

sand berm that marked the Kuwaiti border. Alpha and Echo positions were small lookout brackets cut into the berm. Outpost 2 was much more substantial. An abandoned Saudi police station, it was nicknamed the Castle because it was made of brick and had a watch tower reminiscent of a French Foreign Legion fortress. The reconnaissance team shared the Castle with a forward air control party and a naval gunfire liaison team.

Throughout the day, BLT 3/1 directed aerial close-in-fire support and artillery fire into Al Wafrah. The support missions were flown by AH-1W Super Cobras from MAG-40's HMLA-269 and AH-1J Sea Cobras of MAG-50's HMA-773. These actions resulted in the capture of about 25 Iraqis who crossed the border to surrender. The prisoners were wearing camouflage battle dress and red berets and carried folding-stock AKM rifles, confirming they were members of an elite commando battalion. During intelligence debriefings Iraqi prisoners reported that they had suffered more than 40 casualties. They further stated that the force had split into small groups for safety reasons and was no longer a cohesive fighting unit. They believed, however, that some Iraqi diehards would continue to fight if attacked.

Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines' Alpha command group, and 1st Platoon, Company E, flew into Mishab before dark on G-Day. The Heavy Machine Gun Platoon came in by LCU. These two groups linked up and immediately moved inland to coordinate the 2d Battalion's movement. The Bravo command group and the battalion aid station landed the next morning, as did the remainder of the battalion. Company E flew ashore first, and was followed by Companies F, G, and Weapons Company. The Anti-armor Platoon and most of the battalion's vehicles landed by surface craft throughout the afternoon. That evening the 2d Battalion mounted trucks and moved west.

On 25 February, the 5th MEB Forward command post flew to Al Khanjar and set up its combat operations center adjacent to the I MEF forward headquarters. After RLT 5 completed reorganization, it displaced west along the main supply route. Colonel Gangle planned to set up near Kibrit so RLT 5 could back up BLT 3/1 or move forward to Al Khanjar as the situation warranted. A convoy of humvees, trucks, and LAVs left in the early afternoon. BLT 3/5's mechanized task force, including a few humvees and all of the RLT 5 tanks and AAVs, formed at Checkpoint 5 west of Mishab and departed for Kibrit in the mid-afternoon.

This trip turned out to be only the first leg of a 28-hour journey. It was slow going for the tracked vehicles. The AAVs and tanks could move only at about 10 miles per hour and every hour the convoy halted for 10 minutes. Although this snail's pace was frustrating, the task force moved 186 miles without a single vehicle breakdown.

Colonel Gangle's forward command element, BLT 2/5, and the artillery in the motorized convoy soon outpaced the slower moving mechanized task force. The convoy which included RLT 5 forward CP; BLT 2/5 jump CP; Companies E, F, and G; and the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, arrived at Kibrit at about 1930. When he reported in at CSSB 1, Colonel Gangle learned that the Marine offensive was moving far more rapidly than had been expected and he was given a warning

order for RLT 5 to continue the march to the forward support base at Al Khanjar rather than remain at Kibrit as had been planned. After arriving at Khanjar, RLT 5 was slated to provide security for the main supply routes and breach points.

On the 26th, BLT 2/5 made a motor march from Kibrit through Khanjar to vicinity of Umm Gudair Oilfield where Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy established a battalion patrol base from which motorized patrols could secure the main supply route and protect vital minefield breaches. The column passed through a protective berm on the Saudi border and then moved through two mine belts and into the Kuwaiti desert. Although enemy mines were marked, a damaged D-9 Combat Excavator reminded the Marines of the constant danger. During the afternoon, the Marines established defensive positions oriented north. Each company was reinforced with Dragons and had a heavy machine gun section in direct support. The 81mm mortars were in general support. During the rainy night, the artillery and a LAV unit moved into positions nearby.

The next morning, Kennedy's Marines moved to Al Jaber Air Base, a march slowed by poor visibility caused by burning oil wells and a low-lying slow-moving weather front.\* The Heavy Machine Gun Platoon led the 2d Battalion northeast toward the inky black clouds emanating from the burning oil wells. At 1400 the convoy drove into total darkness and became entangled with a 1st Marine Division convoy near Al Jaber. At dusk, the 2d Battalion reached rubble-strewn Al Jaber Air Base where it joined the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines and the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines for the night.

Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Selvage's BLT 3/5 made a 43-mile road march along Route Green from Mishab to Kibrit in order to relieve Task Force Troy, but this plan was changed when General Boomer ordered the BLT to refuel at Kibrit and then continue moving forward. The mechanized task force finally arrived at Al Khanjar at about 1130 on 26th. Selvage was then ordered to continue forward using Route California to move through the minefield breaches, and alerted that the BLT might have to engage elements of the Iraqi *6th Infantry Division* during the movement to Al Jaber Air Base.

At 1505, Battalion Landing Team 3/5 entered Kuwait. Lieutenant Colonel Selvage established night defensive positions in the vicinity of Phase Line Mary and ordered patrolling to begin at midnight. Almost two hours later, at 0155, Captain Steve L. Suddreth reported BLT 3/5's first contact when a TOW gunner discovered a T-55 tank in the vicinity of the police post at Phase Line Jill. Suddreth ordered him to hold fire because the target might be a Syrian tank from Joint Forces Command North. With daylight, the tank was identified as a disabled Iraqi T-55. On the 27th, most of the task force moved to Al Jaber Air Base except for Companies K and L, BLT 3/1, which remained behind to secure BLT 3/5's southern flank.

Late in the day on 25th, BLT 3/1 was affected by actions farther north. On G-

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\*Visibility was extremely limited even during daylight hours; the author's journal records that at noon that day it was as dark as the foggy moonless nights he recalled from his youth in northern Michigan.

Day the 2d Marine Division had penetrated the Saddam Line, poured through the breaches, and consolidated at Phase Line Red just north of Al Jaber Air Base. The next morning the division repulsed an early-morning attack and then pushed north to capture a fortified built-up area, commonly referred to as the "Ice Cube Tray" because of its graphic representation on tactical maps, in the vicinity of Al Kabd. These actions yielded an estimated 9,000 Iraqi prisoners, an unexpectedly high number which overwhelmed the division's ability to handle them all.<sup>273</sup>


Major General William M. Keys, the division's commanding general, radioed I MEF for assistance. General Boomer quickly decided to use his reserve force to solve this crisis. Up to that time Lieutenant Colonel Robichaud's primary worry had been blocking an Iraqi spoiling attack, but now BLT 3/1 was being transferred to Kuwait. The forward command post and part of Headquarters and Service Company were immediately helilifted to the Ice Cube Tray to assist the 2d Marine Division with the handling and evacuation of Iraqi prisoners.

During the final two days of the conflict, BLT 3/1 was attached to the 2d Marine Division to conduct combat patrols and to handle enemy prisoners at Al Kabd and Al Jaber. The BLT's main command post and logistics train made a motor march from Kibrit to catch up with the forward CP and main body. Headquarters and Service Company guarded and evacuated about 1,500 Iraqis, while Company K provided prisoner of war camp security. Company I and Company M assumed defensive positions northeast of the Ice Cube Tray and began vehicle and foot patrols. Searches of the built-up area revealed large amounts of ammunition, weapons, and stacks of documents. Weapons Company was split: the 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns remained at Landing Zone Lonesome Dove (Al Khanjar), while the Anti-armor Platoon made a motor march to join BLT 3/1. The Reconnaissance Platoon tried to fly into Kuwait International Airport, but was diverted to Lonesome Dove because of poor visibility.<sup>274</sup>

### *RLT 5 Clears Al Wafrah*

By the evening of the 27th, it was obvious Saddam's forces in Kuwait had been defeated. The Coalition's east wing (IMEF, JFC-E, and JFC-N) was pushing hard for Kuwait City and the enemy was on the run. Iraqi forces that had occupied Kuwait City fled north and were being pounded by air strikes as they moved along roads to Basrah and Umm Qasr. In the Euphrates Valley, VII Corps had crushed an Iraqi armored column destroying more than 300 enemy tanks and was moving east to cut off the last escape routes. After consultation with General Powell, President Bush ordered General Schwarzkopf to suspend offensive operations. Central Command ordered a cease fire, effective at 0800 on 28 February. Coalition forces were, however, authorized to engage any Iraqi units or individuals that showed hostile intent or refused to honor the cease fire agreement.

With operations at a standstill, Brigadier General Rowe thought it prudent to begin moving the 5th MEB out of Kuwait so it could backload on board amphibious shipping and resume the role of an afloat reserve. However, he was first



ordered to sweep through the Al Wafrah Forest and clear it of Iraqi soldiers. It was hoped that the Iraqis would surrender without a fight, but considering statements made by Iraqi prisoners who had surrendered to BLT 3/1 and the poor state of Iraqi communications, it was not certain this would be the case.

Intelligence reports indicated there were an estimated 70 to 100 Iraqis still holding out in the Al Wafrah Forest. Because the exact situation was uncertain General Rowe elected to approach it as a combat operation. Colonel Gangle was to use RLT 5 to clear Al Wafrah, BLT 3/1 would be the reserve force, MAG-50 would provide air support, and BSSG 5 would provide logistical support. The clearing operation was to begin on 1 March and would be concluded as soon as possible, hopefully, the next day.<sup>275</sup>

Colonel Gangle issued his orders to RLT 5 at 2300 on the 28th. He wanted BLTs 2/5 and 3/5 to clear their respective zones from west to east beginning at dawn on 1 March. A captured map overlay indicated the Iraqi minefield locations

so he ordered BLT 3/5 to sweep the north side of the minefield while BLT 2/5 moved along the south side. Company A, 4th Tank Battalion, and the TOW Platoon were designated the reserve and collectively labeled Team Tank. Several units from BLT 3/1, LAV Detachment 11, Battery G, and Company L, were attached to the RLT for the clearing operation. The 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, would handle fire support.<sup>276</sup> The attack would be preceded by psychological operations helicopters announcing the cease-fire and giving surrender instructions. MAG-50 helicopters were to be available for medical evacuation, command and control, transportation, and close-in fire support. Brigade Service Support Group 5 would have to serve two masters, supporting the combat units in the field while simultaneously preparing an amphibious backload at Mishab.

At 0600 on the 1st, RLT 5 left the assembly area and moved to the line of departure. At about 0700 it began moving south on two axes toward the Al Wafrah Oil Processing Complex. There was a three-hour delay at Phase Line Janice while psychological operations helicopters crisscrossed Al Wafrah. Some dropped leaflets announcing the cease-fire while others carried loudspeakers blaring surrender instructions. At about 1100, RLT 5 resumed the advance with BLTs 2/5 and 3/5 forward and Team Tank moving in trace. Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy opted to use a battalion "V" formation with Companies E and G following a screen of LAVs while Headquarters and Service Company and Company F brought up the rear. Lieutenant Colonel Selvage, on the other hand, used all four of BLT 3/5's mechanized rifle companies on line.


The column passed abandoned artillery positions, wrecked vehicles, and burning oil wells. The 2d Battalion reached the Al Wafrah transfer station in mid-afternoon. At about 1500 BLT 2/5 discovered fresh food while clearing its portion of the built-up area, but spotted no Iraqis. As the unit moved out about an hour later, Captain Mark A. McDonald, in command of Company F, reported an explosion, possibly an RPG round, about 100 meters behind his rear-most truck. At 1730 a burst of Iraqi small arms and automatic weapons fire caused no casualties. Two Reserve AH-1J Cobras from HMA-773 providing on-call, close-in fire support quickly swooped in. They destroyed several buildings and other likely hiding places in the BLT's zone.

The advance then continued to Checkpoint 69 near the edge of the forest. There, each BLT established 360-degree night defensive positions on its respective side of the obstacle barrier. Realizing there was still much left to do, Colonel Gangle requested an extension of time to clear the Al Wafrah Forest. It was granted, but General Rowe was emphatic that RLT 5 had to be out of Kuwait no later than 1800 on the 3d. Satisfied this could be done, Colonel Gangle planned to use a small ruse. Battalion Landing Team 2/5 would move back through the forest as if it was leaving, then BLT 3/5 would follow at a distance. The plan was for BLT 3/5 to catch the Iraqis as they tried to harass BLT 2/5 from the rear. These Iraqis would then be forced to surrender or could be pushed into pre-planned CIFS/artillery kill zones.<sup>277</sup>

Companies E and F led the sweep through the Al Wafrah Forest. Company G moved in trace. They were supported by the 81mm Mortar Platoon at the north-

east corner of the forest and Company E's 60mm mortars supported the movement from the main road. The companies carefully cleared the area moving from house to house and marking all unexploded ordnance. Two provisional security platoons from H&S Company manned a blocking position at the west end of the forest. As the sweep neared the west end, Company E's 2d Platoon was taken under fire. Distinctive green tracer rounds were spotted coming from a nearby brick structure. The 81mm Mortar Platoon fired an immediate illumination mission that allowed two Cobra gunships to strafe the enemy strongpoint. The 2d Battalion consolidated at dusk. Throughout the night, the Marines were serenaded by a psychological operations helicopter playing music and broadcasting appeals to the Iraqis to surrender.

