize a high knob along a prominent ridgeline, prepare an LZ, and search out the fingers leading down from the high point. While this was being accomplished another company moved through and seized the next high knob and again proceeded to cut LZ's and search out the fingers. As companies in turn passed through along the ridgeline the entire area was soon systematically prepared and searched. One company generally remains behind to secure the area surrounding the fire support base and the battalion CP.

Major improvements were made in the techniques for cutting landing zones in heavy triple canopy. Experiments with heavy bombardment utilizing a number of experimental devices which would blast or burn holes in the canopy proved to be helpful but not fully effective. The only proven, reliable technique is to blast a hole large enough to insert Marines equipped with demolitions, chain saws and other engineering equipment and to systematically employ engineer and security teams until a zone is cleared.

Precise selection of the sites for LZ's is most important. On occasion, the preparatory aerial bombardment was off target sufficiently to cause false starts in LZ preparation. This was a main shortcoming of air-delivered ordnance. When an artillery battery is to be emplaced on a tiny pinnacle a CEP of 50-100 meters will not suffice. Too often troops are required to cut into the canopy and then carry their demolitions and equipment up to the point where the artillery must be inserted. A more precise ordnance delivery system is needed.

Once on the ground, engineers and security troops use demolitions to fell large trees, then use chain saws and axes to clear the area sufficiently to lower lightweight bulldozers and backhoes. Within two hours these machines can prepare the artillery positions adequately for insertion of the guns.

The towed 155mm howitzer is essential to the success of an operation in heavy canopy and against extensive bunker systems. Medium artillery reinforced with 8-inch artillery can get the job done where the 105's fail to penetrate. Army CH-54 heavy lift helicopters were utilized on the average of 15 days per month to move medium artillery and heavy tractors into and out of fire support bases and to salvage downed aircraft.

Another important key to success has been Vandegrift Combat Base where supplies for two regiments are maintained, separated helicopter refueling stations are operated, helicopter gunships are re-armed and a sophisticated TACLOG type helicopter resupply function is performed. Task Force Hotel supplies the command and control needed to insure effective over-all operations. Vandegrift's very location insures a short turn around for resupply helicopters and coupled with highly effective techniques and operations have made it possible to support nine infantry battalions and nine artillery batteries in the hills with a helicopter fleet designed for half this number of units in an amphibious operation. The enemy recognized the importance of Vandegrift Combat Base when he attempted to move heavy artillery within range of the base over his newly cut road below the DMZ.

Foul weather does not pose an insurmountable problem to resupply efforts. Helicopters are maintained in a high state of readiness and can take advantage of the frequent breaks in the weather to accomplish critical resupply and evacuation and are immediately responsive to emergency calls. Marines carry long range patrol rations for emergency use when the weather forecloses extensive helicopter operations over a number of days. When bad weather is predicted, ammunition and other supplies are surged forward to fire bases and operating companies. At times, companies not in contact are fixed in position near their supplies, further reducing resupply problems. It has been noted that the enemy's activities are curtailed during heavy rain storms and therefore pose no serious threat to Marine operations during these times.

High mobility operations are here to stay. They are just as applicable to amphibious operations as to operations ashore. While utilizing this improved capability, amphibious forces can select the most rugged terrain for inserting landing forces ashore, thereby multiplying enemy efforts at defense.
DEWEY CANYON:
ALL WEATHER CLASSIC

By 1stLt Gordon M. Davis

In this instance Marine Corps forces in Vietnam return to the conventional regiment-in-the-attack, with infantry battalions on line.

This article was written and edited by 1stLt Gordon M. Davis in conjunction with and with the advice of the major commanders involved in the operation: Col R. H. Barrow, CO 9th Marines; LtCol G. W. Smith, CO 1/9; LtCol G. C. Fox, CO 2/9; LtCol E. R. Laine, CO 3/9; and LtCol J. Scoppa, Jr., CO 2/12. While this article was contributed to in no small manner by many people, it is primarily an individual effort. For this reason, although the narrative is history, some of the editorial comment and lessons learned are in dispute as to their import and interpretation, not to mention their validity. In this respect, only the author is answerable.

The officers who contributed to this article have designated their share of any proceeds to go to the Bruno Hochmuth Scholarship.
Lt. Davis reported to K/3/9 in Sept '68 participating in three operations as a rifle PltLdr. He was wounded twice. Honor man of 45th OCS, he graduated TBS in Apr '68, and attended Vietnamese LangScol and the Army Civil Affairs Scol prior to going to WesPac.

**VEN** initially, Operation DEWEY CANYON differed from most of the 3rd Marine Division's more recent operations. As usual, it involved the use of mobile Marine Corps forces against sizable enemy resistance, the deployment of maneuver battalions under protective artillery fans from fire support bases, and rifle companies operating independently in extended saturation sweeps and patrolling. But the operation emerged as a conventional regiment-in-the-attack with all three infantry battalions on line.

**DEWEY CANYON** took place along the Laotian border, 35 miles west of Hue and 50 miles south of its principal support facility at Vandegrift Combat Base. The northwest monsoon season was in its final month. Although there was no significant
rainfall, there was continual cloud cover for periods of as long as 11 days, during which normal resupply and evacuation procedures by helicopter were impossible. During the operation, therefore, numerous problems arose which spelled potential disaster. The way they were handled, the concepts that were revised and the ones that were developed to meet these challenges form a part of this article.

The area of operations was generally mountainous and jungle-covered with complex terrain compartments. It formed a large bowl. A few kilometers south was the A Shau Valley. Where the Da Krong River commenced its flow north, the A Shau opened to the south. Between these two valleys, dominating the area, was a large hill mass, Hill 1228 or Tiger Mountain. At this point Route 922 entered the A Shau Valley from Laos. On the Laos-Vietnam border to the west, Co Ka Leuye, a 1,400-meter razorback ridge, dominated the western portion of the AO. The area had never been entered by major allied forces.

Early in January, 1969, several factors sparked an interest in the area. The NVA reopened Route 922 into the A Shau after many months of disuse. Anti-aircraft units increased activity along the road network both in Laos and the A Shau Valley. High performance aircraft received fire; an A-6 was lost; helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft were being fired at with 12.7mm, 25mm and 37mm weapons. Traffic on the road in Laos doubled during a short period—at times more than 1,000 trucks a day were sighted. Enemy forces displayed their presence by the network of heavily used trails and by small arms fire against our reconnaissance efforts. Sophisticated wire communication nets were sighted. Agent reports and other sources indicated the probable movement of enemy forces back into the Da Krong River area, possibly for commitment into the mountains west of Hue and southwest of Quang Tri. From there, the enemy could attack populated areas as far south as Da Nang with speed and surprise. The primary purpose of Operation DEWEY CANYON, then, was to deny the enemy access into the critical populated areas of the coastal lowlands. The emphasis was not simply to kill the enemy and capture or destroy his equipment, but also to interdict his access route.

Route 922 enters RVN from Laos, then becomes Route 548 and runs into the A Shau as one of the enemy's main supply routes in I Corps. It is easily visible from the air, although some of its off-shoot roads and trails are well camouflaged. Extensive facilities for receiving and distributing supplies and personnel coming into the country were located along this road network. Allied presence in the area from late January until mid-March meant that for seven weeks enemy resupply and infiltration was blocked. Resumption of these activities would require a prolonged major effort after the 9th Marines' departure. Facilities destroyed during Operation DEWEY CANYON included underground garages, command posts, supply distribution centers, subterranean supply storage areas, artillery sites, billeting areas and engineer equipment. The operation seriously hurt the enemy both in facilities and personnel destroyed and in disrupting his logistic effort. Due to the strategic importance of Route 922 to the enemy's war effort, the impact of the operation will be felt from Quang Tri to Da Nang.

A Tactical Entity

The success of the operation was rooted in two factors. The first had to do with unit integrity. In early July, 1968, the Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division, realigned the battalions and...
regiments of the division to restore unit integrity. From then until Dewey Canyon, battalions were serving under their parent regimental headquarters. Although battalions were occasionally placed under operational control of other regiments for short periods, the three battalions of the 9th Marines were almost continually a part of the regiment for nearly eight months. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, had been the direct support artillery battalion for the 9th Marines during its entire period. This developed the unit cohesiveness so essential to successful combat operations, and increased the sense of unit pride and esprit. It created a great common understanding of the regiment’s problems and personalities. Commanders and staffs came to know each other and attained solid rapport.

The second factor that had an impact on the operation began when the 9th Marines launched Operation Lancaster July in the mountains northwest of Con Thien. For eight months the regiment had spent its entire time in the mountains and thick jungle canopy of western Quang Tri Province, acquiring experience in the tactics and techniques necessary to conduct successful operations in this kind of inhospitable environment. Experience taught how to live in jungle mountains, how to build LZs, the best spot for a fire support base (FSB), a unit’s limitations and capabilities, and the effects of weather. The experience paid off during Operation Dewey Canyon.

