Chapter 9. Haiti: Government and Politics
Figure from a painting by Dieuseul Paul
AS HAITI APPROACHES ITS 200th anniversary of independence from France, it is struggling to discard deeply rooted legacies of centralized government based on authoritarian rule and of politics predicated upon elitism, cronyism, and exclusion. Historically, the Haitian state has ignored the need to develop institutions and to enact programs required to advance the nation's well-being, and to be accountable to citizens. Haiti's leaders have neglected to build political institutions with a numerically significant or sustained citizen involvement. Rather, since independence in 1804, the country's governments, led by military strongmen, charismatic leaders and/or elites whose interests were shared by the army, generally have done little more than seek to maintain power and prey upon those over whom they exercised such power. Particularly vulnerable to state-sponsored predation and political exclusion have been the urban poor and the country's demographic majority: its peasants.

From the February 1986 demise of the twenty-nine-year Duvalier family dictatorship up to the September 1994 international intervention that dislodged a brutal de facto military regime, Haiti's deeply dichotomized political system experienced a period of profound transition (see table 24 and table 25, Appendix). Characterized by constant turmoil and protracted violence, these eight years witnessed a struggle between two largely juxtaposed groups with fundamentally different visions of their country's future. Supporters of Haiti's traditional political power structure—often simply referred to as makout and composed of the army and other henchmen, and their allies among the political and economic elites—sought to maintain the status quo or, under international and domestic pressure, to accept at least cosmetic change. Traditionalists were challenged by a cacophony of voices calling for social, economic, and political reform. Those voices were led by individuals who emanated principally from community and religious groups, and the middle-class nongovernmental organizations and professional associations of Haiti's increasingly organized civil society. These new political actors saw the Ayiti Libere (Liberated Haiti) of 1986 as an opportunity to end authoritarianism, to democratize and decentralize the state, and, as such, to provide political access to the largely disenfran-
The rural and urban poor and working classes. Two popular political slogans that sprang up in 1986 illustrate the differences between these two groups and their aspirations. The slogan *Chaque quatre ans* (Every four years), calling for regular elections and implying participatory democratic governance, was embraced by those seeking reform. *Vive l'armée* (Long live the army) was adopted by those opposing change.

The 1986–94 post-Duvalier transitional period witnessed an incessant tug-of-war between these two tendencies. Political recidivists, significantly outnumbered by their opponents, resorted to the raw power of weapons and violence when necessary, to maintain their position. An early example of this tactic was the massacre of voters that led to the abandonment of the 1987 presidential election. This incident and the instances of intimidation and murder that followed were eclipsed by the slaughter of some 3,000 Haitians that accompanied the late September 1991 military coup d'état and the subsequent three-year reign of terror led by the Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces Armées d'Haiti—FAd'H).

Confronting the grim reality of brute force, Haiti's incipient reformers relied upon determination, resilience, and sheer strength of numbers throughout the transitional period. They early achieved such key victories as the 1986 election of a constituent assembly and the 1987 ratification of a new, democratic constitution. Ultimately, they resisted the "Duvalierism without Duvalier" of the late 1980s to build a national reformist political movement—Lavalas (a Creole phrase meaning "cleansing flood")—that coalesced around an outspoken Roman Catholic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. With complementary support from international players, Haiti's reformers achieved a transcendent milestone in Haiti's political history: the free, fair, and internationally recognized parliamentary and presidential elections of December 1990.

Although that accomplishment was reversed with the 1991 military coup, it was not erased. The coup leader, General Raoul Cédras, and his co-conspirators succeeded in grasping power during three years of despotic rule, but they were unable to consolidate their hold on power and to gain the national and international legitimacy they desperately sought. The strength and depth of Haitian support for the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the legitimacy granted to it as a result of the 1990 elections, ultimately enabled Haiti's
nascent democratic political process to triumph over the attempt by the putschists to return Haiti to its past.

By late 1994, following eight difficult years of post-Duvalier transition, Haiti’s formula of governance by military strongmen symbiotically linked with the country’s elites had entered into an advanced state of disintegration. The influence of political charisma, however, especially in the presence of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, had not decreased. As the junta’s leaders were escorted from power following the United Nations (UN)-sanctioned and United States-led multinational military intervention of September 1994, and Haiti’s legitimately elected officials were restored to office, the country exploded with relief and joy. Once those emotions subsided, Haiti and its leaders turned their attention to an uncertain political future. Was the country witnessing an end to the difficult transition from predatory rule and political exclusion to an era when accountability and the politics of inclusion would characterize patterns of governance, and the Haitian state would serve the nation? Or, would Haiti witness the re-emergence of patterns of politics and governance that would do little more than replicate those of the past?

From an International Intervention to the Presidency of René Préval, September 1994–December 1999


On September 19, 1994, the first contingents of what would become a 21,000-strong Multinational Force (MNF) landed in Haiti to oust the de facto regime and restore Haiti’s legitimate government to power. Because a last-minute permissive intervention had been negotiated, bloodshed was averted, and damage to Haiti’s urban and rural infrastructure—already crumbling from years of neglect—did not occur. As Haiti’s putschists were escorted from power, or fled on their own, however, they left behind a country in total shambles. Public coffers were empty. The economy, under international sanctions for most of the previous three years, had shriveled. Damage to Haiti’s already fragile natural environment had worsened. Political parties and civil society organizations were in varying states of disarray, and most citizens carried either physical or psychological scars of violence and terror.
The infrastructure and institutions of government were equally in ruin. Key government posts, including that of prime minister, were vacant. During the three years of de facto rule, most public officials elected in 1990 or appointed by the elected government either had fled the country or had gone into hiding. As they returned en masse—many via a chartered aircraft that flew back home dozens of parliamentarians who had sought asylum in the United States and Canada—they found dysfunctional conditions for governance. Not only were state coffers empty, but reforms initiated prior to the coup to streamline and upgrade the civil service had been reversed as the FAd'H placed cronies in public office and padded the civil service payrolls with thousands of supporters. Government offices had been stripped clean, as the army and its allies took vehicles, equipment, furniture, supplies, and even light bulbs from offices as they vacated them. When President Aristide was restored to his office and quarters in the National Palace in mid-October, there was one functioning telephone, and, because the furniture had been stolen or destroyed, he had to sleep on a cot.

Regardless of these conditions, the Aristide government, with massive assistance from the international community, had to move with haste to confront a broad array of challenges. The first order of business was to address the quandary of what to do about the discredited FAd'H. The army, although removed from power and stripped of its heavy weapons by the MNF, remained as an institution whose legitimacy was established in the 1987 constitution. President Aristide wasted little time completing the dismantling process begun by the MNF and, as such, removed the institution from its role as political arbiter. He nevertheless found a way to respect the constitution. Following a violent demonstration in December 1994 by members of the FAd'H over salary and pensions, the Haitian executive initiated a series of steps that emasculated the force. By May 1995, all that was left of the Armed Forces of Haiti was a small military band. Without an army to block the way, Haiti now stood before an unprecedented clear path for political reform.

The disappearance of the FAd'H meant that Haiti no longer had a police force. That fact, which called for urgent attention, opened up space for genuine reform of the country's public safety apparatus. Once again with significant international assistance, steps were taken quickly not only to reform the police, but also to fulfill the as-yet unmet constitutional man-
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date to place the police under the civilian control of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Following the creation by the MNF of an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) composed principally of former FAd’H personnel vetted for blatant human rights abuse, and under the supervision of UN-affiliated International Police Monitors (IPMs), international experts began training new recruits for the Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d’Haiti—PNH). As the PNH began to deploy in mid-1995, it gradually replaced the IPSF. Decommissioned IPSF members were invited to join other former FAd’H personnel in an internationally supervised program of reintegration through skills training. Ultimately, 5,482 of the FAd’H’s 6,250 demobilized soldiers enrolled in that program. By February 1996, the 5,200-member PNH was fully trained and deployed under the watch of UN-affiliated civilian police mentors (Civpols).

Haitian officials also had to confront the complicated status of elected officials. While exiled officials who were elected in 1990 were reclaiming their offices in the aftermath of the intervention, others who had sympathized with the coup leaders or had been installed by them were vacating their posts. Among the latter were the nine senators, who had been "elected" to six-year terms in 1993, but whose legitimacy was unrecognized. By late 1994, the terms of all officials elected in 1990 either had expired or were about to end, with the exception of nine senators elected to six-year terms and the president of the republic, whose term would expire in February 1996. Hence, after incumbent office holders were restored to office, there was a pressing need to conduct nationwide general elections for almost all elected posts.

Before elections could be conducted, key preparatory actions were required. A prime minister had to be nominated and confirmed, his cabinet installed, and a new Provisional Electoral Council (Conseil Électoral Provisoire—CEP) selected. The Lavalas movement and smaller political parties, in varying states of disarray following the three years of de facto rule, had to reorganize themselves and identify qualified candidates. The electoral infrastructure, destroyed by the FAd’H, had to be recreated, beginning with voter registration.

In October 1994, Smarck Michel, a businessman and former minister of commerce, was nominated by Aristide as the new prime minister, received parliamentary ratification, and formed a new government that began to restore order and
function to the executive branch. Subsequently, a CEP was formed and, working with massive international assistance, gradually oversaw the creation of a framework for parliamentary, municipal, and communal section elections. Between June and September 1995, the elections were held. International observers deemed the elections "free, fair, and flawed," the latter characterization resulting principally from the commission's mixed performance (see Democracy Restored, 1994–96, ch. 6). Thousands of candidates from dozens of political parties stood for election to communal section councils, municipal councils, and the parliament—a total of 2,192 positions. Few incumbents won re-election. Swept into office was a new generation of political leaders, practically all of whom ran either as candidates of Lavalas Political Organization (Organisation Politique Lavalas—OPL) or one of the three other political parties that had joined the OPL to form the Lavalas Political Platform (Plate-forme Politique Lavalas—PPL), or simply as Lavalas independents. In a break with Haiti's political past, the victorious candidates were residents of the constituencies they were elected to represent or to govern, and few counted themselves as members of the traditional political class (classe politique).

Presidential Transition, October 1995–March 1997

As Haiti's newly elected officials took office, Smarck Michel resigned in October 1995, largely over issues linked to economic policy. Michel had endorsed macroeconomic policies promoted by the multilateral and bilateral donors who in January 1995 had pledged approximately US$2.8 billion in aid for Haiti's recovery. That policy, based largely on such reform measures as the divestiture of state enterprises ("privatization") and reduced tariffs ("free trade"), became a contentious issue among Lavalas partisans who did not want to undermine the state, but rather to make it finally render services to citizens. Michel was quickly replaced by Claudette Werleigh, the sitting minister of foreign affairs, nominated by Aristide, whose position on macroeconomic policies was enigmatic, and confirmed by the new, pro-Lavalas parliament. Werleigh's government, however, did not move on economic reform policies, thus precipitating a slow-down in aid flows, as internationally identified conditionalities to disbursements went unmet.

Attention to this crisis was diverted, however, by a growing focus on the status of the presidential election scheduled for
late 1995. As the election date drew near, speculation centered around two questions: would President Aristide seek to extend his term by three years to make up for the time spent in exile, and, if not, to whom would he give the Lavalas nod as candidate. Both questions remained unanswered until several weeks prior to the election date. Ultimately, Aristide did not respond to pressure from among his partisans for his additional three years and endorsed his close friend and first prime minister, René Garcia Préval, as the Lavalas candidate. Running under the Bò Tab la (Everyone Around the Table) symbol of Lavalas, Préval easily defeated the handful of barely known opposition candidates from small political groups. Although his margin of victory was huge, voter turnout, at just 28 percent, was significantly lower than the 51 percent for the parliamentary and municipal elections held just months earlier. Haiti experienced the first peaceful transition in its history of democratically elected presidents at Préval's inauguration on February 7, 1996. As Jean-Bertrand Aristide handed over the presidential sash, his successor assumed the difficult roles of leading a country still reeling from decades of bad governance and of succeeding an enormously popular, and young, national hero.

Préval chose agronomist and OPL partisan Rosny Smarth as his prime minister nominee. Smarth easily won parliamentary confirmation as the post-intervention international military presence continued to diminish. The MNF had already withdrawn on March 31, 1995, handing over its authority to a much smaller UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), whose mandate was set to end a year later. Through a series of UN Security Council resolutions responding to requests from the government of Haiti, however, UNMIH's mandate was extended to July 1996. The UN peacekeepers ultimately remained in Haiti until November 1997, however, through a vastly scaled down United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) between July 1996 and July 1997, and an even smaller United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) from August to November 1997.

While the international military presence was diminishing and the PNH was assuming complete responsibility for Haiti's public safety, the Préval/Smarth government enacted programs and policies aimed at addressing Haiti's most pressing social and economic problems. To emphasize its advocacy of decentralization, the government spotlighted programs that would move resources out of Port-au-Prince to the countryside.
President Préval placed a strong emphasis on agrarian reform, winning parliamentary support for an increased budget for the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Institut National de la Réforme Agraire—Inara) and mandating it to focus primarily on the Artibonite Valley, Haiti's breadbasket. Préval himself traveled frequently to the countryside to promote his agricultural reform programs.

Concurrently, international economic assistance resumed principally as a result of the Smarck government's advocacy of economic reform measures that included policies for the modernization of state enterprises. This approach called for the reform of state enterprises through public-private sector partnerships rather than outright privatization. Still, key parliamentary leaders resisted modernization and managed to garner enough support for their position to block or delay passage of required economic reform legislation.

In January 1997, the ruling Lavalas political movement was shaken to its roots, when a new political party personally identified with former President Aristide, the Lavalas Family (La Famille Lavalas—FL), was formally registered. This development further complicated the political picture. As the new organization coalesced around the still-popular, charismatic leader, the Lavalas movement began to splinter into two principal groups. Elected officials and political activists either gravitated to the FL or stayed loyal to the OPL, which soon changed its name to the Organization of Struggling People (Organisation de Peuple en Lutte), a name that enabled the organization to distance itself from Lavalas while maintaining its highly recognized acronym. Rumors and speculation swirled around the political allegiance of President Préval and the ability of the OPL-led government of Prime Minister Smarth to win support for its programs and policies in a now starkly divided parliament.


The first opportunity for the FL to demonstrate its political power would be the elections set for April 6, 1997, that would renew one-third of the Senate and that would create two key institutions in the decentralization of government: the communal section assemblies and town delegations. As voting day neared, controversy surrounding several FL senatorial candidates, particularly one with prior FAd'H affiliation, overshad-
owed the fact that the FL was fielding slates of candidates (cartels) for most of the communal section assemblies and town delegation races. The dismally low 5 percent turnout on April 6 reflected a growing trend of voter fatigue, frustration, apathy, and confusion. The election was plagued not only by a negligible turnout, but also by controversy surrounding the extremely poor management of the process by the allegedly pro-FL CEP and resultant fraudulent vote counts in many races, including several close senatorial races where CEP determinations related to spoiled ballots pushed the FL candidate to outright victory. Pointing to widespread allegations of fraud, few international observers recognized the elections as free and fair. The government, yielding to this pressure, as well as that applied vehemently by the OPL, refused to recognize the results, but did little to resolve the matter quickly.

While the election controversy festered, the country tumbled into an unprecedented political crisis. Government became gridlocked, as relations between the executive and parliamentary branches worsened and the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, fraught with internal divisions, failed to reach consensus on most pressing legislative matters, including the passage of the government's budget and legislation related to economic reform. In June Prime Minister Smarth, unable to work effectively with the parliament and personally disgusted by the way political in-fighting had paralyzed the country—"power is a disease in this country," he stated—resigned, throwing the executive branch into a turmoil. Although many members of his cabinet followed him, leaving their posts, others remained in caretaker roles to manage ongoing programs. However, they were unable to initiate programs until a new government was formed. As remaining ministers combined portfolios, spreading a thin executive branch even thinner, external assistance once again began to dry up, a significant development in a country whose budget is approximately two-thirds derived from foreign aid. Alarmingly, by October 1997, only US$1 billion of the US$2.1 billion pledged almost three years earlier had been disbursed.

