Rotation

Even as the 1st Marine Division became more heavily engaged along the Jamestown Line, replacements had to be absorbed, not only for the growing number of killed and wounded, but also for those whose tours of duty in Korea were ending. In the spring of 1952, for example, the division transferred elsewhere 433 officers and 6,280 enlisted Marines, while adding 506 officers and 7,359 men. The greater number of replacements kept the division slightly above authorized strength.

At this time, a normal tour of duty in Korea encompassed about 10 and one-half months. Infantry lieutenants and captains arrived in such large numbers, however, that a six-month tour became common for these officers, although those in other grades and specialties might continue to serve from nine to twelve months. The turnover among officers, plus reassignments within the division, had mixed results. Although changing assignments every three to five months reduced the effectiveness of the division, the policy broadened the experience of officers, individually and as a group. In the summer of 1952, however, the division chose efficiency over experience and reduced the frequency of reassignments among its officers.

Replacement drafts did not always fill existing vacancies. Indeed, for a time in 1952 the 11th Marines had to retrain infantry officers for artillery duty. Moreover, skilled drivers and gunners for the M-46 tank proved scarce until the training programs at Camp Pendleton, California, could be expanded.

Similar problems affected the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing where tours of duty averaged six to nine months for pilots and 10 to 12 months for non-fliers. As in the division, rotation between Korea and the United States and reassignment within the wing affected efficiency. The turnover in pilots got the blame for a series of accidents on the escort carrier Bataan, even though the new arrivals had requalified to fly from a carrier. Moreover, the wing’s Marine Air Control Group 2 operated a formal course to train forward air controllers, and recently arrived pilots with rusty skills underwent informal refresher training. A scarcity of aircraft mechanics and electronics technicians persisted.
place had to guard against attack at any time and patrol aggressively by night. Another explanation of the lagging program of bunker construction blamed the training received by the Marines, who learned to emphasize the attack at the expense, perhaps, of defensive preparations. Whatever the reasons, Marine bunkers, as well as those manned by American soldiers, did not measure up to the standards of the Chinese, who provided as much as 35 feet of overhead cover for frontline positions, which usually were linked by tunnels rather than trenches.

The fighting along the Jamestown Line grew even deadlier. Shortly after midnight on 9 August, the Chinese seized Siberia (Hill 58A), the site of a squad-size outpost, and also probed the positions of the 1st Marines. Siberia lay midway between the Marine main line of resistance and the line of Chinese outposts. The enemy’s possession of Siberia would provide observation posts to adjust artillery and mortar fire against the nearest segment of the Jamestown Line. As a result, Colonel Walter F. Layer’s 1st Marines, on the right of the division’s line, counterattacked at once, using the same unit, Company E, 2d Battalion, that had dispatched the squad driven from Siberia. Chinese artillery and mortar fire, directed from Hills 110 and 120, stopped the counterattack short of its objective.

The Marines called for air strikes and additional artillery fire before renewing the counterattack on Siberia. At 0650, four Grumman F9F jets from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing struck, dropping napalm and 500-pound bombs. Shortly before 1000, Air Force F-80 jets dropped 1,000-pounders, and a platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, the regimental reserve of the 1st Marines, immediately stormed the hill, with the support of a platoon from the 2d Battalion’s Company E. The Chinese again cut loose with mortars and artillery but could not stop the assault, which seized the crest. The supporting platoon from Company E joined in organizing the defense of the recaptured outpost, which came under a deadly torrent of accurate fire that forced the Marines to seek the protection of the reverse slope, nearer their main line of resistance, where they held out until mid-afternoon before falling back. The enemy’s artillery and mortars had fired an estimated 5,000 rounds, wounding or killing perhaps three-fourths of the Marines who had attacked Siberia on the morning of 9 August.

While Companies E and A reorganized, the task of recapturing Siberia fell to Company C, commanded by Captain Casimir C. Ksyczewski, who attacked with two platoons starting uphill at 0116. A firefight erupted, lasting four
Col Walter F. Layer, a veteran of the battles for Saipan, Tinian, and Okinawa, assumed command of the 1st Marines in July. He would later serve as the senior advisor to the Korean Marine Corps.

hours, but the Marines gained the crest and held it until dawn, when driven from Siberia by a Chinese counterattack.

The losses suffered by the 1st Marines, 17 killed and 243 wounded within 30 hours, convinced Colonel Layer that his regiment could not hold Siberia if Hill 122, nicknamed Bunker Hill, remained in Chinese hands. He and his staff planned a sudden thrust at Bunker Hill, possession of which would enable his command to dominate Siberia and observe movement beyond the Chinese outpost line.

**Fight for Bunker Hill**

To disguise the true objective, Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Batterton attacked Siberia at dusk on 11 August with one company from his 2d Battalion. The 1st Tank Battalion supported the maneuver with four M-46 tanks (M-26 tank with a new engine and transmission), each mounting a 90mm gun and an 18-inch searchlight fitted with shutter to highlight a target in a brief burst of illumination, and four M-4A3E8 tanks, each carrying both a flamethrower and a 105mm howitzer. While the 90mm weapons hammered Hill 110, the flame-throwing tanks climbed Siberia, using bursts of flame to light their way while demoralizing the defenders, and gained the crest before doubling back toward Marine lines. As the flame-throwing M-4s withdrew, the M-46s opened fire on both Siberia and Hill 110, illuminating targets with five-second bursts of light from their shuttered searchlights, and Captain George W. Campbell's Company D overran Siberia, holding the crest until midnight when the diversionary attack ended.