The operation was divided into three fairly distinct phases. Phase I consisted essentially of getting the regiment into the AO and establishing FSBs to support the scheme of maneuver. Phase II consisted largely of patrolling around the FSBs to “clean up our back yard” prior to launching into the hard target area. Later in Phase II forces were aligned to jump off into the critical phase III. Phase III was visualized as a three-battalion, regimental offensive operation conducted more or less conventionally. At this critical point the operation departed from the high mobility concept. Heavy AA defenses in the hard target area influenced the CO 9th Marines against risking a heavy loss of helicopters and troops with a heliborne assault into the area. He chose to make the final move overland, securing the ground and permitting helicopter resupply and support activities to continue from north to south over ground that had already been cleared by infantry. As a result, only one helicopter was lost during Phase III.

**Phase I**

Phase I dealt with getting the forces established in the area. On 19 January, FSB Henderson, about eight kilometers southeast of Ca Lu, was reopened in conjunction with a brief operation in the Ba Long Valley around Henderson. Commencing 20 January, FSB Shiloh and FSB Tun Tavern, used by the 9th Marines in earlier operations, were reopened. On the 22nd, 2/9 conducted a heliborne assault into the northern part of the Dewey Canyon AO. Its purpose was to open FSB Razor approximately eight kilometers southwest of Shiloh and in an area near the Da Krong River in the western part of the AO. Except for scattered small arms fire the landing was unopposed, and work on FSB Razor began immediately. Razor was similar to the other 16 FSBs constructed by the 9th Marines team of infantry, artillery and engineers during their period of mountain warfare but was technically more difficult than most. Trees measuring three to four feet in diameter had to be cleared. The slope on one side was gentle and not easily cleared. Dozers were brought in by helicopter to clear the area and to build gun pits and ammunition berms. Work started on the 22nd and 2/12 displaced Battery “F” into FSB Razor on the 23rd. Also on the 23rd, the regimental CP displaced into Razor, its 13th displacement in eight months of operations in the mountains. A minimum of facilities was taken along, and the move was smoothly executed. Control of the FDC and FSCC was passed from a position in a rear area to Razor at one time, and without a shut-down, 2/12 CP displaced to Razor on the 24th without losing continuity or centralized fire control. On the same day, 3/9 conducted a heliborne landing approximately eight kilometers south-southeast of Razor to construct FSB Cunningham and to conduct saturation patrolling in the area. This area had been cleared in large measure by aviation ordinance. The move was uneventful. The next day 2/12 displaced Battery “D” and Mortar Battery into Cunningham, completing Phase I.

"Dewey Canyon deserves some space in American military history by sole reason of audacity, guts and magnificent inter-service team play. A Marine regiment of extraordinary cohesion, skill in mountain warfare, and plain heart made Dewey Canyon a resounding success. As an independent regimental operation, projected 50 kilometers airline from the nearest base and sustained in combat for seven weeks, it may be unparalleled. Without question, the Ninth Marines' performance represents the very essence of professionalism."

LtGen Richard G. Stilwell, USA CG, XXIV Corps, Vietnam
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As the operation progressed, Cunningham became its center. From an artillery standpoint it was ideally located. It was almost dead center in the critical part of the AO and its 11 kilometer fan extended south and southwest almost to the limit of the AO. For this reason, and as the battalions launched their attack south, both the 9th Marines CP and 2/12 CP/FDC displaced to Cunningham. During the operation as many as five artillery batteries—two 105mm, two 155mm and the 4.2-inch mortars—were firing from Cunningham at one time.

Phase II

Phase II commenced on the 24th and 25th as 2/9 and 3/9 cast out their companies 2000-3000 meters apart in the entire DEWEY CANYON AO north of the east-west axis of the Da Krong River. Enemy encountered in this area were screening elements for forces farther south in the hard target area along Route 922. They were trained guides, porters, and troops who kept the lines of communication open. On the 25th, M/3/9 found a four-strand telephone line which ran from Laos into Base Area 101 south of Quang Tri. The lines were strung between tree-mounted insulators. Branches were cleared for the wires, but overhead concealment was maintained so the line was invisible from the air. Part of the enemy elements evidently were devoted to keeping this phone line open. In any case, the enemy in the Phase II area worked in small bands, many of them living off the land.

Another significant find was Field Hospital 88 near the Da Krong River. It contained a fine, large assortment of Russian-made stainless steel surgical instruments, medicine and facilities typical to a permanent hospital. The twofold purpose of Phase II was to clear the area around FSBs and to move gradually into position for Phase III. This placed 3/9 on the eastern flank of the regimental attack and 2/9 on the western flank near the Laotian border. First Battalion, 9th Marines would be introduced into the middle when Phase III was ready to begin. Accordingly, 2/9 and 3/9 started maneuvering their companies into position.

Phase Line Red ran along the Da Krong River's east-west axis. Company “G” was on the western flank and was assigned to seize the critical Co Ka Leuye ridgeline, which provided clear observation into the AO beyond Cunningham to the east. Company “F,” 2/9, was given the task of constructing FSB Erskine so that 2/9 would be under an artillery fan as it approached its objective to the south.

Late in January two battalions from the 2nd ARVN Regiment were lifted into the DEWEY CANYON AO east of Cunningham. Company “K,” 3/9, had secured a zone for this move and had begun construction of FSB Lightning.

Weather Becomes a Critical Factor

Just as the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were reaching position to commence Phase III and the regiment was prepared to receive 1/9 in the center, bad weather set in. It was not a typical monsoon, but visibility and ceiling were zero. Recent experience indicated it would last two or three days and would not change the plans. With the rations and water available to the troops, it was decided to continue preparations for Phase III and to be ready to jump off as soon as the weather lifted. But about 3 February, after four days of very bad weather, the regimental CO had to make a decision. Should present positions be held? Should Company “G” continue its laborious climb up Co Ka Leuye, or would this be a dangerous extension? The CO, 9th Marines, based his decision on the assumption that the bad weather would continue, so 2/9 and 3/9 were instructed to pull their companies in and hold them close to areas from which they could be supported. It was not an easy decision, but it was a wise one. The FSBs were stocked with rations, and limited water was available. Second Battalion, 12th Marines had attempted to stock extra artillery ammunition, but the weather had hampered this effort. Rifle companies operated within the eight kilometer fan of the artillery on the FSBs so that any company was near food and water and in close mutual support of other companies. In the case of 3/9, Company “L” was on Cunningham; “I,” “M” and “K” came close to “L” and set in. Second Battalion, 9th Marines, had Company “H” on Razor, Company “F” on Erskine and Company “E” at LZ Dallas. Company “G” had the greatest problem. As it moved back from the top of Co Ka Leuye on the morning of 5 February it encountered a large enemy force. The ensuing fire-fight resulted in 5 Marines killed and 17 wounded. At this point the company was out of rations, low on water and had expended considerable ammunition. Now it had dead and wounded to carry out. It took the company four days to move back to a point where, with a slight break in the weather, it got some resupply and was relieved of its casualties. As the company reached low ground, Marine air made an heroic effort to extract the casualties. In the worst weather, medevac helicopters flew south up the Da Krong River Valley, and after having been fired on from the high ground on both sides, got in and got out. The ordeal was an inspirational display of small unit leadership, and the performance was magnificent.

As the weather closed in, the AVRN battalions and their artillery were being inserted around FSB Lightning. They were not fully into position; only one tube of the six-gun 105mm battery had been landed with 400 rounds of ammunition. Both
ARVN battalions had only the supplies carried by the troops—a maximum three days of rations, for example.

The ARVN situation was fairly desperate early in the foul weather. It was decided to attempt a helo-parachute drop by directing helicopters over the target with the ASRAT at Vandegrift. This was at extreme range for the ASRAT—over 30 miles—but the first drops landed within 300 feet of ARVN headquarters. Enough supplies were delivered this way to prevent any long-term deprivation.

Additional ASRAT-controlled drops were made from KC-130s into the area adjacent to Marine operations. The KC-130s could drop greater quantities of supplies, but they were less accurate than the helicopters. This increased the difficulty in locating and recovering the drops. A great deal of work is ahead in refining this type of operation, but it is possible to carry on in some degree in the worst fog and cloud cover. These experiences led to refinement of the facilities on Cunningham. For the first time in mountain operations an ASRAT was installed at a forward fire support base. In addition, a small LSA was built, permitting stockpiling of additional supplies for delivery to the forward companies on day-to-day operations.

Another innovation that paid high dividends concerned handling casualties in the field when the weather precluded medevac. In November 1968, under the guidance of the regimental XO, the three battalion surgeons and the regimental surgeon fabricated an aid station and special equipment that could be put in boxes for helicopter lift and inserted into FSBs/LZs. A small aid station/field hospital capability was thus available. One of these was placed on Cunningham soon after the opening of the base, and it paid for itself a hundred-fold. When NVA artillery and mortars hit Cunningham, and this was continuously every time the weather went bad, the battalion surgeon and his small aid station saved numerous lives. It paid off later when medevac helos made emergency landings on Cunningham, and finally during a sapper attack on the base on 17 February.

The weather cost the regiment some of its momentum, and the jump-off position had to be regained. It also permitted the enemy, who by that time had determined the purpose of the attack, to strengthen and/or prepare his defenses to the south and to emplace his mortars. He was better prepared to meet the attack as it moved toward the hard target area in Phase III.