In the meantime, President Préval, standing somewhere between the FL and the OPL, appeared to be unable to find a way out of the electoral crisis. Indeed, many viewed him as remaining surprisingly aloof from it. After a delay of several months, he nominated Ericq Pierre, an agronomist and Haiti's representative to the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), as his next prime minister. Pierre failed to win confirmation, however, because many parliamentarians were uncomfortable with his links to an organization viewed as promoting Haiti's controversial economic policies. In late 1997, Préval sent his second nomination, Hervé Denis, to the legislative body for confirmation. Denis, an economist and playwright with close ties to Aristide, was denied the post as the OPL rallied against him.

In July 1998, Préval sent his third nomination, Jacques Édouard Alexis, an educator and minister of national education, youth, and sports in the Bramth cabinet, to parliament. Initially, with strong national and international pressure building for the confirmation of Alexis as a pivotal first step toward resolution of the increasingly debilitating political crisis, it appeared that Haiti would finally have a new prime minister. Once in office, Alexis and his government would face not only the task of forging the government's role in rebuilding the nation, but also the challenge of organizing the municipal and parliamentary elections mandated by the end of 1998. Alexis was eventually confirmed by the severely divided parliament, but not until December 17, much too late to organize the elections. Before the new prime minister completed the required next steps of the parliamentary ratification process—presenting his general policy statement and his cabinet—Haiti's political crisis deepened even further.

On January 12, 1999, President Préval, citing the 1995 electoral law that identified January 11 as the expiration date of the term of public officials elected in 1995, issued a presidential decree dismissing the entire Chamber of Deputies and Senate, with the exception of the nine senators who had been elected to six-year terms. On January 22, Préval issued another decree, converting the positions of elected mayors and communal section council members, whose terms also expired, into "interim executive agents" assigned to the Ministry of Interior. The Haitian chief executive's actions ushered the country into yet another period of governance by decree, albeit this time by a legitimately elected president and prime minister who had been confirmed personally, but whose government had not completed the confirmation process. Haiti's defunct lawmakers vehemently protested Préval's decision, citing constitutional irregularities and calling for the populace to rally to their cause. Ultimately, however, Haiti's Supreme Court failed to rule against the president's actions, and ordinary Haitians, "disillu-
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sioned with their dysfunctional democracy," failed to respond to the parliamentarians' call.

Unbalanced Power: January–December 1999

Following what Préval's critics labeled a "political coup d'état," Haiti entered into a period characterized by protracted, tedious, and often byzantine political negotiations, and by spasms of demonstrations and politically related unrest. The next twelve months were also characterized by widespread speculation of veiled political intrigue, particularly as it related to the involvement of former President Aristide and his partisans, and uncertain progress toward the resolution of the political deadlock that had all but derailed the country's meandering march toward democratic governance.

Shortly after the president's dismissal of parliament, six political parties, including the OPL, formed the Coalition to Defend Democracy (L'Espace de Concertation pour la Sauvegarde de la Démocratie) and opened negotiations with the executive branch to resolve the crisis. In late February, the OPL withdrew from the coalition, just prior to the murder of still-sitting Senator Yvon Toussaint, a member of the party. On March 6, the remaining five members of the coalition signed an accord with the executive to resolve the crisis. The agreement mandated the quick creation of a CEP to begin organizing the overdue municipal and parliamentary elections. On March 16, Préval named by decree a nine-member CEP that included three members chosen by the coalition. Reaction to Préval's actions varied. The coalition members and the FL welcomed the formation of the CEP. The OPL and several conservative political organizations reacted coolly, noting that while the members appointed to the body were individuals of integrity, the body itself had not been formed in consultation with parliament, as required by law. Next, on March 24 Préval named a government. Led by Prime Minister Alexis, the cabinet of ministers, sworn in on March 26, was viewed by the government's critics as composed principally of supporters of President Préval and former President Aristide.

Before the CEP could move toward elections, it was obligated to resolve the still-festering controversy surrounding the outcome of two Senate seats contested in April 1997 and claimed by the FL. On June 11, the CEP effectively annulled the results of those elections by announcing that the upcoming Senate race would include the two contested seats. It then set
the date for the first round of municipal and parliamentary elections as November 28. Although a number of political organizations, notably the OPL, refused to commit to the elections, the FL quickly announced that it would participate. The task facing the nascent electoral body was enormous. In addition to the need to obtain the support and participation of the Haitian people, it had to obtain funding and then oversee such complex tasks as voter and candidate registration and the creation of the election's administrative infrastructure, including the appointment of officials to administer the decentralized process.

In view of the enormity of these tasks, few were surprised when the election date was changed to December 19 and then to March 19, 2000. As the dates for municipal and parliamentary elections edged into the new century, however, another issue emerged: whether these elections would ultimately be held separate from the end-of-2000 election for the person who would succeed President Préval on February 7, 2001. Delays in progress toward bifurcated municipal/legislative and presidential elections were widely viewed as playing into the hands of the FL, whose leader had already announced his candidacy for the presidency. In spite of widespread speculation that the popularity of President Aristide, who had left the priesthood, married, and had a family, had slipped somewhat from its 1990 levels, political observers in Port-au-Prince still viewed his electoral coattails as long enough to assure an FL municipal and parliamentary sweep in a combined, general election. At issue, also, was that of the level of voter turnout. Having declined to 5 percent in April 1997, election officials, civil society leaders, and politicians faced the need to identify effective strategies to return voter participation to the levels experienced a decade earlier.

As the country crept toward either one or two elections in 2000, other issues continued to weigh upon those of politics and governance. The ability of Haiti's National Police force to remain independent from partisan politics was tested repeatedly as various political factions called upon the force to support their position and cause. Although informed observers remained cautiously optimistic that the police, under the leadership of Director General Pierre Denizé, were maintaining their autonomy, they also acknowledged the fragility of this status, particularly in view of increased corruption within the force, mostly linked to Haiti's increased role as a conduit for
international cocaine trafficking, and the late 1999 resignation, following months of pressure from FL partisans, of Robert Manuel, secretary of state for public security and close ally of President Préval. The severe and continuing lack of progress in judicial reform also continued to plague the PNH's ability to conduct its mission. An additional challenge facing the PNH was that of providing security for upcoming elections. Undermanned, thinly spread, and confronting an increasingly armed society, the spectre of isolated or general election-related violence—and the PNH's ability to face it—loomed as a large question mark on the horizon.

Concurrently, as Haiti continued to strain under the enormity of the tasks before it, international presence continued to taper off. In August 1999, Washington announced the early 2000 withdrawal of the United States Support Group, a 500-soldier training mission remnant of the 20,000 strong MNF force sent to Haiti in 1994. In December the United Nations announced a final extension of its 280-member Civilian Police Mission in Haiti and the eighty-member International Civilian Mission to March 2000. A new, smaller, and entirely civilian UN umbrella mission with a year-long mandate to cover civilian police, human rights, and judicial reform, functioning in tandem with the UN development mission and under the auspices of the UN General Assembly, however, would follow. In all, Haiti's political landscape at the dawn of the new century could best be described as "fluid and fragile."

**Toward Municipal, Parliamentary, and Presidential Elections**

As debilitating as the political crisis that prevailed in Haiti following the April 1997 elections was, it can be viewed as an indicator of considerable progress toward the reform of Haiti's system of government and politics, particularly in the use—or lack thereof—of power or force to resolve a political crisis. Indeed, the absence of the army as the traditional means to resolve political problems has given birth in Haiti to the phenomenon of political gridlock. Unfortunately, however, the ability of Haiti's political leaders to dialogue and use political compromise as a non-violent, democratic means to resolve disputes remains underdeveloped. Nevertheless, the fact that disputes were confronted, if not resolved, by debate and political maneuvering, not by violence or weapons, is a positive change in Haiti's political culture.
Less clear during the crisis has been irreversible progress in the evolution of Haiti's political culture from one based on an all-powerful president to one based on principles of democracy, the balance of power, and stable political institutions. The dismissal of parliament in early 1999, the assignment of local elected officials to the Ministry of Interior, and the renewal of presidential rule by decree are all troublesome indicators in the country's struggle to divest itself of the dominant role played by the person who occupies the Presidential Palace.

Given these mixed signals, the future of Haiti's nascent and fragile democracy as it moves toward the next round of elections is far from guaranteed. Thirteen years after the resounding approval by the populace of a new constitution, many of its envisaged institutions of decentralized and responsive government are not in place. The elections instrumental to achieving them are still uncertain exercises, involving increasing controversy and decreasing voter participation. In addition, those elections are still subject to apparent manipulation and postponement, hindering the implementation of important election calendars that correspond with the duration of terms in office.

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Haiti's quest for political reform and democratization is what former Prime Minister Smarth referred to as the "disease of power" that is deeply rooted in the country's political culture. Haiti's struggle to systematize free and fair elections is an example of the debilitating effects of that disease. Before this disease can be cured, the country must achieve the emplacement of a permanent electoral council (Conseil Électoral Permanent) that can conduct elections according to schedule and objectively. Also, as Haiti's political leaders maneuver to ensure their advantage, they must find effective and efficient means of reaching workable solutions of compromise with their political opponents. The disease of power appears to manifest itself in the continuing tendency among many Haitians to seek solutions in the form of a charismatic leader rather than from a political process that builds strong institutions and seeks progress through negotiation, compromise, and consensus.

As Haiti struggles toward the full implementation of the reformed government and politics sought by most citizens after 1986, many obstacles remain in its path. An examination of the country's constitutional framework provides some understand-
ing of the reforms sought by many Haitians, but that have proven extremely elusive.

**Constitutional Framework**

Haitian heads of state, often drafting and abolishing the nation's constitutions at will, have treated the documents as their own personal charters. The 1987 constitution, although drafted by an independent commission and ratified by referendum, initially suffered the same treatment. Repeatedly, governments that held power in Haiti between 1986 and 1994 either ignored constitutional provisions, applied them selectively, or suspended them altogether. Only following the restoration of legitimate government in late 1994 was the constitution fully reinstated.

The 1987 constitution is a modern, progressive document. It guarantees a series of basic rights to the citizenry. It declares the intent to establish and maintain democracy in Haiti and includes ideological pluralism, electoral competition, and the separation of powers. Mindful of the perfidious manipulation of constitutions by previous governments, the Haitian jurists who crafted the 1987 constitution carefully prescribed a complex process that requires a two-thirds majority approval of amendments by two consecutive sessions of the National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale) prior to their enactment (Articles 282-1 to 284-1). The articles also ban a sitting president from initiating and enacting amendments during his term of office (Article 284-2) and eliminate the practice of amendment by popular referendum (Article 284-3).

Key provisions of the exacting document, which contains 298 articles, have begun to reshape the governmental system and political tradition bequeathed to Haiti by previous generations of leaders. In particular, the reduction of the president's constitutional powers, the decentralization of governmental authority, and the creation of elected councils for local government have initiated processes of profound change. The constitution establishes the segregation of police and army functions, a point that has become somewhat moot given the 1994–95 dismantling of the Armed Forces of Haiti, but a key provision at the time of ratification. The constitution also establishes an independent judiciary. An extremely popular provision of the 1987 document barred from public office for ten years individuals who had served as "architects" of the Duvalierist dictatorship, enriched themselves from public funds, inflicted torture
on political prisoners, or committed political assassinations (Article 291). The constitution abolishes the death penalty and focuses on the protection of civil rights through detailed restrictions on the arrest and detention of citizens. It calls for the establishment of a career civil service based on merit and for job security, and it recognizes both Creole and French as official languages.

The constitution established a complex system of government based upon three major independent branches of government: legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative powers are vested in two houses, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Deputies and senators are elected by direct suffrage. Eighty-three deputies are elected to represent electoral districts, and twenty-seven senators represent Haiti's nine geographic departments. In the executive branch, the president of the republic serves as head of state. A prime minister, chosen by the president from the majority party in the legislature, heads the government. Other components of the executive branch include cabinet ministers and secretaries of state. The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court (the Court of Cassation), courts of appeal, and other lower courts. The president appoints judges on the basis of nominations made by various elected bodies, including departmental and communal assemblies.

The constitution also provides for several special institutions and autonomous governmental offices that include the Permanent Electoral Council (Conseil Électoral Permanent), the Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes, the Conciliation Commission (a body responsible for settling disputes between the executive and legislative branches and between the two houses of the legislature), the Office of Citizen Protection (an ombudsman organization established to protect citizens against abuse by the government), the University of Haiti, the Haitian Academy (responsible for standardizing the Creole language), and the National Institute of Agrarian Reform. The constitution contains a number of provisions intended to guide the country during transitions between elected governments. These provisions include granting the Permanent Electoral Council sufficient autonomy to hold local and national elections, free of outside interference.

The application of constitutional provisions has occasionally been the focus of vigorous political debate, both within the National Assembly and between the legislative and executive
branches. Particularly protracted and animated has been the
debate surrounding the creation and functioning of the Provi­sional Electoral Council (Article 289) and its transition to a
Permanent Electoral Council (Articles 191–199), mandated to
take place following the inauguration of the first democrati­
cally elected president. Although that event occurred in Febru­
ary 1991, as of late 1999, the Permanent Electoral Council was
still not in place.

Governmental System

At the turn of the century, the complex system of govern­
ment created by the 1987 constitution was still not completely
in place, although progress had been made since the 1994
ouster of de facto military rule by way of parliamentary and
municipal elections in 1995, the presidential election of 1995,
and programs for judicial reform. The disputed election of
April 1997, the subsequent resignation of the prime minister,
the protracted failure of the executive and legislative branches
to agree on his replacement, and the resultant dismissal of par­
liament and postponement of parliamentary and municipal
elections have significantly stalled the completion of the gov­
ernmental system and the initiation of a regular electoral calendar based upon the duration of the terms of office of elected officials. Progress toward the emplacement of a reformed judiciary capable of functioning as an independent branch of government has likewise been stalled, in part because of delays in creating the government bodies responsible for nominating judges.

**Governmental Institutions**

Haiti's complicated system of government is premised on the need to decentralize governmental functions through the composition of a series of executive and legislative bodies that correspond to the country's geopolitical units. Those units are départements, of which there are nine; communes (municipalities), of which there are 133, approximating United States counties; and sections communales (communal sections), of which there are 565, corresponding roughly to United States towns or districts.

Voters in each of the 565 communal sections elect to four-year terms a three-member Communal Section Administrative Council and a seven- to twenty-five-member Communal Section Assembly. Communal section assemblies serve a parliamentary function; they are charged with advising and assisting the communal section administrative councils, which are responsible for administering the affairs of the communal section and, hence, serve as the executive branch of local government. Communal section assemblies also nominate justices of the peace and appoint a representative to the Municipal Assembly, which is the next legislative level of government (see table 26, Appendix).

Each of Haiti's 133 municipalities has both a Municipal Assembly and a Municipal Council. The assemblies are composed of one member per communal section, plus a town delegation whose members are elected to four-year terms. Municipal assemblies serve an essentially parliamentary function, overseeing the three-member Municipal Council, which is elected to a four-year term and functions in an executive role. The president of the Municipal Council serves as mayor.

The legislative and executive bodies in each of Haiti's nine departments are the Departmental Assembly and the Departmental Council, respectively. The assembly is constituted first, comprising one member from each Municipal Assembly within the department. The Departmental Assembly in turn elects
three people to serve four-year terms on a Departmental Council. Members of the council do not have to be chosen from among assembly members. In addition to its role in electing members to the council, the Departmental Assembly nominates candidates for the CEP and judges for the courts of appeal and the courts of first instance. It also selects a representative to serve on the Interdepartmental Council. The nine members of the Interdepartmental Council become members of the Council of Ministers, which also includes the prime minister and his cabinet of ministers. Representatives of the departmental assemblies who become members of the Council of Ministers carry ministerial rank and voting rights on issues of decentralization and development.

The executive branch is headed by a president elected by popular vote to a five-year, non-renewable term. The president names a prime minister, who, once confirmed by the National Assembly, or parliament, heads the government, selecting a council of ministers or cabinet and appointing their secretaries of state. The cabinet of Prime Minister Jacques Édouard Alexis in December 1999 was composed of fifteen ministers (see table 27, Appendix). The president presides over the Council of Ministers, which must be composed of no fewer than ten members. He or she also appoints representatives to coordinate and control public service functions, excluding public safety, in each department.

