WEBVTT 00:00.959 --> 00:03.349 So the humanitarian assistance response 00:03.349 --> 00:05.840 training disaster course is critical 00:05.840 --> 00:09.439 for 3MF because we are in an 00:09.439 --> 00:11.319 environment and a location where 00:11.319 --> 00:14.159 disasters can strike at any time , but 00:14.159 --> 00:16.420 what that HART D course prepares us for 00:16.420 --> 00:18.879 is to respond in an extremely efficient 00:18.879 --> 00:20.989 manner anywhere in the AO . 00:22.709 --> 00:24.653 So hard training gives Marines the 00:24.653 --> 00:26.820 tools to know kind of who's who in the 00:26.820 --> 00:28.931 zoo for humanitarian-led situations . 00:28.931 --> 00:31.042 Since we're not the main person doing 00:31.042 --> 00:33.098 the operation , we rely a lot on the 00:33.098 --> 00:35.320 State Department or in the Philippines' 00:35.320 --> 00:37.376 case , the Office of Civil Defense , 00:37.376 --> 00:37.310 and they're the ones that kind of lay 00:37.310 --> 00:39.310 the ground rules for what they need 00:39.310 --> 00:41.477 done and when . So knowing who to talk 00:41.477 --> 00:43.254 to for what resources is really 00:43.254 --> 00:45.310 important , and heart training did a 00:45.310 --> 00:47.143 good job of saying what civilian 00:47.143 --> 00:49.310 organization is responsible for what , 00:49.310 --> 00:51.532 whether it's , you know , host nation , 00:51.532 --> 00:51.450 United Nations , Department of State , 00:51.669 --> 00:54.009 for example . And what was interesting 00:54.009 --> 00:55.842 is when we went forward into the 00:55.842 --> 00:58.209 Philippines , it was like we had 00:58.209 --> 01:01.130 already seen this before , so those 01:01.130 --> 01:03.689 evolutions were critical to enable us 01:03.689 --> 01:07.120 as key members of the staff to help 01:07.120 --> 01:09.089 advise the State Department as we 01:09.089 --> 01:11.199 liaised with the Office of Civil 01:11.199 --> 01:14.610 Defense to determine what need was 01:14.610 --> 01:16.832 required by the host country and how we 01:16.832 --> 01:18.888 could provide that need . So in this 01:18.888 --> 01:22.339 case we had 7 C-130s , we had 4 01:22.339 --> 01:26.019 V-22s and 3 H60s along with critical 01:26.019 --> 01:28.940 enablers , and we were able to provide 01:28.940 --> 01:31.819 10,000 family food packs to the Vira 01:31.819 --> 01:35.779 airport in a very timely manner to 01:35.779 --> 01:37.779 support the need of the host nation 01:38.589 --> 01:40.533 when they were urgently requesting 01:40.620 --> 01:43.089 those critical supplies . So if we get 01:43.089 --> 01:45.311 a short notice tasker like this one for 01:45.311 --> 01:48.269 example in the Philippines from mission 01:48.370 --> 01:50.449 receipt to actually execution was 12 01:50.449 --> 01:52.393 hours or 10 hours or less for some 01:52.393 --> 01:54.505 people because we had the training we 01:54.505 --> 01:56.338 had the tools to go do the thing 01:56.338 --> 01:58.227 without having to rely on getting 01:58.227 --> 01:58.169 training or getting spun up before we 01:58.169 --> 02:00.336 went out there we kind of knew what we 02:00.336 --> 02:00.250 were getting into because of the 02:00.250 --> 02:02.940 training . And it also makes sense to 02:02.940 --> 02:05.107 get Marines to the heart training that 02:05.107 --> 02:07.162 are part of 3 meth because you don't 02:07.162 --> 02:09.107 know when it's going to happen and 02:09.107 --> 02:08.740 given the nature of where we are , 02:08.860 --> 02:11.027 whether it's the earthquakes , tsunami 02:11.027 --> 02:13.249 type situations , having the deep bench 02:13.249 --> 02:15.360 of people who know what they're doing 02:15.360 --> 02:17.582 again goes back to knowing the tools to 02:17.582 --> 02:19.638 go to execute the mission on a short 02:19.638 --> 02:18.360 notice .