**Phase III**

Each battalion in Phase III had a zone of action about three miles wide—a total regimental ZOA of approximately nine miles east to west. From Phase Line Red to the regimental objective in each battalion zone, the distance was approximately five miles.

The regimental objectives were on high ground along Route 922 at elevations of around 1,000 meters. The highest point was Tiger Mountain at 1,228 meters. Generally, Route 922 and the regimental objectives were on a common ridgeline running from Tiger Mountain to the south, southwest and then due west. The battalions had to fight uphill from north to south. In the east, 3/9 attacked along two ridgelines separated by about 2,000 meters, with two companies on ridge-line and one company on the other. First Battalion advanced over two parallel ridgelines from north to south. On the other hand, 2/9 attacked in a rather broad valley with secondary attacks on the ridges to the east. Here the battalion discovered a brand new road.

Although the operation had been planned to jump off at the same H-hour, loss of momentum in Phase II made this impractical. Third Battalion moved out on 11 February; 1/9 and 2/9 launched the next day.

As each battalion moved across Phase Line Red, it made strong contact. Some prepared enemy positions were not occupied, possibly because the enemy had elected to defend in strength elsewhere. But in general the Marines were up

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*Twelfth Marines fire 4.2 mortar in support of 9th Marines.*
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against numerous prepared and occupied positions. The opposition in some cases was determined and formidable. Enemy forces stayed in their bunkers and fighting holes until they were overrun and destroyed. For five days in mid-February, for example, Company "K" had 12 significant contacts, most against bunkers. The whole effort on the part of the NVA was to delay the Marines' advance on Route 922. Our forces were subjected to mortar and RPG rounds daily and particularly at night. The enemy proved to be well trained, well equipped and tenacious. At night they attacked, squads or Platoons against companies. Snipers frequently were tied in trees. These suicide techniques point up the enemy's fanaticism.

The operations of 1/9 and 3/9 confirmed techniques developed earlier in mountain operations. Third Battalion jumped off with three companies because one was at Cunningham for security; 1/9 jumped off with four companies. Both attacked down ridgelines with one company following in trace of another. As a company moved up a ridgeline and made contact, deployed to meet it and overcame it, the following company could construct an LZ, provide mortar support and take care of casualties. More important, while the lead company reorganized, the follow-on company prepared to pass through and resume the attack, thus putting fresh forces into the action and ensuring constant momentum. This worked very well, but a full battalion was required. Therefore, early in Phase III, additional forces were provided by CG 3d MarDiv to relieve the troops on the FSBs. Two companies of 2/3 relieved the companies on Cunningham and Erskine. This freed all elements of both 2/9 and 3/9.

The first noteworthy find occurred in 1/9's area. The lead element of Company "C," after overrunning a bunker complex, viewed two 122mm field guns, extremely accurate weapons with a range of 13 miles. The inspired troops soon overcame the defenders and captured the guns intact. These two pieces, the largest field guns captured to date in the Vietnam war, were subsequently evacuated and are in mint condition. One of these is now on display at Quantico.

Delta Company Makes a Haul

As the battalions moved south out of range of the supporting guns at Cunningham, it was obvious that a new FSB was needed. As 3/9 approached Tiger Mountain and Route 922 it appeared that defense would be light at this point, so it was decided that one company would take the entire mountain and build FSB Turnage on top. Plans were made to displace Battery 'E' on 25 February. Third Battalion was directed to concentrate its efforts on Route 548 going south toward what could be an enemy stronghold in the Tam Boi area. This proved to be a wise move. The advancing Marines made continuous contact on the road, killing a large number of NVA, and subsequently moved into Tam Boi. The complex was a very large, formidable piece of ground with subterranean caves and tunnels and areas for housing enemy personnel, communications, a headquarters and large stores of ammunition and food.

In the 2/9 area vehicles were heard moving down the road. On 21 February the decision was made to interdict Route 922 by ambush. On the night of 21-22 February, Company "H" moved 1,500 meters south in pitch blackness, found and crossed the road and set up a classical ambush. The ambush was triggered, catching three vehicles, and the company then swept from south to north picking up miscellaneous gear. One truck had carried about five tons of ammunition which exploded in a prolonged cook-off.

On 26 February Company "D" moved east astride Route 922 toward Hill 1044. After eliminating a reinforced NVA platoon occupying the hill, the Marines uncovered the largest arms and ordnance cache of the war. For a week Company "D" continually uncovered caches of enemy supplies in the immediate area. Most of the supplies were buried in the bottoms of scattered bomb craters. The NVA had dug out a hole in the crater, filled it with weapons and ammunition and then recovered it, leaving the bottom of the crater flat and therefore easily recognizable at close range. Almost all the weapons were new, wrapped in oilcloth or canvas and coated with cosmolam. The total haul amounted to over 900 individual and crew-served weapons, 80 tons of foodstuffs and 200 tons of ammunition of all sizes. This action virtually nullified the enemy's ability to strike out at civilian and military targets to the east, and any attempt to rebuild this base will be a long and arduous one.

While the Marines were enjoying huge successes over the NVA, they also were experiencing critical and persistent problems. It was impossible to resupply rifle companies without stopping their forward progress and without pinpointing their positions. Often, companies being resupplied received mortar fire. To make matters worse, when a company had received its supplies and was ready to continue its advance, a squad or platoon often had to be left behind to secure the nets, water cans and other items until they could be retrieved by a helicopter. This reduced the company's overall strength and unity and left a smaller unit exposed. Control by the company commander was difficult. An effort was made to improve this situation through the use of disposable packaging. C-rations, ammunition and water in plastic containers were placed on wood pallets and bundled on discarded or surveyed canvas instead of the usual nets. The bundle was slung on inexpensive
loop type wire cables and taken out to the company. The Marines could obtain their supplies, dispose of the packaging and continue to advance, quickly getting out of the way of incoming mortar fire.

Casualty replacement became a problem. Some units were sustaining moderately high casualties and began to lose some of their strength and effectiveness. Many needed more men, and delivering them was a problem. There was rarely time to stop long enough to cut an LZ capable of taking a troop lift. So men were landed with a follow-on company which had been in position long enough to build an LZ. They could then easily join their parent unit as they passed through. Some success was achieved through this method, but it was developed only through its initial stage. There is a vital need for greater flexibility in the management of replacements.

The Operation Closes

By the end of February the three battalions had nearly run out of real estate. They had advanced south to the Laos border, had made a thorough search of the area and were mopping up what enemy and supplies they could find. It was time to phase out the operation. A retrograde movement was planned to get the regiment out by reversing the process of the first week. The FSBs would be occupied backward and the forward ones would be closed one at a time. Second Battalion, which had been out the longest, would go back first, lifting as a battalion to Vandegrift. Third Battalion would follow, and 1/9 would remain behind for several more days to finish exploiting the area where Company 'D' had made its finds.

On 1 March the weather closed in again. The FSBs had supplies for as long as two weeks, though not necessarily in comfort. The rifle companies, however, were not so well off. They had been moving constantly, and stockpiling was impossible. The troops carried a normal load of five days food and four canteens of water. They had ample ammunition provided there were no heavy contacts. The distance made it impossible to reconsolidate around the FSBs as before. The only recourse was to continue to operate and wait it out. The weather didn't cooperate. The helicopters of MAG 39 and supporting CH-47s and CH-54s from the 101st Airborne Division were to enter their period of greatest trial. Existing LSAs at Quang Tri and Camp Evans were immediately expanded and stocked. These, together with the LSA at Vandegrift, kept helicopters standing by to deliver much-needed supplies as soon as the weather permitted. When the clouds cleared in the Dewey Canyon AO, for example, it might still be socked in at Vandegrift and Quang Tri, with only Camp Evans able to launch aircraft. Even so, a thick layer of clouds clung to the mountain ranges around the AO, and the helicopters could penetrate it only at great risk. Another innovation was tried. Helicopters would lift off the LSA, and on a GCA bearing, ascend through the clouds until they broke through, usually at around 2,000-3,000 feet. After passing over the mountains they would hope to descend. The fire bases and company positions, however, were not always completely open, and the pilots often had to search for a hole in the cloud cover before they could get down. The tremendous skill and raw courage of these pilots made this system work. While the weather was marginally operable for no more than three hours at a time, the helicopters were getting at least some supplies in. Only the Marine pilots and aircraft had the full qualifications and instruments to fly in this weather.

Admittedly, there were problems with three
DEWEY CANYON

of delivering loads was extremely difficult to coordinate. The distance between the LSAs made communications slow and cumbersome. As requests for resupply were received, the individual LSAs were in some doubt as to who should deliver. It was not simply a matter of assigning a task to a single LSA, for it was impossible to forecast which one would be open when, and logistics personnel were kept busy trying to coordinate resupply.

