U.S. Marines In Iraq, 2004-2008: ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cover: U.S. Marines from Company C, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, on patrol in Fallujah during Operation al-Fajr (“Dawn”) in November 2004. The operation, also known as Phantom Fury, was conducted to clear and secure the city in order to prevent it from becoming a center for insurgent activities in Iraq’s al-Anbar Province.

(Photo by LCpl Daniel J. Klein)
U.S. MARINES IN IRAQ, 2004-2008
ANTHOLOGY AND
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Compiled with an Introduction by
Nicholas J. Schlosser

History Division
United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C.
2010
Other Publications in the Series
U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography
U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond
Det One: U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command
Detachment, 2003-2006
Foreword

This anthology presents a collection of 21 articles describing the full range of U.S. Marine Corps operations in Iraq from 2004 to 2008. During this period, the Marines conducted a wide variety of kinetic and non-kinetic operations as they fought to defeat the Iraq insurgency, build stability, and lay the groundwork for democratic governance.

The selections in this collection include journalistic accounts, scholarly essays, and Marine Corps summaries of action. Our intent is to provide a general overview to educate Marines and the general public about this critical period in the history of the U.S. Marine Corps, the United States, and Iraq. Many of the conclusions are provisional and are being updated and revised as new information and archival resources become available. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed overview of where current scholarship on this period currently stands.

The editor of this anthology, Nicholas J. Schlosser, earned his doctorate in history from the University of Maryland in 2008 and has worked as a historian with the Marine Corps History Division since 2009. His research examines U.S. Marine Corps operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom, focusing on irregular warfare, counterinsurgency operations, and the al-Anbar Awakening.

We thank the editors of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Foreign Affairs, Marine Corps Gazette, Military Review, Parameters, New York Times, Survival, Vanity Fair, Osprey Publishing, Potomac Books, William Langewiesche, and the Center for Naval Analysis for permission to reprint articles. Their cooperation has helped make this anthology possible.

C.P. Neimeyer
Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer
Director of Marine Corps History
Preface

The aim of this collection is to provide readers with an overview of how the U.S. Marine Corps confronted the tasks of fighting an insurgency and rebuilding Iraq in its support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2004 through 2008. The period is one of considerable significance in the history of the Marine Corps as it fought in the intense battles of Fallujah, conducted counterinsurgency operations, provided security for elections, and helped build alliances with local tribes in what has come to be known as the al-Anbar Awakening.

The following selections provide a broad overview of all of these events and operations. They include articles on fighting irregular warfare, selections on large-scale kinetic operations such as the battles for Fallujah, and essays on civil affairs operations and the al-Anbar Awakening. The entries in Part I provide contextual information for readers, presenting a broad overview of the events of the Iraq conflict from 2004 through 2008. The selections in Part II explore the theory and doctrine of counterinsurgency. Part III focuses on U.S. Marine Corps operations from 2004 through 2005, with particular attention on the 2004 battles in Fallujah and counterinsurgency operations conducted throughout Iraq’s al-Anbar Province in 2005. Part IV explores civil-military operations and the building of alliances with the tribes of the al-Anbar Province against terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda in Iraq. Part V provides perspectives on the restoration of stability to al-Anbar and thoughts on the consequences of the Awakening on the future of Iraq. The volume concludes with appendices presenting additional information on the commanders and their units, a list of abbreviations that appear in the anthology, a chronology of events, and an annotated bibliography.

This book would not have been possible without the contributions of numerous individuals at the Marine Corps History Division, including Chief Historian Charles D. Melson, Senior Editor Kenneth H. Williams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams, Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, Paul W. Westermeyer, Thomas M. Baughn, Annette D. Amerman, Wanda J. Renfrow, W. Stephen Hill, James M. Caiella, and Colin M. Colbourn. Ms. Renfrow and Mr. Williams edited the volume, with layout and design by Mr. Hill. External to the History Division, we thank Carter A. Malkasian, Aaron B. O’Connell, and Bruce I. Gudmundsson for their input.

Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser
Marine Corps History Division
Table of Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................................................... iii

Preface ............................................................................................................................... v

Introduction: U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2008 ................................................................. 1


Counterinsurgency in Iraq: May 2003-January 2007
Carter A. Malkasian ........................................................................................................ 15

Iraq's Civil War
James D. Fearon ............................................................................................................. 29

Part II: Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare—Observations and Principles ........... 37

Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency
David Kilcullen .................................................................................................................. 39

Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq
Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, USA ................................................................. 49

Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today
Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF ................................................................. 61

Part III: U.S. Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Urban Warfare in Iraq ......................... 73

The Massacre That Wasn’t
Major Alfred B. “Ben” Connable ..................................................................................... 75

I Marine Expeditionary Force Summary of Action
Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command ....................................................... 83

Operation Al Fajr: The Battle of Fallujah—Part II
Lieutenant General John F. Sattler and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel H. Wilson ........... 95

Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?
Jonathan F. Keiler .......................................................................................................... 105
II Marine Expeditionary Force Summary of Action
_U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command_ ................................................................. 111

Efforts to Counter the IED Threat
_Colonel Eric T. Litaker_ .................................................................................. 129

Rules of Engagement
_William Langewiesche_ ................................................................................... 133

Part IV: Building Iraqi Forces, the al-Anbar Awakening, and the Quest to Restore Stability to Iraq ................................................................. 155

The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq
_First Lieutenant Jason R. Goodale and First Lieutenant Jonathan F. Webre_ ........ 157

Will Iraqization Work?
_Carter A. Malkasian_ .......................................................................................... 161

The Anbar Awakening
_Austin G. Long_ ................................................................................................. 179

Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point
_Major Niel Smith, USA, and Colonel Sean B. MacFarland, USA_ ................. 195

Ramadi: From the Caliphate to Capitalism
_Andrew Lubin_ .................................................................................................... 205

Daily Diary of an al-Qaeda Sector Leader
_Abu-Tariq_ ........................................................................................................ 211

Part V: Stability, Progress, and the Future ......................................................... 217

American Exit Increases Optimism in Falluja
_Timothy Williams_ ............................................................................................. 219

The Price of the Surge: How U.S. Strategy is Hastening Iraq's Demise
_Steven N. Simon_ ............................................................................................. 223

When to Leave Iraq: Today, Tomorrow, or Yesterday?
_Colin H. Kahl and William E. Odom_ ................................................................. 233
Appendices

Appendix A
Command List ................................................................. 239

Appendix B
Unit List .............................................................................. 245

Appendix C
Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations .......................... 257

Appendix D
Chronology of Events, 2004-2008 ........................................... 261

Appendix E
Annotated Bibliography .......................................................... 269

When the U.S. Marine Corps began its second deployment to Iraq in the spring of 2004, the Middle Eastern country was in a state of turmoil. An insurgency opposing to the U.S. presence had raged since the summer of 2003, stalling the Coalition Provisional Authority’s efforts to rebuild Iraq and lay the foundations for creating a democratic state. The basic elements needed for building a state—internal security, economic stability, and basic government structures—were in disarray. By 2008 however, observers were beginning to make more optimistic pronouncements. Violence was on the decline, democratic institutions were emerging, and many commentators were anticipating a time when the number of U.S. forces in Iraq could be reduced.

Over the course of the four years from the time that the Marines had begun their second deployment, the Corps contributed to a wide range of efforts to make such hopeful pronouncements possible. The following collection provides readers with an account of these events.

This anthology serves a number of purposes. First, it is an early chronicle of U.S. Marine Corps operations in Iraq from 2004 through 2008. Second, the collection presents a narrative of, and commentary on, the most important events of this period. Finally, the articles provide readers with a window into the most important issues and challenges that the Marines faced during the years following their redeployment to Iraq in 2004.

The War in Iraq

The second war between the United States and Iraq can be divided into two distinct phases. The first, lasting a little over a month from March to April 2003, ended with the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime and the institution of a civilian authority responsible for rebuilding the country and helping to prepare it for self rule along democratic lines. The second phase, beginning almost immediately after the collapse of the regime, was a general insurgency that opposed the Coalition forces. During the course of this insurgency, Iraq erupted into sectarian conflict. The insurgency reached its peak in 2006, leading many to label the conflict a civil war. Although the violence would significantly decline due to developments outlined in this volume, at the time of publication of this anthology, Iraq remains a fragile state with an uncertain future, hindered by internal division and weak civic institutions.

The collapse of the Ba’athist regime was marked by confusion and instability. On 28 and 30 April 2003, mass protests in Fallujah provoked soldiers of the U.S. Army’s 82d Airborne Division to fire into the gatherings, killing more than a dozen civilians. In mid-May 2003, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), L. Paul Bremer III, made a series of decisions that proved to have significant consequences for the future of Iraq and the presence of the United States there. The first was Coalition Provisional Authority order number 1, “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society.” The order purged thousands of experienced civil servants from their posts. Bremer then dissolved the Sunni-dominated Iraq Army. In doing so, the Coalition Provisional Authority hindered reconstruction efforts by removing the one major national force that could maintain security. This action also disenfranchised thousands of soldiers, driving many of the former members of the army underground to take up arms against the Coalition.