The legislative branch is headed by the National Assembly composed of a Senate (Sénat) and a Chamber of Deputies (Chambre de Députés). The three senators of each department are elected to staggered six-year terms, with one-third of the Senate coming up for election every two years. The eighty-three deputies are elected from smaller electoral districts determined by population distribution. Large urban areas can be represented by no more than three deputies.

Haiti derived the formal aspects of its legal system from Roman law, the Napoleonic Code, and the French system of civil law. Like the executive and legislative branches of government, the judiciary is also decentralized, based on an ascending order of courts, beginning at the municipal level with the Court of the Justice of the Peace and rising to the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court). Justice of the peace courts are located in each of Haiti's municipalities. Each court has at least one judge and other officials. To be nominated as a justice of the peace, an individual must have a law degree, be at least twenty-
five years old, be in good legal standing, and have completed a probationary period of at least one year. Justices of the peace hear civil law cases, including those that involve limited sums of money, and landlord and tenant disputes. Their jurisdiction in criminal matters extends only to cases where the penalty does not exceed six months in jail.

Courts of first instance are either civil or criminal tribunals located in major cities. Each court has one judge and various other officers. The courts hear civil cases and all criminal cases, including those sent by the inspector general of the Haitian National Police. For nomination to this court, an individual is required to have practiced law for at least two years. Sitting above the courts of first instance are courts of appeals, of which there are four, located in Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes, Gonaïves, and Cap-Haïtien. The appeals court in the capital has a president and five judges; those in the other cities have a president and four judges. These courts hear both civil and criminal cases, including all appeals from courts of first instance and criminal appeals from justice of the peace courts. For appointment to a Court of Appeals, judges must have been on the bench of courts of first instance for at least three years.

Haiti's highest court, the Court of Cassation, consists of a president, a vice president, and ten judges. It generally functions in two chambers with five judges each, but functions as a whole when hearing appeals and pleas concerning the unconstitutionality of laws and decrees. Judges of the Court of Cassation must be at least thirty years old and must have held the position of judge or public attorney for at least seven years.

In addition to these courts, there are also a Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes and special courts that oversee matters concerning property rights, juveniles, and labor conflicts. The Senate may constitute itself into a High Court of Justice to preside over crimes of state treason, embezzlement, or abuse of power involving high state officials in the discharge of their duties. In 1996 a School of the Magistrature opened in Port-au-Prince to provide judicial training for current and new judges.

Functions of Government

Historically, most Haitians have viewed government functionaries as beneficiaries of patronage and the spoils system rather than as public servants. Governments traditionally supported and maintained the established political order and
extracted wealth from the population. Citizens therefore expected little or nothing from the state. Rather, reflected by the fact that the Creole word for state—leta—also means "bully," they saw government as an entity that confiscated, taxed, prohibited, or imprisoned. The notion of government working in partnership with its people, respecting a social contract to help improve all citizens' standing within the society, has been an abstraction.

The Haitian government also traditionally served as a source of jobs. Payrolls of state ministries and state enterprises were inflated by leaders with cronies and family members, some of whom, the infamous zonbi (zombie) employees, appeared only to collect their salaries. Political favoritism and bribery plagued the system. Social scientists have used terms such as kleptocracy, predatory state, government-by-franchise, and autocolonization to describe the Haitian system of taxation, patronage, corruption, public monopolies, and private monopolies protected by the state.

The Haitian state developed a relatively elaborate apparatus for taxing average citizens, but it provided them few public services. As a result, Haitians have relied heavily on foreign-assistance agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and remittances from abroad to receive or purchase services provided by most other governments. Education, for example, has been the Haitian government's most elaborate public-service sector, but the majority of children attend costly private schools. The state's abdication of its role as service provider created a situation in which foreign-assistance agencies and the NGOs they support served as a kind of shadow government.

Government institutions in Port-au-Prince have provided the facade of public services through the Ministry of Public Health and Population; the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development; the Ministry of National Education, Youth, and Sports; and others. These ministries have had no representatives in most rural areas, however, and they have provided relatively few services even in Port-au-Prince. Government budgets for public services generally accounted for salaries, but they provided little or no support for program implementation.

In addition to the armed forces, the main Haitian institution bringing in revenue has been the customs house. The state also extracted wealth through its control over certain essential services and through public and private monopoly ownership of
key commodity-based enterprises. Since the restoration of elected government, the dismantling of the army, and subsequent progress in the democratic political process, the state's image as predator and bully is changing. State monopolies and franchises have disappeared or are in the process of being restructured. The oppressive section chief system that epitomized the state as bully no longer exists (see Aristide Presidency, February 7, 1991–September 30, 1991, ch. 6, and Role of the Army in Law Enforcement Prior to 1995, ch. 10).

The government's income tax agency (Département Général des Impôts—DGI) has become the object of reform efforts and has been restructured as part of an overall effort to collect taxes equitably from all citizens (wealthy Haitians have generally paid little, if any, government taxes). The government's relationship with other institutions in the society, particularly NGOs, is in flux as public policies now advocate a lead role for government in the provision of citizen services. In this regard, some elected and public officials, recollecting the cozy relationship that existed between certain NGOs and the Haitian army, have also vocalized their desire to dismantle the "Republic of NGOs."

Haitians held high expectations that government would quickly demonstrate an improved capacity to serve its citizens following the end of de facto military rule. The renewed flow of bilateral and multilateral funding following the 1994 intervention heightened those expectations. Thus far, however, stated policies and initial efforts to decentralize governmental structure and function have not been widely matched by a flow of government resources from Port-au-Prince, an improved capacity of public officials to collect and manage public revenues, or an improved standard of life for ordinary citizens. While mayors, other local officials, and citizens struggle to find resources to sponsor or support local development activities, they see an inept and struggling national government that continues both to be the country's principal employer and to spend most of its resources on itself. Although government is no longer necessarily perceived as a repressive and extractive entity, many have taken to viewing it as a grand mangeur (big eater) that uses public resources to feed only itself.

Urban Dominance, Rural Exclusion: Confronting Entrenched Patterns

First-time visitors to the country are often told that Haiti is
actually two distinct countries—the Republic of Haiti and the Republic of Port-au-Prince—that have little contact with each other. The sharp division between them and between the outsiders of rural Haiti and the city dwellers is reflected in the dominance of the capital city. National political institutions and decisions, steadfastly focused on Port-au-Prince, have been far removed from the lives of most Haitians. The political system affects all Haitians, but changes in government have had little direct impact on the lives of rural dwellers. Governments have concentrated themselves in the capital, allocating two-thirds or more of their revenues to be spent in a city that traditionally has held fewer than 20 percent of Haiti’s people. Foreign assistance has tended to exacerbate rural-urban differences because about 40 percent of all foreign aid has directly benefited Port-au-Prince.

In contrast to the relative, albeit selective and uneven, development of Port-au-Prince, provincial cities and towns and rural hamlets have remained undeveloped, lacking such basic twentieth-century amenities as electricity, piped water, sanitation services, and adequate roads. They offer their inhabitants little more than primitive conditions, few opportunities, and a place from which to try to escape, an option taken by ever-increasing numbers seeking perceived greater opportunities in Port-au-Prince and farther afield. As a result of shifting populations, Haiti’s rural and urban demographics have begun to change, Port-au-Prince and its environs have expanded significantly, in all possible directions, and in 1998 held approximately 2 million inhabitants (see Population, ch. 7).

Following the demise of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, decentralization became a catch phrase of those seeking greater public-sector attention to secondary cities, small towns, and villages, and a reversal of historical trends of government investment. In the succeeding years of military rule, decentralization came principally in the form of opening regional ports that had been closed by the dictatorship and fallen into disrepair. The port openings, which could have increased customs revenue and fueled local development, resulted instead in the generation of wealth for those linked to the contraband trade that flowed in and out of the reopened ports. Key public institutions responsible for controlling trade and overseeing revenue collection, notably the customs bureau, port authority, and coast guard, were either corrupt, inept, or nonexistent.
With the restoration of elected government and the subsequent renewed process toward a decentralized governmental system prescribed by the constitution, renewed attention has been placed on entrenched patterns of urban dominance and rural exclusion, and on developing or strengthening government institutions. Debates over the allocation of scarce public resources and the priority use of foreign assistance amid desperate and growing needs in both of Haiti's "republics" now are joined by parliamentarians who originate from long-neglected areas, and are fueled by pressure from local elected officials and the voters who elected them. Although this dynamic of governance is still at an early and uncertain phase of development, it represents a fundamental change from the traditional and unchallenged domination of the capital and its political class.

As debates continue, progress toward developing or strengthening government capacity, in both Port-au-Prince and elsewhere, has been minimal. Revenue generation for enhanced public investment remains ineffective as contraband continues to flourish. State institutions charged with the responsibility for overseeing measures of effective decentralization remain weak and/or disproportionately focused on Port-au-Prince. The Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development, for example, has more employees in the capital than elsewhere in the country. Port-au-Prince, with its increased growth and myriad of highly visible and urgent problems brought on by a deteriorated infrastructure and ever-increasing overcrowding, continues to receive a disproportionate amount of public attention and investment.

Still, the preeminence of the capital in setting Haiti's political agenda is being challenged by the emergence of a decentralized governmental system. Heightened attention among the country's elected leaders to issues of urban dominance and rural exclusion, brought on in large part by shifting patterns of political participation, suggests that a change in the uneven relationships between Haiti's two "republics" is beginning to take place.

Political Dynamics

The Haitian political system historically has displayed certain enduring features. In recent years, especially since late 1994, many of these features have begun to change.
Involvement in Haitian politics traditionally has been the domain of the army and urban elites. Other members of the society, the demographically dominant urban poor and the rural masses, largely excluded from meaningful participation in the country's political life, have been the target of Haiti's political players, particularly when they could be mobilized to serve ulterior motives of political leaders. The Duvaliers were masterful at mobilizing the masses to serve their ends: trucking peasants to the capital so they could demonstrate their "support" of the regime; creating festive events and holidays during which the poor could receive hand-outs from their munificent leader such as food, currency in the form of five-gourde notes thrown at them from passing cars, and T-shirts emblazoned with a likeness of the president.

With the demise of the Duvaliers, Haiti's political outsiders struggled to gain meaningful participation in their country's political process. The clear parameters for the equal participation in political life for all citizens established by the 1987 constitution facilitated a tidal wave of outside voter registration in 1990 immediately after their man, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, declared his candidacy for the presidency. Haiti's political elites
were forced to confront an unexpected and sobering reality when the populist priest came from nowhere to defeat resoundingly their candidate and expected victor, Marc Bazin, on the strength of the independent participation of voters whose views and participation previously had not counted. Indeed, many observers have attributed the subsequent support of the military by Haiti's established political class at least in part to the fact that they could not accept a political scenario where their votes were equal to those of their maids and illiterate peasants.

Since 1990 the inclusion in Haiti's political life of its former political outsiders has expanded to include their participation as candidates in local and national elections, and their ascension to various elected posts. These trends have resulted in the emergence of a heretofore largely unknown dynamic in Haitian politics, that of increased accountability of elected officials to their constituents. Port-au-Prince continues to be the center of Haiti's political life, and political players based there loom large in determining the country's political dynamics. Nevertheless, the ascension of outsiders to meaningful inclusion in the country's politics, combined with the disappearance of the army as a political player and the partial eclipse of the dominant power of urban political elites, has created an important and fundamental alteration of Haiti's political dynamics.

**Maintenance and Transfer of Power**

During the twenty-nine-year rule of the Duvaliers, Haiti resembled not a republic, but a dynastic monarchy, where a leader extended his term of office at will, ultimately to become "president-for-life," and power was transferred from father to son. The Duvalier achievement of hereditary succession was new to Haiti, but arbitrary term extensions and for-life presidencies were not. Duvalier's immediate predecessors all tried to extend their prescribed terms in office, and nine of his predecessors had designated themselves chiefs of state for life. In short, the primary goal of most Haitian leaders has been to maintain themselves in power for as long as possible.

The governmental system prescribed by Haiti's 1987 constitution, although still incomplete in its implementation, was created in large part to constrain such presidential perfidy. The five-year, nonconsecutive term of the top executives is only one of a number of constraints aimed at ensuring regular and orderly transitions of power. When President Aristide opted
not to attempt to extend his term in office by three years to make up for the time lost in exile, but rather stood down and transferred power peacefully to René Préval, he established a positive precedent for his successors. In a country, however, where a well-known proverb reminds all that "Laws are made of paper, bayonets are made of steel," it was the dismantling of the army, not the constitution by itself, that enabled such a prescribed transition to occur. Unless this now-obsolete proverb can find its way back into Haiti's political lexicon, the maintenance and extension of the personal power of a president, if now achieved, must take place by a combination of nonconsecutive terms and a political proxy, and under the watchful eyes of a parliament that may not be prone to making such a maneuver easy.

The Presidency and Political Culture

Although hundreds of positions were open in the 1990 elections, it was only one—the presidency—that seemed to matter. In 1994 the restoration to power of one person, President Aristide, overshadowed all other issues linked to Haiti's three-year, post-coup crisis. Underscored by this attention to one office or to one person was a deeply ingrained Haitian political reality: the focus has always been on the presidency, the crown jewel—some might say the only jewel—in Haitian politics. For generations, the aspiration of Haitian political leaders has been to achieve the all-powerful position of the presidency. Haitian writers have often described in pathological terms the obsession of Haiti and its political leaders with the presidency. Prior to becoming president, François Duvalier wrote about the historical "mania for the presidency" as the disease of "presidentitis." State and nation merged in the person of the president, an often godlike figure with life-and-death power over the citizenry. Presidents rarely represented a coalition of interest groups; instead they usually headed a faction or political movement that seized control of the state by any means possible, with the support, or at least the tolerance, of the army.

These perceptions, and the reality of weakly developed political institutions and separation of powers, have reflected the disproportionate power of the country's chief executive and the existence in Haiti of a political culture based on who would be the president. Political parties or movements organized around a charismatic or powerful leader who could ascend directly to the position. Legislative bodies and elections, which
have existed for centuries in form if not in substance, have generally done little except assist the chief of state in obtaining whatever he wished.

More than a decade after 1986's pivotal event, which unleashed the country's pent-up desire to modernize its government and politics, there remains the fundamental challenge to move from a political culture based on the presidency to one based on democracy. As Haiti's political institutions have strengthened themselves, governmental structure and function have begun to decentralize and devolve certain responsibilities from Port-au-Prince. As a result, separation of powers has gained real meaning, and the supremacy of the presidency has begun to decline. President Préval has endured much criticism—from both within and beyond Haiti—as a weak president. Although few would argue that he lacks the charisma of his predecessor, it is also true that his is the first administration to confront fully the realities of the constitutionally weakened presidency. As Haiti moves toward the election of Préval's successor, the weakened presidency may be challenged by the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Perceptions of Democracy

After the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, talk of democracy was everywhere in Haiti. Average Haitians expected that life would improve dramatically with the muzzle of dictatorship gone and democracy at their doorstep. For most Haitians, however, democracy was an abstract concept. They had not experienced anything close to real democracy, having been excluded from a voice in the political process. The political role models for most Haitians emerged during the Duvalier era. For many, notions of democracy meant only a change in the factions and the personalities of the people in power. For others, democracy meant their finally being able to take their turn at the spoils system. Some people believed that democracy meant an opportunity to do what one pleased—liberty without responsibility. Many felt that a democracy should provide everyone with jobs, food, and material goods.

Between 1986 and 1991, Haitians had an opportunity to become better acquainted with the concept of democracy through their participation in a constitutional referendum and in election processes, and through their involvement in a spectrum of political organizations, whose activities ranged from neighborhood committees to political parties. They also had an
opportunity to experience democracy as a slow and difficult process, especially in a context such as Haiti's, and not as a sudden elixir to eliminate problems. Between 1991 and 1994, when Haitians suffered painful setbacks to the fitful process of political change they had been able to put in motion, their commitment to what remained largely an abstraction was profoundly tested. Regardless of varying perceptions of what democracy was or would be, Haiti's people stood firm behind their commitment to it.