The weather broke long enough for 2/9 to be extracted on 4 March. Third Battalion remained until 17 March. First Battalion, with its huge cache exploited completely, was directed to move to Tam Boi as a covering force for other U.S. units. From 14 to 18 March, adverse weather prevented extraction of 1/9. Each day enemy probes and mortar attacks increased, and on the morning of 18 March, just before dawn, the enemy attacked in company strength supported by mortars. The final assault was repelled, and by 1200 the ground fog had cleared sufficiently to commence extraction. Although an extensive suppressive fire plan had been developed to include artillery, fixed wing and helicopter gunships in addition to organic battalion weaponry, all helicopters, except the final four lifts, were subjected to enemy mortar fire in the LZ. Miraculously, this total battalion lift under constant enemy indirect fire was accomplished without loss of a single helicopter. With the extraction of 1/9 on 18 March, Operation DEWEY CANYON was officially terminated.

Lessons Learned

The greatest contribution to the accumulation of lessons learned in the operation was this: that a helicopter need not always be able to see in order to fly. The ASRAT and GCA provided the capability of feeling the way to an objective, delivering the cargo and returning while in the most limited visibility. Of course, this is not the magic cure-all. Many lifts were not delivered, and many casualties had to wait hours or even days to be evacuated. But a start was made, and it surely should be pursued.

An experiment was made in refueling helicopters in a forward area. The distances involved frequently meant helicopters were running low on fuel, especially UH-1E gunships and CH-46 medevac helicopters which often had to remain on station in the AO for extended periods. A small fuel bladder was installed at FSB Lightning and helicopters were able to draw enough emergency fuel from it to get them home. The concept worked, but was not completely successful in that the weather made it difficult to keep the bladder filled. Again, this must be further developed to serve as a working tool for heliborne operations.

The problem of food was not completely solved. The ASRAT/GCA solution is a workable one. However, to make it work well, close centralized handling of resupply activity is required. As in the case of the three LSAs, someone must be in a position to establish priorities, and in turn must have the authority to say go! The coordination required in this type of operation is tremendous. Control is a critical factor, and yet finding the agency or person with enough authority to effectively control the entire support operation was impossible. Much needs to be done to make the system more responsive to the immediacy of a three-hour weather break.

Tactical integrity is paramount. The 9th Marines' success against a determined enemy was no accident. A long period of close communication within the regiment made it a team, and teamwork is the keystone to combat.

The use of disposable/destructible slings, cargo nets and supply packages for resupplying rifle companies on the move was an important innovation.

Scoutship capability has become an obvious need. The operation was provided limited scoutship use by the 101st Airborne, but this was not sufficient. It was impossible to be sure that a helicopter assault could get through the enemy's AA defenses. Consequently, the attack from Cunningham south was overland. Scoutships have proved invaluable for flying at tree-top level at high speeds and finding the enemy's AA positions. With the positions spotted, they can either be destroyed or avoided. A whole AO need not be cleared in this manner; it is sufficient to clear a corridor to a target and the area around the target to insert troops without risking aircraft. Scoutships would give this capability. As it was, the overland attack cost the Marines much needed surprise and gave the enemy the chance to dig in. This does not mean we should jump around between targets, but we should use our mobility and speed, as would have been possible in DEWEY CANYON, to get behind the enemy and attack into his rear.

Epilogue

History will review and judge what was accomplished in DEWEY CANYON. Our primary concern as professional Marines dwells not on our success but on recording, for the benefit of those who follow us, those methods which made our success possible.

Had the 9th Marines been blessed with good weather throughout the operation, their problems, other than day-to-day tactical considerations, would have been minimal. The experience gained and solutions found will benefit the Marine Corps for years to come. In this case, the weather provided the impetus to seek answers that otherwise might never have been found.
Corps was almost peaceful again. Seven years of hard fighting had faded into the past as a feeling of tranquility spread through Quang Tri Province. Highways, long closed, were open and filled with traffic which stimulated the rebirth of a blossoming economy. Market places in Cam Lo, Dong Ha and Quang Tri City, humming with the incessant chatter of bargaining Vietnamese, were heavy with food and wares. Around them, an ugly war was slowly dying. U.S. Marines, from the Third Division had been out of country over two years. A battle area once known as “Leatherneck Square,” remained only a dim memory. Under President Nixon’s Vietnamezization plan the last U.S. Army combat brigade in Northern I Corps was rapidly preparing to standdown. The South Vietnamese were now shouldeering the full responsibility for the ground combat role.

In place of 80,000 U.S. troops which had departed I Corps, stood the fledging 3rd ARVN Division. Reinforced by two brigades of Vietnamese Marines, Regional and Popular Forces the division still totalled less than 9,000 men. The division was headquartered at Ai Tu (Quang Tri) Combat Base, three kilometers northwest of Quang Tri City. Thinly spread over 300 square miles were the 3rd ARVN’s 2nd, 56th and 57th Regiments plus Marine Brigades 147 and 258; all together, a token defense force.

The 57th ARVN Regimental area of operation (AO), extended from Dong Ha, due north to the DMZ and east to the Gulf of Tonkin. The regiment’s infantry and artillery battalions were positioned on fire support bases (FSB) Alpha-1, Alpha-2 (Gio Linh), and Alpha-3. All bases fronted the DMZ, 2,000 meters to the north. This regiment, less than six months old, had its headquarters at FSB C-1 midway between Dong Ha and the DMZ. The 2nd ARVN Regiment’s AO included combat bases North of Cam Lo, at Alpha-
The 1972 Easter Invasion by the North Vietnam Army, that several months later backfired into the re-capture of Quang Tri City by Republic of Vietnam Marines, may have pre-destined the end of the war.

4 (Con Thien), Charlie-2 and Charlie-3. Located at FSB CARROLL, and activated a brief 90 days earlier, was the 56th ARVN Regiment. This Regiment had its infantry units at FSB'S FULLER, KHE GIO and CARROLL. Co-located at FSB CARROLL was a composite artillery group of 22 pieces varying from 105mm howitzers to 175mm guns.

At an earlier time the 3rd ARVN Division commander had developed a plan to periodically rotate his forces through each regimental area of operations. On 30 March 1972, the 56th and 57th Regiments commenced to exchange their AO's. To insure maximum use of trucks, convoys alternated unit displacements by carrying full loads of troops in both directions. It was anticipated this administrative move could be completed by dusk that same day. The rotation began on schedule and by 1100 approximately 40 percent of each regiment had been relocated. Both regimental headquarters were also in the process of displacing. There was no urgency, the front was calm on this Holy Thursday. The warm spring sun signaled the customary noon day siesta an hour away.

At the same time far to the west the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion, located on FSB's SARGE and NUI BA HO sighted enemy troop movements of platoon and company size. Moments later the 8th Marine Battalion, Bravo Command Group on FSB HOLCOMB reported enemy ground contact with an estimated company size force. These were the first ground contacts of the 1972 North Vietnamese Easter Invasion.

Precisely at noon, on 30 March, the main body of a North Vietnamese Army, three divisions strong, invaded South Vietnam. Over 45,000 enemy, reinforced by Russian built tanks, SAM missiles, anti-aircraft weapons and long range artillery blasted a three-pronged attack across the demarcation line (17th Parallel) which partitioned Vietnam as a result of the 1954 Geneva Accord.

The test of Vietnamization had come. Hanoi, by changing its military tactics to those of conventional war backed by sophisticated machines of destruction had caught the 3rd ARVN Division by surprise. Massive attacks by fire shattered the calm over South Vietnam as the three most northern districts underwent precision artillery barrages. Unprecedented, indiscriminate firings by North Vietnamese gunners struck military and civilian areas alike, forcing 50,000 refugees to the highways fleeing south toward Quang Tri City. Panic prevailed. The question echoed around the world—could the South Vietnamese Army contain the advancing Communist onslaught?

Within the next 24 hours over 5,000 artillery and rocket rounds struck all 12 of the major combat bases watching the DMZ. The 56th and 57th Regiments caught in the midst of their AO change were paralyzed, unable to react. Heavy T-54 and amphibious PT-76 tanks roared south sending the untried 3rd ARVN Division reeling back. Fire bases A-1, 2, 3, 4, FULLER, CARROLL, MAI LOC, SARGE and NUI BA HO were all contained under unrelenting artillery barrages.

By 1800 on 30 March, the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion troops on SARGE and NUI BA HO had received more than 600 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar, 122mm and 130mm artillery fire. The next 36 hours saw the intensity of incoming fire increase even more as low cloud cover throughout the area prevented the use of tactical air support. Intense enemy pressure at CARROLL and MAI LOC prevented these bases from replenishing critically low stocks of ammunition. Artillery support for SARGE and NUI BA HO dwindled.

Initially NUI BA HO received the brunt of the enemy ground attacks and after repeated assaults were beaten back; the fire base was penetrated. As night closed in, hopelessly outnumbered Vietnamese Marines moved to the
southeast corner and, unable to defend their po-

tion, began to breach the booby-trapped per-
rimeter wire. North Vietnamese soldiers were
now intermingled with Marines. Capt Ray L.
Smith, USMC, the advisor, threw himself across
the final barrier of booby-trapped concertina
thus making a human bridge for the last 30 Ma-

rines to leave. Nui Ba Ho was the first combat
base to fall to the North Vietnamese Easter In-
vasion.