The insurgency against the U.S.-led Coalition cannot be understood without examining the critical impact that de-Ba’athification had on Iraqi society. Initially, the George W. Bush administration dismissed the insurgents as
Ba'athist "dead-enders." As Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed S. Hashim, USA, has noted, however, the insurgency had much deeper roots that transcended Ba'athist ideology. The U.S. decision to end the Sunni ascendency and build a Shi'a-dominated federation led many Sunnis to fear retribution, disenfranchisement, and marginalization. The Sunnis' refusal to accept their loss of status, coupled with an increasingly "muscular" response to insurgent attacks on the part of the United States, fanned the flames of the uprising. A broad collection of nationalists, former Ba'athists, and Islamic fundamentalists coalesced around the goal of ending the occupation and removing the United States from Iraq. At the same time, radical groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, the most prominent of which was the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq, sought to build a Sunni-dominated Islamic state. In pursuing their goals, the fundamentalist organizations purposely targeted not only American troops, but also Iraq's Shi'a population.

By the summer of 2003, Iraq was in the grip of a general insurgency. The Coalition Provisional Authority, undermanned in both troops to provide security and civilians to help rebuild the country's infrastructure and civil institutions, was ill-equipped to confront the challenge. The U.S. response was uncoordinated, with all of the major units in the country employing different approaches. Major General Raymond T. Odierno's 4th Infantry Division, USA, favored large-scale sweeps and liberal use of artillery, while Major General David H. Petraeus's 101st Airborne Division, USA, conducted a more measured counterinsurgency that focused on securing the population, using foot patrols through the major urban center of the division's area of operations, the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. While Petraeus's approach ultimately proved more effective, relieving forces were substantially smaller.

It was in this context that the Marines of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) redeployed to Iraq in March 2004. During this period, the majority of Marines deployed were responsible for stability and reconstruction operations throughout Iraq's vast western al-Anbar Province as Multi National Force-West (MNF-W).

The Marines and Irregular Warfare

The U.S. Marine Corps has a legacy of fighting insurgencies that dates back to the Philippine Insurrection at the turn of the 20th century. Since that struggle, Marines have conducted counterinsurgency operations (also called small wars or irregular warfare) in Central America, the Caribbean, and Vietnam. By the 1930s, members of Congress and the Department of the Navy began to see military intervention and the waging of these small wars as the Marine Corps' primary mission. Nevertheless, the legacy of the Marine Corps' experience in Central America, Vietnam, and other regions is elusive. Historian Allan R. Millett noted about the Corps' experience in the 1920s that "as the U.S. Army had learned in an earlier era, pacification campaigns were not popular in the United States." The Marines were often deployed as if they were auxiliaries of the Department of State, sent to unstable states to restore order. Ultimately, the Corps' involvement in Central America during the 1920s and 1930s was overshadowed by the legacy of large-scale operations and battles of World War II and the Korean War. The failures in Vietnam also overshadowed a number of Marine Corps counterinsurgency innovations used during that conflict, such as the Combined Action Program. By 2003, the Marine Corps was largely known for large-scale maneuver operations and amphibious landings, not for its involvement in small wars.

Nevertheless, the Marine Corps has a long tradition of not only battling insurgencies, but also conceiving and implementing important contributions to counterinsurgency doctrine. The Small Wars Manual, first published in 1935 and revised in 1940, synthesized nearly half a century of experience in combating insurgencies. It proved prescient in its assessment of the nature and character of irregular warfare. When considered alongside the recently published Army and Marine manual, Counterinsurgency, drawn up...
during the years immediately following the outbreak of the Iraqi insurgency, the similarities are striking. Both stress the primacy of the political dimension to counterinsurgencies. Both manuals emphasize the need to understand the culture of the local population and contend that cultural immersion and understanding are critical requirements for waging successful counterinsurgency operations. Consequently, both documents point to the importance of conducting effective civil-military operations.