The Bunker Hill assault force, Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines—commanded by Captain Sereno S. Scranton, Jr., and under the operational control of Batterton's 2d Battalion—reached the crest by 2230 and began driving the enemy from the slope nearest the division's main line of resistance. The defenders recovered from their initial surprise, but the bypassed pockets of Chinese soldiers, though they tried to resist, could not check the Marine advance. In the wake of the assault force, other Marines and members

Marines crouch in a trench during the fighting for Siberia and other nearby hills. The struggle was fierce; some Chinese refused to yield and fought to their death. Most briefly held their defensive positions before retiring.
most of the casualties. Of the Korean Service Corps manhandled sandbags, wire, and shovels up the hill to help Company B organize the defenses of the objective against the counterattack that was certain to come.

Chinese mortars and artillery harassed the Marines on Bunker Hill until dawn on 12 August, but the counterattack did not come until mid-afternoon, after Company B passed under the operational control of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. The defense of Bunker Hill became the responsibility of the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gerard T. Armitage, whose Marines faced a demanding test. The volume and accuracy of the shelling increased at about 1500, a barrage that lasted an hour and forced the Marines to seek the protection from direct fire afforded by the reverse slope. Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, commanded by Captain Howard J. Connolly, reinforced Scranton's embattled Company B in time to help break up an attack by some 350 Chinese and hold the southern slope of Bunker Hill.

While the battle raged on Bunker Hill, General Selden moved his reserves closer to the fighting. Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, took the place of Connolly's company on the main line of resistance, and by the end of the day, all of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, had come under the operational control of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Selden attached the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, to Layer's command to strengthen the reserve of the 1st Marines. Meanwhile, Layer moved two provisional platoons from his reserve, the 1st Battalion, to reinforce the 3d Battalion, and the 3d Battalion's reconnaissance platoon established an outpost on Hill 124, linking Bunker Hill with the main line of resistance. This shuffling of units proved necessary because the 1st Marine Division was so thinly spread over an extended front. During the realignment, supporting weapons, ranging from machine guns through mortars and artillery to rocket batteries, prepared to box in the Marines holding the near slope of Bunker Hill, hammer the Chinese at the crest.
and beyond, protect the flanks, and harass movement on the routes enemy reinforcements would have to use.

As daylight faded into dusk on 12 August, the Marines defending the reverse slope of Bunker Hill struggled to improve their hurriedly prepared fortifications, for the Chinese preferred to counterattack under cover of darkness. Fortunately, the comparatively gentle incline of the reverse slope of the ridge that culminated in Bunker Hill reduced the amount of dead space that could not be covered by grazing fire from the Marine position. Moreover, weapons on the Jamestown Line could fire directly onto the crest, when the expected attack began. By 2000, all the supporting weapons had registered to help the two companies hold the position.

Just as the Marines had attacked Siberia on the evening of 11 August to divert attention from Bunker Hill, the Chinese sought to conceal the timing of their inevitable counterthrust. Shortly before midnight on the night of 12 August, the enemy probed the division’s sector at three points. While one Chinese patrol was stumbling into an ambush set by Korean Marines, another harried a Marine outpost east of Bunker Hill. The third and strongest blow, however, landed after midnight at Stromboli, a Marine outpost on Hill 48A at the far right of the sector held by Layer’s regiment, near the boundary with the 5th Marines.

In conjunction with the attack on Stromboli, launched in the early hours of August 13, the Chinese hit Company F on the right of the line held by the 1st Marines. The Chinese failed to crack the Jamestown defenses, but they inflicted so many casualties at Stromboli that reinforcements had to be sent. The reinforcing unit, a squad from Company F, came under mortar and machine gun fire from the Chinese probing Company F’s defenses and had to return to the main line of resistance. Pressure against Stromboli and its defenders continued until the commander of Company F, Captain Clarence G. Moody, Jr., sent a stronger force that fought its way to the outpost, breaking the Chinese encirclement. The 5th Marines moved one company into a blocking position behind the Jamestown Line near Stromboli in case the fighting again flared at that outpost.

Some 4,500 yards to the southwest, the Chinese attempted to seize Bunker Hill. At about 0100 on the morning of 13 August, savage Chinese artillery and mortar fire persuaded Captain Connolly of Company I to request box-me-in fires, which the 11th Marines provided immediately. Enemy infantry, supported by machine gun fire, advanced behind bursting shells, but the Marines fought back with every weapon they could bring to bear—artillery, mortars, tank guns, rockets, rifles, and automatic weapons. After almost four hours, the violence abated as the enemy relaxed his pressure on Bunker Hill.

Company G, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, under Captain William M. Vanzuyen, joined Connolly’s men before the Chinese broke off the action and withdrew behind a screen of artillery and mortar fire. Except for a determined few, whom the Marines killed, the enemy abandoned Bunker Hill. Colonel Layer took advantage of the lull to send Company H, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, to relieve the Marines holding the hill. He afterward withdrew all the other elements of the 7th Marines that had reinforced his regiment, but not until a patrol from Company I had reconnoitered the far slope of the hill.

In keeping with their usual tactics, the Chinese tried to divert attention from Bunker Hill before
Staff Sergeant William E. Shuck, Jr.

Born in 1926 in Cumberland, Maryland, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1947. Serving as a machine gun squad leader with Company G, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, he was killed near Panmunjom on 3 July 1952. His Medal of Honor award bore a citation which reads, in part:

When his platoon was subjected to a devastating barrage of enemy small-arms, grenade, artillery, and mortar fire during an assault against strongly fortified hill positions well forward to the main line of resistance, Staff Sergeant Shuck, although painfully wounded, refused medical attention and continued to lead his machine-gun squad in the attack. Unhesitatingly assuming command of a rifle squad when the leader became a casualty, he skillfully organized the two squads into an attacking force and led two more daring assaults upon the hostile positions. Wounded a second time, he steadfastly refused evacuation and remained in the foremost position under heavy fire until assured that all dead and wounded were evacuated. [He was] mortally wounded by an enemy sniper bullet while voluntarily assisting in the removal of the last casualty.