Individual acts of heroism occurred every-
where across the 3rd ARVN Division front, but
the armored momentum and tenacity of the
North Vietnamese invasion could not be re-
strained. ARVN forces fell back.

FSB SARGE had its perimeter penetrated at 0200,
1 April. At 0345 its gallant defenders were forced
to evacuate the shattered peak. The battered
Marines of the battalion Alpha Command Group
moved off the eastern slope of the perimeter
and were immediately engulfed by the night
and forest. For the next two days small groups of the
4th Battalion evaded the enemy and made a
march for their lives back to MAI LOC. All radio
contact was lost. The unspoken sensation was that
the 4th Marine Battalion had been lost forever.

The 7th Marine Battalion, located in Danang as
part of the 1 Corps reserve when the invasion be-
egan, was immediately ordered north. Moving by
truck they arrived at Dong Ha that same night.
The following morning the 7th Battalion de-
ployed west of Dong Ha toward Cam Lo even-
tually reaching FSB MAI LOC where they were
placed under OPCON of Brigade 147.

Late on the afternoon of 30 March, Brigade
258, consisting of the 3rd Artillery and 3rd In-
fantry Battalion, was directed to displace from
FSB NANCY, to the Dong Ha Combat Base 30 kilo-
meters northwest. The move was completed at
2300. On the 31st the 3rd Marine Battalion was
positioned to provide security along Route 9 and
around Dong Ha Combat Base. On 1 April the
brigade headquarters was ordered to move back
to Ai Tu and assume overall security for the 3rd
ARVN Division command post. The 3rd Marine
Battalion remained at Dong Ha.

LtCol Dinh, Brigade 258 commander, arrived at
Ai Tu in time to be greeted by an 800-round artil-
lery barrage. The 6th Vietnamese Marine Battal-
ion, which had been on FSB BARBARA, had also
just arrived and was assuming the perimeter de-
fense of Ai Tu. Due to the increasing enemy artil-
lery attacks on the 3rd ARVN Division command
post, it was necessary to displace the division
headquarters back to the Citadel in Quang Tri
City. U. S. advisors, fire support coordination
personnel and their control facilities remained at
Ai Tu (3rd ARVN Division Forward) and became
the only Vietnamese command post north of
Danang which contained facilities for the control
of U. S. supporting arms assets. As such it quickly
became the focal point for the continued effec-
tive employment of U. S. supporting arms for the
3rd ARVN Division. For five critical days naval
gunfire missions, B-52 arclight strikes, tactical air
support and Vietnamese fire support coordina-
tion were all controlled from within this one
bunker.

Below the DMZ the battle continued to rage.
At 1045 hours, 1 April, Con Thien was evacuated.
By 1430 hours FSB's FULLER, KHE GIO and HOL-
COMB had all been evacuated. The NVA were
seemingly everywhere. Soldiers, civilians and infil-
trating NVA artillery observer teams clogged
Highway 1 and Route 9. Military control of ARVN
units was fragmented and becoming ineffective.
The enemy further compounded the military sit-
tuation by jamming the radio nets and transmit-
ting contradicting messages over captured
ARVN radios. Several aircraft were shot down
during the first two days of the invasion. The U. S.
activated rescue missions imposed sudden and
large area "no fire zones" on all supporting arms
thus complicating responsive fire plans. Hastily
developed defensive plans faltered, order was
lost.

By the morning of the 2nd, South Vietnamese
forces were attempting to reposition and estab-
lish a new defensive line along the Cam Lo-Cua
Viet River. The last two remaining western fire
support bases at CARROL and MAI LOC continued
to remain under heavy 82mm mortar and 130mm
artillery fire.

At 0900 a two-pronged North Vietnamese tank
column was reported north and northeast of
Dong Ha. The main armor thrust was moving on
Highway 1, near FSB C-1. The second tank col-
umn was traversing the beaches north of the
Cua Viet River's mouth. Immediately grasping
the gravity of the situation, the Brigade 258 com-

LtCol Turley and Capt Wells were advisors to
the Vietnamese Marine Corps during its
successful fight against the NVA that led to
the recapture of Quang Tri City. LtCol
Turley, who has spent much of his career in
recon units, is currently the G-3 advisor to
the VMC. He served a previous tour in
Vietnam with 1stMarDiv.
mander ordered the 3rd Vietnamese Marine Battalion to secure a bridge head on the south side of the Dong Ha bridges. Anti-tank elements of the 6th Marine Battalion were also ordered North to supporting positions. Vietnamese Marines were now totally committed, the 3rd ARVN Division was without a reserve force.

Maj Binh, commanding the 3rd Battalion, was ordered to "Hold Dong Ha at all costs." Two companies moved across the Dong Ha Combat Base to the bridges. One company took up defensive positions around the main vehicular bridge. The second deployed to the west along Route 9 to include the adjacent abandoned railroad bridge. An NVA flag was flying from the northern girder of the railroad bridge as the Marines took up hasty fighting positions. Armed with only hand-held M-72 anti-tank weapons, a small force of Marines dug in and prepared to halt the first major NVA tank and infantry assault of the Vietnam War.

Refugees and ARVN stragglers were still streaming south across the main bridge. Population control was becoming a major problem.

As the 3rd Battalion's command element arrived at the bridge, the enemy unleashed a devastating 45-minute artillery attack which precluded any troop movements south of the river. At 1020 the enemy armored column on Highway 1 was identified as 20 PT-76 and T-54 tanks. PT-76 tanks were also seen traveling south along the beaches. Naval gunfire was brought to bear on both columns. Four columns of black smoke along the beach gave testimony to the ships accurate gunfire.

Along Highway 1 the skies cleared and Vietnamese A-1 aircraft bombed and strafed the Russian tanks, destroying 11. One aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire forcing the pilot to bail out.

Forces on both sides of the river stopped firing and watched as the parachute drifted to earth. Winds carried the pilot away from the Marines and to certain capture north of the bridge.

As a last desperate measure an order was issued to destroy the Dong Ha bridges. At approximately 1115 the lead enemy tank moved on the abutment on the north side of the Cua Viet. Marines took it under fire and struck it once with an M-72 anti-tank round. The tank, partially disabled, backed off and moved into a firing position north of the bridges. The U.S. advisor, 3rd Marine Battalion began to strategically implant 500 pounds of assorted explosives diagonally across the spans of the roadways. Under continuous fire by the swelling enemy infantry and tank forces, Capt John W. Ripley, USMC, miraculously moved unscathed through the intense enemy fire to place the demolitions. After two hours of preparations the explosives were charged and at 1630 Capt Ripley sent both bridges crashing into the Cua Viet River.

Stopped at the Dong Ha bridges, the enemy armored columns turned west toward the Cam Lo bridge complex. Accurate guns from USS Bachanian, Strauss and Weddell rendered these enemy movements ineffective. Throughout the night off shore guns rained hundreds of shells upon the enemy. "Danger close" targets within 300 meters of the Vietnamese Marines were common fire missions.

For three days FSB CARROLL, with its 22 artillery pieces, has been under constant artillery attack. By 1400, 2 April, enemy ground forces had moved within small arms range of the perimeter. At 1430 an emergency radio appeal from the U.S. Army advisor, 56th Regiment, requested extraction because his ARVN counterpart had elected to surrender. Before any action could be taken at

Northern I Corps, a battle area once known as "Leatherneck Square," was now the responsibility of the South Vietnamese.
division level, an unknown CH-47 pilot, participating in the last resupply mission to Mai Loc, 3,000 meters to the south, took it upon himself to extract the advisory team. At 1440 a white flag was raised over FSB Carroll and 1,500 ARVN soldiers were lost to the invaders. The sudden lull of enemy artillery gave mute testimony to the fact that the largest concentration of ARVN artillery in I Corps was lost to the North Vietnamese. This unique capitulation psychologically crushed the flickering hopes of many South Vietnamese units fighting across the northern front.

As the sun was setting on this war-torn day there were two brief moments of joy. The 4th Marine Battalion Alpha Group from FSB Sarge, with Maj Walter E. Boomer, USMC, the battalion's senior advisor, had made contact with an aerial observer who guided them back to Mai Loc. Several hours later, at 1745, the 30 survivors of the 4th's Bravo Group from the siege on Nui Ba Ho passed quietly through the gate and rejoined their battalion. The 4th Marine Battalion was now accounted for.

FSB Mai Loc was next as the enemy artillery attacks became more intensive. The remaining radio antennas were shot away and direct communications with the 3rd ARVN Division was lost. Artillery ammunition was down to several hundred rounds with little chance of replenishment. At 1815 LtCol Bao, Brigade 147 commander, made the decision to abandon Mai Loc and march to Dong Ha. When the artillery storage bins were depleted and the last artillery round had been fired, incendiary grenades were placed in the tubes making all 10 guns useless to the enemy. Around 1900, with the 200 survivors from the 4th Battalion leading the way, the brigade column moved out under the cover of darkness.