Since the 1994 restoration of democratic governance, Haiti's experience with the democratic process has deepened, but the results have disappointed many. Although voters have shown thus far a penchant for denying new candidates or those standing for re-election who appear susceptible to the deeply ingrained political role models of the past, fewer and fewer are voting; participation in elections has declined precipitously with each election. Voter disenchantment with the results of those exercises is a key factor contributing to the growing apathy. In spite of their participation in the process, few Haitians have seen improvement in their economic conditions. Indeed, most have seen their quality of life worsen as they witness, instead, titanic political struggles among factions in parliament and between the executive and legislative branches. As long as Haiti's democratic process fails to produce political results that can bring tangible improvements in overall and individual well-being to Haiti's citizens, it will remain fragile, nascent, and susceptible to setbacks.

The Mass Media and the Spread of Information

The mass media in Haiti expanded rapidly between the 1950s and the 1990s, with radio leading the way. The transistor radio brought news and information to previously isolated rural areas. Joining state-owned radio during the Duvalier years were stations established by private entrepreneurs and by Protestant missionaries and the Roman Catholic Church. The latter's station, Radio Soleil, which emphasized educational broadcasts, played an important role in the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986. Following that event, the approximately two dozen radio stations broadcasting in Haiti, at least half of which operated from Port-au-Prince, became the principal source of information on breaking political developments through their use of mobile units equipped for direct broadcast. Stations also became the venue used by political leaders and activists to issue
declarations and demands. In 1996 Haiti had more than sixty radio stations, including twenty-nine in the Port-au-Prince area.

Under 1991–94 de facto military rule, several radio stations were ransacked, and outspoken announcers were kidnapped and/or killed. Fearing the consequences of political reporting, stations undertook a mode of self-censorship. Objective reports on the political crisis reached Haiti via shortwave Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts, from stations broadcasting in Creole from the Dominican Republic, and, at one point, from United States military aircraft equipped with radio transmitters. Since late 1994, Haiti's radio stations have resumed their pre-coup role as outlets for news, political commentary, declarations, and discussions. Their number has expanded considerably with the advent of low-power, community-based radio stations.

In 1996 Haiti's print media were dominated by two daily newspapers published in Port-au-Prince with an estimated combined circulation of 29,000, four weekly newspapers including three edited in New York and Miami and sold in Haiti, and a variety of monthly publications. The number of publications varies over time, with some produced irregularly. Circulation outside Port-au-Prince is limited. Unlike radio, which broadcasts principally in Creole, Haiti's print media are primarily in French. In 1996 Haiti had six publishing houses and several dozen bookstores.

In 1996 some twenty television stations, including a cable network, were broadcasting in Haiti. With the advent of small, independent stations in Haiti's secondary cities, broadcasts are much more available than before outside of Port-au-Prince. Those with means own satellite dishes that pick up television signals from abroad. During de facto military rule, international broadcasts picked up by these dishes played a major role in disseminating information. Telephones, faxes, and E-mail also played a key role in diffusing information, both during de facto military rule and after it. Their utility, however, is circumscribed by the irregularity and low quality of Haiti’s telephone service, and the limited number of available telephone lines. In 1996 President Préval disbanded the government's Ministry of Propaganda and Information. Taking its place have been public relations offices and information officer positions in key government ministries and departments.

Technology and modern communications notwithstanding, zen, that is, information and rumors passed from one person to
the next, continues to play a key role in the reporting and dissemination of news in Haiti. News of incidents occurring in far reaches of the country is often spread through zén more rapidly than by electronic or print media, which, given their own resource limitations, depend to a certain extent on zén networks as their sources. If not carefully checked for accuracy, however, reporting based on zén can result in the spread of incomplete or distorted information.

Creole has become Haiti’s principal language of communication in radio and television, and among officials in public positions and civil society organizations. Many candidates elected to office since 1995 speak only Creole. In recent years, ever since its orthography became standardized, written Creole has been used much more frequently. It has become the language of preference in adult literacy classes and has been more thoroughly incorporated into the formal education system. The production of materials written in Creole also has expanded tremendously since the 1980s. French, however, remains widely represented in the press, commercials, advertisements, street names, and the cultural scene.

Interest Groups

Since the 1986 demise of the Duvalier dictatorship, a variety of such interest groups as political parties, political activist organizations, private-sector and professional associations, and civil society organizations, including NGOs, regional peasant movements, and community groups, have become a greater part of the Haitian political landscape. The groups function with varying degrees of freedom, visibility, and effectiveness. Since late 1994, their ability to function freely, in accordance with the law, has been guaranteed.

Political Parties

Political parties in Haiti have existed in name since the nineteenth century, but have not exerted independent influence on the political system. As a rule, they have been dominated by an elite, self-described political class based in the Republic of Port-au-Prince. Parties have been most active during presidential election campaigns, when they have organized under the banner of specific individuals serving as their campaign vehicles. Parties have tended to be institutionalized around their founder/leader, to thrive or perish according to that individ-
ual's political status. This historical tendency has changed slightly in recent years, particularly as parties have begun to try to build national constituencies and to compete for lesser offices.

In the 1870s and 1880s, the emergence of the Liberal Party (Parti Libéral—PL) and the National Party (Parti National—PN) reflected the polarization between black and mulatto elites. In the wake of the United States occupation (1915–34), nationalist parties organized around the issue of resistance to foreign occupation. During the presidential campaign of 1946, there were many candidates and parties, including the Popular Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Populaire—PSP), Worker Peasant Movement (Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan—MOP), Communist Party of Haiti (Parti Communiste d'Haiti—PCH), and a federation of groups known as the Haitian Revolutionary Front (Front Révolutionnaire Haitien—FRH).

The presidential campaign of 1956–57 included candidates who ran under the banners of the National Agricultural Industrial Party (Parti Agricole et Industriel National—PAIN), the MOP, the PN, and the National Unity Party (Parti Unité National—PUN), which was led by François Duvalier. Both Duvalier governments banned, or severely restricted, opposition political parties. As a result, about a dozen opposition parties operated in exile, including the established PAIN and MOP, and such newcomers as the National Political Assembly of Democrats (Rassemblement Démocratique National Politique—RDNP) formed by Leslie Manigat in Venezuela, the Unified Haitian Communist Party (Parti Unifié des Communistes Haïtiens—PUCH) based in France, and the National Progressive Revolutionary Haitian Party (Parti National Progressiste Révolutionnaire Haitien—Panpra) headed by France-based Serge Gilles.

With the ouster of the Duvalier dictatorship, exiled parties shifted their activities to Haiti, often coinciding with the "triumphal" return home of their leaders. During the presidential campaign of 1987, more than 100 individuals announced their candidacy. As of August 1987, twenty-one political parties had registered. None of these parties, however, developed a nationwide organization, although four of them stood out from the rest prior to the violence that sabotaged the election: the Christian Democrat Party of Haiti (Parti Démocrate Chrétien d'Haiti—PDCH), led by Sylvio Claude; the Movement for the Installation of Democracy in Haïti (Mouvement pour l'Instau-
ration de la Démocratie en Haïti—MIDH), led by Marc Bazin; PAIN, led by its founder’s son, Louis Dejoie II; and the National Cooperative Front (Front National de Concertation—FNC), represented by Gérard Gourgue. The FNC, a loose federation of parties, community groups, and trade unions that had previously joined forces as the Group of 57, had the broadest and most diverse following. It included two well-structured parties with some national membership—the National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Movements (Comité National du Congrès des Mouvements Démocratiques—Conacom) and Panpra.

By the 1990 elections, the FNC had expanded its coalition to include the Unified Democratic Committee (KID, based on the Creole name) and its charismatic leader Evans Paul, altered its name to the National Front for Change and Democracy (Front National pour le Changement et la Démocratie—FNCD), and become affiliated with Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s amorphous Lavalas movement when it persuaded him to be its standard-bearer. Although twelve other parties fielded presidential aspirants and slates of candidates for other posts, Marc Bazin of the MIDH was considered the chief rival to Aristide. Bazin, however, drowned in Lavalas’s cleansing flood as Aristide swept to office. His political ally and KID leader, Paul, captured what was perhaps the elections’ second largest prize: Port-au-Prince City Hall. The victors of other parliamentary, municipal, and local offices were divided among the FNCD, MIDH, and other parties.

Most political party activities shifted out of Haiti following the 1991 coup d’État. However, three developments in Haiti affected the country’s political party dynamics. First, in 1991 Sylvio Claude was assassinated, effectively ending the PDCH. Second, in 1992 MIDH leader Bazin accepted an appointment as the military government’s prime minister, inflicting the same fundamental damage to his future and that of his party as Leslie Manigat inflicted on himself and his RDNP when he accepted the presidency offered by the military in rigged elections in 1988. Third, in 1993 supporters of Aristide in Haiti announced the formation of the Lavalas Political Organization (OPL), headed by political scientist Gérard Pierre-Charles, peasant movement leader Chavannes Jean-Baptiste, and agronomist Yvelt Chéry.

Following the return of Aristide, the OPL became the leading institution of the Lavalas movement, as Aristide broke with
the FNCD and his ally, Evans Paul. In the 1995 parliamentary and municipal elections, the FNCD presented itself as the main opposition to the Lavalas Political Platform, a coalition that pulled together the OPL, MOP, and two newer parties, the Open Gate Party (Pati Louvri Baryé—PLB), which had its strongest following in the North Department, and the Resistance Committee of Grand'Anse (KOREGA, based on the Creole name), a Lavalas group based principally in the Grand'Anse and South departments. Most other marginal political parties boycotted the elections, although some individuals affiliated with them presented their candidacies. Their absence was not felt; voters endorsed the PPL or independent candidates linked with Lavalas by large margins of victory in most races. Without the Lavalas endorsement, Evans Paul failed to gain re-election as mayor of Port-au-Prince, and the FNCD was almost shut out.

Of the fourteen candidates who ran in the December 1995 presidential election, four were independents; nine were affiliated with political parties. The landslide winner, René Préval, ran simply as Lavalas. As noted elsewhere, since those elections the Lavalas movement has splintered in two directions: toward Jean-Bertrand Aristide's Lavalas Family, created in 1997, and toward the OPL, which altered its name to the Organization of Struggling People to symbolize its break from Aristide's Lavalas. The OPL is headed by Gérard Pierre-Charles. The other parties that formed the 1995 PPL coalition—MOP, PLB, KOREGA—remain active, although they are currently overshadowed by the FL-OPL division. The marginal parties, now including the FNCD and sometimes lumped together as "the opposition," still exist, but they are characterized by small followings. They are plagued by their inability to distinguish themselves from political pasts that do not appeal to most voters, or to form effective coalitions. Since the contested elections of April 1997, the OPL has occasionally taken a common position with these parties.

Duvalierists and Makout

Support for the de facto military regime was strong among a network of individuals and organizations that had participated in the well-developed patronage system of the Duvalier dictatorships and the military regimes that followed. Among them were the former members of the infamous nationwide paramilitary organization, the tonton makout, and Duvalierist or military
sympathizers who lost their jobs when ministries were downsized in 1990. Still others included the sons of past military and makout leaders, who, in 1993, organized the Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (Front Révolutionnaire pour l'Avancement et le Progrès d'Haití—FRAPH), a paramilitary group that backed the military regime. Following the MNF intervention, decommissioned members of the FAd'H and some of their political allies joined this loose, anti-democracy network. With the abolition of the FAd'H, however, the disparate groups and individuals that make up this network, although representing a destabilizing factor, have no established institutional base for coordination or support.

The Elite

The system of public and private monopolies, including parastatals and import-substitution industries, developed under the Duvaliers and sustained by subsequent military regimes generated great wealth for a handful of powerful families in Port-au-Prince. Viewing itself threatened by changes in the political status quo, this elite sector backed the military governments likely to protect their lucrative business privileges established under the old regime. Characterized as MREs (Morally Repugnant Elites) by international actors during the de facto military period, Haiti's upper crust has had to adapt to the country's altered political framework following an international intervention that came not to their assistance, but to the assistance of those they opposed.

Not all of Haiti's elite can be assigned MRE status. Some, feeling the pinch of international sanctions and perhaps disgust with the FAd'H's mounting human rights atrocities, exhibited a willingness to work toward the restoration of the Aristide government prior to the intervention, as evidenced by their participation in a widely publicized meeting in Miami with Aristide and his supporters in early 1994. Since the restoration of democratic governance, they and others have opened relations with the Aristide and Préval administrations, seeking mutually beneficial relations and upholding the deeply established practice of politique de doublure (political understudies) (see Early Years of Independence, 1804–43, ch. 6). Since 1994 some government officials have privately expressed displeasure with the MRE characterization, feeling that it maintains polarization at a time when reconciliation is required. "This country will not develop without their participation," one high-ranking official
stated. Some in government and among the elites emphasize the importance of recognizing generational differences and supporting the efforts of younger generations to "play by the rules." The creation of revamped chambers of commerce in the country's secondary cities and the work of the Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy (Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Démocratie—CLED), a private-sector association founded in 1993, are cited as examples of these efforts.

Some of these younger members have emerged from the intermediate classes (those between the wealthy elite and the impoverished masses) that grew significantly during the Duvalier era, principally as a result of Papa Doc's political strategy of providing avenues of patronage to the black middle class as a means for creating a new political constituency. Others are the educated sons and daughters of middle-class professionals who emigrated from Haiti in droves to Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, and, most commonly, to North America during the Duvalier years, or who have been educated abroad. Returning home, they bring resources, experience, expertise, attitudes, and values that reinforce Haiti's efforts to change.

Civil Society

In a report issued in 1992, the Inter-American Development Bank estimated that between 800 and 1,000 development NGOs were active in Haiti prior to the coup d'état. Not included in the bank's figures were the thousands of community-based religious, social, and economic groups that had emerged by 1991 to become involved in improving the lives of their members and communities. The groups, and the national and international NGOs that work with them, tended to coalesce around such interests as literacy, agricultural production and marketing, credit, the status of women and children, civil and legal rights, and access to improved social and economic services. They should be distinguished from the so-called popular organizations that arise in response to timely issues; these organizations are more informally structured, and sometimes do little more than serve as mouthpieces for various politicians.

During the 1990s, particularly since 1994, civil society organizations also have been deeply involved in reforming Haiti's political process and making the government responsive to citizens. Haitians in organized civil society associations formed the core of the Lavalas political movement's strength. By 1995, hav-
ing seen their associations disintegrate, their leaders forced into exile or hiding, and their programs damaged or destroyed during the three years of de facto military rule, civil society activists seemed determined to engage the political system more profoundly—as candidates for political office or as appointees in public posts. As a result, many mayors, members of communal section administrative councils and of the parliament, and government technicians throughout Haiti have their roots in grassroots groups or the NGOs that work with them. Their experience as grassroots activists has infused Haitian government, especially at the communal and municipal levels, with new and, at least initially, idealistic leadership that is well informed of the challenges that government needs to confront. Given access to supporting resources, they are well positioned to work in partnership with organized civil society and the modernizing business sector to begin to confront them. It is yet to be seen, however, if this new generation of leaders will change the entrenched political system or if the system will, indeed, change them.

**Foreign Relations**

A Haitian religious leader recently stated that his country’s relative importance on the world stage is like an accordion: sometimes it is small; sometimes it is large. Although Haiti’s relative isolation through most of its history has constrained its foreign relations, keeping the imagined accordion small, at times Haiti has occupied a prominent place on the world stage. This was particularly the case between 1991 and 1996, when a violent military coup d’état against the internationally recognized Aristide government, followed by three years of brutal de facto rule, led to international sanctions, intense multilateral diplomacy, a refugee crisis, and, ultimately, an international military intervention and peacekeeping operation sanctioned by the United Nations (UN) and led by the United States. The intense attention given to Haiti during this period not just by the UN and the United States, but also by the Organization of American States (OAS), member states of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom), a grouping within the UN referred to as The Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Canada, France, the United States, and Venezuela), and the governments of the thirty-four countries that contributed personnel to the UN peacekeeping operation, has placed the relatively small Caribbean country on the world stage as never before,
perhaps to such an extent that its isolation from the world community has ended.