The general argument pervading both the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual and Counterinsurgency is that the military must not engage the enemy in insurgencies in the same way that it would battle the enemy during regular warfare. Small wars are a decidedly different type of warfare and require a different array of principles and techniques from those used in regular warfare. This principle echoed through essays and articles on irregular warfare published between 2004 and 2008. For example, the primary goal of David Kilcullen’s essay “Twenty-Eight Articles” was to overturn preconceptions. Among his assertions were that “rank is nothing; talent is everything,” “small is beautiful,” “local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves,” and “fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces.” Similarly, General Petraeus argued in an article published in 2006 that commanders need “to remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants, the relatively junior commissioned or noncommissioned officers who often have to make huge decisions, sometimes with life-or-death as well as strategic consequences, in the blink of an eye.” At the same time, counterinsurgency theorists also argued that a back-to-basics, boots-on-the-ground approach was not the only means for waging counterinsurgency operations. In an essay on air power and its utility in irregular warfare, Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF, noted that precision bombing and technologically advanced, unmanned drones could play a critical role in supporting native forces and acquiring intelligence.

The dialogue that has taken place in publications such as Marine Corps Gazette, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Parameters, and Military Review over the past six years has focused on the need to overcome the tendencies and preconceptions of conventional warfare and to embrace a type of combat operations radically different from large-scale regular warfare. This debate has dominated military thinking since the end of conventional warfare operations in Iraq in 2003.

The period from 2004 through 2008 was marked by innovation and adaptation. As Carter A. Malkasian relates in his overview of the insurgency in Iraq, the U.S. efforts in Iraq have gone from heavy-handed tactics favoring liberal use of firepower and search-and-destroy operations to small-scale security operations that focus on foot patrols, intelligence gathering, and engaging the Iraqi population. During this period, U.S. forces have developed a variety of strategies and tactics for combating insurgencies, including building civic institutions and forging alliances with regional tribes.

The selections in Part III of this anthology, “U.S. Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Urban Warfare in Iraq,” show that counterinsurgency, though waged on a smaller scale, is no less violent, dangerous, or decisive than large-scale maneuver warfare. Nowhere was this clearer than during the two battles of Fallujah.

In the words of Malkasian, the Iraqi insurgency would “explode” during the spring and summer of 2004. Anti-Coalition attacks, which numbered around 200 a week at the beginning of 2004, jumped to 500 a week during the summer. Two major events, both of which involved the Marines of I MEF, marked this transition. The first was the first battle of Fallujah, fought in Sunni-dominated al-Anbar Province in April of 2004. The second was the Mahdi uprising, led by the Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Shortly after the beginning of I MEF’s redeployment, four U.S. contractors from the security firm Blackwater USA were murdered and their bodies mutilated in the city of Fallujah. Although I MEF’s commander, Lieutenant General James T. Conway, argued against a large-scale retaliatory assault on the city, higher headquarters ordered I MEF to launch an offen-
sive against the city to clear it of insurgents. Within days, public outrage throughout Iraq against civilian casualties led the U.S. government to halt the offensive. Within weeks, the city became a stronghold for insurgent operations.

The first battle of Fallujah demonstrated Kilcullen’s dictum that destroying enemy combatants does not necessarily destroy the insurgency. Carter A. Malkasian’s piece, “Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of Fallujah,” and Major Alfred B. “Ben” Connable’s “The Massacre that Wasn’t” argue that Fallujah illustrates the difference between counterinsurgency and regular warfare operations. In his essay, Malkasian considered the serious setback dealt the U.S. military when it suspended operations against insurgents in Fallujah. Despite its superior military force, he believes that the U.S. suffered a critical defeat in April 2004. Malkasian argues that this was due to the lack of consideration for the nonmilitary factors needed to succeed against an insurgency:

U.S. civilian and military leaders were not mistaken regarding the importance of signaling resolve. However, these leaders were mistaken that military force alone was the best course for signaling resolve. Military force can escalate violence by oppressing the population. Resolve will not be signaled if the costs of escalation preclude an offensive’s completion.

Thus, echoing the language of the Small Wars Manual and anticipating that of the Counterinsurgency manual, Malkasian contends that a mixture of military and nonmilitary tactics must be deployed to achieve political victory against an insurgency. Military force cannot achieve victory when fighting an insurgency unless it is combined with a respect for how that military operation is understood and perceived by both the enemy and civilian population as a whole.

One challenge that Malkasian argues Marines were initially unprepared for was combating the insurgents’ information offensive. As Connable’s essay illustrates, the information battlefield was a critical theater of the struggle for Fallujah. Taking full advantage of the Internet and world media, the insurgency was able to use stories of civilian casualties incurred in the battle to inflame opinion throughout Iraq, and the world, against the Marine offensive. Both Connable and Malkasian agree that the failure to win the information war crippled the Marine offensive, despite its superior military force. Outrage among Iraqis, the Iraqi provisional government, and Great Britain, pressured Bremer to halt the operation out of fear that continuing it would destroy the still-fragile reconstruction efforts in the country.