Hampered by rain showers, harrassed by the enemy guns, the column moved east. The brigade became separated while traversing several precarious stream crossings; however, by 0500 the next morning all units were again linked up. Later that morning the column reached Highway 1, near Dong Ha, turned south and reached Ai Tu at 1800 on 3 April. As the haggard and near exhausted Marines joined at the Brigade 258 command post, weary eyes became misty as comrades greeted each other. The familiar faces of over 300 Vietnamese Marines were gone forever but the brigades were together at last and this gave them the needed strength for the battles ahead.

During the first 78 hours of the Easter Invasion all major combat bases north and west of Dong Ha had fallen to the NVA invaders. South Vietnamese forces had lost 53 artillery pieces and several thousand soldiers were missing or dead. Whole ARVN units were unlocated. FSB's Pedro, Ai Tu, and Dong Ha Combat Base were the only remaining ARVN strongpoints north of Quang Tri. Most important, however, the main North Vietnamese invasion thrust was halted and the Communist army's time schedule for seizing Quang Tri City within seven days was disrupted. Vietnamese Marines paid a heavy price, but in doing so bought their government precious time. Time to reposition its forces, time to consolidate, time to act.

The period 3 to 8 April found the South Vietnamese forces maneuvering and strengthening positions around Quang Tri City while the 3rd Marine Battalion repulsed repeated enemy attempts to cross the Cua Viet River at Dong Ha. On 3 April the Republic's Joint General Staff ordered the Marine division headquarters and the rem-
nants of the brigade airlifted to the battle area. Division headquarters moved into the Hue Citadel while Brigade 369 set up in a new AO around FSB's NANCY and JANE. At this time the Commandant of Marines had not received operational control of the full Division as Brigades 147 and 258 were still OPCON to the 3rd ARVN Division.

Shortly after midnight on 9 April the NVA massed their artillery and began shelling Ai Tu with 130mm guns. The heavy pounding continued throughout the night. Just before dawn the 6th Marine Battalion around FSB PEDRO reported heavy ground contact. At 0645 first two, then seven and finally 16 enemy tanks supported with two battalions of infantry advanced on the fire support base. Marine artillery batteries quickly brought accurate fire to bear on the enemy, stalling the infantry attack. At 0715, several enemy tanks advanced, with two T-54’s breaching the perimeter. These immediately began crushing all bunkers as the few Marines within the wire withdrew toward Ai Tu. A nearby platoon outpost was overrun and all Marines were killed by gunfire or crushing tank actions. The other T-54’s held their positions around PEDRO, waiting for their infantry to move up. When the T-54’s had completed their destruction they moved on toward Ai Tu. The 6th Battalion commander had his OP on a small knoll. The two tanks maneuvered toward it. The lead tank struck an anti-tank mine and was disabled. The second moved around his burning mate and continued on to within 50 meters of the 6th’s Command Group. The tank stopped, rotated its main gun but did not fire.

Earlier when the first report of an impending tank and infantry attack had been received at Brigade 258, LtCol Dinh began assembling a reaction force. The lead ARVN M-48 tank of the reaction force moved into a firing position just as the enemy T-54 ground to a halt at the 6th’s OP. A brief tank battle ensued and the enemy tank was destroyed. Approximately 30 minutes later the 6th was reinforced by two infantry companies of the 1st Battalion and an ARVN tank and APC armor force of 20 vehicles. A counterattack was launched toward PEDRO. As this force deployed a Vietnamese Air Force flight of four A-1 aircraft came on station. This Vietnamese air-ground team began to systematically destroy the enemy. The heavy bombardment from Marine 105mm howitzers forced the enemy infantry to abandon the area and withdraw toward the Ba Long Valley. Within two hours 13 of 16 T-54 tanks had been destroyed by mines, tank fire, air strikes and Marine infantry weapons. Of the remaining three, one withdrew, two were deserted by their crews during the battle. Both captured tanks were proudly driven by Marines back to Ai Tu as war trophies.

The first enemy tank-infantry assault on PEDRO was repulsed with the enemy leaving 157 dead on the battlefield. Succeeding enemy attacks came on 10 and 11 April, again the enemy was beaten back with 211 dead NVA left behind. Captured documents later revealed the enemy had launched an infantry regiment and a tank battalion against the Marine western front. Their mission was to take both PEDRO and Ai Tu and attack the southern flank of the Dong Ha defenses. This three-day battle accounted for the defeat of a major drive to bisect the vital Quang Tri defensive line which would have destroyed the remaining effectiveness of the 3rd ARVN Division’s northern front. More significantly however, this battle allowed Marine infantry units to discover that they could meet and defeat Russian armor with their organic anti-tank weapons. Russian armor had lost its psychological shock effect on the Vietnamese Marines.

The invading North Vietnamese divisions continued to press their attacks toward Quang Tri City with enemy armor and infantry forces using the Cam Lo bridge as their primary crossing point. Once South of the Cam Lo-Cua Viet River,
NVA units moved on Dong Ha from the West. Other enemy forces moved south, passing FSB Carroll and Mai Loc, on toward Route 557 and FSB Pedro.

On 23 April, Brigade 147, with 4th and 8th Infantry and the 2nd Artillery Battalion returned to Ai Tu from a rest and refitting period in Hue. Brigade 258 deployed to Hue. The 1st Battalion remained at FSB Pedro and changed OPCON to Brigade 147.

At that time the 4th and 5th Ranger Groups and the 57th ARVN Regiment were located to the North of Ai Tu and around Dong Ha. On the southern flank of the 1st Marines stood elements of the 2nd ARVN Regiment. The 2nd's AO extended south from Ai Tu to the Thach Han River and east to Highway 1. Across the Thach Han on the south bank was the 1st Ranger Group.

During the night of 26 April the 3rd ARVN Division issued a warning of an impending attack by the 304th NVA Division. At 0630 a red double star cluster signaled the enemy attack. All ground attacks were launched under the protective cover of intensive artillery fires. The 1st Battalion which was now positioned 2-3,000 meters south of Ai Tu also came under a heavy 82mm mortar attack. The battalion beat back two ground attacks. The 8th Battalion had little ground contact across their front at this time, but discovered enemy in their rear area that was to have been secured by an ARVN Battalion. During the day both the 1st and 8th Battalions repulsed tank and infantry attacks destroying 12 Russian tanks in the process. At dusk the Marine defense line was straightened as the 1st and 8th were pulled back to within 1-2 kilometers of Ai Tu. Shortly after dark, enemy artillery fire struck an ammunition dump; most of the stocks were destroyed.

By 28 April the enemy pressure on the Ranger Groups in the Dong Ha area caused all ARVN forces North of Ai Tu to fall back along Highway 1 toward Quang Tri. By night fall the Ranger's defensive line was tied in with the 8th Marine Battalion at Ai Tu, and eastward to the river. The 57th ARVN Regiment, in full rout, retreated through this defense line into Quang Tri City. The 2nd ARVN Regiment still held the line southwest of the Quang Tri bridges.

At 0200 on 29 April the enemy launched a tank-infantry attack around the south end of the Marine minefield on the 2nd ARVN's front along the Thach Han. The attack rolled up the southern flank of the ARVN forces on the west side of the river and penetrated up to the Quang Tri bridges. U.S. tac-air was called in and, working under flares, destroyed three of the enemy tanks. By morning enemy forces remained in control of the west side of the Quang Tri bridges. Two companies of the 7th Battalion, which had arrived at Ai Tu the night before, reopened the highway to the city by killing 12 NVA in the bridges' west defensive bunkers.

Throughout the day the defensive situation across the river from Quang Tri City deteriorated. Late that afternoon the Ai Tu ammunition dump was again hit by artillery and the remaining stocks went up in flames. Ammunition for the Marine howitzers became critical as the battalion's guns had less than 1,000 rounds on position.

Marines of 7th VNMC Bn en route to U.S. Navy ships that transported them to their first amphibious landing at Wunder Beach.
The NVA continued to exert pressure on AI Tu. The Ranger Group holding at the east of the 8th Marine Battalion fell back and withdrew into Quang Tri City. Brigade 147 was now almost encircled. At noon on 30April the 3rd ARVN Division ordered the Marines to withdraw from AI Tu and return to the Citadel to provide a defensive force around the city. The withdrawal plan called for the brigade headquarters and the 2nd Artillery Battalion to depart first. Followed by the 1st Battalion; the 8th would follow in trace from the Western flank. The 4th Battalion would close the column as the rear guard.

The plan was executed smoothly, with the exception of the 18 artillery pieces and their prime movers. As the Marine brigade was moving on the city, ARVN engineers prematurely destroyed both bridges over the Thach Han River. Attempts were made to tow the howitzers across at a fording site, but due to a soft bottom and currents this failed. Thus it was necessary to disable and destroy the howitzers and 22 prime movers. The infantry battalions crossed the river and took up defensive positions around the city as Brigade 147 set up its command post beside the Citadel walls.