Haiti achieved some prominence as a result of its successful revolution, but the governments of slaveholding countries either ignored or decried the country during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the United States, the question of recognizing Haiti provoked sharp debate between abolitionists, who favored recognition, and slaveholders, who vehemently opposed such action. The advent of the Civil War, however, allowed President Abraham Lincoln to recognize Haiti without controversy. Haiti became a focus of interest for the great powers in the early twentieth century mainly because of the country's strategic location. Competition among the United States, Germany, France, and Britain resulted in the breaching of Haiti's sovereignty and the nineteen-year occupation (1915-34) by United States forces (see United States Involvement in Haiti, 1915-34, ch. 6). Subsequent isolation stemmed from Haiti's cultural and linguistic uniqueness, its economic underdevelopment, and international condemnation of the Duvalier dictatorship and subsequent military regimes.

Relations with the United States

Haiti has maintained a long-standing relationship with the United States. Economic ties to the United States are vital, as the latter country is Haiti's primary trading partner for both exports and imports. The United States is also Haiti's most important source of bilateral foreign assistance and the primary target for Haitian emigration. A large number of United States private voluntary agencies and religious groups are active in Haiti, for example. The Haitian private sector is closely tied to the United States economy. In short, the economic and political influence of the United States in Haiti has been more extensive than the influence of any other country.

United States diplomatic interest in Haiti has been uneven. Washington's interest in its neighbor arose chiefly because of the country's proximity to the Panama Canal and Central America. Haiti borders the Windward Passage, a narrow body of water on which maritime traffic could be easily disrupted. During World War I, the United States undertook a military occupation of Haiti, along with a number of other countries in the Caribbean and Central America. During the Cold War, Washington viewed Haiti as an anti-communist bulwark, partly because of the country's proximity to Cuba. François Duvalier
exploited United States hostility toward the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro and United States fears of communist expansion in the Caribbean basin in order to deter the United States government from exerting excessive pressure on his own dictatorship.

Since the 1980s, the United States has been particularly interested in curbing illegal Haitian immigration. Washington also has focused on Haiti as a transshipment point for narcotics destined for United States markets and has undertaken various efforts to curtail shipments. Between 1986 and 1994, Haitian army involvement in drug trafficking reduced the effectiveness of United States efforts. Following the 1996 departure of UN peacekeeping troops, United States attention to narcotics trafficking in Haiti has intensified because Haitian coasts have become particularly vulnerable to international traffickers seeking to land their product on Hispaniola for transfer to proximate United States ports of entry, notably Puerto Rico.

From the 1970s until 1987, United States assistance to Haiti grew. Between 1987 and 1994, however, the flow of assistance to Haiti was disrupted on several occasions, notably following the 1987 election massacre and during the 1991–94 period of de facto military rule. Following the restoration of Haiti's legitimate government in late 1994, the United States added a pledge of US$458 million to the US$2.342 billion pledged by
other bilateral and multilateral donors for the rehabilitation and development of the country over five years. Four years later, the majority of those funds (approximately US$1.5 billion) remained undischursed, largely as a result of factors in Haiti (see Economic Policies, ch. 8).

Relations with the Dominican Republic

The second most important country to Haiti is the Dominican Republic, with which it shares the island of Hispaniola. An enormous amount of trade, much of it informal, crosses the border. The Haitian economy has proved to be a desirable market for Dominican products. During the 1991–94 period of international economic sanctions on Haiti, the flow of goods from the Dominican Republic provided a lifeline for the de facto military regime and facilitated the market penetration of Dominican products as never before. By the mid-1990s, an estimated US$50 million in products flowed annually from the Dominican Republic into Haiti.

Until recently, political relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been strained. For generations, Haitians had informally crossed into the Dominican Republic in search of work. The perceived "blackening" of the Dominican population resulting from this population flow motivated dictator Rafael Trujillo (1930–61) to carry out a notorious massacre of Haitians in 1937. Nevertheless, more than 250,000 people of Haitian parentage now live in the Dominican Republic.

In recent decades, Haiti has supplied cheap labor to the Dominican Republic, mostly to harvest sugarcane and coffee, and, until 1986, through a formal intergovernmental exchange. The question of the status and treatment of those laborers, a prickly issue between the two countries, occasionally has spilled onto the international stage. In July 1991, for example, when United States congressional hearings on the treatment of Haitian laborers in the Dominican Republic exposed abusive treatment of Haitian children in the canefields, Dominican President Joaquín Balaguer responded by pushing thousands of poor, dark-skinned people, mostly Haitians, but also some Dominican-Haitians born in his country, across the border, creating a refugee crisis in the hemisphere's already poorest country. Although the issue of Haitians in the Dominican Republic remains a difficult one, since the mid-1990s and the election of Presidents René Préval in Haiti and Leonel Fernández in the Dominican Republic, relations between the
two countries have improved considerably. The two governments now explore cooperation on such issues as the environment, drug trafficking, and economic development.

**Relations with Other Countries**

Ties with other Caribbean nations have been limited. Historically, Britain and France strove to limit contacts between their dependencies and Haiti, in order to discourage independence movements. Haiti's cultural and linguistic distinctiveness also prevented close relations in the Caribbean. Haitian labor migration to the Bahamas since the 1970s has resulted in strained relations with that country in the late 1990s because in recent years Bahamian authorities have returned undocumented migrants to Haiti. Following the election of Aristide and the 1991 coup, a new awareness of Haiti arose in the Commonwealth Caribbean, however. In 1994 Caricom troops were the first international contingent to land in Haiti following the entry of United States soldiers. By 1998 Haiti had achieved membership status in Caricom. In general, Haiti's relations with Latin America, historically limited, have expanded since Haiti became part of a broader movement toward democracy in the region in 1990, and then intensified as Latin American nations, especially Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile, assumed leadership roles in the resolution of the Haitian crisis of 1991–94.

Other countries important to Haiti include the primary donor countries for foreign assistance, especially Canada, France, Germany, and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Increasingly, European assistance to Haiti has been coordinated under the auspices of the European Union, which, by 1998, was the largest single donor of aid to Haiti. Haiti has maintained special cultural ties to France, even though the two countries are not major trading partners. Haiti also has enjoyed a supportive relationship with the Canadian province of Quebec, one of the few linguistically compatible entities in the Western Hemisphere and the home of a significant number of Haitian émigrés. The importance of Haiti to Quebec and to Canada is reflected in Canada's leadership in the resolution of Haiti's political crisis and its deep involvement in UN peacekeeping and public safety programs since. Haiti's membership in international and multilateral organizations includes the UN and its associated organizations, the OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank (see Glos-
The Haitian diaspora, or Haitians living outside of Haiti, several million strong and concentrated principally in South Florida, New York, and other North American cities, has become an important focus of Haitian foreign relations. Although Haitians overseas are prohibited from voting in Haitian elections, members of what is now referred to as Haiti's "Tenth Department" play influential roles in the transfer of resources, knowledge, and skills from their metropolitan base to the homeland. Additionally, they play key roles in advocating policies toward Haiti in Washington and Ottawa.

Haitians have been proud of their history, particularly the accomplishments of such revolutionary figures as Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Toussaint and, in more recent years, such figures as Charlemagne Péralte, Jean-Marie Vincent, François Guy Malary, and others who fought for freedom from foreign or authoritarian rule. Haiti has suffered not only from its uniqueness and from its similarity to other less developed nations, but also from the abuse of its own leaders. Since the demise of the Duvalier dictatorship, most Haitians have demonstrated a strong desire for the reform of the systems of governance and politics that have abused the country and its people. They steadfastly clung to their commitment to democracy through the shock of the 1991 coup and the repression and violence that followed. Although Haiti can now count itself among the democratic nations of the hemisphere, as it approaches the twenty-first century the country and its leaders face the enormous challenges of eschewing the past and completing reform processes of government and politics that run contrary to the country's history.

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Among studies of Haiti's government and politics, two stand out in providing the comprehensive historical framework required for understanding contemporary issues: Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race, and Underdevelopment since 1700, by Alex Dupuy, and Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism, by Michel-Rolph Trouillot. The analysis of politics and government in both of these works covers the period up to, and including, the demise of the Duvalier dicta-
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torship. Dupuy's more recent book, *Haiti in the New World Order*, provides a detailed description and analysis of political developments between 1986 and the late 1994 intervention and restoration of the Aristide government, with a parallel analysis of economic policies promoted and applied in Haiti during the post-Duvalier era. *Libète: A Haitian Anthology*, edited by Charles Arthur and Michael Dash, provides an insightful array of short essays on Haiti and its political culture. Finally, the writings of Jean-Bertrand Aristide offer many useful insights into Haiti's political culture and its best-known contemporary political leader. *In the Parish of the Poor* offers essays from the pre-presidential era, whereas *Dignity* includes assessments from the period of de facto rule and the author's restoration to the post of president.

Several works focus more exclusively on the period of 1990–94, covering Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government prior to the military coup and the subsequent three years of de facto military rule. *The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis*, edited by James Ridgeway, compiles essays on the principal political players both in Haiti and internationally, including the Haitian diaspora. A number of its essays relate politics and government to drugs, migration, and international assistance. *Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for US Policy*, edited by Georges Fauriol, also focuses on key political sectors, placing its emphasis on international actors and their involvement in Haiti's political crisis, and includes the texts of key political documents. *Haitian Democracy Restored: 1991–1995*, by Roland I. Perusse, provides a succinct description of developments during these crisis years. *Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood, 1986–1996*, by a team of researchers led by Robert Maguire, places the 1991 military coup d'état and period of de facto rule in a broader perspective, examining both developments leading up to it, and the role of international actors in the period following the military intervention. It offers a concluding chapter on lessons learned for future crises and interventions.

Although material on the evolution of Haiti's politics and governance since 1994 exists principally in the form of individual reports and articles, one published volume, *Haiti Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects*, edited by Robert Rotberg, provides analyses by leading scholars and several political activists on an array of political and economic challenges confronting Haiti and offers policy recommendations. The World Bank's
March 1998 report, *Haiti: The Challenges of Poverty Reduction*, includes technical papers that offer information on Haiti's political economy and analyses of overcoming obstacles to economic and political development. Finally, the *Haiti Info Circular*, compiled three times annually since 1995 under the auspices of the Georgetown University Caribbean Project's Haiti Program and available on the project's website, reproduces reports and analysis on Haiti and United States Haiti policy written and published by a wide array of Washington-based government agencies, scholars, and private policy analysis organizations. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Chapter 10. Haiti: National Security
Figure from a painting by Prosper Pierrelouis
BORN OF REVOLUTIONARY violence and plagued by socio-economic deterioration, Haiti has not succeeded in building permanent civilian institutions capable of exercising control over the military establishment. Until 1994 the armed forces had been a pillar of Haitian society based on an institutional cohesion that other organizations lacked. The military leadership acted with relative autonomy as a kind of government in reserve, ready to intervene in crises when civilian authority broke down.

Upon his return to power in 1994 after three years of military rule, the elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, took the bold step of abolishing the armed forces. Although Haiti never before had a police force independent of the army, the country's security was entrusted to the newly created Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d'Haiti—PNH) under the supervision of civilians having no previous experience in matters of public safety. The evolution of the PNH into a professional, competent force for public order may be pivotal to the future of democratic government in Haiti.

Until the United States occupation in 1915, much of Haiti's history had been the story of competing mercenary bands (cacos) and peasant groups (piquets), who fought a ramshackle military. The most visible product of the occupation turned out to be the Garde d'Haiti, which evolved into the Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces Armées d'Haiti—FAd'H).

Under his autocratic rule, François Duvalier (1957–71) shrewdly brought the FAd'H under his control while ruthlessly suppressing all opposition groups. As a counterweight to the army's power, a sinister paramilitary organization was created—the Volunteers for National Security (Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale—VSN)—to protect the regime and enforce its directives. During the tenure of François Duvalier's son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971–86), a reconstituted officer corps emerged, restoring the balance with the VSN.

After popular discontent forced Duvalier into exile, a succession of military coups and periods of internal military feuding were followed by the election of Aristide in 1990 (inaugurated 1991). Although police functions traditionally had been the responsibility of the army, Aristide's intention to introduce a separate police force was unacceptable to the FAd'H leadership.
and contributed to his ouster in a military-led coup nine months after he took office. During the subsequent three years of military rule (1991–94), the armed forces deteriorated sharply as a result of the poor economic state of the country, an international arms and fuel embargo, and growing corruption and competition for spoils among members of the officer corps. When Aristide returned, supported by a United Nations (UN) force, he ordered a rapid demobilization. Some soldiers were transferred to an interim police force, but most found themselves suddenly deprived of their careers and incomes. Embittered and in many cases still armed, they formed a potentially dangerous dissident element.

With international assistance, the government swiftly introduced a training program for the new national police, the first units of which took up their posts in mid-1995. As of late 1999, the police were close to their targeted strength of 6,732, a modest number for a country with Haiti's population and severe security and crime problems. All PNH recruits are obliged to go through a nine-month course at the police academy after meeting mandated educational standards and rigorous testing. Some officers and enlisted members of the FA'd'H were accepted into the PNH after screening but have been required to undergo the same testing and training as civilian candidates. Former army officers remain a minority in the ranks of supervisory police.

The remaining small UN military contingents were withdrawn between August and November 1997, leaving a mission of some 290 civilian police officers to train and provide mentoring to the young PNH recruits. A separate United States contingent of mainly engineering troops provides assistance in the construction of roads, schools, bridges, and other public works.

The PNH is organized into two main elements: the Administrative Police, which, operating through nine departmental directors, staffs city police stations, subprecincts, and rural posts; and the Judicial Police, which investigates cases on behalf of examining magistrates. Separate specialized units deal with crowd control and narcotics violations, and act as protective forces to guard the president and high officials. The small Haitian Coast Guard is being trained in intercepting narcotics shipments and already cooperates with the United States Coast Guard in this regard. The staff of the inspector general investigates allegations of human rights abuses and crimes by
the police, and regularly surveys the operation of police stations.

Four years after it was first deployed, the PNH had achieved measurable success in a country that had no civilian police tradition. It has for the most part been politically impartial, refraining from involvement in the political dispute that paralyzed the government in 1998 and 1999. Nevertheless, individual police commanders have been accused in incidents of harassment and intimidation of critics of the government.

This positive assessment of the PNH is clouded by a significant number of abuses, including the unnecessary use of force that has often resulted in deaths, mistreatment of detainees, failure to observe legal procedures in making arrests, and arrogance in dealing with the public. At supervisory levels, officers of both civilian and military backgrounds demonstrate numerous weaknesses.

The police are ill-equipped to deal with the country's rapidly growing role as a transshipment point for narcotics between Colombia and the United States. Although a number of police have been dismissed for drug corruption, the integrity of the force is seriously endangered by the influence of the traffickers.

In spite of programs of international assistance, the justice system in Haiti remains barely functional and is afflicted with rampant corruption. Many judges are poorly educated, untrained, unqualified, and open to bribery. In addition, the legal process is extremely slow; only a small proportion of crimes reaches the trial stage. In 1998 some 80 percent of prison inmates were being subjected to illegal or prolonged detention. Because of the public's lack of confidence in the judicial process, vigilante activity against suspected criminals is commonplace.

Aristide's daring move to do away with the armed forces has proved to be a major achievement. The civilian national police, in spite of its many shortcomings, is improving, and, although serious problems remain, they are being addressed by the authorities and are not on the massive or systemic scale that existed under the de facto military regime of 1991-94. Ex-soldiers and other disaffected elements, as well as mounting criminal and narcotics activity, present continuing dangers to the regime. If the new police force can weather its current challenges and remain apolitical, future civilian governments
should be able to conduct the country's affairs without the risk of another military takeover.

The Military in Haitian History

The origins of Haiti's military lie in the country's revolution, which began with a slave rebellion in 1791 and culminated in French withdrawal in 1803 (see Fight for Independence, 1791–1803, ch. 6). A decade of warfare produced a military cadre from which Haiti's early leaders emerged. Defeat of the French demonstrated Haiti's considerable strategic stamina and tactical capabilities, but Haiti's victory did not translate into a successful national government or a strong economy. Lacking an effective constitution, Haiti was usually ruled by force. The armed forces, which had been united against the French, fragmented into warring regional factions. The military soon took control of almost every aspect of Haitian life, and officers assumed responsibility for the administration of justice and for municipal management. According to a Haitian diplomat, the country in its earlier days was "an immense military camp." Without viable civilian institutions, Haiti was vulnerable to military strongmen, who permanently shaped the nation's authoritarian, personalist, and coercive style of governance.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the army either failed to protect the central government or directly caused the government's collapse by means of a coup. In addition, rural insurgent movements led by *piquets* and *cacos* limited the central government's authority in outlying areas. These groups carried on guerrilla warfare into the twentieth century; they remained active until put down by the United States Marines in 1919.