At about 0700 on the 2d, Company B, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, breached an 11-row minefield using AAV-mounted mine-clearing line charges, bangalore torpedoes, satchel charges, and tank-mounted mine rakes to clear a 275- by 20-foot lane through the obstacle belt. The engineers completed the job at 0855 and



the forward elements of BLT 3/5 moved south at 0900. About three hours later, Company L, BLT 3/1, came under automatic weapons and small arms fire. The AAVs, Company L, and snipers returned fire and pinned the Iraqis inside a house. An armed UH-1N destroyed the building and its occupants at 1343. The remaining Iraqis broke contact and fled. Lieutenant Colonel Selvage ordered BLT 3/5 to halt and establish night defensive positions about nine kilometers west of the morning start line. He estimated that the forest was about 75 percent cleared when darkness halted operations.<sup>278</sup>

The advance resumed at daybreak the next morning. At about 0830, BLT 3/5 captured a truck and detained its driver. During mid-morning RLT 5 suffered its first combat casualty when a Marine from Company A, 4th LAI Battalion, tripped a booby trap. Second Lieutenant Bruce S. McGraw, the 2d Battalion motor transport officer, drove straight into the minefield and pulled the injured man to safety. The wounded Marine was lifted out by helicopter to be treated for leg and eye wounds. At about half-past noon, enemy soldiers were spotted and taken under fire by 81mm mortars. The final combat action occurred when the RLT 5 command post was fired upon. Company L, BLT 3/1, immediately engaged an enemy force occupying the built-up area near the Al Wafrah Oil Processing Complex. The buildings were destroyed or damaged by small arms, rounds from MK-19 automatic grenade launchers, TOW missiles, and close-in fire support from HMLA-169 Super Cobras. When the fire fight was over RLT 5 moved into Saudi Arabia at the breach site near the Castle.<sup>279</sup>

### *MAG-50 Operations*

Marine Aircraft Group 50 played an active role throughout Operation Desert Storm. In order to do this effectively the 5th MEB aviation combat element had to undergo a drastic reorganization. The fixed-wing element went ashore and was attached to the 3d MAW to support I MEF air and ground operations. One rotary-wing detachment remained on board ship to support mine countermeasures operations and to protect the amphibious task force. Most of the group, however, moved ashore at Mishab and supported 5th MEB ground operations from Tanajib Airfield. At the end of combat operations MAG-50 was once again restructured to meet new requirements.

The single most important factor that influenced MAG-50 combat operations was the loss of the big deck amphibious assault ships *Tripoli* and *New Orleans*. Colonel West, virtually without warning in each case, lost two-thirds of his afloat aviation support. While the loss of deck spaces were costly enough, he also lost the bulk of his maintenance and ordnance storage facilities. These losses and unexpected operational needs dictated radical changes in the aviation plans.

Colonel West left four AH-1Js from Detachment A, HMA-773, on board the *Tripoli* which separated from the ATF and joined Destroyer Squadron 22 to conduct airborne mine countermeasure operations on 3 February. The Rainbows of HMM-265 moved from the *Tripoli* to the *Tarawa* which, in turn, forced the six Harriers from VMA-513 and Marine Air Control Squadron 7 personnel and



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) DM-SC-93-03521

*UH-1N Iroquois and AH-1 Cobra helicopters are parked on the flight line at Lonesome Dove Expeditionary Airfield in Saudi Arabia.*

equipment to move ashore. The Harriers flew to King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Base and the ground support personnel and equipment landed at Jubayl on 15 February. Colonel West, MAG-50 headquarters and service personnel, HMM-268, and HMA-773 moved to Tanajib Airfield not far from Mishab. Two AH-1Js, tasked to provide emergency defense of the amphibious task force, a light helicopter detachment from HMLA-169, and the CH-46s of HMM-265 remained at sea. Eventually, after the end of the conflict, Marine Composite Helicopter Squadron 268 was absorbed by the 11th MEU(SOC) and HMA-773 was detached from MAG-50 to return to Atlanta by air transport. Four RH-53D Sea Stallions from Detachment A, Marine Reserve Heavy Helicopter Squadron 772 (HMH-772), were attached to MAG-50 to offset the loss of HMM(C)-268's CH-53Es. The MAG-50 command element operated from Tanajib until 17 March, when it returned to the *Tarawa*.<sup>280</sup>

The aviation detachments from MAG-50 were busy throughout the conflict. After leaving the ship, the six VMA-513 Harriers, commanded by Major Eddie L. Holcomb, were assigned to Marine Aircraft Group 13 (Forward) at King Abdul Aziz Air Base and later flew 133.9 hours in 12 days. Most of the 39 combat sorties were over Kuwait and were flown in support of I MEF requirements. The four AH-1Js of HMA-773 on board the *Tripoli* began flying AMCM support missions on 16 February and continued to do so until the 27th when the disabled *Tripoli* was relieved of these duties by the *New Orleans*.

The bulk of MAG-50 worked in direct support of RLT 5 and was not placed under the operational control of 3d MAW. This arrangement caused no problems and Colonel West noted there were no complaints from any agency about the



independent status of MAG-50.<sup>281</sup> On 24 February, the Sea Knights of HMM-268, aided by HMM-461 Super Stallions, lifted 302 Marines and more than 200,000 pounds of cargo to Tanajib. That same day HMM-265 lifted 272 Marines from BLT 3/1 to blocking positions near Al Wafrah. The Sea Cobras of HMA-773 and HMLA-169 provided helicopter escorts, close-in fire support, and anti-armor defense missions. The Hueys of HMLA-169 furnished reconnaissance, command and control, medical evacuation, and resupply support.<sup>282</sup>

The tempo of operations picked up on the 25th. The Sea Knights from HMM-265 and -268 made 58 combat sorties in support of BLT 3/1 at Al Wafrah. Two AH-1Js from HMA-773 provided on-call, close-in fire support, two AH-1Ws from HMLA-169 provided antitank support, and two Hueys from HMLA-169 provided medical evacuation support for BLT 3/1. The Sea Cobras made 45 combat sorties over the Al Wafrah area, destroying two and damaging four buildings, in addition to causing two secondary explosions, neutralizing an enemy observation post, destroying a radio tower, and engaging an unknown number of Iraqis hiding in the treeline. These actions resulted in the surrender of 14 Iraqis. One Sea Cobra sustained minor damage from small arms fire, but was able to return to Tanajib safely. The enemy antiaircraft battery was immediately destroyed by 20mm fire from the rest of the flight. The Vipers of HMLA-169 flew 40 combat sorties over Al Wafrah and southern Kuwait. Two Viper Hueys carried Colonel Gangle and Lieutenant Colonel Robichaud on several visual reconnaissance missions of the operational area. Detachment A, 3d LAAD, accompanied RLT 5 as it displaced forward from Mishab.<sup>283</sup>

The next day, MAG-50 continued to provide six aircraft in direct support of BLT 3/1 at Al Wafrah. One UH-1N was provided to General Rowe to serve as the 5th MEB airborne command post. The Sea Knights made 44 sorties to transport elements of BLT 3/1 to Al Kabd and elements of BLT 2/5 to Al Khanjar. Viper Super Cobras conducted 38 fire support missions and two Hueys flew emergency medevacs. Nineteen more Iraqis surrendered to BLT 3/1 after aerial attacks on positions inside Kuwait. An AH-1J from HMA-773 escorted six Iraqis waving a white flag into the waiting arms of the Marines of Task Force Troy. Two HMA-773 Sea Cobras remained with BLT 3/1 Rear at Al Wafrah, and two HMLA-169 Hueys supported BLT 3/1 Forward inside Kuwait.<sup>284</sup>

The next two days were difficult for aviation operations because of the deteriorating weather. The already limited visibility was further restricted by rain and low-lying cloud cover that made flight operations almost impossible. The weather delayed the lift of BLT 3/1 from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait on the 27th, then delayed until 1 March the return from Al Kabd to Mishab of some of BLT 3/1. Brigadier General Rowe, Colonel Gangle, and Lieutenant Colonel Selvage on board Hueys escorted by Super Cobras, conducted a visual reconnaissance of the Al Wafrah Forest and its approach routes prior to moving RLT 5 into the area.<sup>285</sup>

Helicopters from HMA-773 and HMLA-169 worked in direct support of RLT 5 during its sweep of the Al Wafrah area. They provided continuous on-call fire support and emergency evacuation support. A section of Hueys and Cobras remained with the RLT 5 command post during its overnight halts. One Huey

conducted an emergency medical evacuation of two Marines from BLT 2/5 and the Huey carrying General Rowe had to make an emergency landing south of Kuwait City due to a gearbox failure. A backup helicopter flew in and continued the mission. The grounded bird was taken to Kuwait International Airport for repairs. From 27 February to 3 March HMA-773 conducted 150 combat sorties, HMM-265 flew 45, and HMM-268 flew 39.<sup>286</sup>

On 4 March, 15 CH-46s, escorted by AH-1Js, lifted more than 1,150 RLT 5 Marines, while overland convoys carried the rest of RLT 5 to Mishab. Two Hueys conducted command and control support for General Rowe and Colonel Gangle. The Vipers of HMLA-169 flew back on board the *Tarawa* that day, but HMM-268 and HMA-773 remained at Tanajib. The crash of an AH-1J Sea Cobra on 6 March resulted in a rotational safety standdown for the next three days. Most of the flight time at Mishab was devoted to cross-decking the 5th MEB staff and bringing on shore more than 300 pallets of HMA-773 supplies and equipment for further shipment to the United States in late March. There were the daily medical evacuation standbys and some aerial logistics support was given to Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 at Tanajib, but for the most part, Colonel West kept flight operations to a minimum until MAG-50 reembarked on 17 March.<sup>287</sup>

## Retrograde and Departure

### *Return of the 13th MEU*

It was finally time for the 13th MEU to sail for home. After disembarking the Faylakah prisoners of war at Mishab, the four ships carrying the MEU sailed into the southern Gulf to rendezvous with the *Cayuga*. The ARG remained at anchor off Dubai until 9 March, when it sailed to conduct underway replenishment. While at sea, the *Okinawa* and *Ogden* were tasked to ferry some 3d Marine Aircraft Wing aircraft back to the United States. A detachment from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM-165), a Hawaii-based aviation unit, flew on board while the ships were off the Bahrain coast. This detachment was commanded by Captain Glenn W. Rosenberger and it included 11 CH-46E Sea Knights and 18 aviation support personnel. They had been in Saudi Arabia since the previous August and were long overdue to return home. Once the helicopters had been lashed down, the aviation gear safely stowed, and the Marines quartered, the task group headed south. It passed through the Strait of Hormuz on 11 March, made a turn east, and began the 37-day voyage back to San Diego via the Philippines and Hawaii.<sup>288</sup>

The first leg of the journey home went as planned. On 15 March, the 13th MEU(SOC) left the Gulf and returned to the operational control of the Pacific Fleet. Thus ended the 13th MEU's ninth month of deployment. All hands were looking forward to a final liberty in the Philippines and hoped for a quick stop at Pearl Harbor to be followed by a long-awaited reunion with their loved ones in California. The weather cooperated and it was a smooth sail under sunny skies across the Indian Ocean.

The Marines were given what Colonel Rhodes described as a "Heroes'

Welcome” when they arrived at Subic Bay’s Alava Pier on 24 March. The band was playing, a large crowd was clapping and cheering, banners and American flags were proudly displayed, and yellow ribbons abounded. The next day Brigadier Generals George R. Christmas, Commanding General, 9th MEB, and Major General Arthur C. Blades, Commanding General, 1st MAW, saluted the MEU’s successful deployment, as did Major General Henry C. Stackpole III, Commanding General, III MEF. While at Subic the 13th MEU embarked additional HMM-165 pilots and aviation support personnel. Shore-anxious Marines got a chance to call home and the 13th MEU enjoyed a well-earned liberty before putting to sea again.

The trip from the Philippines to southern California was not smooth. Only four of the five ships of PhibRon 5 left Subic Bay on the 28th. The *Durham* remained behind due to engine problems, but was finally able to get underway 36 hours later. Unfortunately, several days later the *Cayuga* developed engine problems and began to lag behind. The *Fort McHenry* reduced speed to escort the limping *Cayuga*, and they were joined later by the *Durham*, and all three sailed the northern circle route home. The *Okinawa* and *Ogden* proceeded to MCAS Hawaii to drop off HMM-165, which on 9 April conducted its fly-off at Kaneohe Bay.