After the war, enlisted quarters at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia, were named in his honor.

Hospital Corpsman John E. Kilmer

A native of Highland Park, Illinois, 22-year-old Kilmer enlisted in the Navy from Texas in 1947. He was assigned to duty with 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Korea and was killed on 13 August 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

With his company engaged in defending a vitally important hill position, well forward of the main line of resistance, during an assault by large concentrations of hostile troops, HC Kilmer repeatedly braved intense enemy mortar, artillery, and sniper fire to move from one position to another, administering aid to the wounded and expediting their evacuation. Painfully wounded himself when struck by mortar fragments, while moving to the aid of a casualty, he persisted in his efforts and inched his way to the side of the stricken Marine through a hail of enemy shells falling around him. Undaunted by the devastating hostile fire, he skillfully administered first aid to his comrade and, as another mounting barrage of enemy fire shattered the immediate area, unhesitatingly shielded the wounded man with his body.

Private First Class Robert E. Simanek

Born in Detroit, Michigan, in 1930, he was inducted into the Marine Corps in 1951. For his bravery in Korea on 17 August 1952, while serving with Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, he was awarded a Medal of Honor with a citation which reads, in part:

While accompanying a patrol en route to occupy a combat outpost forward of friendly lines, Private Class Simanek exhibited a high degree of courage and resolute spirit of self-sacrifice in protecting the lives of his fellow Marines. With his unit ambushed by an intense concentration of enemy mortar and small-arms fire, and suffering heavy casualties, he was forced to seek cover with the remaining members of the patrol in the near-by trench line. Determined to save his comrades when a hostile grenade was hurled into their midst, he unhesitatingly threw himself on the deadly missile, absorbing the shattering violence of the exploding charge in his own body and shielding his fellow Marines from serious injury or death.

He miraculously survived the explosion and was retired on disability in 1953. —Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
attacking again. Mortars and artillery shelled Combat Outpost 2, overlooking the Panmunjom corridor on the left of the sector held by the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, and also harassed the main line of resistance nearby. The main Chinese thrust, directed as expected against Bunker Hill, began at about 2100 on the night of August 13. While shells still exploded on Combat Outpost 2, the enemy intensified his bombardment of Bunker Hill, which had been under sporadic fire throughout the afternoon. Chinese troops hit Company H, commanded by Captain John G. Demas, attacking simultaneously near the center of the position and on the right flank. (His was the only element of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, not yet pulled back to the Jamestown Line.) High explosive shells boxed in the Marines, and illuminating rounds helped them isolate and kill the few Chinese who had penetrated the position.

The Chinese battalion that attacked Bunker Hill on the night of August 13 again tested the Marine defenses at 0225 on the following morning. Before this unit's second attack, a Chinese machine gun on Siberia began firing onto Bunker Hill. Marine M-46s stabbed Siberia with brief shafts of illumination from their searchlights and silenced the weapon with 90mm fire, thus revealing the position of the tanks and enabling Chinese artillery fire to wound a crewman of one of them. The enemy may have initiated this flurry of action, which lasted only about four minutes, to protect the recovery of his soldiers wounded or killed in the earlier fighting rather than to challenge the hill's defenses.

The 1st Marines responded to the fighting of 13 and 14 August by reinforcing both Bunker Hill and the nearest segment of the Jamestown Line, the so-called Siberia Sector, in anticipation of further Chinese attacks. As part of the preparation, Captain Demas, whose Company H, 7th Marines, still held Bunker Hill, patrolled the slopes where the enemy had launched several attacks but found no Chinese, a situation that rapidly changed. At 0118 on 15 August, a deluge of hostile artillery began pummeling the Marine position, while Chinese infantry jabbed at the defenses. Once again, Marine-
The quiet lasted only until late afternoon. At 1640, the Chinese attacked during a thunderstorm, avoiding the use of mortars or artillery, presumably to achieve surprise, but once again the attack failed. The Chinese refused, however, to abandon their attempts to seize Bunker Hill. At 0040, 16 August, a Chinese battalion attacked behind mortar and artillery fire, penetrating to the crest of the hill. Captain Scranton, whose Company B held the hill, called for reinforcements, and a platoon from Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, arrived as this assault was ending. The enemy again probed the hill with fire but did not press the attack. Before Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, relieved Scranton’s unit, it came under artillery fire three more times.

The succession of Marine companies that took over Bunker Hill had to repel seven attacks before the end of August, but only one, on the night of 25-26 August, threatened to overrun the outpost.

The struggle for Bunker Hill cost the Marines 48 killed, 313 seriously wounded, and hundreds of others who suffered minor wounds. The number of known Chinese dead exceeded 400 and total casualties may have numbered 3,200. The month ended with Bunker Hill in Marine hands.

The capture of Bunker Hill by Colonel Layer’s Marines and its subsequent defense relied on the deadly use of supporting arms, ranging from the tanks that had spearheaded the diversion against Siberia, through mortars and artillery, to aircraft. The search-light-carrying M-46s, for example, helped illuminate Chinese troops massing to counterattack the hill and opened fire on them. Marine and Air Force fighter-bombers hit the enemy on Siberia, helped seize and hold Bunker Hill, and hammered the approaches to Stromboli, where F4Us dropped 1,000-pound bombs and napalm. Marine MPQ-14 radar directed nighttime strikes against Chinese artillery positions. In addition, Marine artillery played a critical role, especially the box-me-in fires planned for emergencies. The 11th Marines fired 10,652 shells in the 24 hours ending at 1800 on 13 August, a volume not exceeded until the final months of the war in 1953. Although supplies of explosive shells proved adequate at this time, illuminating rounds tended to be in short supply.