Prolonged instability weakened the army. By the end of the nineteenth century, Haiti's military had become little more than an undisciplined, ill-fed, and poorly paid militia that shifted its allegiances as battles were won or lost and as new leaders came to power. Between 1806 and 1879, an estimated sixty-nine revolts against existing governments took place; another twenty uprisings or attempted insurrections broke out between 1880 and 1915. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Haiti's political problems attracted increasing foreign involvement. France, Germany, and the United States were the major actors. In 1915, as mob violence raged, the United States occupied the country (see United States Involvement in Haiti, 1915–34, ch. 6).
During the occupation, the United States Marines disbanded Haiti's army, which consisted of an estimated 9,000 men, including 308 generals. In February 1916, the Haitian Constabulary (Gendarmerie d'Haiti) was formed. United States Marine Corps and United States Navy officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) commanded the group. The gendarmerie attempted to assure public safety, initially by subduing the cacos; to promote development, particularly road construction; and to modernize the military through the introduction of a training structure, a health service, and other improvements. The gendarmerie became the Garde d'Haiti in 1928; the Garde formed the core of Haiti's armed forces after the United States administration ended in 1934.

The United States had sought to introduce a modern, apolitical military establishment in Haiti. On the surface, it succeeded; the organization, training, and equipment of the Garde all represented improvements over the military conditions existing before the occupation. What the United States did not (and probably could not) reform was the basic authoritarian inclination of Haitian society, an inclination antithetical to the goal of military depoliticization.

Some professionalization of the army continued for a few years after the United States occupation; however, Haiti's political military relations deteriorated rapidly after 1934, weakening civil-military relations and ultimately affecting the character of the armed forces. After the coup that ended the populist government of Dumarsais Estime and led to Colonel Paul E. Magloire's election to the presidency in 1950, the army resumed a political role. This development divided the army internally and set the stage for Francois Duvalier's ascent to power in late 1957 (see Francois Duvalier, 1957–71, ch. 6).

The Duvalier Era, 1957–86

When Francois Duvalier came to power in 1957, the armed forces were at their lowest point professionally since 1915. Duvalier's establishment of a parallel security apparatus posed the most serious challenge to the crumbling integrity of the armed forces. In 1959 the regime began recruiting a civilian militia (Milice Civile) drawn initially from the capital city's slums and equipped with antiquated small arms found in the basement of the Presidential Palace. The militia became the Volunteers for National Security (Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale—VSN) after 1962. Its control extended into the
countryside through a system of information, intelligence, and command tied directly to the Presidential Palace. Both François Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude, lacked military experience; still, they managed to neutralize the army's influence through intimidation, bribery, and political maneuvering. The Duvaliers also managed to stave off a number of low-level opposition plots and invasion attempts, mostly during the 1960s.

During the early 1960s, François Duvalier pursued measures to overpower the mainstream military establishment, often by ruthlessly eliminating or exiling any officers who opposed him. The Military Academy, a professional and elitist institution that represented a potential source of opposition to the regime, was closed down in 1961. Officers who attempted to resist Duvalier forfeited their careers. In 1963 Duvalier expelled the United States military mission, which he had invited to Haiti in 1959; Duvalier feared that the military-modernization values imparted by United States instructors could lead to resistance to the government's restructuring of the armed forces.

Although referred to as a militia, the VSN in fact became the Duvaliers' front-line security force. As of early 1986, the organization included more than 9,000 members and an informal circle of thousands more. The VSN acted as a political cadre, secret police, and instrument of terror. It played a crucial political role for the regime, countering the influence of the armed forces, historically the regime's primary source of power. The VSN gained its deadly reputation in part because members received no salary, although they took orders from the Presidential Palace. They made their living, instead, through extortion and petty crime. Rural members of the VSN, who wore blue denim uniforms, had received some training from the army, while the plainclothes members, identified by their trademark dark glasses, served as Haiti's criminal investigation force.

When Jean-Claude Duvalier ("Baby Doc") came to power in 1971, the country's security forces became less abusive, but they still resorted to some brutality. During Jean-Claude's regime, a realignment of power between the VSN and the armed forces was achieved, ensuring him greater control over the nation's security apparatus. Jean-Claude's half-hearted attempt to open Haiti to the outside world and to qualify for renewed foreign assistance from the United States suggested a need to restrain the abuses of the VSN.
With United States support, the government created the Leopard counterinsurgency unit, which provided the regime with a relatively modern tool for responding to internal threats. By placing a capable new force under Baby Doc's command, the Leopards reduced his dependence on the allegiance of the armed forces and the VSN. In 1972 the Military Academy reopened, and the first class since 1961 graduated in 1973. Because the lower classes could not meet the academy's educational requirements, the students were drawn from the middle class and were usually sponsored by active-duty officers or other officials. The reopening of the academy represented a small step toward reprofessionalizing the military. Some modernization of army equipment was also undertaken during this period.

The armed forces largely escaped the immediate wrath of a population clearly bent on putting an end to Duvalier rule. Popular violence had erupted in 1984, and it continued into early 1986 in an expanding sequence of local revolts. In its waning days, the regime relied heavily on the VSN and on limited local police capabilities to curb violence. Many Haitians detected the fissures growing in the nation's security apparatus, and some rumors held that the army would move against Duvalier. These rumors, however, proved incorrect; still, Duvalier's inability to contain the widespread rioting through political measures and the VSN's failure to control the unrest placed the military in a pivotal position. Conscious of his precarious hold on power, Duvalier reshuffled the cabinet and the military leadership in the last days of 1985, but to no avail. Reports of brutal excesses by the increasingly desperate VSN further weakened Duvalier's position.

The army's discontent with the crumbling regime became evident when troops refused to fire on demonstrators, and, in a few instances, army personnel turned against the VSN. With last-minute assistance from the United States, Haiti's leading generals provided the political transition required to ease Duvalier out of power in February 1986. In pushing for Duvalier's abdication, the army was not expressing genuine concern for the best interests of Haiti. Rather, the army sought to shield itself from responsibility for the explosive sociopolitical situation.

The Post-Duvalier Period

Jean-Claude Duvalier left behind a hastily constructed
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interim junta, controlled by the armed forces. After Jean-Claude's departure, Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, army chief of staff, became head of the interim National Council of Government. The interim government officially disbanded the VSN a few days after Duvalier's departure but avoided the politically difficult measure of effectively halting the VSN's activities. The failure to do so led angry mobs to set upon members of the VSN and set in motion a cycle of instability. Despite the popular backlash, some VSN agents managed to survive by integrating themselves into military circles. By 1987 the initial positive view of the armed forces had given way to anger because of the army's failure to dismantle the VSN, which continued to thwart proposed government reform. Worse, the senior military command was blamed for the failed elections of 1987 and 1988, isolating the Haitian military from the international community, which had grown skeptical about the role of the armed forces.

In September 1988, another coup brought Lieutenant General Prosper Avril of the Presidential Guard to power. The armed forces continued to face problems. Within a six-month period, 140 officers reportedly were retired or were fired, some because they were suspected of drug smuggling. Political rifts within the senior command split the officer corps into warring factions. After a week of internecine conflict in April 1989, Avril was able to prevail because he held the loyalty of the Presidential Guard and enjoyed support from many NCOs. But the military was left in a state of crisis, without a clearly defined political program.

Under pressure from the United States and facing severe dissenion at home, Avril fled to Florida in March 1990. Elected president in fair elections nine months later, Jean-Bertrand Aristide entered office in February of 1991 without opposition from the army. He introduced an ambitious program of reforms, several of which were bound to disturb the military leadership. The top ranks were purged, steps were taken to separate the police from the army as called for by the 1987 constitution, and the position of section chief—key to the FAd'H's power in the provinces—was abolished.

Increasingly perceived as a radical by the military, Aristide found it difficult to exert his authority over the military command. The return to Haiti of Duvalier supporters and the evidence of drug-dealing among a number of officers heightened civil-military friction. A military-led coup, backed by the eco-
nomic elite and right-wing elements, overthrew Aristide in Sep­
tember 1991, less than eight months into his five-year term.

A puppet civilian government installed by the armed forces
effectively dominated the weak and divided civilian politicians
and managed the country. The main military figure was Lieu­
tenant General Raoul Cédras, who had been appointed chief
of staff of the armed forces by President Aristide, but who was
generally believed to have engineered the coup against Aris­
tide. Cédras installed his friend, Brigadier General Philippe
Biamby, as chief of staff of the army. Both Cédras and Biamby
came from prominent families that had supported the Duvalier
regime. Another leading coup figure was Lieutenant Colonel
Joseph Michel François, in charge of the Port-au-Prince mili­
tary zone, with control over the capital's police. François also
was thought to have been responsible for building up a force of
1,500 plainclothes auxiliaries, known as "attachés," who com­
mittcd most of the abuses and intimidation of opponents of
the military regime. The attachés were abetted by the provin­
cial section chiefs and a new group that emerged in 1993, the
Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of
Haiti (Front Révolutionnaire pour l'Avancement et le Progrès
d'Haiti—FRAPH).

As international pressures mounted against the de facto gov­
ernment, the armed forces became less and less a professional
military organization and more a violent business enterprise
with numerous criminal features. According to an exiled
former Haitian officer, Kern Delince, "The hierarchy and most
of the principles upon which armies are organized have van­
ished. What you have left is a force of mercenaries and preda­
tors, a military institution that is in its terminal phase. . . ."

The army developed close links with wealthy families and
controlled most state-owned businesses, such as the telephone
and electricity companies, the port, and imports of basic goods
like cement and flour. It was widely believed that the army was
permeated with officers profiting from the narcotics trade.
Because the officers were making so much money and because
of their dislike of Aristide, they had little incentive to end the
stalemate. In response to the situation, the international com­
unity instituted an international embargo, which had severe
effects on the country. The embargo hit the poor the hardest,
and, ironically, enabled the military to profit from the sale of
scarce fuel supplies smuggled into the country. Eventually,
however, the presence of armed civilian gangs, the lack of
funds to pay soldiers' salaries and the growing dependence of senior and junior officers on the proceeds of drug trafficking contributed to the breakdown of military discipline.

As a result of these economic pressures and the worsening domestic situation, in July 1993, a Cédras-led delegation accepted a plan, known as the Governors Island Accord for the place where it was negotiated, to restore the Aristide government. As one element of the accord, 1,100 police trainers and military personnel under UN control were to supervise the reform of the Haitian army and to introduce the constitutionally mandated separate police force. The accord did not go smoothly. When the first Canadian and United States military personnel were about to go ashore from the cargo ship, the U.S.S. Harlan County, they were discouraged from landing by a FRAPH-led dockside demonstration. With the Governors Island Accord thus repudiated, the UN embargo was reimposed, and a renewed campaign of terror was instigated by the FAd'H and FRAPH.

A year later, with stiffened international sanctions that targeted all trade except food and medicine, and a UN-endorsed United States intervention imminent, the Haitian military leadership capitulated and accepted the "permissive intervention" plan negotiated by a delegation headed by former United States president Jimmy Carter.

Disintegration and Demobilization of the Haitian Army, 1993–95

On September 19, 1994, a day after the Carter agreement was signed, the first units of the United States-led Multinational Force (MNF) landed in Haiti. The military leaders, including General Cédras, resigned, as called for by the agreement, and went into exile, leaving the FAd'H leaderless and demoralized. Aristide, who resumed his presidential term in October 1994, quickly moved to reduce the size of the discredited army, announcing a reduction in personnel from 6,000 to 3,500. Some of the former soldiers were enrolled in a United States-sponsored program to ease their return to civilian life by providing them with job training and referrals, but few found employment. To reduce the danger of violence from weapons among civilians and demobilized soldiers, the MNF instituted a buy-back program that attracted thousands of firearms but failed to uncover all the hidden arms that could be used in a future uprising against the legitimate government. Many ordi-
nary soldiers were permitted to serve in the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), which acted as a stopgap until the new civilian national police force could be trained and deployed. Some 3,300 soldiers were ultimately accepted into the IPSF.

By January 1995, all officers' commissions had been revoked, and the remaining FAd'H personnel who had not been accepted into the IPSF were demobilized. Aristide announced his intention to ask parliament to take up a constitutional amendment to formally abolish the armed forces. Under the constitution, action to this effect was not possible until the end of the legislative term in 1999. In addition to the weapons collected by the occupying troops under the buy-back program, the military's heavy weapons were impounded and destroyed.

Structure and Capabilities of the Pre-1995 Armed Forces

Haiti's internal upheavals had repeatedly caused the armed forces to assume a decisive role in the conduct of the political institutions of the state. Domestic security concerns greatly outweighed external defense considerations in the operations and organization of the armed forces. The FAd'H constituted the military arm of the Ministry of Interior and National Defense. The commander of the FAd'H served a renewable three-year term. Under him, the general staff had the usual staff offices for operations, intelligence, logistics, and training. Among other important officers were the inspector general, an adjutant general, and commanders of the military regions of the north and south, and of the metropolitan military region (Port-au-Prince).

The nine military departments under the northern and southern military regions operated principally as district police. Only the forces assigned to the metropolitan military region had a significant tactical capability. The strongest of these units was the 1,300-member Presidential Guard, which was relatively well-trained and disciplined. Many members of the guard were stationed on the grounds of the Presidential Palace as a protective force for the president. The Dessalines Battalion, with barracks behind the Presidential Palace, was a light infantry force of some 750 men. The Leopard Corps was an internal security unit of some 700 men equipped with United States help. Both the Dessalines Battalion and the
Leopard Corps were disbanded after the 1989 conflict within the army.

The FAd'H controlled the Port-au-Prince police and the prison system. The capital's police force of about 1,000 ill-trained members was in effect a low-level constabulary under military command. The armed forces administered the capital city's firefighters and the country's customs, immigration, and narcotics-control programs.

Haiti's security services consisted of about 8,000 military and police when military rule was ended in 1994. The FAd'H itself had a strength of about 6,200. Most officers began their careers at the Military Academy at Frères (near Pétionville). After a three-year course in a class of about sixty students, academy graduates became career officers with the opportunity of rising to the most senior FAd'H positions. In the final years of the regime, the academy program degenerated. The training was only nominal, and officers were selected and promoted not on the basis of their records and capabilities but on family ties and political orientation. Graduates of the NCO school and training camp at Lamentin (near Carrefour) outside Port-au-Prince served in mainstream army units or were assigned to rural police duties, but the NCO school, too, was not fully operational in the last years of the military government. Basic training was conducted at the unit level. Although Article 268 of the 1987 constitution required all men to serve in the military when they reached their eighteenth birthday, enlistment was in reality voluntary. Women were limited to participating in the medical corps.

Prior to demobilization of all the armed forces—army, navy, and air force—the principal small arm for most of the army was the Garand M1 rifle of World War II vintage. Some German G3 and American M16 rifles were distributed to elite units, as were Israeli Uzi submachine guns. The Presidential Guard had a few armored vehicles and artillery pieces at its disposal. As reported by *The Military Balance, 1995–96*, these consisted of V-150 Commando and M2 armored personnel carriers and nine 75mm and 105mm towed howitzers. The army also had a small inventory of 60mm and 81mm mortars, 37mm and 57mm antitank guns, 20mm and 40mm antiaircraft guns, and some 57mm and 106mm rocket launchers.

The Haitian navy was formed in 1860 and by the turn of the century was theoretically the largest naval force in the Caribbean, with two cruisers and six gunboats, manned largely by
foreign mercenaries. The navy ceased to exist after the United States military occupation in 1915 but reappeared as a coast guard unit in the late 1930s. During and after World War II, Haiti received several coast guard cutters and converted submarine chasers from the United States. After the three major units of the Haitian coast guard mutinied in 1970, shelling the Presidential Palace, the ships were disarmed by the United States at Guantanamo, Cuba, where they had fled, and returned to Haiti. François Duvalier subsequently announced plans for a major expansion by the purchase of twenty-four vessels, including motor torpedo boats, but the project was not consummated and was in any event probably beyond the support capabilities of the Haitian navy.