It was a happy group of Marines which left Pearl Harbor for Camp Pendleton. Training during the transit from Hawaii to California included live fire, limited flight operations, and deck-top physical training and recreation time. There were also “reunion and return” classes taught by Navy Family Service representatives from San Diego and Long Beach which stressed potential problems, and a California Highway Patrol officer refreshed the Marines about highway and traffic safety. On 16 April, the ships arrived off California.

The returnees were greeted by Major General James M. Myatt, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, and Major General Harold W. Blot, the commanding general of V Marine Expeditionary Force (V MEF). Following welcome home speeches, most of the Marines went on leave and the V MEF assumed operational control of the 13th MEU. Eight days later V MEF stood down and the 13th MEU was absorbed by recently returned I MEF. By 26 April, all of the 13th MEU major subordinate elements had returned to their parent commands. On 9 June, the 13th MEU participated in the Washington, D.C. Victory Parade and then marched in a similar parade in New York City the next day, ending its bitter-sweet Persian Gulf sojourn.<sup>289</sup>

### *The 4th MEB Goes Home*

Upon receiving the fragmentary order that directed the cease-fire, General Jenkins ordered his staff to begin joint retrograde planning with the amphibious task force staff while the MFA stood by for any further tasking in support of operations ashore. On 7 March, General Schwarzkopf’s headquarters announced retrograde plans. The 4th MEB was in good shape because almost all of its men and equipment were already afloat. The main hurdles would be to reembark HMLA-269 and prepare for a detailed washdown of all equipment prior to a rigorous agri-

cultural inspection. Soon, however, the word filtered down that the ATF would also be carrying additional aircraft and equipment back to the United States.<sup>290</sup>

The retrograde and homeward voyage went smoothly and were accomplished without incident. From 5 to 9 March, PhibGru 2 split up for port calls at Dubai and Abu Dhabi. While in port the ships underwent maintenance inspections and conducted repairs prior to the long voyage home. The embarked Marines cleaned equipment and performed preventative maintenance to get ready for agricultural certification. The *Iwo Jima*, *Saginaw*, and *Manitowoc* were certified upon leaving Dubai. Between 11 and 12 March, the 4th MEB embarked two CH-53Es (HMH-362) and four CH-46s (HMM-774) for the trip to the U.S. On the 16th, the *Baugh* and *Bonnyman* sailed from Jubayl for Sunny Point with most of the 4th MEB Port Operations Group on board. These black bottoms arrived on 7 April and began downloading the next day.

On 11 March, Major General Jenkins passed his CTF 158 designation to Brigadier General Rowe. Three days later, Amphibious Group 2 rendezvoused and sailed out of the Persian Gulf for the last time. While in transit the 4th MEB was alerted about trouble in Ethiopia and made plans for a possible non-combatant evacuation of American citizens at the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, but no evacuation was required. Admiral Edney made a farewell visit to several ATF ships as they sailed through the Red Sea and thanked the sailors and Marines for their service during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. After exiting the Suez Canal on the 24th, the ATF divided into two transit groups.

Transit Group 1 included the *Iwo Jima*, *Trenton*, *Saginaw*, *Spartanburg County*, *Manitowoc*, *Shreveport*, *Raleigh*, and *Gunston Hall*. This eight-ship task group sailed to Rota, Spain, for washdown and agricultural inspection and then proceeded across the Atlantic to Onslow Beach and Morehead City. The group arrived at Rota on 30 March, passed inspection, then departed on 3 April. After 11 days at sea, the ships of Transit Group 1 offloaded at Onslow beach and then continued offloading at Morehead City the next day. They arrived at Norfolk on 17 April and were returned to the administrative control of PhibRons 10 and 12.

Transit Group 2, consisting of the *Nassau*, *Guam*, *Portland*, *Pensacola*, and *LaMoure County*, sailed to Haifa, Israel. The Marines began washing equipment but the lack of sufficient hard stand parking and sanitized holding areas contaminated most of the backload, so a washdown stop at Rota was necessary. The group departed Haifa on 29 March and arrived at Rota on 4 April. After certification on the 6th, Transit Group 2 was placed under the operational control of the Atlantic Fleet and began its Atlantic crossing. Enroute, Captain Robin Kearns of HMM-263 made the 10,000th landing of the 4th MEB deployment. On the evening of the 17th, it arrived off the North Carolina coast. Selected units crossed Onslow Beach on 17-18 April, while the remaining units were unloaded at Morehead City on 18-19 April. When the debarkation was complete selected dependents boarded the ships for a one-day "Tiger Cruise" to Norfolk on the 20th. On the 21st, the group was deactivated and its ships rejoined their respective administrative amphibious squadrons.<sup>291</sup>



Department of Defense Photo (USN) DN-ST-91-07977

*4th MEB Marines wait with their gear on a ramp leading to the well deck of the Nassau as the ship lies off Onslow Bay, North Carolina. The Marines are departing the Nassau after being deployed in the Persian Gulf for nearly eight months.*

### *Ethiopia Evacuation Contingency*

Even though the Gulf War was over and CentCom was in the midst of its retrograde, there were still trouble spots within the CentCom operational area. One such area was the Horn of Africa where civil wars were raging in Somalia and Ethiopia. On 14 March, the U.S. Embassy at Addis Ababa issued an evacuation warning to American citizens in Ethiopia as rebel factions advanced on the capital. On the 18th, General Rowe received a warning order to be prepared to conduct a non-combatant evacuation at Addis Ababa. This contingency mission was first given to the 4th MEB, then went to the 5th MEB, and it was finally passed to the 11th MEU(SOC).<sup>292</sup>

Upon receipt of the NEO warning order on 18 March, Brigadier General Rowe directed the 5th MEB staff to begin planning to conduct both a permissive and an opposed evacuation of the Addis Ababa Embassy. These contingencies were collectively codenamed Operation Prompt Relief. Although none of the rebel groups had voiced any hostility for Americans, Charge d'Affaires Robert G. Houdek feared U.S. citizens might be placed at risk during the expected period of chaos and political unrest after the capital fell. The exact number of evacuees was uncertain, but there were at least 600 Americans in Ethiopia. Many of them, however, were relief workers and volunteers who did not wish to leave or were located in the hinterland too far from Addis Ababa to arrive in time to be evacuated.

As had happened during Operation Eastern Exit, it was very possible other diplomats and foreign nationals might seek the safety of the U.S. Embassy or request evacuation.

After careful study of the situation and available assets, the 5th MEB staff presented its plan. An amphibious task group would wait near Djibouti in the Bab Al Mandeb Strait between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Distance was a problem because Addis Ababa was about 500 miles from the planned evacuation launch site. The initial rescue wave would fly directly to Addis Ababa on board four RH-53D Sea Stallions of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Miller's Marine Reserve Heavy Helicopter Squadron 772. This wave would be comprised of a command element, a security force, an evacuation control team, and a helicopter support team. The helicopters would have to be refueled at least twice by KC-130s from Marine Reserve Refueler-Transport Squadron 452 operating from either Saudi Arabia or Djibouti. Depending on the situation at the embassy, one or two forward ground refueling points might have to be established inside Djibouti or Ethiopia to support additional fixed-wing or helicopter operations if they were needed.<sup>293</sup> Intelligence, aviation control, and logistics support would be provided by U.S. Navy carrier aircraft and U.S. Air Force special operations aircraft.

The 5th MEB remained on standby status at locations in the southern Gulf and North Arabian Sea until it departed for home on 7 May. At that time the 11th MEU(SOC), embarked on board the ships of Amphibious Squadron 1 inside the Gulf, picked up responsibility for the NEO contingency.<sup>294</sup> As it turned out, no threat to U.S. citizens developed. The crisis abated when the Communist regime of Lieutenant Colonel Megistu Haile Mariam fell on 21 May and the rebel forces took control of Addis Ababa about a week later. Although an emergency evacuation was not needed the Marines were good to go at a moment's notice.<sup>295</sup>

### *The 5th MEB Sails*

On 3 March, the 5th MEB began backloading at Mishab. The movement from Al Wafrah to Mishab was completed on the 4th when the last of the convoys arrived at the staging area. More than 1,150 Marines had been helilifted back by 15 HMM-268 Sea Knights escorted by HMA-773 Sea Cobras operating from Tanajib Airfield. That same day, HMLA-169, except for one UH-1N at Kuwait International Airport awaiting repair, flew back on board the *Tarawa*. The 5th MEB command post also reopened on board the *Tarawa*.

Unfortunately, only 11 of the original 13 amphibious ships were available for backload because the *Tripoli* was undergoing repairs and the *New Orleans* was still attached to the mine countermeasures force. The retrograde required a massive effort to collect, sort, repack, and turn in more than 300 pallets of Class V(W) supplies at the Mishab ammunition supply point. This took nine 24-hour work days to accomplish. Concurrently, there was a major effort to clean vehicles that were covered with oil and mud and ready them for embarkation.

The 5th MEB underwent several organizational changes prior to sailing for



**Ethiopia  
Evacuation  
Contingency  
March-June 1991**

home. The most important of these was the breakout of the 11th MEU(SOC), which reduced the command element by about one-half. The ground combat element would have to do without BLT 3/1 and its significant combat power. Marine Aircraft Group 50 would lose HMM(C)-268 and its 12 Sea Knights, 6 Super Cobras, 4 Hueys, and 4 Super Stallions. The resultant loss left the 5th MEB without a helicopter heavy lift capability. Brigade Service Support Group 5 would become a shell of its former self, losing its commander, significant amounts of equipment, and about two-thirds of its personnel. In all, 778 Marines were scheduled to fly back to the States rather than return by ship.

The air combat element was most impacted by these changes. Colonel West had to reshuffle his remaining personnel and assets to meet post-Desert Storm commitments. On 6 March HMA-773 lost an AH-1J when it lost power and crashed in the Saudi desert while on a training mission about 35 miles northwest of Tanajib. Both crew members were able to escape, but one suffered a broken neck. The Reserves of HMA-773 remained at Tanajib until mid-March when they moved to Jubayl for air transport back to Atlanta. Marine Air Control Squadron 7 detached and would remain in Saudi Arabia to assist with the I MEF retrograde. MAG-50's sagging lift capability was bolstered with the return of Detachment B, VMA-513, from 3d MAW and Detachment A, Marine Reserve Heavy Helicopter Squadron 772, with its four RH-53D Sea Stallions.\*

By 10 March, all of the 5th MEB at Mishab, except elements of RLT 5 that remained on shore awaiting the return of the *New Orleans* and the Marines scheduled to fly home, had returned to their ships. The *Tarawa* sailed to Jubayl to finish loading, then moved to the United Arab Emirates for five days at Dubai. When the Ethiopia crisis heated up, the ATF gathered in the SAG Box, then spent nine days standing by. With only a few brief respites, the ATF remained at ModLoc in the southern Gulf during most of April.

The 5th MEB patiently waited in the Persian Gulf until the Americans could be relieved by United Nations Forces in Iraq. On shore MarCent was replaced by a brigade-size Marine contingent, Marine Forces Southwest Asia. Despite rumors, counterrumors, and uncertainty about its time remaining in the Gulf, morale in the 5th MEB remained high. Finally, PhibGru 3 raised anchor and sailed through the Strait of Hormuz for the last time on 7 May 1991. The 5th MEB had finished its time in the Persian Gulf, but a storm was brewing on the horizon.

### *Breakout of the 11th MEU(SOC)*

The backload had been carefully planned so that the five ships of PhibRon 1 would carry only the men, supplies, and equipment assigned to the 11th MEU(SOC). This allowed the 11th MEU(SOC) to break out of the MEB easily on 17 March. Commanded by Colonel Robert J. Garner, who had served as the

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\*RH-53Ds were rated as medium-lift helicopters, but they could lift far more than CH-46s and their in-air refueling capacity extended the reach of MAG-50.



5th MEB operations officer when the MEU was embedded in the 5th MEB during Desert Storm, 11th MEU included Battalion Landing Team 3/1, HMM(C)-268, and MSSG 11. The MEU mustered 162 officers and 2,098 enlisted men. Its combat power included 10 howitzers, 12 AAVs, 6 LAVs, 12 Sea Knights, 4 Super Stallions, 4 Super Cobras, and 2 Hueys.