The Marines of 1952 were fighting a war of unceasing attrition far different from the succession of bloody campaigns, interspersed with time for incorporating replacements into units withdrawn from combat, that had characterized the war against Japan. Men and equipment had to be absorbed during sustained fighting to replace not only combat losses, but also administrative attrition.
Casualties and Courageous Hospital Corpsmen

The fighting at Bunker Hill would have been even deadlier for the Marines had it not been for their protective equipment and the excellent medical treatment available from battlefield first-aid stations to hospital ships off the coast. According to regimental surgeons, 17 wounded Marines would certainly have died had they not been wearing the new armored vest. Moreover, the steel helmet used in World War II had again proved its worth in deflecting or stopping shell fragments or nearly spent bullets. The heavy vest, though it undeniably saved lives, proved an enervating burden in the heat and humidity of the Korean summer and contributed to dehydration and heat exhaustion, but the advantage of increased safety—along with improved morale—more than outweighed the disadvantages.

The uniformly sloping terrain of Bunker Hill caused the Hospital Corpsmen assigned to the Marines to set up their forward aid stations on the reverse slope, overlooked by the Jamestown Line, to obtain protection from flat trajectory fire and direct observation by the enemy. Wounded Marines being evacuated from the aid stations for further treatment ran the risk of mortar and artillery fire. A shortage of tracked armored personnel carriers, which would have provided a measure of protection from hostile fire and a less jolting ride than ordinary trucks, increased both the danger and the discomfort. Moreover, the stretcher rapidly became a precious item, since so many of the limited supply were being used for the time-consuming trip to surgical facilities some distance to the rear.

The 1st Medical Battalion had three collecting and clearing companies, two of which supported units committed on the division's main line of resistance while the third supported units on the Kimpo Peninsula. Located about six miles behind the line was the division hospital, a 200-bed facility staffed and equipped to provide definitive care for all types of cases. Serious cases or cases requiring specialized care were evacuated by helicopter, ambulance, hospital train, rail bus, or plane to a hospital ship at Inchon, Army Mobile Surgical Hospitals, or to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

The Surgeon General of the Navy, Rear Admiral Herbert L. Pugh, evaluated the medical support that he observed during the Bunker Hill fighting. He declared that medical treatment had been successful for a variety of reasons: the armored vest and steel helmet, of course; skilled Navy surgeons with access to a reliable supply of blood for transfusions; evacuation by helicopter to surgical facilities ashore or, if necessary, to hospital ships; and the courageous effort of Navy Hospital Corpsmen serving alongside the Marines.

Courtesy of Frank D. Praytor, USMC
caused by a fixed period of enlistment and a definite tour of duty in Korea. To help man his combat battalions, General Selden on 12 August directed rear-area units to provide replacements for the 1st Marines; within two days, some 200 men, most of them volunteers, joined the regiment’s infantry units. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., approved flying 500 infantry replacements to Korea. Lieutenant General Franklin A. Hart, in command of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, requested a delay to make sure he could assemble the necessary air transport; he could, and on 21 August the replacements arrived in Korea. The Commandant also approved

On 29 August 1952, Major General John T. Selden, shown on the left in the accompanying photograph, relinquished command of the 1st Marine Division. His tenure as commanding general, which began in January 1952, earned him the U.S. Army’s Distinguished Service Medal for conducting “successful operations against the enemy.” During World War II, he had commanded the 5th Marines on New Britain and served as Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division, in the conquest of Peleliu in the Palau Islands. After leaving Korea, he served on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe, until 1953 when he assumed command of Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California, from which post he retired in 1955. General Selden died in 1964 and was buried with full military honors in Arlington National Cemetery.

Born at Richmond, Virginia, in 1893, Selden enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1915 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in July 1918. Instead of being sent to France, he received orders to convoy duty in USS Huntington. Between the World Wars, he served in Haiti and China and at various posts in the United States. He attended the Senior Officers’ Course at Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, joined the 1st Brigade, which formed the nucleus of the 1st Marine Division, and participated in maneuvers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When war came, he served in a variety of assignments in the Pacific before joining the 1st Marine Division in time for the New Britain campaign.

Command of the 1st Marine Division in Korea passed to Major General Edwin A. Pollock, a native of Georgia who graduated from The Citadel, South Carolina’s military college, in 1921. He promptly resigned his commission in the Army Reserve and on 1 July accepted an appointment as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. His early career included service in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, on board ship, and with various installations and units in the United States.

Promoted to lieutenant colonel in April 1942, he commanded the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Guadalcanal, where on the night of 20-21 August, he earned the Navy Cross for his inspired leadership in repulsing a Japanese attack at the Tenaru River. He became a colonel in November 1943 and afterward saw action on New Britain and at Iwo Jima.

Following the war he served at Marine Corps Schools and Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, and at Headquarters Marine Corps. As a major general, he took over the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, before being reassigned to Korea, where he succeeded General Selden in command of the 1st Marine Division. General Pollock led the division in Korea from August 1952 until June 1953, in the final weeks of the war.

After Korea, General Pollock returned to Quantico as director of the Marine Corps Education Center, and then was assigned as commander Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, before coming back to Quantico as Commandant of Marine Corps Schools. In 1956, he was appointed Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, followed by a tour as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, from which post he retired in 1959. General Pollock served in several capacities on The Citadel’s Board of Visitors before his death in 1982.
Selden's request to increase by 500 men each of the next two scheduled replacement drafts.

Fighting Elsewhere on the Outpost Line

As the month of August wore on, any lull in the action around Bunker Hill usually coincided with a surge in the fighting elsewhere, usually on the right of the main line of resistance, the segment held by the 5th Marines, commanded after 16 August by Colonel Eustace R. Smoak. On 6 August, while Colonel Culhane still commanded the regiment, the Chinese began chipping away at the outpost line in front of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which consisted of Outposts Elmer, Hilda, and Irene.