At 1215, 1May, the 3rd ARVN Division advised all units in Quang Tri that the city would undergo a 10,000-round artillery barrage starting at 1700. Military units were ordered to evacuate the city. No orderly withdrawal plan was promulgated. The 27 maneuver battalions under the OPCON of the 3rd ARVN Division were released to fend for themselves. During the afternoon three CH-54 helicopters landed at the Citadel and extracted the ARVN division staff and their U.S. advisors. The last remaining shreds of unity dissipated. The strain and shock of 30 days conventional warfare on ill-prepared troops had unraveled the already thin fabric of unit discipline and effectiveness. A frightened mass of humanity moved like a rampant tidal wave onto Highway 1 and south toward Hue, 50 kilometers away. Highway 1, south of Quang Tri, was interdicted by enemy artillery and had been periodically closed off by enemy infantry units since 29April. The roadway was one of incredible destruction. Burning vehicles of all types, trucks, armored vehicles, civilian buses and cars filled the highway forcing all traffic off the road to the east. Tracked vehicles explored crosscountry routes as hundreds of civilians were subjected to enemy artillery barrages. Marine Brigade 147, which had its USMC advisors and retained its unity, moved out of the City at 1430. The column was composed of over 30 armored vehicles and four Marine battalions. As the brigade moved south it was joined by large numbers of ARVN soldiers and civilians. As dusk fell the column was halted by an estimated NVA regiment just west of Hai Lang. In addition, the Marine column had become so fragmented by intermingling civilians and ARVN stragglers that effective unit control became difficult.

By late afternoon on 2May the carnage was complete. The number of civilians killed fleeing Quang Tri Province will never be known, but estimates place it in the thousands. Somehow several ARVN units and Marine Brigade 147 managed to maintain some order in the midst of hysteria and fought their way to a new Marine Defense Line.

Marine Brigade 369's defensive lines had been located to the south of Hai Lang along the O'Khe and My Chanh Rivers since deploying north from Saigon. The two bridges crossing these rivers along Highway 1 had to be held if the withdrawing troops and civilians were to successfully move south. On 2May a pre-dawn, hour-long, intensive enemy artillery barrage struck the two bridge sites. At first light elements of an NVA regiment supported by 18 tanks assaulted the O'Khe Bridge area, held by the 9th Marine Battalion. The battle raged through the morning hours and although five tanks penetrated the defensive perimeter all were destroyed. The enemy, unable to break through, left 17 burning tanks along with several hundred dead infantry on the battlefield. By dusk Highway 1 north of the O'Khe was void of movement as the enemy closed off all routes of escape. Brigade 369, commanded by Col Chung, had completed its mission as a rear guard force and withdrew south of the My Chanh and redeployed.

The My Chanh line and counteroffensive

As darkness fell on 2May, South Vietnam's future looked bleak. Near Saigon there were NVA tanks in An Loc; west of Hue FSB BASTOGNE had just fallen and to the north all of Quang Tri Province had been lost. The invaders had declared Quang Tri City their Provincial Capital in the South. There was a national atmosphere of desperation, yet a prevailing feeling of grim determination to drive out the Communists. The South Vietnamese Government responded with changes in the military command structure and a new Order of the Day—there would be no further withdrawals. The full test of Vietnamization had come. For Marines, the My Chanh Line would be their decisive battlefield.

After Brigade 147 withdrew past the My Chanh River it returned to Hue for rest, replacements and refitting. All three Marine brigades and the three artillery battalions had experienced losses of men and equipment during the first five weeks of the invasion. Material combat losses were quickly identified and through the U.S. advisory channels requests for replacements were transmitted to HQMC. In less than 30 days over 80 percent of the initial equipment losses had been replaced. Trucks flown from Okinawa, were hitched to 105mm howitzers airlifted from
Barstow, California and rushed north to the war zone. Every C-141 or C-5A that landed at Danang Air Base demonstrated that although the U.S. Marines were out of country, they were dedicated to providing full logistical support to the Vietnamese Marines through their most trying period. It was an overwhelming confirmation, and did much to rekindle the spirits of Marines along the My Chanh.

On 4 May, President Thieu appointed LtGen Khanh to the Joint General Staff as assistant for operations. This marked the first time a Vietnamese Marine officer had ever held such a high military office. Col Bui The Lan, Gen Khanh’s deputy, was appointed as the new Commandant of Vietnamese Marines.

For the first time since the Easter Invasion began the Marines were assigned their own division area of operations. Their battle line was the northern front, extending from the Gulf of Tonkin on the East, 18 kilometers westward, across Highway 1 and into the foothills. Five infantry battalions were initially positioned along the My Chanh Line. As they were digging in, North Vietnamese units spirited by fresh successes at Ait Tu and Quang Tri City, began to probe the line.

On 5 May, Brigade 258 moved forward from Hue to Phong Dien and assumed responsibility of the western half of the division’s My Chanh line. On 12 May, Brigade 369 was repositioned on the east flank. At the same time the NVA was building up its forces for an all out attack on the ancient capital of Hue.

Col Lan and Col Joshua W. Dorsey III, USMC, senior advisor, began to develop plans for putting the Marine division on the offensive. Under the planning guidance of its Commandant, an immediate counter offensive by Vietnamese Marines across the division front was begun. As an initial step a helicopter assault would be made into the Hai Lang Village area. Utilizing U.S. Marine Corps helicopter assets from the Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade, two Vietnamese infantry battalions were helilifted into adjoining landing zones around Hai Lang. One CH-53 was lost to enemy ground fire. The enemy was tactically surprised with over 240 NVA killed by the assaulting Marines and their supporting arms.

The North Vietnamese, momentarily set back by the vertical assault in their rear, responded with a major armor and infantry attack. On 21 May, the NVA moved his forces south on Route 555 and crossed the My Chanh, striking into Brigade 369’s AO. Hearing the armor approaching, regional forces along the line fell back, allowing the enemy to almost encircle the 3rd and 9th Battalions. Both units were forced to withdraw, but after intense fighting that lasted throughout the day the Marines had reestablished their defense line back on the My Chanh River. Casualties among the Marines were high, but the enemy suffered heavier losses including the destruction of seven PT-76 and T-54 tanks.

At 0100, on 22 May the 3rd Battalion was again attacked by a large infantry force accompanied by 22-25 tanks. The 3rd Battalion destroyed eight tanks by artillery and M-72’s before being overrun by numerically superior forces. The enemy force continued his penetration and moved on Brigade 369’s command post, attacking at first light. Five of the enemy’s armored vehicles were stopped within 400 meters of the brigade CP. An artillery battery, 200 meters further south literally bore-sighted one gun to stop a PT-76 tank at 140 meters from the battery position. Also, the newly introduced TOW Guided Missile system destroyed a PT-76 tank with the first round ever fired in combat. Vietnamese Marines, observing the TOW missile glance off a radio antenna, change its deflected course, stopped shooting and cheered as the Russian tank was enveloped in flames. The armored attack was finally repulsed, as 10 tanks and APC’s were destroyed. At 0930 the 8th Battalion conducted a counterattack...
that broke the infantry assault. The enemy fled leaving their dead and wounded behind them. For the NVA the cost was extremely high and nothing was gained. The My Chanh Line was restored by nightfall.

Even as this attack was under way, another counter-offensive operation was being planned. On 23 May, the 7th Marine Battalion was trucked to Tan My, where they boarded U.S. Navy landing craft and embarked aboard ships of the Seventh Fleet. Early the next morning the Marine division conducted a combination amphibious landing and heliborne assault in the Wunder Beach area of Quang Tri Province. The operation, Song Than 6-72, was conducted by Brigade 147 and required close coordination with the Ninth MAB, U.S. Navy amphibious shipping, naval gunfire support and B-52 arclight strikes. Col Lan, his G-3 operations officer LtCol Ky, and a small staff coordinated their multi-assault force from on board the CCL-19, Blue Ridge. In many ways it was a history making event, as the Vietnamese Marine Corps planned and executed its first assault from the sea. A B-52 arclight strike thundered across the beach area just as the leading wave of LVT’s approached the 2,000 meter off-shore mark. Shortly thereafter, the 7th Marine Battalion moved ashore in two waves of 40 amphibious tractors and landed under enemy 82mm mortar fire. The beachhead was seized. As the USMC tractors turned and went back to sea, the Vietnamese Marines moved over the sand dunes out of sight. An hour later, again following B-52 strikes, the 6th and 4th Infantry Battalions aboard USMC helicopters were lifted into two landing zones near the junction of Routes 555 and 602. Both battalions landed on time and seized initial objectives against light resistance. For the second time in a month a major offensive operation had been successfully executed by the Marine division. The North Vietnamese Army had suddenly discovered its sea flank was vulnerable to the varied tactics of the Marines. Song Than 6-72 ended on 31 May, as all battalions returned to the My Chanh Line.

At 0530 on 25 May, the NVA switched back to the western flank of the Marine division’s AO and launched attacks at Brigade 258’s western units. For three consecutive days, the enemy infantry deployed in their daylight attacks prematurely allowing artillery and other friendly supporting arms to be employed with excellent results. Early on the 26th, the 1st Regiment received its heaviest attack as a reinforced enemy battalion was committed to breaking the My Chanh Line. One element of the enemy force almost succeeded in reaching the battalion command post. Ultimately, the attack failed, for by mid-morning, the NVA forces had broken contact, leaving over 200 enemy bodies on the battlefield and stacked around the battalion CP. Two weeks of continuous fighting and heavy losses caused the 66th and 88th NVA Regiments to temporarily retire from the battle area. During May over 2,900 enemy had been killed, 1,080 weapons captured and 64 armored vehicles destroyed or captured.