On 17 March, the 11th MEU(SOC) and PhibRon 1, commanded by Captain Michael D. Barker, USN, were reconstituted. PhibRon 1 included the *New Orleans* (detached for MCM operations), *Denver*, *Mobile*, *Germantown*, and *Peoria*. The MEU command element was embarked temporarily on board the *Denver* until the *New Orleans* returned. Battalion Landing Team 3/1 had elements of Headquarters and Service Company and Companies K and M on shore conducting live-fire training at Thunderbolt Range. The rest of BLT 3/1 was spread between the *Germantown*, *Peoria*, and *Denver*. The aviation combat element, HMM(C)-268, was ashore at Tanajib Airfield, while the combat service support element was on board the *Mobile*.<sup>296</sup>

In the early morning hours of 21 March, a Saudi C-130 transport carrying more than 100 Senegalese Muslim soldiers back to Mishab from their pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca crashed near Mishab.\* Despite the fog and overcast night sky, Corporal Juan Jimenez, Lance Corporal Andre Bright, and Private First Class Kevin Mason observed the crash. They reported the incident, then hurried to the site where they, along with other Marines from Companies K and Headquarters and Service, braved the flames to pull injured and dead from the burning wreck. They also provided medical care until Saudi authorities assumed control of the crash site. Despite heroic efforts by Marines and Navy corpsmen, only three of the injured men survived the crash. The official cause of the crash was given as poor visibility produced by thick black smoke from nearby burning oil wells.<sup>297</sup>

Admiral Arthur tasked Colonel Garner to perform an amphibious presence mission and to establish an operational relationship with allied states within the Arabian Gulf area. As a result, Garner initiated a training program to hone basic combat skills and to improve the 11th MEU special operations capability. From 18 March to 6 April, the 11th MEU(SOC) conducted a series of small unit and limited integrated training exercises using facilities at Ras Al Ghar, Mishab, Thunderbolt Range, and Tanajib. On 24 March, the elements of BLT 3/1 located at Mishab moved south to the Saudi Marine Base at Ras Al Ghar. The training period concluded with an international "march, run, and shoot" competition that pitted the 11th MEU against the British 1st Battalion, Coldstream Guards, which bested the Marines.

On 11 April, the backload of the *New Orleans* was complete and the 11th MEU(SOC) sailed for the United Arab Emirates. A nine-day amphibious exercise at Al Hamra (27 April to 5 May) followed a port call at Dubai. This was the first opportunity for the 11th MEU and PhibRon 1 to function as a separate entity since

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\*King Fahd generously dictated that any Muslim soldiers defending Saudi Arabia would be allowed to make the *Hadj* Pilgrimage at his expense.

Exercise Kernel Usher in October 1990. The training included an amphibious exercise, small unit tactics, live fire, joint close air support, and Blue-Green coordination exercises. A solid working relationship with the Sultan's Armed Forces was also established. This was followed by a three-day joint maritime interdiction training exercise including elements from the 11th MEU(SOC), U.S. Navy, and U.S. Coast Guard. After the interdiction exercise, the Marines began a series of goodwill visits throughout the Gulf, which included stops at Manama (Bahrain), Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Jebel Ali.

Ethiopia contingency planning was continuous from late March until mid-June. Detailed concepts of operations were developed, presented, approved, and rehearsed. On 2 June, Colonel Garner and the 11th MEU staff met with representatives from PhibRon 1, HMM(C)-268, Central Command Special Operations Command, and Air Force Special Operations to coordinate external support requirements. Following the conference, PhibRon 1 was directed to proceed to a modified location in international waters off the coast of Oman, where it and the MEU were placed on 72-hour alert to launch a heliborne evacuation of the U.S. Embassy at Addis Ababa. While on station, HMM(C)-268 Super Stallions conducted aerial refueling refresher training with Air Force MC-130s and planning conferences were held with the *Nimitz* Carrier Battle Group. Luckily, the Ethiopian situation stabilized and the 11th MEU(SOC) stood down on 16 June. Returning to the Gulf, the MEU continued to train, make port calls, and prepared for its return to southern California in July.<sup>298</sup>

### 5th MEB's Angels from the Sea *The Winds of Death*

In April 1991, a killer cyclone named Marian struck Southern Asia. For eight hours the coast of Bangladesh, located at the tip of the natural funnel formed by the Bay of Bengal, was battered by gale-force winds and swamped by tidal waves. The devastation began on the evening of the 29th when winds reaching a velocity of 145 miles per hour lashed the densely populated coastal lowlands and a 20-foot-high wall of water swept over the offshore islands and cascaded onto the low-lying coastal plain. What the people of the region called "the winds of death" claimed a reported 139,000 lives, killed more than one million livestock, displaced more than 10 million people, ruined more than 74,000 acres of vital crops, and inundated with seawater an additional 300,000 acres of farmland.<sup>299</sup>

Cyclone Marian also destroyed the existing infrastructure making relief operations difficult. The southern port city of Chittagong was awash and could not handle incoming traffic. All roads were cut and electrical service was disrupted throughout the affected area. The survivors of the storm were threatened by starvation and disease. The recently elected democratic government, which had only eight weeks before ended more than 15 years of military dictatorship, was overwhelmed by the forces of nature, so Prime Minister Begum Khaldea Zia appealed for assistance. International aid and assistance was soon on the way; the American response was to launch Operation Productive Effort, later changed by



Photo Courtesy of Col Eugene L. Gobeli, USMC

*Salt water inundated the rice fields of Sandwip Island in Bangladesh, destroying much of the dry season rice crop. Devastated areas such as this could only be reached by helicopter.*

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to Operation Sea Angel.\*

### *The Joint Task Force*

On 10 May, a United States joint task force (JTF) was formed to control and coordinate American relief efforts and led by Marine Major General Henry C. Stackpole III, Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force. Following an aerial reconnaissance of the coastal lowlands from the port city of Chittagong to the coastal resort town of Cox's Bazar, General Stackpole issued his operational intent which stressed three issues. First, the Government of Bangladesh would "call the shots" by setting priorities and controlling relief supplies. The upcoming relief operations were going to be the first real test of democratic government in Bangladesh and all wanted them to be a success. Second, he wanted to reduce culture shock to local civilians unused to American technology and customs. Third, emergency aid must be delivered quickly, but at the same time, long-

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\*For a detailed account of relief operations in Bangladesh, see Charles R. Smith. *U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations. Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, USMC, 1995.

term programs would have to be developed to deal with future natural disasters.<sup>300</sup>

The Joint Task Force staff formulated a three-stage campaign plan. Stage one involved an estimate of the situation, which would include a survey of the damage, an inventory of all available assets, and a request for appropriate outside assistance. An implied task was to establish liaison with all government and non-government agencies and make them aware of the JTF's nature and capabilities. The second stage stressed the speedy delivery of life-saving emergency supplies, potable water production, and medical aid. The campaign plan's final stage involved winding down American participation while local agencies took over relief operations. During this phase the JTF would advise the Government of Bangladesh how to rebuild the countryside and assist in planning for future emergencies.<sup>301</sup>

The concept of operations entailed providing transportation, communications, medical, and logistics support. The priorities of action and the actual distribution of supplies would be left to Bangladeshis. Although there were sufficient relief supplies available in Dhaka, they were located more than 120 miles from the disaster zone. Rapid movement of these supplies would require helicopters and watercraft as Cyclone Marian had destroyed the infrastructure of the disaster area. After the initial survey, it was obvious the existing Joint Task Force would have to be expanded to accomplish the mission.<sup>302</sup>

Luckily, the perfect instrument for such operations was nearby. The home-bound PhibGru 3, with the embarked 5th MEB, was sailing across the Indian Ocean when the crisis arose, and it was well-suited for relief operations in Bangladesh. The areas most in need of help were the offshore islands and the coastal lowlands, both of which were well within the reach of the amphibious task force's landing craft, small boats, helicopters, and amphibious vehicles. Operations could be sea-based and would require only minimal American presence on shore, lessening the impact of cultural differences and reducing the drain on already scarce resources in the affected area. Although it had been reduced in size and capability after Desert Storm, the ATF could still provide a solid nucleus to support a humanitarian operation.<sup>303</sup>

On 11 May, the task force was ordered to the Bay of Bengal to support the joint task force. Its mission was to deliver relief supplies and provide other humanitarian assistance as needed. Marines and sailors were not deploying to establish a foothold, so Brigadier General Rowe and Admiral Clarey expected to be in country only a short time before resuming the journey home.

From the 11th to the 15th, when the ATF made landfall, Marines and sailors devoted their time to planning and preparation. The intelligence section prepared map studies and gave orientation lectures. The operations section worked out task organizations and prepared contingency operations plans. The logistics section reconfigured landing craft loads to carry engineer equipment and relief supplies instead of combat equipment. Medical personnel gave inoculations and informed Marines about medical dangers ashore. Helicopter crews labored to prepare desert operations-configured aircraft for the vastly different Bangladeshi environ-



Photo Courtesy of American Embassy, Dhaka  
*MajGen Henry C. Stackpole III, commanding the III Marine Expeditionary Force, was given command of the joint American effort to provide disaster relief to victims of the Bangladesh cyclone.*

ment. Embarkation teams reconfigured their loads so tactical equipment and supplies were replaced by engineer equipment, rations, medical supplies, and relief aid.<sup>304</sup>

When PhibGru 3 arrived off the coast, Admiral Clarey, Brigadier General Rowe, and Colonel Randolph Gangle flew to Chittagong to meet with Major General Stackpole. At the initial briefing, General Stackpole explained the situation as he saw it. There were plenty of relief supplies and more were on the way. A dedicated, but inexperienced, democratic government was struggling to take control of the situation. Non-government relief agencies were at hand, but they

lacked adequate communications and transportation. With these issues in mind, General Stackpole informed General Rowe that the focus of the MEB's effort would be the distribution of food, medicine, and relief supplies. Marines would lend their expertise when requested, but would not run the show; Americans would be the providers, the Bangladeshis the policy makers.<sup>305</sup>

Since MAG-50 possessed more than 90 percent of the helicopters available to the JTF, General Stackpole assigned PhibGru 3 and 5th MEB the largest segment of the disaster zone. A 9,000-square-mile area of operations, it included more than 150 miles of coastline, stretching from the apex of the Bay of Bengal south to Cox's Bazar, and the outlying islands of South Hatia, Sandwip, Kutubdia, Matabari, and Maheshkali Islands.<sup>306</sup> General Stackpole's intent was to complete the relief effort within two weeks; that the forces ashore should carry no weapons; and that a minimum "footprint" would be created by using as few Americans on the beach as possible.

### *5th MEB Command, Control, and Coordination*

General Rowe and his staff developed a six-phase concept of operations; a forward command element would be collocated with JTF Forward Headquarters at Chittagong; helicopter insertion of communications personnel and liaison teams into designated landing zones to coordinate operations with JTF/relief agencies on the scene and positioning ATF ships in the northern Bay of Bengal to provide sea-based logistics support; lifting supplies ashore employing ATF helicopters and landing craft, including movement of water-making facilities and potable water; provide additional support as directed; turnover the relief mission to international agencies or follow-on relief organizations within two weeks; and back-load equipment to ATF ships.<sup>307</sup>

Planned operations included five major areas: command and control; force enhancement; water craft operations; aviation operations; and medical assistance. The 5th MEB remained sea-based throughout the operation, so there were never more than 500 personnel on the shore at one time. Most of the ships closed the beach, but the prevailing winds, currents, and sea state forced the *Tarawa* to keep sailing about 30 miles out at all times. The *Achorage*, *Mount Vernon*, *Barbour County*, *Frederick*, and *Vancouver* anchored off Chittagong to offload materials and serve as forward replenishment stations. The *Juneau* was centrally located near Kutubdia Island.

Admiral Clarey and General Rowe were designated the JTF Navy and Marine component commanders, but retained their respective command posts on board the flagship *Tarawa*. General Rowe then chose Colonel Gangle mission commander to control operations ashore. He opted to use his ground combat element commander for this mission because he felt his aviation and combat service support commanders would be too busy to effectively wear "two command hats." General Rowe described Gangle as "senior and savvy" and noted that the RLT 5 staff was "a sound base around which to build an integrated mission command."<sup>308</sup>





future operations, networking administrative and tactical radio traffic, handling public affairs, and escorting important visitors. While these were typical command functions, they had to be adapted for non-combat humanitarian relief operations.

Colonel Randall L. West coordinated the movement of Marine aircraft in accord with the wishes of the JTF and mission commanders. To facilitate the movement, he formed an aviation forward control element composed of an operations and logistics section and a team from Navy Tactical Control Squadron 11. Throughout the operation, Colonel Gangle allowed Colonel West maximum latitude to accomplish his tasks.<sup>310</sup>

### *Relief Operations*

On 16 May, the 5th MEB began relief operations. Mission control centers were manned 24 hours each day to receive reports, constantly update information, maintain communications with forward deployed units, and ensure reliable information was disseminated up and down the chain of command. The ground combat element provided work parties, communicators, and liaison officers. The aviation combat element provided helicopters and air control assistance. The combat service support element provided skilled technicians and special equipment.