Because the battalion manned the outposts only in daylight, the Chinese simply occupied Elmer, farthest to the southwest, after dusk on 6 August and employed artillery fire to seal off the approaches and prevent the Marines from returning after daylight. The Chinese took over Outpost Hilda on the night of 11 August, driving back the Marines sent to reoccupy it the following morning. The same basic tactics enabled the enemy to take over Outpost Irene on the 17th. During an unsuccessful attempt to regain the third of the outposts, Private First Class Robert E. Simanek saved the lives of other Marines by diving onto a Chinese hand grenade, absorbing the explosion with his body, suffering severe though not fatal wounds, and earning the Medal of Honor.

Heavy rains comparable to the downpour of late July turned roads into swamps throughout the Marine sector, swept away a bridge over the Imjin River, and forced the closing of a ferry. Bunkers remained largely unaffected by flooding, but the deluge interfered with both air support and combat on the ground. Since the rain fell alike on the U.N. and Chinese forces, activity halted temporarily when nine inches fell between 23 and 25 August.

Bunker Hill and Outpost Bruce

The Chinese greeted the new division commander, Major General Edwin A. Pollock, by exerting new pressure against the Bunker Hill complex, now held by Captain Stanley T. Moak's Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, attached temporarily to the regiment's 3d Battalion. On the night of 4 September, Chinese gunners began shelling the outpost and probing its right flank, but small arms fire forced the enemy to pull back.

The resulting lull lasted only until 0100 on 5 September, when Chinese mortars and artillery resumed firing, concentrating on Hill 122, Bunker Hill. Apparently confident that the barrage had neutralized the defenses, the attackers ignored cover and concealment and moved boldly into an unexpected hail of fire that drove them back. After regrouping, the enemy attacked once again, this time making use of every irregularity in the ground and employing the entire spectrum of weapons from hand grenades to artillery. This latest effort went badly awry when a force trying to outflank Bunker Hill lost its way and drew fire from Marines on the main line of resistance. The attackers tried to correct their mistake only to come under fire from their fellow Chinese who had penetrated the extreme right of Bunker Hill's defenses and may have mistaken their comrades for counterattacking Marines. Amid the confusion, Moak's company surged forward and drove the enemy from the outpost. The Marines of Company E suffered 12 killed and 40 wounded in routing a Chinese battalion while killing an estimated 335 of the enemy.

Yet another diversionary attack on Outpost Stromboli coincided with the thrust against Bunker Hill. The Marines defending Stromboli sustained no casualties in breaking up an attack by an enemy platoon supported by machine guns.

The 2d and 3d Battalions of Colonel Smoak's 5th Marines
Private First Class Alford L. McLaughlin

A 24-year-old native of Leeds, Alabama, he listed in the Marine Corps in 1945. Awarded a Purple Heart Medal in August 1952, his heroism again was recognized during the struggle on Bunker Hill on the night of 4-5 September 1952, while serving as a machine gunner with Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. His citation reads, in part:

When hostile forces attacked in battalion strength during the night, he maintained a constant flow of devastating fire upon the enemy, alternating employing two machine guns, a carbine and hand grenades. Although painfully wounded, he bravely fired the machine guns from the hip until his hands became blistered by the extreme heat from the weapons and, placing the guns on the ground to allow them to cool, continued to defend the position with his carbine and grenades. Standing up in full view, he shouted words of encouragement to his comrades above the din of battle and, throughout a series of fanatical enemy attacks, sprayed the surrounding area with deadly fire accounting for an estimated one hundred and fifty enemy dead and fifty wounded.

Remarkably, he survived this battle, made a continuing career in the Marine Corps, and eventually retired in 1977 as a master sergeant.

Hospital Corpsman Third Class Edward C. Benfold

Born in Staten Island, New York, in 1931, he enlisted in the Navy and was assigned in 1951 to the Marine Corps where he bore the designation of “medical field technician.” In Korea, while serving with 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, he was killed on 5 September 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

Benfold resolutely moved from position to position in the face of intense hostile fire, treating the wounded and lending words of encouragement. Leaving the protection of his sheltered position to treat the wounded, when the platoon area in which he was working was attacked from both the front and rear, he moved forward to an exposed ridge line where he observed two Marines in a large crater. As he approached the two men to determine their condition, an enemy soldier threw two grenades into the crater while two other enemy charged the position. Picking up a grenade in each hand, HC3c Benfold leaped out of the crater and hurled himself against the onrushing hostile soldiers, pushing the grenades against their chests and killing both the attackers.

In 1994, the Navy named a guided missile destroyer, USS Benfold (DDG 65), in his honor.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

fought to defend their outpost line—from Allen in the west, through Bruce, Clarence, Donald, Felix, and Gary, to Jill in the east—against a succession of attacks that began in the early hours of 5 September. At Outpost Bruce—manned by Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, under Captain Edward Y. Holt, Jr.—a company of attacking infantry followed up a savage barrage. Private First Class Alford L. McLaughlin killed or wounded an estimated 200 Chinese, victims of the machine guns, carbine, and grenades that he used at various times during the fight, and survived to receive the Medal of Honor. Private First Class Fernando L. Garcia, also earned the nation’s highest award for heroism; though already wounded, he threw himself of a Chinese grenade, sacrificing his life to save his platoon sergeant. Hospitalman Third Class Edward C. Benfold saw two wounded Marines in a shell hole on Outpost Bruce; as he prepared to attend to them, a pair of grenades thrown by two onrushing Chinese soldiers fell inside the crater. Benfold picked up one grenade in each hand, scrambled from the hole, and pressed a grenade against each of the two soldiers. The explosions killed both the Chinese, as Benfold sacrificed himself to save the two
Private First Class Fernando L. Garcia

Born in 1929 in Utuado, Puerto Rico, and inducted into the Marine Corps in 1951, he was killed at Outpost Bruce in the Bunker Hill area on 5 September 1952 while serving as a member of Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. The first Puerto Rican to be awarded a Medal of Honor, his citation reads, in part:

While participating in the defense of a combat outpost located more than one mile forward of the main line of resistance, during a savage night attack by a fanatical enemy force employing grenades, mortars, and artillery, Private First Class Garcia, although suffering painful wounds, moved through the intense hall of hostile fire to a supply point to secure more hand grenades. Quick to act when a hostile grenade landed nearby, endangering the life of another Marine, as well as his own, he unhesitatingly chose to sacrifice himself and immediately threw his body upon the deadly missile, receiving the full impact of the explosion.