During the 1970s, after Duvalier's death, most of the existing fleet units were disposed of or returned to the United States. Five small patrol craft were purchased privately in the United States, as was an armed tugboat from the United States Navy; the tugboat was converted for offshore patrol use. This vessel plus two coastal patrol craft were all that remained of the navy when the 1991–94 military regime ended. The navy had a single base at Port-au-Prince and a complement of 340 officers and men.

The Haitian air force was formed in 1943 with a number of training aircraft and help from a United States Marine Corps aviation mission. After World War II ended, several transport aircraft, including three Douglas C–47s, were added to form a transport unit. In 1950, after the arrival of a United States Air Force mission, a combat unit was formed with six F–51D Mustangs. The F–51s were instrumental in the defeat of the 1970 naval mutiny when they strafed the rebel vessels bombarding the capital. By the early 1980s, the combat units consisted of six Cessna 337 counterinsurgency aircraft. Haiti also had a variety of transport aircraft and trainers and a unit of eight helicopters. By the end of the military regime in 1994, the operating aircraft were listed as four Cessna 337s, two light transport aircraft, and twelve training aircraft. The helicopters were no longer in service. The air force's only base was at Port-au-Prince, and its personnel strength as of 1993 was estimated at 300.

**Military Spending and Foreign Assistance**

According to estimates published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), military expendi-
tures averaged about US$40 million annually under the military regime. In 1994, the final year of the military government, the spending level of US$45 million amounted to 30.2 percent of central government expenditures and 2.3 percent of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary). However, because of the deteriorating economy resulting from government mismanagement and the international embargo, the share assumed by the military was relatively higher than in more normal times. Any analysis of spending data is subject to many uncertainties. Portions of the nation’s expenditures for military purposes probably have been unrecorded, or allocated funds may have been siphoned off by corrupt officers.

Between 1975 and 1985, under the Duvaliers, military spending averaging US$30 million a year represented about 8 percent of government expenditures. Between 1987 and 1991, when Aristide was ousted by the military, the share of military expenditures in the national budget rose from 10.6 percent to 15.3 percent. Recorded military outlays did not exceed 2 percent of GNP during the Duvalier era or under any subsequent regime.

Throughout the twentieth century, the United States was the primary source of foreign military support in terms of matériel and financing. United States military missions to Haiti during and after World War II helped to maintain links between the two countries.

Overall, between 1950 and 1977, the United States provided US$3.4 million in military aid, which included the cost of training for 610 Haitian students in the United States. During the 1980s, no direct military aid was provided, although some credits were advanced to permit commercial military purchases. The financing program amounted to about US$300,000 a year, but the Duvaliers spent a much greater amount in direct commercial transactions, primarily for crowd-control equipment. All forms of military assistance ended when the elections of 1987 failed. ACDA has recorded no imports of military equipment since 1987, when US$500,000 worth of military items entered the country, presumably acquired through commercial channels.

Role of the Army in Law Enforcement Prior to 1995

Although the 1987 constitution mandated a separate police corps and a new police academy under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, political realities pre-
vented the implementation of these changes. The army feared that a separate police would compete for funds and influence and would threaten its opportunities for profit. The armed forces continued to act as the nation’s ultimate law enforcement agency in spite of their lack of competence in this area. The only identifiable police force in Haiti operated in Port-au-Prince, its members assigned to it by the armed forces. This 1,000-member force had few operational or technical capabilities, even though it was responsible for criminal investigations, as well as narcotics and immigration control. Members of the FAd’H detailed for police duties received no specific training in police methods. They did not have regular beats, investigate crimes, or carry out other normal police functions. The police could be hired to arrest persons on flimsy evidence. Warrantless arrest was common, as was incommunicado detention.

There was no true rural police. Small garrisons, operating under military department command, with some cooperation from the lowest central government administrative heads, the military section chiefs, were responsible for rural security. In effect, the 562 section chiefs functioned not only as police chiefs but also as primary government representatives in rural areas. Thus, with little or no oversight from the capital and without special training, the officers assigned to keep order often acted as prosecutors, judges, and tax assessors in a brutal system whose main purpose was to prevent any grassroots opposition from developing.

In addition to its failure to establish a nationwide police force as called for in the constitution, the military leadership failed to subdue the VSN and other vigilante groups. Direct links between the senior army command and remnants of the VSN enabled many VSN agents to infiltrate FAd’H units and the cadres of the Port-au-Prince police force. Many of the paramilitary groups simply were engaged in a career of banditry with no political motivation. The Avril government made some effort to crack down on abuses in the internal security services, but members of the FAd’H and its various affiliates continued to use their monopoly of power to subjugate and mistreat the Haitian citizenry. It has been estimated that some 3,000 Haitians died in the 1991–94 period as a result of the FAd’H’s oppressive governance.

**Haiti’s External and Domestic Security Concerns**

Defense of the nation against external threats was never a
prominent factor in the mission of Haiti's armed forces. Since the efforts of the French to reconquer the island in the early years of the nineteenth century, the country has not been seriously challenged by any foreign power. In 1822 Haiti occupied the eastern part of the island of Hispaniola, which had declared itself independent of Spain as the Republic of Santo Domingo. Controlling the whole island, however, drained the national treasury, and internal struggles so weakened the army that it was unable to pursue missions beyond its borders. Nonetheless, under Faustin Soulouque, Haiti made repeated attempts to reconquer the eastern part of the island between 1847 and 1859, following its ejection in 1844.

The principal sources of the nation's safety until the twentieth century were the jealousies among the great powers and the increasing interest of the United States in a stable order in Haiti. The United States Navy deployed to the country's ports fifteen times between 1876 and 1913 in order to protect United States lives and property. Occupation of Haiti by the United States Marines beginning in 1915 was designed to ensure domestic law and stability. During this period, the United States helped establish the Garde d'Haiti, which was intended to be a modern, apolitical military establishment oriented toward this goal.

As a noncommunist country situated only eighty kilometers from Cuban territory, Haiti's security falls within the wider framework of United States strategic interests in the Caribbean. The Marine occupation and a succession of American training missions have in effect placed Haiti under a United States security umbrella. The Duvaliers' tight control eliminated all Marxist influence, and it was not until 1986 that a small communist party began to operate openly in the country. Cuba has not tried to interfere in Haitian affairs, deterred by the severity of Haiti's political and economic difficulties and the high profile of the United States in the region.

Relations with the Dominican Republic, Haiti's neighbor on the island of Hispaniola, have been marked by recurrent differences, but neither country presents a threat to the other's territorial integrity or security. The Dominican Republic was an important source of smuggled gasoline and other goods during the 1991-94 international embargo against Haiti. Under pressure from the United States, however, the Dominicans strengthened their military border posts, reducing if not shutting off the movement of contraband. By agreement, several
thousand Haitian cane cutters migrate annually to assist in the harvest of Dominican sugar plantations. Nevertheless, the issue of legal and illegal Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic is a source of friction. During a visit by Haitian president René Garcia Préval to the Dominican capital of Santo Domingo in 1996, the first such event in decades, the authorities of the two countries agreed to set up a joint commission on trade, immigration, and other problems.

Traditionally, the military has seen its role as an autonomous force available to intervene in crises that threaten lawful authority. It has, however, been subject to chronic instability traceable in part to generational and political differences among members of the officer corps and the complicating role of the VSN and other paramilitary groups. As of 1999, the former military leaders and agents of the paramilitary groups still presented a latent threat to the post-1994 government. Many of these figures live in exile in the Dominican Republic or in one of the Central American countries. Other former soldiers are employed by private security companies and as personal bodyguards of wealthy families. The private security firms are larger and better armed than the Haitian police. Arms are easily available to dissident elements. Only about 30,000 of roughly 175,000 guns in Haiti have been seized or turned in under the United States-sponsored buy-back program.

Armed groups could potentially bring about the collapse of Haiti’s civilian government by assassinations of leading politicians, aiding plots by disaffected elements, or taking advantage of mounting turmoil growing out of street violence and economic distress or politically manipulated demonstrations. The continued presence of small United States military contingents and UN-sponsored personnel acts as a limited deterrent on actions intended to overturn domestic institutions.

Government officials have charged that former military figures have encouraged paramilitary gangs to demoralize and destabilize the political situation by demonstrating that the PNH is unable to ensure the nation’s internal security. An incident in May 1999 in which eleven detainees were gunned down by the police in Port-au-Prince has been cited as a deliberate plot to tarnish the image of the PNH. Seven officers were arrested, including the Port-au-Prince police commissioner, a former army officer.

Episodes of violence are common in Haiti, particularly in the slum area of Port-au-Prince known as Cité Soleil, which the
police are often reluctant to penetrate. Most of this crime is associated with five or six criminal gangs. Although these gangs are formless and undisciplined, they represent a danger to the established order by contributing to a sense of chaos and lawlessness that weakens public confidence in the government's power to maintain control. Most of the lawless behavior lacks a political motivation, although the police have been the target of a number of attacks, some resulting in their deaths. In early 1998, the station chief in Mirebalais was lynched by a gang of young men linked to Aristide's political movement.

Violence has spread from gang-ridden areas to more prosperous parts of the city and to the countryside, driven by increasing economic desperation and a limited police presence. The looting of warehouses, truck hijackings, and holdups of buses are among the most common forms of armed crime. A rash of kidnappings and robberies of wealthy and middle-class Haitians has been a further feature of the crime wave. Vigilante groups, sometimes organized with government approval, act to enforce rough "street justice" where the police are unable or unwilling to act, or where confidence is lacking in the court system. Angry mobs often kill suspected thieves, murderers, and rapists. According to police records, some 100 deaths resulted from such incidents in the first half of 1998. Occasionally, timely police intervention has prevented Lynchings.

Some armed, unemployed ex-FAd'H soldiers have turned to crime. Other demobilized troops with legitimate grievances over the loss of their careers and pensions and the lack of jobs and army severance pay present a potentially dangerous anti-government element. Several hundred ex-soldiers staged a protest in the capital in 1996, threatening to take up arms if their demands were not met. Subsequently, the police arrested twenty members of the extreme right-wing Mobilization for National Development, most of whose members were ex-soldiers, on charges of plotting the assassination of public officials. Two of the group's leaders were later found murdered, apparently by members of the Presidential Guard. René Préval, who became president in February 1996, came under United States pressure to purge his bodyguard unit but, apparently fearful for his own safety, was unwilling to do so until a security detail from the United States and Canada was assigned to guard him. The detail was withdrawn a year later.
Internal Security since 1994

Upon President Aristide's return to Haiti in October 1994, the military was divested of all of its previous internal security functions, and steps were immediately undertaken to replace it with a separate national police force as stipulated in the constitution. As an initial measure, the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) was formed under the supervision of more than 1,000 international police monitors. Nearly 1,000 of the IPSF members were drawn from Haitian migrants in the United States safe haven in Guantanamo, Cuba. Most of the remainder, about 3,300, were former FAd'H personnel who had been screened to eliminate any suspected of human rights abuses or criminal conduct. After an inadequate six-day training period that emphasized human rights, the interim police were deployed to cities and larger towns with the international monitors serving as mentors to the untried new officers and helping to reduce violations of human rights.

The effort to establish a permanent professional police force got underway with the opening of a police academy in January 1995 at Camp d'Application outside of Port-au-Prince. A series of four-month courses was instituted to enable the newly trained policemen to begin replacing the IPSF in June 1995. In December 1995, the government phased out the IPSF by incorporating its remaining 1,600 members into the permanent police force.

National Police

The Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d'Haïti—PNH) reached its targeted strength of 6,500 by early 1998, but, by late 1999, its strength had fallen to 6,000 as a result of dismissals. Its goal is to have 9,500–10,000 policemen by 2003, a goal that many observers doubt is attainable. For a nation of Haiti's size, the police complement is considered modest in comparison with other countries of the region. New York City, with a similar population, has a police force five times the size of Haiti's.

The PNH represents a signal departure from Haiti's historical reliance on the army to maintain internal security. Under the police law passed by the Haitian congress in November 1994, the PNH falls under the immediate jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the secretary of state for justice and public security. Ultimate authority rests
with the Superior Council of the National Police, which includes the ministers of justice and interior, and the director general and inspector general of police. Pierre Denizé, a civilian lawyer with a reputation for being tough on crime and corruption, was appointed director general of police in 1996. The director general is chosen by the president from police directors or divisional commanders for a renewable three-year term. His appointment is subject to Senate approval.

Recruitment to other command positions has been opened to both military officers and civilian university graduates. Both groups are required to go through the same examination process and training. No more than one-third of PNH officers are former military, and the highest posts at PNH headquarters and departmental directorates are all held by civilians.

Neither military nor civilian officers have proven to be well qualified, with wide differences in capacities of individual officers. Deployed after the first agents were already in place, the officers have had difficulty gaining the respect of their subordinates. Many officers meeting the academic criteria have shown poor leadership skills. In addition, many have failed to enforce discipline against the agents under their command and have failed to implement regulations and codes of discipline.

The PNH is divided into two main units, the Administrative Police with responsibility for day-to-day public security and
crime prevention, and the Judicial Police, a detective force that assists the courts in carrying out criminal investigations (see fig. 14). A separate unit, the Office of the Inspector General, which reports to both the director general and the minister of justice, investigates complaints against the police of human rights abuses. The Office of the Inspector General also conducts periodic inspections of police establishments and the Police Academy to assure compliance with police regulations and to evaluate the PNH's effectiveness. The office had seventy-two people assigned to it in 1997, and more personnel were being added. Its head was said to be seriously committed to purging the PNH of abusive and criminal elements, but the staff was overwhelmed as a result of trying to pursue cases of police misbehavior while at the same time carrying out its on-site inspection schedule.

Each of Haiti's nine departments has a departmental police director. Beneath them are the positions of chief commissioners (commissaires principaux) and some 130 posts of city police chiefs or municipal commissioners (commissaires municipaux). The next subdivisions are the 185 subcommissariats under chief inspectors (inspecteurs principaux) and, finally, 577 supervisory positions of sergeants (inspecteurs) in the sub-precincts of smaller towns and the smallest police divisions in rural and urban areas. These smallest offices may be staffed by as few as three policemen.

Specialized forces—the 200-member National Palace Residential Guard, the eighty-seven member Presidential Security Unit, and the Ministerial Security Corps—provide protection to the political leadership. There is also a crowd control unit, the Company for Intervention and Maintaining Order (Compagnie d'Intervention et Maintien d'Ordre—CIMO), and a SWAT team, the Intervention Group of the Haitian National Police (Groupe d'Intervention de la Police Nationale d'Haiti—GIPNH). Each of the nine administrative regions also has its own crowd control force. Two specialized units that had been undergoing training began to be deployed in 1997. One was the Haitian Coast Guard with ninety-four members; the other was the Counternarcotics Unit under the Bureau of Criminal Affairs with only twenty-five members.

The government has established a Special Investigative Unit under the director of the Judicial Police to look into notorious homicides—generally politically motivated—dating back to the mid-1980s. About seventy such cases have been brought under
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investigation, including deaths that occurred under the mili­
tary regime after 1991, and high-profile killings following Aris­
tide's return to office. However, the unit is ill-equipped and
inexperienced and had made only limited progress on these
cases by the close of 1999.

Some mayors have formed quasi-official forces to supple­
ment the work of the PNH in their communities. These forces
remain small and lack legal standing or the right to carry weap­
ons. The municipalities have openly resisted the national gov­
ernment's demands that their arms be turned in to the PNH.
In some cases, they assume arrest authority without the sanca­tion of the law. The Port-au-Prince extra-legal force is believed
to number several dozen persons, and the adjoining suburb of Delmas has about thirty. Other communities have smaller
corps.