One of the 5th MEB's major contributions to the Joint Task Force was force enhancement provided by BSSG 5 and the MEB command element. Although equipment and logistics expertise were important, Major General Stackpole noted that the most important support was communications. Neither the Bangladesh government nor the relief agencies had sufficient communications equipment. Even Bangladeshi military communications had been degraded to the point where officers were unable to communicate with units inside the disaster zone. Fifteen hundred volunteer workers had come to Bangladesh, but their agencies could neither transport them to the field nor communicate with representatives already there. To alleviate this problem about a dozen communications sites were established using assets from the JTF, the 5th MEB, and fly-in elements of the Marine 7th Communications Battalion.<sup>311</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel William V. Cantu, 5th MEB's communications officer, developed a communications plan and established a communications network covering all aspects of air, ground, and seaborne operations. Small detachments, each consisting of only two or three Marines, manned high frequency radios at government buildings, relief storehouses, and distribution points. These sites supported government and non-government relief agencies. Although only a temporary measure, communications detachments helped to double the amount of supplies reaching the Chittagong and Cox's Bazar distribution centers. This communications support allowed Prime Minister Zia's government to coordinate relief efforts and simultaneously rebuild commercial communications links to the disaster zone.

At first, relief efforts were limited to the vicinity of Chittagong, however, operations rapidly expanded and soon included many of the outlying areas and off-





Department of Defense Photo (USAF) DF-ST-92-06111

*A common sight throughout the devastated areas of southeastern Bangladesh were Marines hurrying to unload sacks of rice.*

shore islands. On 19 May, Colonel Gangle ordered Lieutenant Colonel Selvage's BLT 3/5 to move ashore from the *Vancouver* and establish a second control center at Cox's Bazar, a small resort city located at the southern tip of the area of operations. Its 6,000-foot airfield and small boat harbor became the focal points for relief efforts at Kutubdia, Matabari, Chokoria, and Maheshkali.<sup>312</sup>

Battalion Landing Team 3/5's efforts at Cox's Bazar received a welcome boost when the British Navy and Royal Marines reported for duty with the Joint Task Force. Royal Fleet Auxiliary large logistics support ship RFA *Fort Grange* (A 385) arrived from Sri Lanka on 21 May. The *Fort Grange* was crewed by 208 men, including 20 Royal Marines of Assault Squadron 529 to man six rigid raiding craft. It also carried four Westland HAS.5 Sea King helicopters from Flight G, Naval Air Squadron 825.

The first day of operations set a pattern that became standard operating procedure throughout Operation Sea Angel. At first light, helicopters and landing craft carried personnel and equipment ashore. After unloading cargo transportation assets they were directed to various pick up and delivery points by mission control centers. During the day, working parties and medical teams assisted with ongoing relief efforts; when these missions were completed or when darkness approached, the Marines on shore were picked up and returned to their respective ships.

### *5th MEB Departs*

As the month of May came to a close, the allotted two-week period came to an end. In accord with JTF plans the 5th MEB backloaded its equipment, reconsti-

tuted its combat capability, and sailed for home on 29 May. In less than two weeks ashore the 5th MEB had delivered 5,485 passengers and transported almost 700 tons of supplies. The hard-working helicopters of MAG-50 flew 1,208 helicopter sorties in 1,111 flight hours. Watercraft had delivered 99,500 pounds of relief aid. The medical assistance program treated 6,470 patients.<sup>313</sup> These achievements earned PhibGru 3 and the 5th MEB a hard-earned "well done."

The amphibious task group entered the Strait of Malacca on the first day of June and headed for the Philippines. While the task group was in port at Subic Bay, Colonel Gangle conducted a battle study of Corregidor Island, and Detachment B, VMA-531 detached from MAG-50.\* On the 9th, the 5th MEB sailed on the next leg of its journey home. Six days later PhibGru 3 entered the Third Fleet operational area. The "Rainbows" of HMM-265 flew off the *Tarawa* for MCAS Kaneohe Bay and the ATF put into Pearl Harbor where the remainder of HMM-265 disembarked. On the morning of 22d, the 5th MEB was underway again and closed the California coast on the 28th. The "Roadhogs" of HMM-772 departed the *Tarawa* for Naval Air Station Alameda the same day. The next day the rest of the 5th MEB began off loading at Camp Pendleton and San Diego. Its 210-day deployment was finally over.<sup>314</sup>

### *'Bravo Zulu'*

When the 4th and 5th MEBs and the 13th MEU(SOC) united in January 1991, they constituted the largest Marine combat landing force since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Together, the Marine Forces Afloat and the Gator Navy posed a powerful amphibious threat which Saddam Hussein could not ignore.

The amphibious deception was a strategic victory of the first magnitude. The impact of the amphibious threat was brought home when a large sandtable was discovered in a schoolhouse near Kuwait City. This impressive display showed exactly where the Iraqis expected landings and the disposition of their defenses. These elaborate plans left little doubt that the focus of the Iraqi defenses in and around Kuwait City was coastal defense. Major General James M. Myatt, the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, reported about half of the Iraqi artillery in his sector was aimed to repel an assault from the sea rather than positioned to defeat an inland attack.

In retrospect there is little doubt that, given the circumstances, the decision not to land the landing force was the correct one.\*\* The strategic distraction caused

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\*Its aircraft remained in the Philippines while VMA-513 personnel flew home for 10 days leave before returning to join the 15th MEU on board the USS *Peleliu* (LHA 5).

\*\*There remains some controversy over exactly when the amphibious option was dropped; Adm Mauz and Col Wickersham believe it happened in Sept90, others point to the *Blue Ridge* meeting on 2Feb91; Gen Rowe felt it remained on the table until the 5th MEB came ashore on 24Feb91. (Arthur, Mauz, Jenkins, Rowe, and Wickersham comments).

by the Marine Forces Afloat hovering over the horizon yielded a far greater tactical advantage than could have been gained by a landing. The simple threat of a landing drew Saddam's attention away from the actual attack area and caused him to use precious resources to defend the coast. The threat to the seaward flank allowed the amphibious forces to influence the outcome of the overall campaign without sustaining a single battle casualty.<sup>315</sup>

Throughout the Persian Gulf Conflict, embarked Marine forces were an integral part of a naval expeditionary force that performed a wide variety of combat and non-combat operations in the air, on land, and at sea. Eminent British military historian Sir Basil Liddle-Hart once observed, "amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset a sea power possesses." The Marine Forces Afloat were not limited to the solitary role of amphibious assault, but provided the theater commander with a versatile tool capable of rapid response to a wide variety of contingencies. They executed no less than two dozen amphibious operations (assaults, raids, and demonstrations); put teeth into the U.N. embargo by providing highly capable forces to seize Iraqi ships; conducted five large-scale training exercises; executed one short-notice non-combatant evacuation and were ready to do a second one; launched the first fixed-wing combat strikes from amphibious ships; moved almost one-half its combat power ashore to support the largest Marine ground offensive since World War II; and participated in the largest Marine humanitarian effort to that time while sailing for home. It is no wonder that as each element of the Marine Forces Afloat departed the Gulf, it received a commander's "bravo zulu" message conveying the traditional naval congratulations for a job "well done."



## Notes

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Unless otherwise noted, the material in this monograph was derived from: MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., telcon of 5Jun95, hereafter Jenkins intvw and comments on draft ms, hereafter Jenkins comments; BGen Peter J. Rowe telcon of 7Jun95, hereafter Rowe intvw; 5th MEB Staff interview at 5th MEB HQ, Camp Pendleton, California, hereafter 5th MEB Staff intvw; Battlefield Assessment Team interviews conducted in SWA in Mar91, hereafter BAT intvw; USMC command chronologies (ArcSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter unit ComdC; official messages (ArcSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter originator, msg followed by date-time group; MarCent, Command Brief dtd 3Mar91 (ArcSec, MCHC, Washington, DC), hereafter MarCent Comd Brief; 4th MEB After Action Report, "The Fourth Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, 1990-1991," hereafter 4th MEB AAR; 5th MEB After Action Report, "The 5th MEB Deployment To Southwest Asia, 1990-1991," hereafter 5th MEB AAR; Department of Defense, "The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," *Final Report to Congress*, Apr92, hereafter DoD, *Report to Congress*; U.S. Army, *How They Fight: Desert Shield Order of Battle Handbook* (USAITAC, Sept 1990), hereafter USA, *Desert Shield Order of Battle*; U.S. Army, AIA-DS-1-90: *Identifying the Iraqi Threat*, hereafter USA, *Iraqi Threat*; U.S. Army National Training Center *Handbook 100-1: The Iraqi Army* (Fort Irwin, Ca: S-2, 177th Armored Brigade, 3Jan91), hereafter NTC *Iraqi Army*; Center for Naval Analyses, "U.S. Marine Operations During Desert Shield/Desert Storm," hereafter CNA, "Marine Ops"; Lawrence R. Benson and Jay E. Hines, *The United States Military in North Africa and Southwest Asia Since World War II* (MacDill AFB, CentCom HO, 1988); Col Charles J. Quilter II, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With I Marine Expeditionary Force* (Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1993), hereafter Quilter, *I MEF*; LtCol Charles H. Cureton, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division* (Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1993); Maj Charles D. Melson, Evelyn A. Englander, and Capt David A. Dawson, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1992); LtCol Dennis P. Mroczkowski, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf: With the 2d Marine Division* (Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1992), hereafter Mroczkowski, *2d MarDiv*; LtCol Darrell L. Stewart, MCRC PAM-92-0001 "Amphibious Operations in Southwest Asia" (MCCDC, Quantico, 1992), hereafter Stewart, "PhibOps"; Norman Friedman, *Desert Victory* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), hereafter Friedman, *Desert Victory*; LtCol Ronald J. Brown, "Marine Forces Afloat in Southwest Asia," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov92, pp. 60-63; Col John R. Pope, "U.S. Marines in Operation Desert Storm," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jul91, pp. 63-68, hereafter Pope, "Desert Storm"; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Getting Marines To The Gulf," *USNIP*, May91, pp. 50-64, hereafter Simmons, "Getting Marines To The Gulf"; Simmons, "Getting the Job Done," *USNIP*, May91, pp. 94-96; Adm

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261. Ibid.; MSSG 13 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.

### *5th MEB Operations on Shore*

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter was derived from: 5th MEB AAR; 5th MEB Brief; 5th MEB ComdC; 5th MEB Staff intvw; 5th Mar ComdC; MAG-50 ComdC; BLT 3/1 ComdC; BLT 2/5 ComdC; BLT 3/5 ComdC; and BSSG 5 ComdC.

263. 5th MEB Staff intvw.
264. Siegel comments.
265. 5th MEB AAR; 5th MEB ComdC; 5th MEB Staff intvw.
266. 5th MEB ComdC; 5th MEB Staff intvw.
267. 5th MEB OpsSum.
268. 5th MEB ComdC, 5th MEB AAR.
269. BLT 3/1 ComdC, Feb91.
270. BLT 3/1 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
271. 5th MEB ComdC, Feb-Mar91; 5th MEB Staff intvw; MAG-50 ComdC, Feb-Mar91; BSSG 5 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
272. RLT 5 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
273. Mroczkowski, *With the 2d MarDiv*, pp. 39-59.
274. BLT 3/1 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
275. 5th MEB ComdC, Feb-Mar91; 5th MEB Staff intvw.
276. CTU 158.2.1 msg 212235ZFeb91 "FragOrd #1."
277. RLT 5 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
278. Combat AAR included in BLT 3/5 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
279. 5th MEB ComdC, Feb-Mar91; RLT 5 ComdC, Feb-Mar91; MAG-50 ComdC, Feb-Mar91; 5th MEB AAR; 5th MEB Staff intvw.
280. MAG-50 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
281. MAG-16 msg to 5th MEB dtg 261903ZFeb91.
282. "5th MEB as I MEF Reserve," SAR, pp. 3-5; MAG-50 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
283. MAG-50 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
284. Ibid.
285. "5th MEB as I MEF Reserve," pp. 4-5.
286. MAG-50 ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
287. Ibid.

#### *Retrograde and Departure*

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter was derived from: 4th MEB ComdC; 5th MEB ComdC; 11th MEU ComdC; 13th MEU ComdC; 4th MEB AAR; 5th MEB AAR; Facts on File, *World News Digest*, 1991.

288. 13th MEU ComdC, Feb-Mar91.
289. 13th MEU ComdC, Mar-Jun91.
290. 4th MEB ComdC, Mar-May91.
291. 4th MEB ComdC, Mar-Apr91.
292. 5th MEB AAR.
293. 5th MEB AAR.
294. 11th MEU ComdC, May-Jun91.
295. Facts on File, *World News Digest*, 6Jun91, pp. 425.
296. 11th MEU ComdC, Mar-Apr91.
297. BLT 3/1 ComdC, Mar-Jun91; SSgt Jeanette C. Harris, I MEF PAO rpt #153-



91 dtd 9Apr91.

298. 11th MEU ComdC, Mar-Jun91.