A steady increase in violence against Coalition forces in Iraq continued in the summer of 2004. In August, Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, with support from U.S. Army and Iraqi Army units, defeated al-Sadr’s militia forces in an-Najaf and opened the way for a negotiated settlement between al-Sadr and the Shi’a cleric Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. At the same time, insurgents in Anbar continued to transform Fallujah into a base of operations and stronghold. It became increasingly apparent that a second offensive would be necessary. In November, I MEF, under its new commander, Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, launched a second assault, drawing upon the lessons from the first engagement there.

The second battle of Fallujah, fought in November and December 2004, demonstrated the Marine Corps’ ability to learn from past experience and adapt. For example, the Marines skillfully used psychological operations to encourage the residents to vacate the city before the attack began. As a result, fewer than 500 residents remained when the Marines began their assault on 8 November with Operation Phantom Fury, renamed Operation al-Fajr (Dawn) at the behest of the Iraqi government. The fighting was the most intense faced by the Marines up to this point in the war. As Lieutenant General Sattler and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel H. Wilson recounted, “The fighting was intense, close, and personal, the likes of which has been experienced on just a few occa-
sions since the battle of Hue City in the Vietnam War.⁵² By December, the city had been cleared of insurgents and secured. By January, residents were already returning to Fallujah.

Yet despite the clear victory against the insurgency, the legacy of both battles was mixed. As Jonathan F. Keiler relates in "Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?", the two battles demonstrated the paradoxical nature of counterinsurgency operations. In answering the question posed by his title, he notes the distinction between tactical and strategic victories:

Was the battle of Fallujah a victory or a defeat? The Marine Corps' military operations in urban terrain doctrine recognizes that tactical success does not necessarily translate to strategic victory. It notes the Israeli's tactical victory in Beirut was a strategic defeat—and observes the same about the Battle of Hue in the Vietnam War, when Marines defeated an enemy that sought to put up a good fight but never expected to win.²⁶

Seeing both battles of Fallujah as a continuous struggle for the city, Keiler concludes that the victory in Fallujah was a Pyrrhic one, commenting that "the Battle of Fallujah was not a defeat—but we cannot afford many more victories like it."²⁷ Marines achieved a major victory against the insurgency in November 2004. But in many ways, it was a battle that had to be fought because of the inability to achieve a sustainable victory in April 2004.

The battles of Fallujah represent some of the largest and most intense fights of the Iraq War. However, as the unit summaries produced by the II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) during its tour from the winter of 2005 to the winter of 2006 demonstrate, counterinsurgency often entailed much smaller operations and did not always involve combat. Throughout 2005, II MEF conducted a number of critical operations such as Matador, Iron Fist, and Steel Curtain aimed at neutralizing insurgents, securing Iraq's western border, and preventing insurgent fighters from crossing from Syria and Jordan into Iraq. Marine units helped build Iraqi security forces, forged relationships with local leaders, and participated in the construction of democratic institutions. At the same time, Marines developed new means to confront the rudimentary, yet lethal, weapons used by insurgents, such as the improvised explosive device (IED). Colonel Eric T. Litaker's essay explores one of these developments, the IED Working Group. As Litaker argues, the challenge of the IED is not just one confronted by engineers, but also intelligence operatives. Most importantly, Litaker contends that there is no single method for confronting these explosive devices. "There is no 'silver bullet' in sight. For the foreseeable future, the key to defeating the IED threat will almost certainly be a combination of technology, [tactics, techniques, procedures], and an offensive mindset."²⁸ The lack of a "silver bullet" in many ways characterizes counterinsurgency operations as a whole.

The urban battlefield during an insurgency is marked by tension, confusion, and uncertainty. It is often difficult to determine friend from foe and civilians from insurgents. The stresses and consequences of fighting an urban insurgency are illustrated by the events in Haditha. On 5 November 2005, insurgents attacked a Marine convoy from Company K of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, in the town of Haditha. In the course of the attack, a land mine destroyed a Humvee, killing one Marine and seriously wounding two others. The progression of subsequent events is still unclear, although in the end, Marines from Company K killed 24 Iraqi civilians.²⁹ William Langewiesche's examination considers the complexities and ambiguities of the incident, exploring the morning's events in close detail.³⁰ His study weighs the intense challenges and stresses of conducting counterinsurgency operations. As he writes, casting accusations and blame only blur and confuse attempts to reconstruct what occurred:

The events that followed will never be reconstructed completely, no matter what the courts may find. Through the dust and noise on that Haditha street, they played
out in a jumble of semi-autonomous actions, complicated by perceptions that had been narrowed by the attack and further confused by the ambiguities associated with fighting a guerrilla war on foreign ground. Some of the Marines may have suspected that a line had been crossed, and that crimes might have been committed, but in the urgency of the moment it would have seemed less likely then it seems now, and even today the principal view of those involved is anger that the accusations are cheap, and that Kilo Company has been unfairly singled out.31

As of this writing, the court proceedings involving the Haditha case are ongoing. A report produced by the U.S. military in 2007 concluded that Marine commanders had been negligent in adequately and publicly investigating the events.32 At the same time, seven of the eight Marines charged for the incident have either been acquitted or had the charges against them dropped.33

The important consequence of Haditha was its impact upon the overall U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. Even though it was the exception and not the rule to the behavior and efforts of the Marine Corps throughout Anbar Province, isolated incidents such as Haditha (and their treatment in the mass media) were a critical setback to U.S. efforts in Iraq. The failure of U.S. commanders in Iraq to effectively and openly investigate the incident further damaged U.S. forces in the eyes of the Iraqi people. As the field manual Counterinsurgency asserted, "At its core, COIN [counterinsurgency] is a struggle for the population's support."34 Incidents such as Haditha threatened to undermine this goal.

In 2006, the insurgency against the Coalition forces escalated to a level that many have described as a civil war. On 22 February 2006, al-Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Askariya Mosque in Samarra. The structure, also known as the "Golden" Mosque, was a sacred site of considerable significance for Shi’a Muslims. By attacking it, al-Qaeda hoped to spark sectarian violence in the region. Shi’a militias retaliated against Sunni insurgents in Baghdad.35 Political scientist James D. Fearon equated the civil war with similar sectarian conflicts in Turkey and Lebanon and noted the complicity of the Iraqi government in the conflict. "As the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad proceeds, the weak Shiite-dominated government is inevitably becoming an open partisan in a nasty civil war between Sunni and Shi’ite Arabs."36 In Iraq, Sunnis and Shi’a sought for dominance in the country. Meanwhile, outside forces such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, Iran, and Syria sought to establish their own spheres of influence in the fractured state. The United States quickly became just one of an array of actors in a conflict that was becoming increasingly more complex and violent.

In early 2007, President Bush announced a change in U.S. policy in Iraq. Known as "the surge," the strategy called for a significant increase in U.S. forces in Iraq and a new commander, counterinsurgency expert General Petraeus.37 For the Marines and soldiers in the Anbar Province, however, the surge did not have the same impact as it did in the rest of Iraq. For Multi National Force-West, the most significant development after 2005 was not the surge, but the al-Anbar Awakening.

Initially, the United States focused its efforts on rebuilding the Iraqi Army as a means of restoring security to the country. One means for achieving this was the combined action program, or CAP. Developed by the Corps in the 1960s to build effective military forces in South Vietnam, the program had been phased out when Marines left Southeast Asia in 1971. Combining a platoon of Marine advisors with two squads of Iraqi soldiers, the CAP was a unique approach to building an Iraqi military. In their article, "The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq," First Lieutenant Jason R. Goodale and First Lieutenant Jonathan F. Webre recount the development of one such force in 2004, the 3d Platoon, Company G, Task Force 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 7.38

The building of an Iraqi Army ultimately proved to be a less effective means of what came to be called Iraqization than U.S. com-
manders had hoped. Many Sunnis avoided serving in the Shi'a-dominated army for fear of marginalization and discrimination. The creation of professional police forces proved to be a more fruitful means of Iraqization, particularly among the tribal groups in al-Anbar Province. Despite the potential that strengthening local police units could weaken national unity, the construction of regional units helped overcome Sunni fears of marginalization and disenfranchisement.

As Austin G. Long relates in his essay, “The Anbar Awakening,” Iraq’s tribes have constituted an important element in Iraqi and Anbari political culture and society since the rule of the Ottomans. Under the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, the Hashemite monarchy, and the Ba'athist dictatorship, Anbar Province was dominated by familial groups ranging from households to clans to tribes. At different times throughout Iraq’s history, Iraq’s rulers forged power-sharing agreements with these tribes as a means of securing the loyalty and support of the Anbar Province. By the time of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, the tribal system was in a state of decline. However, with the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime in 2003 and the collapse of centralized state authority during the occupation, the tribes of Anbar quickly filled the power vacuum in the region.