The enemy then overran his position and his body was not recovered. In his honor, a camp at Vieques in Puerto Rico and a destroyer escort, USS Garcia (DE 1040), were named after him.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

wounded Marines, earning a posthumous Medal of Honor.

When dawn broke on 5 September, Holt's Company I still clung to Outpost Bruce, even though only two bunkers, both on the slope nearest the Jamestown Line, survived destruction by mortar and artillery shells. The commander of the 3d Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar T. Jensen, Jr., rushed reinforcements, construction and other supplies, and ammunition to the battered outpost despite harassing fire directed at the trails leading there.

The 1st Marine Division commander, MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, left, welcomes the United Nations commander, Gen Mark W. Clark, USA, to the division's area. Gen Clark had succeeded Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, who took over as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Marine and Air Force pilots tried to suppress the hostile gunners with 10 air strikes that dropped napalm as well as high explosive.

On the morning of 6 September, the defenders of Outpost Bruce beat off another attack, finally calling for box-me-in fires that temporarily put an end to infantry assaults. At dusk, however, the Chinese again bombarded the outpost, this time for an hour, before attacking with infantry while directing long-range fire at neighboring Outpost Allen to the southwest. The Marines defending Outpost Bruce survived to undergo further attack on the early morning of 7 September. Two Chinese companies tried to envelop the hilltop, using demolitions in an attempt to destroy any bunkers not yet shattered by the latest shelling.

For a total of 51 hours, the enemy besieged Outpost Bruce before breaking off the action by sunrise on the 7th. At Bruce, the site of the deadliest fighting in this sector, the Marines suffered 19 killed and 38 wounded, 20 more than the combined casualties sustained defending all the other outposts manned by the 2d and 3d
Battles, 5th Marines. Chinese killed and wounded at Outpost Bruce may have totaled 400.

Pressure on Korean Marines

At the left of the line held by the 1st Marine Division, the frontage of the Korean Marine Corps veered southward, roughly paralleling the Sachon River as it flowed toward the Imjin. The Korean Marines had established a series of combat outposts on the broken ground between the Sachon and the Jamestown Line. On the evening of 5 September, while the outposts manned by the 5th Marines were undergoing attack, Chinese artillery and mortars began pounding Outpost 37, a bombardment that soon included Outpost 36 to the southwest and an observation post on Hill 155 on the main line of resistance, roughly 1,000 yards from the boundary with the 1st Marines.

Chinese infantry, who had crossed the Sachon near Outposts 36 and 37, attacked both of them.

Two assaults on Outpost 37, which began at 1910, may have been a diversion, for at the same time the enemy launched the first of three attacks on Outpost 36. The final effort, supported by fire from tanks and artillery, overran the hill, but the Chinese had lost too many men and too much equipment—at least 33 bodies littered the hill along with a hundred abandoned grenades and numerous automatic weapons—forcing the enemy to withdraw the survivors. The Korean Marines suffered 16 killed or wounded from the platoon at Outpost 36 and another four casualties in the platoon defending Outpost 37.

Clashes involving the outposts of the Korean Marine Corps continued. The South Koreans dispatched tank-infantry probes and set up ambushes. At first, the Chinese responded to this activity with mortars and artillery, firing a daily average of 339 rounds between 12 and 19 September, about one-third of the total directed against Outpost 36. An attack by infantry followed.

Before sunrise on the 19th, Chinese troops again infiltrated across the Sachon, as they had two weeks earlier. They hid in caves and ravines until evening, when they advanced on Outposts 36, their principal objective, and 37, along with Outposts 33 and 31 to the south. A savage barrage of more than 400 rounds tore up the defenses rebuilt after the 5 September attack and enabled the Chinese to overwhelm Outpost 36. Shortly after midnight, a South Korean counterattack seized a lodgment on the hill, but the Chinese retaliated immediately, driving off, killing, or capturing those who had regained the outpost.

With the coming of daylight, Marine aircraft joined in battering
enemy-held Outpost 36. Air strikes succeeded in hitting the far side of the hill, destroying mortars and killing troops massing in defilade to exploit the earlier success. Two platoons of Korean Marines—supported by fire from tanks, mortars, and artillery—followed up the deadly air attacks and regained Outpost 36, killing or wounding an estimated 150 of the enemy.

Further Action Along the Line

In late September, while fighting raged around Outpost 36 in the sector held by the Korean Marines, the Chinese attacked the combat outposts manned by Colonel Layer's 1st Marines, especially Hill 122 (Bunker Hill) and Hill 124 at the southwestern tip of the same ridge line. The enemy struck first at Hill 124, attacking by flare-light from four directions but failing to dislodge the squad dug in there, even though most of the Marines suffered at least minor wounds.

The entire ridge from Hill 124 to Hill 122 remained under recurring attack for the remainder of September, especially Bunker Hill itself, where the enemy clung to advance positions as close as 30 yards to Marine trenches. The Chinese frequently probed Bunker Hill's defenses by night, and the Marines took advantage of darkness to raid enemy positions, using portable flamethrowers and demolitions to destroy bunkers while fire from tanks and artillery discouraged counterattacks.