*5th MEB's Angels from the Sea*

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter was derived from: 5th MEB AAR; 5th MEB Staff intvw; 5th MEB Brief; MAG-50 Special Action Report "Operation Sea Angel: A Case Study," hereafter MAG-50 SAR; LtGen Henry C. Stackpole III, "Sea Angel," presentation at MCHC on 30Jan92, hereafter Stackpole brief; Charles R. Smith, "Operation Sea Angel," presentation to MCHF on 25Oct93, hereafter Smith brief; LtGen Stackpole, "Angels from the Sea," *USNI Proceedings*, May92, pp. 110-16; BGen Peter J. Rowe, "Interview," *USNI Proceedings*, May92, pp. 128-132; Col Donald R. Selvage, "Operation Sea Angel: Bangladesh Disaster Relief," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov91, pp. 89-97, and Charles R. Smith, *Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991*, (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, 1995).

299. Cited in Andrew Bilski, "Winds of Death," *MacClean's Magazine*, 13May91, pp. 22-24.

300. Stackpole brief; 5th MEB AAR.

301. Stackpole, "Sea Angel," pg. 114.

302. Stackpole brief.

303. 5th MEB Ops Brief.

304. 5th MEB AAR.

305. 5th MEB intvw.

306. 5th MEB AAR.

307. 5th MEB Ops Brief.

308. 5th MEB intvw.

309. 5th MEB AAR.

310. MAG-50 SAR.

311. Stackpole brief.

312. Selvage, "Sea Angel."

313. 5th MEB Brief.

314. 5th MEB ComdC; MAG-50 ComdC.

315. LtGen Bernard E Trainor, USMC (Ret), "Still going...Amphibious Warfare," *USNI Proceedings*, Nov92, p. 33.

# Appendix A

## Command and Staff List

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### 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit

#### 13th MEU Command Element

CO	Col John E. Rhodes
XO	LtCol Rollin G. Napier
SEM	SgtMaj Anthony Reese
S-1	Capt Christopher G. Wright
S-2	Maj Steven J. Cash
S-3	LtCol John A. Clauer
S-4	Maj Russell O. Scherck
CommO	Maj Marshall K. Snyder
1st SRISG	Capt Jon A. Stallings
Det, 1st Radio Bn	1stLt Henry C. Kaufman
Det, MACG-38	Capt Michael S. Maciel
2d Plat, 2d Recon	Capt Ignatius P. Liberto
1st Plat, 4th Recon	Capt Kenneth Grimes

#### Battalion Landing Team 1/4

CO	LtCol George W. Flinn
XO	LtCol Charles K. Curcio
SEM	SgtMaj Michael J. Eschbach
S-1	1stLt Richard D. Hall
S-2	Capt Kurt M. Conrad
S-3	Maj Steven J. Piccirilli
S-4	Capt David T. Colbert
H&S Co	Maj Robert K. Jennings
Wpns Co	Capt Richard L. deTriquet
Co A	Capt Larry J. Richards
Co B	Capt Garrett J. McKenzie
Co C	Capt Michael J. Brown
Co D	Capt Gregory A. Boyle
Bty B, 1/11	Capt Jon K. Lowrey
Co B, 1st LAI	Capt Bruce L. Cornish
3d Plt, Co A, 1st Rcn	Capt Dane P. Kucera
1st Plt, Co A, 3d AAV	1stLt Peter W. Cushing
1st Plt, Co A, 1st CEB	1stLt Alford G. Kyle

#### Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (Reinforced)

CO	LtCol Guy M. Vanderlinden
XO	Maj Peter O. Francescon

SEM	MSgt Stephen A. Posey
S-1	Maj Mark J. Gibson
S-2	Capt John J. Nelson
S-3	Maj Michael B. Minnehan
S-4	Maj Anthony E. Van Dyke
MaintO	Maj Michael Duva
SafetyO	Maj Philip C. Peterson
MEU Service Support Group 13	
CO	LtCol Bradley M. Lott
XO	Maj Charles D. Workman
SEM	1stSgt Larry Campbell
S-1	SSgt Miguel A. Ramirez
S-3	Capt Charles A. Dallachie
S-4	1stLt David L. Rhodes
CommO	1stLt Andrew J. Frie
OIC HQDet	1stLt Michael J. Reilly II
OIC EngrDet	1stLt Keith F. Stewart
OIC SupDet	1stLt Hoke M. Rose
OIC MaintDet	CWO2 Walter Shihinski
OIC MTDet	1stLt Terrance T. Rosato
OIC MedDet	Lt Olen R. Robinson, USN

#### 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

##### 4th MEB Command Element

CG	MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, Jr.
C/S	Col William W. Scheffler
SEM	SgtMaj Douglas E. Berry
G-1	Maj John R. Turner
G-2	LtCol Michael M. Bullen
G-3	LtCol Robert P. Mauskapf
G-4	LtCol Gary W. Collenborne
G-6	LtCol Glenn R. Williams
H&SCo	Capt Richard O. Bartch, Jr.

##### Regimental Landing Team 2

CO	Col Thomas A. Hobbs
XO	LtCol Michael J. Franks
SEM	SgtMaj Michael G. Keith
S-1	Capt Beau Peterson
S-2	Capt Andrew J. Rand
S-3	Maj Robert M. Carroll
S-4	Maj Vincent Pontani, Jr.
H&SCo	Capt Richard B. Fitzwater

LAI Det  
 Co A, 2d AAV Bn  
 Co A, 2d Tank Bn  
 TOW Plt, 2d Tank Bn  
 CEB Det

Maj John A. Toolan, Jr.  
 Capt Glenn L. Wagner  
 Capt Michael A. Alpiger  
 1stLt Andrew D. Bianca  
 2dLt Christopher W. Rollins

Battalion Landing Team 1/2

CO  
 XO  
 SEM  
 S-1  
 S-2  
 S-3  
 S-4  
 HQCo  
 Co A  
 Co B  
 Co C  
 Wpns Co

LtCol Robert P. McAleer  
 Maj Michael G. Waters  
 SgtMaj Claude J. Vananebee  
 1stLt Stuart M. Sutley  
 Capt Franklin D. Baker  
 Maj Thomas M. Corbett  
 Capt James E. Reilly III  
 Capt Michael S. Aiken  
 Capt Bradley A. Barker  
 Capt Richard G. Houck  
 Capt David B. Dysart  
 Capt John J. Chester

Battalion Landing Team 3/2

CO  
 XO  
 S-1  
 S-2  
  
 S-3  
 S-4  
 H&SCo  
 Co I  
 Co K  
 Co L  
 Wpns Co

LtCol James T. Conway  
 Maj Richard S. Garretson  
 Capt William D. Andrews  
 Capt Harry A. Frank (to 15 Jan 91)  
 SSgt Alvin B. Morse (fm 16 Jan 91)  
 Capt Ronald J. Johnson  
 Capt Irvin E. Evans III  
 Capt Scott A. Graham  
 Capt Joseph C. Munch  
 Capt Thomas R. Kelly, Jr.  
 Capt John F. Kelly  
 Capt Thompson A. Gerke (to 9Mar91)  
 Capt Donald A. Graczyk (fm 10Mar91)

1st Battalion, 10th Marines

CO  
 XO  
 SEM  
 S-1  
 S-2  
 S-3  
 S-4  
 Hq Bty  
 Bty A

LtCol Douglas A. Okland  
 Maj Richard D. Mullins  
 SgtMaj Phillip J. Holding  
 1stLt Stephen D. Means  
 1stLt Euseekers Williams, Jr.  
 Maj James A. Haig  
 Maj Robert S. Rayfield, Jr.  
 Capt Christopher P. Lagay  
 Capt Owen W. Englander

Bty B	Capt Timothy M. Barnes
Bty C	Capt Doman O. McArthur
Bty I, 3/12	Capt Noel S. Wood

## Marine Aircraft Group 40

CO	Col Glenn F. Burgess
XO	LtCol Bruce H. Moran
SEM	SgtMaj Joseph E. Forbes
S-1	Maj Thomas E. Powers
S-2	Maj Ronald G. Greene
S-3	LtCol Troydale Caraway
S-4	Capt Clayton E. Smith
ComO	CWO3 Jack A. Stoner
MaintO	Maj Paul F. Lease
AvSupO	Maj Richard J. Gough

## Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263

CO	LtCol Robert J. Wallace
XO	Maj George E. Busfield, Jr.
SEM	SgtMaj Peter M. Gants
S-1	Capt Robin W. Kearns
S-2	1stLt Carlos J. DeJesus
S-3	Maj Alfia Mirabella, Jr.
S-4	Capt Steven D. Fox
MaintO	Maj William J. Davin
SafetyO	Capt Paul A. Evans

## Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365

CO	LtCol Robert F. Saikowski
XO	Maj Kenneth J. Glueck, Jr.
SEM	SgtMaj Richard M. Roark
S-1	Capt Odin F. Leberman, Jr.
S-3	Maj Alan C. Sproul
S-4	Capt Shaun L. Cash
MaintO	Maj Daniel E. Cushing
SafetyO	Capt Daniel W. Hackman

## Marine Attack Squadron 331

CO	LtCol Jerry W. Fitzgerald
XO	Maj Edward A. McGuigan, Jr.
SEM	SgtMaj Daryl Epperson
S-1	Maj Charles L. Myer
S-3	Maj Henry J. Coble
S-4	Capt Charles G. Hughes II

MaintO  
SafetyO

Maj Michael W. Smyth  
Capt James T. Moore, Jr.

#### Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269

CO  
XO  
SEM  
S-1  
S-2  
S-3  
S-4  
MaintO

LtCol Kenneth W. Hill  
Maj Gary A. Mattes  
SgtMaj E.L.G. Salas  
Maj George F. Ranowsky II  
Capt Thomas E. Stone, Jr.  
Maj Jeffrey L. Speer  
Capt Harold R. Gielow  
Capt James R. Derda

#### Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461

CO  
XO  
SEM  
S-1  
S-2  
S-3  
S-4  
MaintO  
OIC Det A  
OIC Det B  
OIC Det D

LtCol Daniel J. Moseler  
LtCol Larry E. Johnson  
SgtMaj Lewis Zimmerman III  
Capt Timothy W. Blunck  
Capt Mark A. Clark  
LtCol Samuel T. Helland  
Capt Robert B. Holder  
Maj Douglas F. Ashton  
Capt James E. Bender  
Maj Richard A. Mehaffey  
Maj Daniel C. Schultz

#### Brigade Service Support Group 4

CO  
XO  
SEM  
S-1  
S-2  
S-3  
OpsO  
S-4  
EmbarkO  
OIC MTDet  
OIC LSptDet  
OIC MDet  
OIC EngrDet  
OIC MPDet  
OIC MedDet  
OIC DentDet

Col James J. Doyle, Jr.  
Maj William N. Saunders  
SgtMaj F. H. Kinsley, Jr.  
2dLt John R. Giltz  
SSgt T. L. Fulton  
Maj Wallace W. Hills, Jr.  
Capt Gary L. Carter  
Capt Donald G. Vrooman  
CWO2 Michael A. Bowman  
Capt Walter  
Capt Douglas A. Gethers  
Capt Dennis W. Ray  
Maj Edward J. Maguire  
Maj Randy R. Smith  
LCdr M. Gentry  
Cdr W. Melby

CO Hq&amp;Svc Co

Capt Jorge Ascunce

## 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (24 February 1991)

## 5th MEB Command Element

CG	BGen Peter J. Rowe
C/S	Col Drake F. Trumpe
SEM	SgtMaj Joseph I. Celestine
G-1	Maj Leslie E. Garrett
G-2	LtCol Malcolm Arnot
G-3	Col Robert J. Garner
G-4	Col Eugene L. Gobeli
G-6	LtCol William V. Cantu
H&S Co	Maj Clifton R. Weyeneth

## Regimental Landing Team 5

CO	Col Randolph A. Gangle
XO	LtCol William N. Myers
SEM	SgtMaj Paul D. Hershey
S-1	Capt Nathan S. Turner (to 1 Feb 91)
	Capt David A. Bethel (fm 2 Feb 91)
S-2	Capt Michael Gallagher (to 13 Jan 91)
	Capt Jon S. Hoffman (fm 14 Jan 91)
S-3	Maj Thomas M. O'Leary
S-4	Maj David Bedworth
Hq Co	Maj Gary K. Schenkel
Co A, 4th AAV	Capt John W. Saputo
Co A, 4th Tks	Capt John V. Geary
Co A, 4th LAI	Capt Larry O. Christian
Co B, 1st CEB	Capt Truman D. Anderson, Jr.
Co A, 4th CEB	Capt John S. Sharpe
Co B, 1st Recon	Capt Erik Grabowsky
Trk Co, 6th MT	Capt David G. Brown

## Battalion Landing Team 2/5

CO	LtCol Kevin M. Kennedy
XO	Maj Michael Wisloski, Jr.
SEM	SgtMaj Michael J. Stevenson
S-1	1stLt Charles C. Adams IV
S-2	1stLt Wesley S. Hannon
S-3	Capt Thomas J. McGrath (to 1 Jan 91)
	Capt Mark H. Bean (fm 2 Jan 91)
S-4	Capt Mark H. Bean (to 1 Jan 91)
	Capt Louis R. Herrera, Jr. (fm 2 Jan 91)
CommO	2dLt Vincent F. Simpson
H&S Co	Capt Lee E. Reynolds, Jr.
Co E	Capt Dave C. Reinaman II
Co F	Capt Mark A. McDonald
Co G	Capt James R. McLenagan

## Wpns Co

Capt Clarke J. Schiffer

## Battalion Landing Team 3/5

CO

LtCol Donald R. Selvage

XO

Maj Thomas M. Ochala

SEM

SgtMaj Harold L. Johnson

S-1

1stLt James P. Connolly

S-2

Capt Jeffrey W. Bolander

S-3

Capt David A. Bethel (to 1 Dec 90)

Maj Frank J. DiFalco (fm 2 Dec 90)

S-4

Capt Bruce G. Kesselring

H&amp;S Co

Capt Karl A. Schwarm

Co I

Capt Steve L. Suddreth

Co K

Capt James W. McKellar

Co L

Capt Bruce A. MacCaulay

Wpns Co

Capt Joshua W. Dorsey IV

## 3d Battalion, 1st Marines

CO

LtCol Robert S. Robichaud

XO

LtCol Reno C. Bamford II

SEM

SgtMaj William A.D. LeBlanc

S-1

1stLt Joshua L. Collins

S-2

Capt Rodney S. Nolan

S-3

Maj George E. Stratmann, Jr.