The month began with chaos above My Chanh, but ended with a strong northern front anchored by the Vietnamese Marine division. The My Chanh Line had been subjected to tremendous pressures and although it bent at times, it was never broken. This was due to responsive supporting arms fire plans, excellent small unit leadership and the courage and tenacity of individual Vietnamese Marines. It was a good month for Marines. On 28 May, on the Emperor’s Walkway in front of the Old Imperial Palace of the ancient capital of Hue Citadel, President Thieu personally promoted Col Lan to brigadier general.

During June the Vietnamese Marines seized the initiative and began a series of limited offensive operations. The first week there was little ground action. On 8 June, Song Than 8-72 was
launched as all brigades advanced north from the My Chanh Line. The Marines, moving forward behind a well-coordinated fire support plan of B-52 strikes, tac-air, naval gunfire and artillery, encountered the heaviest resistance along the coast and Route 555. The operation ended successfully with all brigades having a foothold in southern Quang Tri Province. The Marines lost only nine men while accounting for over 230 enemy killed, 102 weapons and seven tanks or APC's destroyed.

With South Vietnamese forces north of the My Chanh River, ARVN engineers constructed pontoon bridges so armored vehicles could cross back into Quang Tri Province and support the attacking infantry. The tide of battle was slowly, but definitely, turning in favor of the South Vietnamese forces. Another Marine operation, Song Than 8A-72, began on 10 June. The 6th and 7th Battalions moved northwest paralleling the beach. The 7th met only light resistance along the coast. Again the heaviest resistance was encountered along Route 555; a roadway more commonly known to U.S. Marines as "Triple Nickel." Enemy tanks and infantry counterattacks against the 6th Battalion were ineffectual and poorly coordinated, as the NVA still had not been able to organize its armor and infantry units into any semblance of a team effort. With each sighting of tanks, Marine artillery was quick to bring its guns to bear on the enemy armor. (Both Chinese armored personnel carriers and Russian tanks are manufactured with their gasoline tanks on the outside of the vehicle; therefore it is not necessary to achieve a direct hit to disable or set them on fire.) Marine artillery learned to mass its fires on enemy armor and to exploit this basic weakness.

By 27 June the Marine division had pushed the NVA back four kilometers from the My Chanh River. Song Than 8A-72 was completed with 761 enemy killed and eight more tanks destroyed.

June ended with the Vietnamese Marine Corps at its peak combat strength. The infantry battalions were at their highest level ever. In addition, the VNMC recruit training center was operating at maximum capacity, and Marine recruiters had men waiting to enter the Corps. The division's logistical posture was also excellent; almost all the earlier combat losses had been replaced.

I Corp's counter-offensive, Song Than 9-72, with the mission of destroying the North Vietnamese Army and recapturing Quang Tri City, began on 28 June. This was a coordinated two-division attack with the Marines operating generally between the coast and Highway 1. The airborne division maneuvered from the Marines left flank west to the Anamite foothills. Quang Tri City was included in the airborne division's AO. Song Than 9-72 was in full swing, as the month ended, and the NVA were on the defensive in all sectors of the 1 Corps front. During June, 1,515 enemy were killed, 18 armored vehicles were destroyed. The captured column registered 15 POW's, 4 armored vehicles and 550 weapons. Slightly over 150 Vietnamese Marines lost their lives during June.

Throughout July the Marines remained in heavy contact, as 1,880 enemy were killed in action. Enemy material losses were equally heavy as Marines destroyed or captured 51 armored vehicles, seven Russian 37mm anti-aircraft guns, four artillery pieces, a 20-ton ammunition dump and over 1,200 individual weapons.

On the morning of 11 July, the 1st Vietnamese Marine Battalion was helilifted by 28 USMC helicopters into a landing zone 2,000 meters directly north of Quang Tri City. Its mission was to block Route 560 and prevent the enemy from resupplying his units in the Citadel. U.S. Army Air Cavalry gunships led the helicopter waves into the landing zone. Even though the objective area had been struck by extensive preparatory fires, most of the helicopters were hit by enemy ground fire. One CH-53 was struck by an SA-7 heat seeking missile, causing it to burst into flames, killing a full load of Vietnamese Marines.
To secure his tenuous position, Maj Hoa, the battalion commander, personally led his battalion in an assault against the well entrenched enemy. Two more trench lines had to be seized before the perimeter was secure. A USMC naval gunfire spot team officer was hit almost immediately after leaving a helicopter. Capt Lawrence H. Livingston, USMC, the battalion advisor, left his position beside Maj Hoa and moved across the fire-swept rice paddies to carry the wounded lieutenant to safety. Cpl Jose F. Hernandez, USMC, the spot team radio operator, also braved enemy fire to help wounded Vietnamese Marines to safety. He then commenced to call in naval gunfire missions to prevent the NVA from reinforcing. Over 100 Marines lay wounded, but medical evacuation was impossible as the enemy had interdicted the LZ with artillery, mortar and anti-aircraft fire. Three days of heavy fighting were required to permanently close off the enemy's main supply route into Quang Tri City. With the line secure, the first med-evac's were finally accomplished on the evening of 14 July.

On 22 July, another heliborne assault was executed along the coast line about 10 kilometers northeast of Quang Tri City. Again USMC helicopters with the 5th Vietnamese Marine Battalion, landed behind the NVA's main line of resistance. No planes were hit and only moderate contact was encountered in the landing zone. As events turned out this was the last U.S. Marine Corps-supported heliborne operation of the Vietnam War.

The airborne division, keeping abreast on the left flank of the Marines, entered Quang Tri City in early July. But, exhausted and depleted from previous battles at An Loc and the Central Highlands, they could not recapture the City. After several weeks of heavy casualties and limited progress by the paratroopers, the Marine division was ordered to relieve the airborne division and retake Quang Tri City. Brigade 258 received the mission and the in-place relief was completed at 2130, 27 July. Prior to relief, the nearest airborne unit was still 200 meters from the Citadel walls. The last four days of July were devoted to extensive artillery preparation fires on the city, while the enemy countered with substantially increased artillery of its own.

Throughout August, the enemy kept heavy pressure on Brigade 147, just north of the city, as the brigade continued to block Route 560. All enemy supplies entering the city now had to be ferried across the Thach Han River. During the month, Brigade 147 was in contact with all three regiments of the 325th NVA Division, as well as the 27th Independent Regiment. August also found Brigade 258's four infantry battalions devoted to heavy house-to-house fighting around the Citadel. The 3rd Battalion was attacking from the northeast, the 9th and 6th from the southeast and the 1st from the southwest. The enemy kept an almost continuous artillery and mortar barrage falling on the Marine battalions. Over 720 attacks by fire, exceeding 50,000 rounds, struck friendly positions in and around the city. While little progress was gained on the ground, the Vietnamese Marine Corps inflicted heavy casualties in some of the hardest fighting of the war. There were 2,322 enemy killed during the month. However, after 30 days of slow progress, it was apparent that more combat power would be needed to wrest the city from elements of three NVA regiments. Thus, on 8 September, the 1st Ranger Group's three battalions relieved Brigade 147 of its blocking positions north of the City. This enabled Gen Lan to employ two Marine brigades in a direct assault on Quang Tri City. Brigade 258, with its four battalions, continued its attack from the south and southwest. Brigade 147, with the 3rd and 7th Battalions, attacked from the northeast. On 9 September, the final assault on Quang Tri City began. Intensive artillery and tactical air preparations fire were placed on the Citadel and adjacent parts of the city. LtCol Tung, commanding officer, 6th Marine Battalion, set up his forward command post 300 meters south of the southeast corner of the Citadel and there, observing through a small hole in the second floor wall, the USMC advisor coordinated and adjusted over 200 sorties of tactical air on the Citadel.

During the night of 9-10 September a small squad of Marines from the 6th Battalion slipped in and out of the Citadel. Early on the 11th a platoon from the 6th moved over the southeast corner of the wall. The enemy continued to resist fanatically, but the massive supporting arms fires and air strikes, steadily crushed its will to fight. At dawn on 15 September, the 3rd Battalion moved over the northeast corner and joined with the 6th Battalion to clear the east wall of the ancient fortress. Together, they turned west and began to clear the 500 meter-square Citadel. Marines of these battalions, unable to hold back their exuberance, shouted with joy as they swept across the rubble and seized the western wall of the Citadel. At 1700, the Citadel was cleared and in complete control of the Marines. All other enemy resistance collapsed. Quang Tri City was returned to RVN control.

In seven weeks of fanatical fighting, under the unrelenting shelling of enemy artillery and mortars, one of every five Marines had become a combat casualty. South Vietnamese Marines had climbed their mountain. At 1200, 16 September, they raised their nation's scarlet and gold flag over the western gate of the Quang Tri Citadel and, in so doing, gave signal to the world that the South Vietnamese could more than stop the aggressors, they could soundly defeat them. Vietnamese Marines, short in stature, rich in courage, and full of determination, stood tall in the eyes of all Marines.