Tests earlier in the year had proved the theory that transport helicopters could resupply a battalion manning the main line of resistance. The next step was to determine if rotary wing aircraft could accomplish the logistical support of an entire frontline regiment. For the five-day period, 22-26 September, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 successfully supplied the 7th Marines with ammunition, gasoline, rations, and made a daily mail run. All but valuable cargo, such as mail, was carried externally in slings or wire baskets.

As October began, the Chinese saluted the new month with heavier shelling, the prelude to a series of attacks on outposts all across the division front from the Korean Marine Corps on the left, past the 1st Marines and Bunker Hill, to the far right, where the 7th Marines, commanded by Colonel Thomas C. Moore, Jr., had taken over from the 5th Marines, now in reserve. To make communications more secure, Colonel Moore's regiment redesignated Outposts Allen, Bruce, Clarence, Donald, Gary, and Jill, replacing proper names, in
Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., center, Commandant of the Marine Corps, looks at enemy positions while touring frontline Marine positions. LtCol Anthony J. Caputo, left, commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, briefs the Commandant on the situation.

alphabetical order, with the randomly arranged names of cities: Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle.

On the left, Chinese loudspeakers announced on the night of 1 October that artillery would level the outpost on Hill 86, overlooking the Sachon River, and warned the defenders to flee. When the South Korean Marines remained in place, a comparatively light barrage of 145 rounds exploded on the hill and its approaches, too few to dislodge the defenders. On the following evening at 1830, the Chinese resumed firing, this time from the high ground beyond Hill 36, and extended the bombardment to all the outposts within range. The Korean Marines dispatched a platoon of tanks to silence the enemy's direct-fire weapons, but the unit returned without locating the source of the enemy fire. After the tanks pulled back, Chinese artillery fire intensified, battering all the outposts until one red and one green flare burst in the night sky. At that signal, the guns fell silent, and infantry attacked Outposts 36, 37, and 86.

Outpost 37, the northernmost of the three, resisted gallantly, forcing the Chinese to double the size of the assault force in order to overrun the position. On 3 October, the Korean Marines launched two counterattacks. The second of these recaptured the crest and held it until Chinese artillery and mortar fire forced a withdrawal. By late afternoon on 5 October, the Korean Marines twice regained the outpost, only to be hurled back each time, and finally had to call off the counterattacks, leaving the hill in enemy hands.

To the south, the Chinese also stormed Outpost 36 on 2 October. The defenders hurled back two nighttime attacks, but the cumulative casualties and damage to the fortifications forced the Korean Marines to withdraw. The enemy immediately occupied the hill and held it.

The most vulnerable of the three, Outpost 86, lay farthest from the main line of resistance and closest to the Sachon River. On the
night of 2 October, a Chinese assault overran the outpost, forcing the Korean Marines to find cover at the foot of the hill and regroup. At mid-morning on the 3d, artillery barrages and air strikes pounded the enemy at Outpost 86, scattering the Chinese there and enabling a South Korean counterattack to regain the objective. The Korean Marines dug in, but on 6 October the Chinese again prevailed, holding the outpost until a South Korean counterattack in the early hours of the 7th forced them down the slope. At about dawn on that same morning, the enemy mounted yet another counterattack, advancing behind a deadly artillery barrage, seizing and holding Outpost 86, and ending this flurry of action on the outpost line in front of the Korean Marine Corps.

Focus on 7th Marines

Although October passed rather quietly for the 1st Marines—except for recurring probes, patrols, and ambushes in the vicinity of Bunker Hill—violent clashes erupted along the line held by the 7th Marines. The enemy began stubborn efforts, which persisted into 1953, to gain control of some or all of the nine combat outposts that Colonel Moore's regiment manned on the high ground to its front.

The 7th Marines took over seven outposts when it relieved the 5th Marines, renaming them, from left to right, Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle. At the point—later known as the Hook—where the frontline veered southward toward the boundary with the British Commonwealth Division—the 7th Marines set up Outpost Warsaw. A second new outpost, Verdun, guarded the boundary between the Marine and Commonwealth divisions. An average of 450 yards separated four of these outposts—Detroit, Frisco, Seattle, and Warsaw—which occupied hills lower than those on the left of the regimental line and therefore were more easily isolated and attacked.

As they did so often, the Chinese began with a diversionary thrust, jabbing at Detroit before throwing knockout blows—artillery and mortar fire preceding an infantry attack—at Seattle and Warsaw. An enemy company overwhelmed the reinforced platoon on Warsaw on 2 October, but the Marines fought stubbornly before falling back. Private Jack W. Kelso picked up a grenade thrown into a

![Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166198](image)

Replacements step ashore at "Charlie Pier." Brought from transports by landing craft, the Marines would board waiting trains for the four-and-one-half-hour trip to the division's lines.
bunker that he and four other Marines from Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, were manning. Kelso threw the live grenade at the advancing Chinese, but it exploded immediately after leaving his hand. Although badly wounded, Kelso tried to cover the withdrawal of the other four, firing at the attackers until he suffered fatal wounds. Kelso earned a posthumous Medal of Honor, but heroism alone could not prevail; numerically superior forces captured both Warsaw and Seattle.

The Marines counterattacked immediately. Captain John H. Thomas, in command of Company I, sent one platoon against Warsaw, but the enemy had temporarily withdrawn. The lull continued until 0145 on the morning of 4 October, when a Chinese platoon attacked only to be beaten back by the Marines holding Warsaw.

Meanwhile, Captain Thomas mounted a counterattack against Seattle early on the morning of 3 October, sending out two squads from the company's position on the main line of resistance. Despite Chinese artillery fire, the Marines reached the objective, but Seattle proved too strongly held and Thomas broke off the counteratt-
Second Lieutenant Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr.