Initially, many of the tribes in al-Anbar Province participated in the insurgency. However, a rivalry emerged between fundamentalist religious groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Anbar tribes for control of the province. Seeing the tribes’ local, provincial outlook to be at odds with their own anti-nationalist, religiously radical goals, al-Qaeda in Iraq made an attempt to undermine the tribes’ power. Al-Qaeda in Iraq attempted to take over the chief sources of revenue in the region—smuggling and banditry—and waged a campaign of intimidation and murder against tribal leaders. Meanwhile, by 2006, domestic opinion in the United States had turned decisively against the U.S. presence in Iraq. Many local leaders feared that a potentially imminent U.S. withdrawal would leave them vulnerable to al-Qaeda.

Thus, a collection of factors came together in 2006 that made change possible. With al-Qaeda in Iraq’s power growing, many of the Anbar tribal leaders concluded that the United States was the lesser of the two evils and consequently began to forge alliances with U.S. forces in order to expel the fundamentalist fighters from the province. One of the chief instigators of this alliance was Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha of the Albu Risha tribe. Launching a general campaign against the al-Qaeda fighters in September of 2006, Sattar formed the Anbar Salvation Council, which became the prototype for Awakening councils created throughout Anbar Province. A detailed picture of these developments, from both Iraqi and U.S. military perspectives (with an emphasis on the roles played by U.S. Marines), can be found in a two-volume set of interviews published by Marine Corps University Press in 2009.

In the capital of the Anbar Province, ar-Ramadi, the 1st Brigade of the U.S. Army 1st Armored Division, a joint unit under Multi National Force-West, forged alliances with the major tribal groups in the region and encouraged them to serve in the local police forces. These efforts are described in articles by Andrew Lubin and by the 1st Brigade’s commanding officer, Colonel Sean B. MacFarland, USA (with Major Niel Smith, USA). The Anbar Awakening demonstrates the full scope of successful counterinsurgency strategy. On one hand, attempts to encourage members of the Anbari tribes to serve in the local police forces represented efforts at engagement and building provincial security forces. By focusing on regional, rather than national, forces, the U.S. was able to create a security and intelligence apparatus more in tune with and trusted by the local populace. On the other hand, this could not have been accomplished without operations eliminating insurgent military forces conducted by units such as the 1st Battalion of the 6th Marines. Throughout the fall of 2006, the unit targeted areas of Ramadi under the control of al-Qaeda in Iraq, established regular foot patrols, built an intelligence gathering apparatus, and established the broadcast service Voice of
Ramadi as a means of providing accurate information about U.S. and Iraqi efforts against al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Marines of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, thus conducted kinetic and non-kinetic operations concurrently, demonstrating that effective counterinsurgency relies on a synergy between the outside military force and regional soldiers and civilians.

By 2008, Anbar Province had largely been secured, a marked difference from the situation in 2005-2006 when it was one of the most dangerous and violent regions in the country. A diary recovered from an al-Qaeda in Iraq fighter describes the sudden collapse of support once enjoyed by the group. In the course of a month, the fighter relates how his organization lost a substantial number of members and the basic resources to continue fighting. He attributes the cause for this decline to the Awakening councils. Cities like Fallujah, once the stronghold of the insurgency, became symbols of progress. As Timothy Williams wrote in the New York Times in October 2008:

This month, as the last American marines prepare to leave Camp Falluja, the sprawling base a few miles outside of town where many of the American troops who fought the two battles were stationed, Falluja has come to represent something unexpected: the hope that an Iraqi town once at the heart of the insurgency can become a model for peace without the United States military.

Such an optimistic appraisal was due largely to the agreements forged between Marines, soldiers, and Iraqi tribes throughout Anbar Province. An observer looking at Iraq in 2008 had reason to be optimistic. Violent attacks were down, and a semblance of stability had returned to the country for the first time since the 2003 invasion. Nevertheless, the "surge" and Awakening were not without their critics. Scholars such as Steven N. Simon have noted that while the strategies employed by the United States may have brought short-term stability, the United States may have sacrificed long-term prospects for Iraqi unity in pursuing them. Writing on the tribal alliances in a mid-2008 article, Simon asserted that they may have reduced violence, but that they "had done so by stoking the three forces that have traditionally threatened the stability of Middle Eastern states: tribalism, warlordism, and sectarianism." Simon argued that a new, multinational strategy that favors "reconciliation from above" as opposed to the bottom-up approach of the Anbar alliances is necessary if the United States is to preserve Iraq as a state and not allow it to succumb civil war.