S-4

Capt Michael G. Dana

CommO

1stLt Marc G. Shechtman

H&amp;S Co

Capt Carlyle E. Shelton

Co I

Capt Michael F. Reineberg

Co K

Capt Ronald F. Baczkowski

Co L

Capt Glenn E. Gearhard

Co M

Capt Dane H. Skagen

Wpns Co

Capt Eric H. Carlson

## 2d Battalion, 11th Marines

CO

LtCol Paul A. Gido

XO

Maj William M. Brumbach

SEM

SgtMaj Royce G. Coffee

S-1

1stLt Thomas J. Egan

S-2

1stLt Patrick M. Kelleher

S-3

Maj Douglas L. Clubine

S-4

Capt Thomas G. Peery

CommO

1stLt Edward D. Williams

## Marine Aircraft Group 50

CO

Col Randall L. West

XO

LtCol Keith L. Maxfield

SEM

SgtMaj Robert W. Holub

Adj

LtCol Michael P. Wilson



S-2	Capt James B. Semple
S-3	LtCol Robert H. Settle
S-4	Maj Ruben Baca
MaintO	Capt Dwight S. Lada
SafetyO	LCdr Robert Hertan, USN

## Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265

CO	LtCol John D. Holdstein
XO	LtCol Raymond Bevlieu
SEM	SgtMaj Thomas J. Elston
S-1	Capt Matthew C. Taylor (to 23 Jan 91) Capt Robert D. Clinton (fm 24 Jan 91)
S-2	Capt Mark L. Rohrbaugh II
S-3	Maj Stephen C. Upton
S-4	Capt Raymond W. Hammer
MaintO	Maj Robin R. Renken
SafetyO	Capt Thomas J. Lindblad

## Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169

CO	LtCol Theron D. Rogers
XO	Maj George J. Trautman III
SEM	SgtMaj Dennis W. Lara
S-1	Capt Frank D. Mazur
S-2	Capt Kenneth D. Randall
S-3	Maj Billy C. Bell
S-4	Maj Harry E. McClaren
MaintO	Capt Mitchell A. Jaurena

## Marine Helicopter Attack Squadron 773

CO	LtCol James M. Dunn
XO	LtCol Karl T. Schwelm
SEM	SgtMaj Ray L. Riggins
S-1	Maj James D. Tharp
S-2	Maj Bradley C. Lapiska
S-3	Maj Robert C. Eikenberry
S-4	Maj Willard D. Cragg
DOSSO	Maj James A. Smith, Jr.
MaintO	Maj Gerald S. Cory

## Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 772, Det A

CO	LtCol Thomas J. Miller
XO	Maj Richard F. Hamilton (ashore) Maj William Haines (afloat)
SEM	1stSgt Anthony Bricca
S-1	Capt Douglas J. Wadsworth
S-2	Capt Timothy Bruton
S-3	Maj Michael T. Lovejoy
S-4	Capt Mark Powell

## Brigade Service Support Group 5

CO	LtCol Robert E. Lupton
XO	Maj Robert G. Johnson
SEM	1stSgt Wally C. Hardwick
S-1	1stLt Donald W. Brookins
S-2	1stLt Clay A. Brown
S-3	Maj Kelly W. Kvigne
S-4	Capt Andrew S. Haeuptle
OIC HqDet	1stLt Gregory J. Maradei
OIC EngrDet	Capt Scott D. Nelson
OIC MTDet	1stLt David L. Giesen
OIC ComDet	1stLt Robert M. Gatch, Jr.
OIC LSptDet	Capt Douglas E. Keeler
OIC MedDet	Lt Kevin L. Little, USN
OIC SupDet	Capt Barnaby N. Wiesner
OIC MaintDet	CWO2 Kevin J. Howell

## 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (after 17 March 1991)

## 5th MEB Command Element

CG	BGen Peter J. Rowe
C/S	Col Drake F. Trumpe
G-1	Maj Leslie E. Garrett
G-2	LtCol Malcolm Arnot
G-3	LtCol Thorys J. Stensrud
G-4	Col Eugene L. Gobeli
G-6	LtCol William J. Cantu

## Regimental Landing Team 5

CO	Col Randolph A. Gangle
BLT 2/5	LtCol Kevin M. Kennedy
BLT 3/5	LtCol Donald R. Selvage
2d Bn, 11th Mar	LtCol Paul A. Gido

## Marine Aircraft Group 50

CO	Col Randall L. West
HMLA-169	LtCol Theron D. Rogers
HMH-772, Det A	LtCol Thomas J. Miller
VMA 513, Det B	Maj Eddie J. Holcomb
HMM-265	LtCol John D. Holdstein
3d LAAD	Maj Gerald L. Troupe

## Brigade Service Support Group 5

CO	Maj Robert G. Johnson
XO	Maj Steven C. Miller
SEM	1stSgt D. K. Pence

S-1	1stLt David W. Brookins
S-2	Capt Clay A. Brown
S-3	Capt Bruce K. Bancroft
S-4	Capt Andrew S. Haeuptle
OIC HqDet	Capt David L. Robbins
OIC EngrDet	Capt Scott D. Nelson
OIC MTDet	2dLt Matthew J. Waters
OIC LSptDet	Capt Douglas E. Keeler
OIC MedDet	HMC R. Bains, USN
OIC SptDet	Maj Steven C. Miller
OIC MaintDet	GySgt B. James

## 11 Marine Expeditionary Unit (from 17 March 1991)

## MEU Command Element

CO	Col Robert J. Garner
XO	LtCol Charles L. Baker (to 26 May 91)
	LtCol Paul S. Graham (fm 27 May 91)
SEM	SgtMaj Robert W. Holub
S-1	Capt Edward S. Lopez
S-2	Maj Thomas M. Vanderhoof
S-3	Maj Bobbie J. Martin, Jr.
S-4	Maj William E. Holdorf

BLT 3/1	LtCol Robert S. Robichaud
HMM(C)-268	LtCol Melvin W. Forbush
MSSG 11	LtCol Robert E. Lupton

## Appendix B

### Chronology

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#### 1990

- 20 June--13th MEU(SOC) sails for WestPac on board PhibRon 5.
- 22 July--5th MEB CE participates in USCentCom Exercise Internal Look to test OpPlan 1002-90 at Eglin AFB, Florida.
- 2 August--Iraq invades Kuwait.
- 7 August--Operation Desert Shield begins. I MEF, 1st MEB, 4th MEB, and 7th MEB receive warning orders for possible deployment to the Persian Gulf.
- 10 August--4th MEB ordered to Gulf.
- 11 August--BSSG 4 opcon to 4th MEB.
- 12 August--RLT 2 and MAG-40 opcon to 4th MEB.
- 15 August--VAdm Mauz assumes duties as ComUSNavCent.
- 17 August--TransGru 1 departs Morehead City, NC for Gulf.
- 19 August--Landing Force Planning Cell (LFPC) embarks on board *Blue Ridge* (LCC 19) at Subic Bay, P.I.
- 20 August--TransGru 2 departs Morehead City for Gulf.
- 22 August--TransGru 3 departs Morehead City for Gulf. ARG A (13th MEU) sails for Gulf.
- 25 August--CMAGTF 6-90 departs Okinawa for Gulf.
- 3 September--TransGru 1 opcon to USCinCCent.
- 4 September--ComUSNavCent/FMO brief amphibious operations/training plans to Gen Schwarzkopf on board *Blue Ridge* (LCC 19).
- 5 September--4th MEB contingency plans issued.

- 6 September--ATF ordered to ModLoc in North Arabian Sea.
- 7 September--TransGru 2 opcon USCinCCent.
- 7 September--13th MEU(SOC) arrives in North Arabian Sea.
- 8 September--13th MEU chops to ComUSNavCent. RLT 4/ARG B chop to ComUSNavCent.
- 9 September--TransGru 3 opcon USCinCCent.
- 13 September--ARG B lands at Al Jubayl, RLT 4 chops to ComUSMarCent.
- 16 September--ATF rendezvous in North Arabian Sea.
- 17 September--4th MEB chops to ComUSNavCent.
- 19 September--Amphibious Conference held on board *Blue Ridge*; NavCent, MarCent, CinCCent, PhibRon 2, and 4th MEB reps attend.
- 24-25 September--CMC/CG FMFPac visit LCC 19, amphibious operations discussed.
- 28 September--CATF/CLF present 10 amphibious option package to NavCent; ATF has no mission assigned by either CinCCent or ComUSNavCent.
- 29 September--Exercise Camel Sand (later renamed Sea Soldier I) begins at Ras Al Madrasah, Oman.
- 6 October--FMO begins negotiations for amphibious training area in UAE.
- 8 October--Helicopter collision kills eight Marines from 13th MEU(SOC).
- 13 October--13th MEU(SOC) HMIF boards *Al Mutanabbi*. 5th MEB receives warning order to deploy to SWA. ComUSNavCent visits ATF at Masirah.
- 16 October--4th MEB transfer of equipment from MSC to MPF shipping begins at Jubayl.
- 17 October--4th MEB Hawk battery opcon to 3d MAW.
- 21 October--13th MEU(SOC) HMIF boards *Al Bahar*.
- 26 October--CentCom amphibious planning conference.

- 28 October--13th MEU(SOC) HMIF boards *Amuriyah*.
- 30 October--Exercise Sea Soldier II begins at Madrasah.
- 4 November--13th MEU(SOC) departs NAS for Philippines.
- 5 November--Co B, BLT 1/4 (Rein) conducts first live-fire training at Al Hamra, UAE.
- 6 November--H&S, 3/2 lands at UAE for training ashore, 3d MAW CAS/air delivery ops conducted.
- 8 November--Exercise Sea Soldier II ends. Stop/loss instituted to stabilize personnel. 13th MEU(SOC) ordered to Subic Bay; placed on 72-hour alert to redeploy to Persian Gulf. CinCCent given amphibious update by FMO.
- 9 November--PhibGru 3 assigned 13 ships and sail date for SWA is set as 1Dec90.
- 8-10 November--Combined USMC/UAE forces training at Al Hamra, UAE.
- 10 November--13th MEU(SOC) released to CinCPac by 4th MEB.
- 15-21 November--Joint/combined amphibious Exercise Imminent Thunder held at Ras Al Ghar, Saudi Arabia.
- 19 November--11th MEU(SOC) embedded into 5th MEB.
- 23 November--Presidential party visits 4th MEB. 2d RPV Company, 2d SRIG, released from 4th MEB to I MEF.
- 29 November--CentCom moves from defensive to offensive posture. 5th MEB ordered to join not replace 4th MEB.
- 1 December--5th MEB sails from San Diego. VAdm Arthur replaces VAdm Mauz as ComUSNavCent.
- 1-5 December--Combined 4th MEB/UAE training at Al Hamra.
- 8-18 December--Exercise Sea Soldier III held at Madrasah.
- 13-14 December--CinCCent planning conference at Muscat. NavCent amphibious conference on board *Blue Ridge*.
- 17-19 December--5th MEB liaison team assigned to 4th MEB.

- 19 December--CG 4th MEB meets with CG I MEF at Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia.
- 20 December--ComUSNavCent briefs SecDef on amphibious options.
- 26 December--HMIF boards *Ibn Khaldoon* "Peace Ship." CMC & CG FMFPac visit *Blue Ridge*.
- 28-29 December--CG 4th MEB meets CMC and KTO VIPs at I MEF HQ.
- 30 December--HMIF boards *Ain Zallah*. Rebel forces enter Mogadishu, Somalia.