Born in 1929 in Hartford, Connecticut, he was appointed a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve 1952 and then ordered to active duty. He died heroically at “The Hook” on 26 October 1952 while serving as an artillery forward observer of Battery F, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. The citation for his Medal of Honor award reads, in part:

Skinner, in a determined effort to hold his position, immediately organized and directed the surviving personnel in the defense of the outpost, continuing to call down fire on the enemy by means of radio alone until this equipment became damaged beyond repair. Undaunted by the intense hostile barrage and the rapidly closing attackers, he twice left the protection of his bunker in order to direct accurate machine-gun fire and to replenish the depleted supply of ammunition and grenades. Although painfully wounded on each occasion, he steadfastly refused medical aid until the rest of the men received treatment.

As the ground attack reached its climax, he gallantly directed the final defense until the meager supply of ammunition was exhausted and the position overrun. During the three hours that the outpost was occupied by the enemy, several grenades were thrown into the bunker which served as protection for Second Lieutenant Skinner and his remaining comrades. Realizing that there was no chance for other than passive resistance, he directed his men to feign death even though the hostile troops entered the bunker and searched their persons. Later, when an enemy grenade was thrown between him and two other survivors, he immediately threw himself on the deadly missile in an effort to protect the others, absorbing the full force of the explosion and sacrificing his life for his comrades.

In 1991, Skinner Hall at Quantico, Virginia, was dedicated in his honor.

Second Lieutenant George H. O’Brien, Jr.

Born in Fort Worth, Texas, in 1926, he enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1949. Ordered to active duty in 1951, he entered Officer Candidate School and was commissioned in 1952. As a rifle platoon leader with Company H, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in the battle for the Hook on 27 October 1952, he was awarded a Medal of Honor with a citation, which reads, in part:

O’Brien leaped from his trench when the attack signal was given and, shouting for his men to follow, raced across an exposed saddle and up the enemy-held hill through a virtual hail of deadly small-arms, artillery and mortar fire. Although shot through the arm and thrown to the ground by hostile automatic-weapons fire as he neared the well-entrenched enemy position, he bravely regained his feet, waved his men onward and continued to spearhead the assault, pausing only long enough to go to the aid of a wounded Marine. Encountering the enemy at close range, he proceeded to hurl hand grenades into the bunkers and, utilizing his carbine to best advantage in savage hand-to-hand combat, succeeded in killing at least three of the enemy.

Struck down by the concussion of grenades on three occasions during the subsequent action, he steadfastly refused to be evacuated for medical treatment and continued to lead his platoon in the assault for a period of nearly four hours, repeatedly encouraging his men and maintaining superb direction of the unit.

He received a second Purple Heart Medal in January 1953, and after the war, he joined the Reserves and was promoted to major.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
counterattack. While the Marines regrouped for another assault, the 11th Marines pounded the outpost with artillery fire. At 2225 on 3 October, the Marines again stormed the objective, but Chinese artillery prevailed, and Seattle remained in Chinese hands.

The loss of Outpost Seattle, the recapture of Warsaw, and a successful defense of Frisco against a Chinese probe on the night of 5 October did not mark the end of the effort to seize the outposts manned by the 7th Marines, but only a pause. The regiment's casualties—13 killed and 88 wounded by 3 October when the Marines suspended the attempt to retake Seattle—caused the 7th Marines to shuffle units. The 3d Battalion, commanded until 13 October by Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F. Russell, had suffered most of the casualties. As a result, while Russell's battalion reduced its frontage, the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki, moved from the regimental reserve to take over the right-hand portion of the Jamestown Line. Dulacki's Marines manned the main line of resistance from roughly 500 yards southwest of the Hook to the boundary shared with the Commonwealth Division, including Outposts Warsaw and Verdun. Colonel Moore thus placed all three battalions on line, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Caputo's 2d Battalion on the left, Russell's 3d Battalion in the center, and now Dulacki's 1st Battalion on the right.

The 7th Marines completed its realignment just in time to meet a series of carefully planned and aggressively executed Chinese attacks delivered on 6 and 7 October against five combat outposts and two points on the main line of resistance. The Marines struck first, however, when a reinforced platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, attacked toward Outpost Seattle at 0600 on 6 October. Mortar and artillery fire forced the platoon to take cover and regroup, even as the Chinese were reinforcing the outpost they now held. The attack resumed at 0900. Despite infantry reinforcements, air strikes, and artillery, the Marines could not crack Seattle's defenses and broke off the attack at about 1100, after losing 12 killed and 44 wounded. The attackers estimated that they had killed or wounded 71 Chinese.

On the evening of the 6th, the Chinese took the initiative, by midnight firing some 4,400 artillery and mortar rounds against the outpost line and two points on the main line of resistance. On the left of Colonel Moore's line, the enemy probed Outposts Carson and Reno, and on the right he stormed Warsaw, forcing the defenders to call for box-me-in fire that severed the telephone wire linking the outpost with the Jamestown Line. The first message from Warsaw when contact was restored requested more artillery fire, which by 2055 helped break the back of the Chinese assault, forcing the enemy to fall back.

The most determined attacks on the night of 6 October and early hours of the 7th hit Outposts Detroit and Frisco in the center of the regimental front. To divert attention from these objectives, each one manned by two squads, the Chinese probed two points on the main line of resistance that had already been subjected to artillery and mortar bombardment. At 1940 on the night of the 6th, an attacking company that had gained a foothold in the main trench on Detroit fell back after deadly fire stopped the enemy short of the bunkers. Two hours later, the Chinese again seized a segment of trench on Detroit and tried to exploit the lodgment. The Marines