Not all analysts share Simon’s pessimistic outlook. Colin H. Kahl and William E. Odom, in response to Simon’s piece, observed that “tribalism will not be subdued in a couple of years, or even a couple of decades.” However, even though they argue that Simon “ultimately draws the wrong lessons for U.S. policy moving forward,” Kahl and Odom were in agreement that the prospects for Iraq’s future remain uncertain. Referring to Iraq’s sectarian divides, the authors contended in their mid-2008 piece that “these divides are unlikely to be bridged by any means other than a civil war fought to a decisive conclusion. This reality indicates that Iraq’s eventual rulers are not now in the Green Zone, and when they one day occupy the capital, all foreign elements will be gone.” Thus, while the Anbar Awakening and surge did much to restore order and stability to Iraq, there is little agreement on what the consequences of these strategies will be over time.

The Selections

The story of the U.S. Marine Corps in Iraq from 2004 through 2008 is one of change and adaptation. The Iraq insurgency and the Coalition reconstruction efforts constituted new challenges that necessitated innovations. Some of these, such as the Combined Action Program and engagement with the local populace, drew upon the Corps’ long tradition of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. Others, such as use of the mass media and the Internet, looked to the future. The stability and security achieved in
Iraq by 2008 is a testament to the efforts and innovations of Marines and soldiers alike throughout Iraq, and in Anbar Province especially.

This collection has been assembled for Marines, national security advisers, scholars, and general readers to provide them with a preliminary resource on the Corps' experience in Iraq in the 2004-2008 time frame. The selections highlight the challenges, innovations, and accomplishments of the Corps as Marines fought to establish security and stability in western Iraq.

As this anthology is being assembled, U.S. forces are still stationed in Iraq. Furthermore, the prospects for the country's future remain uncertain. Assumptions about the causes, course, and consequences of the Iraq War continue to be questioned and revised at an almost daily rate. Much of the official documentary record remains classified. Events such as the Haditha shootings of November 2005 are still being investigated, and the ability to acquire adequate information about them is hindered by legal proceedings. As a consequence, much of the analysis and many of the conclusions herein are provisional. The pieces presented here nevertheless provide an early look into these events.

The selections are not confined to academic works, but include a wide range of texts, ranging from scholarly analyses of the war in Iraq (Malkasian, Fearon, and Long), articles published in military journals (Petraeus, Connable, Sattler and Wilson, Keiler, Litaker, Lubin, Petraeus, Goodale, Dunlap, Smith and MacFarland, and Kilcullen), and articles written for a mass audience (Langewiesche, Williams, Simon, and Kahl and Odom). The collection also presents several documents, including two official action summaries produced by I Marine Expeditionary Force and II Marine Expeditionary Force and a diary recovered from a member of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Appendixes includes a chronology of events, a list of units deployed as part of the Multi National Force-West between 2004 and 2006, and an annotated bibliography, which covers the most relevant literature to date on the Marine Corps in Iraq from 2004 through 2008. It is the hope of the editor that these resources will be of value to readers as they seek to learn about the experiences of the U.S. Marines in Iraq and their contributions to the Coalition efforts in that country.

Notes


5. Ricks, Fiasco, 164-65.


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid., 243.

12. Ibid., 263.
19. Ibid., 244-46.
20. According to LtGen Conway in a 2005 interview, “I went to certain levels in the chain of command to try to determine where this was coming from. . . . I felt the Army could be fairly heavy-handed, and I wanted to make sure this just wasn’t CJTF-7 telling us we had to attack. In fact, it came from higher than that.” CWO-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and LtCol Kurtis P. Wheeler, eds., *Al-Anbar Awakening. Volume 1: American Perspectives: U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 50.
25. Ibid., 21.
27. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
34. MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-28.
41. Ibid., 77.
43. Andrew Lubin, “Ramadi: From the Caliphate to Capitalism,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Apr08, 54-61; Maj Niel Smith (USA) and Col Sean B. MacFarland (USA), “Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” *Military Review*, Mar-Apr08, 41-52. See also the interview with MacFarland in McWilliams and Wheeler, *Al-Anbar Awakening*, 1:177-85, as well as interviews with two
Marines assigned to MacFarland's team, LtCol William M. Jurney (1:187-99) and Maj Daniel R. Zappa (1:201-10).

44. For a summary of how these forces were created, see the PowerPoint presentation created by Capt Davis Patriquin reproduced in Smith and MacFarland, "Anbar Awakens," 48.


49. Ibid.


51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.