### 1991

- 1 January--CG 4th MEB designated CLF/CTF 158. Amphibious Coordination Conference held on board the USS *Blue Ridge*.
- 2 January--Operation Eastern Exit launched when 4th MEB CMAGTF departs Masirah for Somalia.
- 5 January--Two CH-53s launched from *Trenton* insert 60-man evacuation force then return to *Guam* with 61 evacuees. TF 158/I MEF holds planning meeting.
- 6 January--Somalia evacuation complete. MarCent(Fwd) boards *Blue Ridge* to coordinate phib ops.
- 7 January--Planning conference for Exercise Sea Soldier IV.
- 9 January--MarCent (Fwd) embarks on board *Blue Ridge*.
- 10 January--Operations conference with ComNavCent staff and MarCent(Fwd) staff on board *Blue Ridge*.
- 11 January--Operation Eastern Exit ends; 262 evacuees debark at Muscat, Oman.
- 12 January--13th MEU(SOC) opcon to CTF 158.
- 13 January--5th MEB joins 4th MEB to form largest ATF since 1950.
- 14 January--NavCent issues PhibOp Initiating Directive to CTF 158.
- 15 January--5th MEB opcon to CTF 158.
- 17 January--Operation Desert Storm begins; TF 158 assumes DefCon II.
- 18 January--Maritime Planning conference held on board *Blue Ridge*.

18-27 January--4th and 5th MEBs conduct Exercise Sea Soldier IV at Madrasah.

23 January--Warning order for Operation Desert Sting issued to 13th MEU(SOC).

29 January--Co C (-) (Rein), BLT 1/4, 13th MEU(SOC) conducts Operation Desert Sting, a heliborne EPW raid at Umm Al Maradim Island off Kuwaiti coast.

2 February--Amphibious Operation Desert Saber replaced by amphibious deception plan.

4 February--ATF enters Gulf.

6 February--Desert Slash warning order issued to 4th MEB to attack Faylakah Island.

8 February--Iraqi Navy destroyed by air strikes at Umm Qasr.

11 February--NavCent issues execute order for Desert Slash.

12 February--USS *Tripoli* designated AMCM platform.

13 February--5th MEB designated I MEF reserve; 4th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC) assigned to conduct raids and demonstrations in support of CentCom deception plan.

15 February--USS *Tarawa* offloads AV-8Bs at Jubayl; undergoes Scud missile attack. CinCCent briefed about Desert Slash.

17 February--*Tripoli* disabled after it hits mine. 5th MEB liaison team moves to I MEF CP at Al Khanjar, Saudi Arabia.

20 February--VMA-331 (MAG-40) conducts 20 combat sorties from USS *Nassau*; this is first fixed-wing combat strike from LHA.

23 February--5th MEB opcon to I MEF.

24 February--RLT 5 lands at Mishab. BLT 3/1 reinforces TF Troy at Al Wafrah. MAG-50 displaces to Tanajib Airfield. CinCent cancels Desert Slash.

25 February--5th MEB FCE moves to Al Khanjar. BLT 3/1 artillery raid. MAG-50 conducts CIFS instead of GCE. 13th MEU(SOC) ACE conducts demonstration at Ash Shuaybah.

26 February--BLT 3/1 captures 25 EPWs. MAG-40 demonstration at Bubiyan



Island. BLT 3/1 moves to Ice Cube Tray. RLT 5 screens I MEF left flank and provides MSR security.

27 February--RLT 5 processes more than 3,000 EPWs.

28 February--CinCCent declares cease fire.

1 March--RLT 5 begins combat clearing operations at Al Wafrah.

2 March--RLT 5 penetrates Al Wafrah minefields.

3 March--RLT 5 completes clearing operations at Al Wafrah.

4 March--5th MEB opcon to NavCent. 13th MEU(SOC) captures more than 1,400 EPWs on Faylakah Island.

5 March--2d MP Co transferred from 4th MEB to 1st FSSG. Faylakah EPWs debark *Ogden* at Mishab.

8 March--13th MEU(SOC) departs Persian Gulf.

9 March--4th MEB begins retrograde.

11 March--CG 5th MEB designated CTF 158. MarCent (Fwd) departs. PhibGru 2/4th MEB ordered home.

13 March--13th MEU(SOC) released by CTF 158.

16 March--11th MEU(SOC) breaks out of 5th MEB.

18 March--Warning order to conduct Ethiopia NEO issued by CinCCent to ComUSNavCent.

19 March--ComUSNavCent directs 4th MEB return via Red Sea due to trouble in Ethiopia.

23 March--PhibGru 2 enters Suez Canal.

24 March--PhibGru 2 divided into TransGru 1 and 2.

11 April--U.N. cease fire declared.

13 April--UAE PhibEx plans meeting begins.

14 April--CentCom orders US forces out of Iraq and Kuwait; 11th MEU/5th MEB

act as residual force afloat.

15 April--TransGru 1 arrives at Camp Lejeune.

16 April--13th MEU(SOC) arrives at Camp Pendleton.

17 April--TransGru 2 arrives at Camp Lejeune.

20 April--4th MEB deployment ends when CE arrives at Norfolk.

21 April--MarCent replaced by MarForSWA.

24 April--ComUSNavCent replaced by ComUSMEFor.

27 April--PhibRon 1/11th MEU begin amphibious training at Al Hamra.

30 April--Bangladesh ravaged by Cyclone Marian.

7 May--TF 158 dissolved. 5th MEB departs Arabian Sea. 11th MEU(SOC) opcon to ComMidEastFor.

11 May--CinCPac orders 5th MEB to Bangladesh.

15 May--5th MEB commences two-week humanitarian effort in support of Operation Sea Angel.

29 June--5th MEB arrives at San Diego.

# Appendix C

## Task Organization

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### **ARG A/LF7F**

PhibRon 5

- USS *Okinawa* (LPH 3)
- USS *Fort McHenry* (LSD 43)
- USS *Ogden* (LPD 5)
- USS *Cayuga* (LST 1184)
- USS *Durham* (LKA 114)

13th MEU (SOC)

- HQ
- BLT 1/4
- HMM(C)-164
- MSSG 13

### **4th MEB**

HQ

- H&S Co
- SRISG 2

RLT 2

- HQ Co, 2d Mar
- BLT 1/2
- BLT 3/2
- 1st Bn, 10th Mar (Rein)
- Co A, 2d AAV Bn
- Co A, 2d Tk Bn
- Det 2d LAI Bn
- Det 2d Recon Bn
- Det 2d Trk Co, HQ Bn, 2d MarDiv

MAG-40

- HQ
- VMA-331
- HMM-263
- HMM-365
- HMH-461
- HMLA-269
- MALS-14
- Det H&HS-28
- Det MACS-6
- Det MWCS-28
- Det MASS-1
- Det Btry A, 2d LAAD Bn

**MWSS-274****BSSG 4****HQ**

Det H&amp;S Co, 2dFSSG

Det 8th ESB

Det 2d LSB

Det 2d Maint Bn

Det 2d Med Bn

Det 2d Dent Bn

Det 2d Supply Bn

Det 8th MT Bn

Det 8th Comm Bn

Det 2d MP Co

**PhibGru 2****Transit Group 1**USS *Shreveport* (LPD 12)USS *Trenton* (LPD 14)USS *Portland* (LSD 37)USS *Gunston Hall* (LSD 44)**Transit Group 2**USS *Nassau* (LHA 4)USS *Raleigh* (LPD 1)USS *Pensacola* (LSD 38)USS *Saginaw* (LST 1188)**Transit Group 3**USS *Iwo Jima* (LPH 2)USS *Guam* (LPH 9)USS *Manitowoc* (LST 1180)USS *LaMoure County* (LST 1194)**MSC Support Ships**USNS *Wright* (T-AVB 3)MV *Cape Domingo* (T-AKR 5053)MV *Strong Texan* (T-AK 9670)MV *Bassro Polar* (non-NRV)MV *Pheasant* (non-NRV)MV *Aurora T* (non-NRV)MV *PFC William Baugh Jr.* (T-AK 3001)MV *1st Lt Alex Bonnyman Jr.* (T-AK 3003)**Operation Eastern Exit****Amphibious Task Unit**USS *Guam* (LPH 9)USS *Trenton* (LPD 14)**Contingency Marine Air-ground Task Force**

- Command Element
  - HQ Det 1
  - Det 2d SRISG
  - Det 8th Comm Bn
  - Det 2d Intel Co
  - Det 2d Force Recon Co
- Ground Combat Element
  - Det HQ Co, 2d Mar
  - Co C, BLT 1/2 (-) (Rein)
  - Seal Team 8 F (USN)
- Aviation Combat Element
  - HMM-263
  - HMM-365
  - Det HMLA-269
  - Det HMH-461
- Combat Service Support Element
  - Det HQ Co, BSSG 4
  - Det 2d MP Co
  - Det 2d LSB
  - Med Det
- Support
  - Det VMGR-252
  - Det VMGR-352
  - Mogadishu MSG Det
  - Det 1st SOW (USAF)

**PhibGru 3**

- USS *Tarawa* (LHA 1)
- USS *Tripoli* (LPH 10)
- USS *New Orleans* (LPH 11)
- USS *Denver* (LPD 9)
- USS *Juneau* (LPD 10)
- USS *Mobile* (LKA 115)
- USS *Vancouver* (LPD 2)
- USS *Anchorage* (LSD 36)
- USS *Barbour County* (LST 1195)
- USS *Frederick* (LST 1184)
- USS *Mount Vernon* (LSD 39)
- USS *Germantown* (LSD 42)
- USS *Peoria* (LST 1183)
- USNS *Flickertail State* (T-ACS 5)
- MV *Cape Girardeau* (T-AK 2039)

**5th MEB Operations Ashore**

5th MEB

## HQ

H&amp;S Co (-) (Rein)

SRISG 5

Det 1st Radio Bn

Det Co A, 9th Comm Bn

Det 4th Recon Co

Det 4th MP Co

## RLT 5

HQ Co, 5th Mar

BLT 2/5

BLT 3/5

BLT 3/1

2d Bn, 11th Mar (Rein)

Co B, 1st Recon Bn (Rein)

Co A, 4th Tank Bn (Rein)

Co A, 4th AAV Bn (Rein)

Co D, 1st LAV Bn (Rein)

Co F, 2/25 (-) (Rein)

Co B, 1st CEB (Rein)

Co A, 4th CEB (-)

TOW Plat, HQ Co, 23d Mar

Prov Trk Co, 6th MT Bn

## MAG-50

HQ, MAG-50

Det MACG-38

Det MACS-7

Det MALS-39

Det MALS-16

Det MALS-24

Det MWHS-3

Det MWHU-3

Prov MWSS (RW)

Prov MWSS (FW)

HMM(C)-268

HMM-265

HMLA-169 (-)

HMA-773 (-)

Det HMH-466

Det MWSS-372

Bty A (-), 3d LAAD Bn

## BSSG 5

MSSG 11

Det H&amp;S Bn, 1st FSSG

Det H&amp;S Bn, 4th FSSG

Det 1st LSB

Det Prov Comm Co  
Det 6th MT Bn  
Det 7th MT Bn  
Det Med & Den Bns  
Bridge Co, 6th ESB  
Det 6th ESB  
Det 4th Supply Bn  
Det 1st Supply Bn  
Det 1st Main Bn  
Det 4th Main Bn  
Prov POG, Jubayl

**ARG A/LF7F, Mar91**

PhibRon 1

USS *New Orleans* (LPH 11)  
USS *Denver* (LPD 9)  
USS *Germantown* (LSD 42)  
USS *Peoria* (LST 1183)  
USS *Mobile* (LKA 115)

11th MEU(SOC)

HQ  
BLT 3/1  
HMM(C)-268  
MSSG 11

**Operation Sea Angel**

Amphibious Task Force

USS *Tarawa* (LHA 1)  
USS *Juneau* (LPD 10)  
USS *Vancouver* (LPD 2)  
USS *Anchorage* (LSD 36)  
USS *Mount Vernon* (LSD 39)  
USS *Barbour County* (LST 1195)  
USS *Frederick* (LST 1184)  
USNS *Passumpsic* (T-AO 107)

5th MEB

HQ  
RLT 5  
BLT 2/5  
BLT 3/5  
2d Bn, 11th Mar  
MAG-50  
HQ  
HMM-265

HMLA-169  
HMH-772, Det A  
Det 3d LAAD Bn  
Det MWSS-372

**BSSG 5**

HQ  
Med Det  
Maint Det  
Supply Det  
Engspt Det  
LdgSpt Det  
Prov Trk Co, 6th MT  
Comm Det  
MP Det



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*The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points, the device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.*