Recruitment, Training, and Equipment

Initial recruitment for the PNH was carried out by traveling
teams that tested thousands of applicants. Only a small per­
centage was able to pass the examination, in part because liter­
acy in French and the equivalent of a high-school diploma were
required. This relatively high education level created some
problems for the police in dealing with the mostly illiterate
population, especially in rural areas, and the education
requirement has since been reduced to a tenth-grade level.
Members of the IPSF were allowed to apply on the basis of rec­
ommendations from international police monitors but were
still required to pass the entrance test.

The academy course has been expanded from four to nine
months, although, realistically, adequate training would
require twelve to eighteen months. The program includes
instruction in police procedures, tactical skills, police manage­
ment and administration, law, and a course in "human dignity."
Under pressure to train large numbers of recruits rapidly, the
initial classes were brought to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri,
for the portion of the program dealing with practical police
skills. Short-term specialized courses also have been introduced
to sharpen the skills of police and officers in the field.

The training program was developed by the United States
Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). Haitian lawyers focus
on the constitution and Haitian laws, while personnel of ICITAP,
together with Canadian and French police trainers, deal
with patrol, arrest, and investigative techniques. Haitian instructors are scheduled to fill all positions at the academy.

The highest 10 percent of the members of the initial classes received additional training for supervisory positions. Other members of each class were selected to receive additional investigative training for service in the Judicial Police. Women comprised about 7 percent of the original classes and were assigned to regular patrol duties after graduation.

The monthly salary ranges between US$250 and US$400, with sergeants earning US$500–600. These wages are generous by Haitian standards. Nevertheless, the police have demonstrated for higher rates on the grounds that higher salaries will reduce a force member's temptation to resort to bribery and drug trafficking. However, it seems unlikely that the Haitian government can afford to maintain this pay scale if the economy continues to decline. In 1998 consideration was being given to establishing a separate rural police force that would be less well paid and have lower entrance standards. Many PNH recruits are reluctant to serve outside Port-au-Prince, in some cases because they are concurrently continuing university studies. However, a policy of redeployment has been instituted to bring police who have served in rural areas for several years
into towns and making members of the PNH in the Port-au-
Prince area subject to reassignment to the provinces.

Each new officer is provided with a gun, shoes, and one uni-
form. The uniform consists of blue trousers with a vertical yel-
low stripe and a pale tan shirt, usually short sleeved. Rank
insignia are worn on epaulets. Members of CIMO wear distinc-
tive black uniforms.

The police are restricted by law to carrying only sidearms.
Special units are equipped with shotguns, M16 semiautomatic
rifles, and Uzi submachine guns, but in some cases police on
routine assignments are seen with them as well. Some riot
shields and bulletproof vests have been distributed. Mainte-
nance of equipment, including firearms, is poor, and control
systems are described as embryonic. Vehicles are in seriously
short supply. A number of new vans were donated to the police,
but most quickly became inoperable because of insufficient
maintenance and repair and the high accident rate attributed
to the inexperience of the recruits. Radio communication
exists between the capital and the departmental directors and
major urban areas, but communications remain poor in rural
areas. The police stations were at first in wretched condition,
some entirely uninhabitable, especially outside the capital.
They lacked furniture, office equipment, and holding cells.
Typewriters, filing cabinets, and some other equipment have
since been made available with the aid of outside agencies.

Among the problems still confronting the new police force
are weak leadership and political influence over appointments
and promotions. Excessive use of force continues to be at a
worrisome level (see Respect for Human Rights, this ch.).
Police often also display an arrogant attitude toward the local
community. PNH personnel are reluctant to descend from
their vehicles, to carry out routine patrolling, or to thoroughly
investigate crimes. In addition, supervisors are frequently
absent from their posts. However, Rachel M. Neild of the Wash-
ington Office on Latin America, who has closely followed the
emergence of the PNH, observed in early 1998 that in spite of
these problems the PNH had gained confidence in 1997, its
second full year, and had become less dependent on foreign
police monitors in carrying out its operations."

The United States Department of State observed in 1999
that the PNH was continuing to gain experience and to benefit
from training. Nevertheless, the PNH found itself still grap-
pling with problems of attrition, corruption, incompetence, narcotics trafficking, and human rights abuses within its ranks.

**Respect for Human Rights**

State violence and terror have been features of Haitian life since the nation broke away from colonial rule in 1804, and even before. Between Aristide's overthrow in 1991 and his restoration in 1994, the use of paramilitary groups against individuals thought to be opposed to the regime became common. Control of the populace was enforced by acts of kidnapping, extrajudicial killings, rape, and "disappearances." Mutilated bodies were left in the streets as warnings against disobedience. A pattern of judicial corruption, arbitrary arrest, and prolonged detentions was inherited from the previous Duvalier era as a method of governance. The FAd'H and its various affiliates used their monopoly to subjugate and abuse the Haitian citizenry. Their abuses escalated in the final months of the military regime's existence.

The arrival in 1994 of the international military and police missions and the return of President Aristide brought a dramatic reduction in the level of institutional violence. The shift in responsibility for law enforcement from the FAd'H to a new police organization and the subsequent disbanding of the FAd'H introduced fundamental changes to the human rights landscape. The transformation has by no means been complete, however. Continuing political feuds and bitter hatreds, combined with the inexperience of the new police force, have accounted for many brutal criminal acts, but far beneath the scale of the past. In the first three years following the entry of the international forces in September 1994, about two dozen executions were recorded that may have been politically motivated. The most notorious cases in which a government role was suspected were those of Mireille Bertin, the spokeswoman for an opposition party, in 1995, and two right-wing extremist leaders the following year. In October 1999, Jean Lamy, a former army colonel who was slated to become secretary of state for justice (public security), was assassinated by unknown gunmen.

There were sixty-six cases of extrajudicial killings by the police in 1999, according to the Organization of American States (OAS)/UN International Civilian Mission (ICM). Although a continuing problem, these killings were not political but resulted from excessive use of force and lack of profes-
sionalism on the part of the police. Many were believed to be summary executions of suspects and detainees. Others occurred during police actions against gangs and mobs. Cases of police executions and serious police crimes were investigated by the Office of the Inspector General, although police beatings were likely to be overlooked.

In January 1999, the secretary of state for justice and public security announced that 500 police implicated in various infractions had been removed from the force. However, the weakness of the judiciary has precluded successful prosecutions of police for unjustified deaths. This apparent impunity was underscored in 1997, when an investigative judge released without trial six members of the PNH who had been charged with participating in three separate incidents of summary executions. The judge involved was later removed from office, and Haitian authorities were making efforts to reinstitute charges.

Police mistreatment of detainees appears to be on the increase. The ICM recorded 191 such incidents in 1998. This rise, which went up nearly five times in a single year, may have been linked to the beatings of large groups of inmates in connection with escape attempts at two prisons. Many reports involved beatings of armed gang members, excessive force in dealing with demonstrators, application of psychological pressures, and administration of shock treatment to prisoners while they were under questioning. However, these incidents of human rights violations by the PNH failed to substantiate a policy of deliberate or systematic abuse. The inspector general has focused most of his resources on police criminal activities and has not punished many cases of abuse. Complaints against indiscriminate use of firearms by the police have declined in spite of the increase in the number of police deployed. The inexperience and youth of the recruits as well as training shortcomings and fears for their own safety accounted for many of the problems of the new force.

**Multinational Security Assistance**

The coup of September 1991 against Haiti's first democratically elected president brought condemnation by the UN Security Council and the imposition of sanctions by the OAS. Diplomatic efforts by the OAS to restore the Aristide government lacked force in part because the OAS embargo was so porous. It was not until June 1993, when the Security Council imposed a worldwide fuel and arms embargo, that the leaders
of the illegal Haitian military regime agreed to negotiations to restore democracy to the country. However, the ten-point Governors Island Accord of July 3, 1993, failed when an advance team of the UN-sponsored police trainers and military personnel was prevented from coming ashore (see The Post-Duvalier Period, this ch.)

More resolute pressures by the United States and the UN, plus preparations by the United States for an actual invasion, finally persuaded the de facto Haitian leaders to agree to the landing of troops on the basis of "permissive intervention." The United States-led Multinational Force (MNF) quickly grew to 21,000 troops, of which 2,500 were from other countries.

The MNF was welcomed as a liberating force by ordinary Haitians, who celebrated their restored freedom and the hope of a resumption of democratic government. Relations with the Haitian military were less cordial. The MNF was obliged to send patrols into the countryside to replace Haitian troops carrying out rural police functions. In the cities, the FAd'H was confined to barracks and divested of its arms. The coup leaders soon departed the country, leaving the army demoralized and leaderless.

In March 1995, the MNF was formally replaced by the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) under the terms of a UN resolution providing for a force of 6,000 military peacekeepers. The 3,300 United States military personnel then remaining in Haiti formed the core, with most of the other troops coming from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Canada. The UNMIH was organized into five infantry battalions, including a United States quick-reaction force, a military police battalion, and engineering, aviation, logistics, military intelligence, and civil affairs units. The group had its headquarters in Port-au-Prince, with six subheadquarters. United States Special Forces were detailed to twenty-five rural areas to supervise ad hoc arrangements with local army units.

In 1996 Canada assumed a principal role in the operation, agreeing to supply the UNMIH force commander. The mission was gradually drawn down until its last contingents of 650 Canadian and 550 Pakistani troops began their departures in November 1997. A separate United States contingent of 480 active-duty soldiers and reservists remained in Haiti from the original force of 20,000 in 1994. Mainly civil engineers and medical personnel, they helped with construction of schools, roads, and bridges and provided medical assistance. The troops

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were scheduled to be withdrawn in January 2000, to be replaced by reserve and National Guard forces on short assignments to continue medical programs and engineering projects.

The UN was also responsible for some 900 police trainers from more than twenty countries, who assisted in the formation and professionalization of the PNH. This multinational mentoring and training force had been reduced to 290 civilian police specialists from eleven countries by 1998, of whom twenty-three were detached from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and from local police forces in Canada, thirty from the United States, many of them of Haitian origin, and thirty-five from France. Argentina supplied 140 federal police to provide security for the police trainers. The training mandate was scheduled to expire March 15, 2000, with a follow-up technical support program planned.

Justice System

Haiti's legal system reflects its colonial origins. It has a French structure superimposed on a traditional African-Caribbean society and thus lacks the parallel or indigenous legal system often found in modern Africa. The civil law system is based on the Napoleonic Code. The Criminal Code dates from 1832 (see Governmental Institutions, ch. 9).

For nearly 200 years, the justice system has been noted for its rampant corruption. Most crimes go unsolved and unpunished. The Duvalier dictatorships and the military regimes that followed left a judicial system that was barely functioning. The best judges and lawyers fled the country, in some cases to serve as judicial officials of newly independent francophone African states.

The OAS/UN International Civilian Mission to Haiti delivered a devastating indictment of the judicial system after the monitors had completed a study of the system's most pressing weaknesses in 1993 while the military was still in power. Their report found that judges, prosecutors, and lawyers had been threatened, beaten, and killed for attempting to follow the rule of law. Judges and prosecutors were afraid even to investigate cases involving the military, the attachés, or their supporters. Corruption and extortion permeated every level of the judicial system. Despite the requirement that justices of the peace have a law degree and complete a minimum one-year probationary period, many justices of the peace did not know how to read and write. People viewed the court system with contempt and
avoided it by settling disputes on their own, sometimes by "vigilante justice." The impunity of the most powerful sectors of Haitian society fed the country's cycle of violence. Judicial procedures and protections were systematically breached by detentions and warrantless arrests that amounted simply to abduction.

The restored civilian government has undertaken limited measures to redress the abuses of the 1991-94 period, but as of 1999 the judicial system remained weak and corrupt. Sweeping judicial reforms are planned. Congress passed a judicial reform law in 1998, but it did not contain sufficiently precise measures to produce material changes. Persons are still detained for long periods without trial, and normal protections against arbitrary arrest are routinely violated. A large proportion of crimes, including grave political offenses, are never brought to trial even when strong evidence could be presented against the presumed perpetrators.

With the help of international donors, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security has opened a magistrates' school offering a twenty-four-week course. The first two classes in 1998 and 1999 trained a corps of 100 new magistrates. In addition, 120 justices of the peace attended training seminars. The ministry has improved the functioning of the public prosecutor's office and brought about better case presentation and judicial supervision. In spite of some salary increases, there have been repeated strikes of justices of the peace and prosecutors demanding pay raises and better working conditions. Many lower courts are barely functional, lacking proper quarters, electricity, record-keeping, or stationery. Corrupt judges from the coup period, many regarded as irredeemable, continue on the bench. Failure to reform the code of criminal procedure contributes to a large backlog of cases. The code stipulates that the fifteen courts of first instance hold only two criminal court sessions per year, each lasting for two weeks, to try all major crimes, primarily murder, requiring a jury trial.

At the end of 1999, about 80 percent of prison inmates were unsentenced and awaiting trial. No compensation is granted to those ultimately found innocent. A new Office to Control Preventive Detention was formed by the Ministry of Justice in 1998 to accelerate the review and processing of cases stagnating in the prison system. By improving judges' access to detainees, this office facilitated the review of 1,198 cases and the
release of 477 prisoners and referral of 160 detainees to the courts.

The constitution stipulates that a person may be arrested only if apprehended during commission of a crime or if a warrant has been issued. The detainee must be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours of arrest. The police often take a cavalier attitude toward the legal requirements for the issuance of valid search and arrest warrants, adequate evidence for arrests, and presentation of suspects before a judge within forty-eight hours. The constitution prohibits the interrogation of those charged with a crime unless the suspect has legal counsel present or waives this right. Most accused cannot afford counsel, and, despite efforts of local and international human rights groups to provide legal aid, many interrogations continue to be held without counsel present. During actual trials, most defendants have access to counsel. Notwithstanding the order of the minister of justice that Creole be used in the courts, most legal proceedings continue to be conducted in French, which only about 10 percent of the population speaks.

Under the post-1994 civilian regime, there were no reported cases of the previously common practice of secret detention. The number of arbitrary arrests also declined significantly. The government has detained political opponents and persons associated with the former military regime, often on vague charges of plotting against the state. In some cases the authorities have responded to court orders to release such prisoners, but in others political prisoners have continued to be held contrary to court rulings.

The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is said to have made a sincere effort to overcome the stagnation of the trial system, releasing those who had already served more time than if they had been found guilty. As part of a new project, law students assist detainees to prepare their cases. The constitution provides protection against unnecessary force, psychological pressure, or physical brutality to extract confessions. However, police mistreatment of suspects at the time of arrest remains common.

Prison System

Haiti's prisons have long been notorious for their inhumane conditions and often cruel treatment of inmates. A United States Marine Corps report described them in 1934 as "a disgrace to humanity." Under the military regime of 1991–94, the
prisons deteriorated still further. Detainees suffered from a lack of the most basic hygiene as well as from inadequate food and health care. Prisoners had to rely on families for food and medicines. Most of the seventeen prisons were remnants of garrisons built for United States troops in the 1920s and lacked electricity, potable water, and toilets; many prisoners were forced to sleep on the floor in densely overcrowded quarters.

The civil governments of Aristide and Préval have taken some measures to improve the situation, with the help of international humanitarian bodies. The government created Haiti's first civilian prison agency, the National Penitentiary Administration (Administration Pénitentiaire Nationale—Apena), and formed a corps of trained prison guards. The agency was placed under the PNH in 1997 but retained most of its autonomy. The prison population was 3,494 in late 1998. One section of Fort National, the main penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, has been refurbished to house women and juveniles. In other prisons, overcrowding often prevents strict separation of juveniles from adults or convicts from those in trial detention. In 1998 prisoners generally received one or two adequate meals a day, often supplemented by food brought by family members. In police station holding cells, where politically sensitive prisoners have often been kept, detainees continued to be dependent on their families for food. Prisoner health is a serious problem. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) paid for the installation of rudimentary clinics, but the government has failed to keep them adequately staffed with medicines. Human rights groups such as the ICRC and the Haitian Red Cross are freely permitted to visit prisons and police stations to monitor treatment of prisoners and to provide needed medical care, food, and legal aid.

Narcotics Trafficking

Haiti's geographic location between Colombia and the United States, coupled with its long, unpatrolled coastline, mountainous interior, and the presence of numerous airstrips, makes the country an ideal transshipment and storage point for Colombian cocaine suppliers. A lesser amount of marijuana also transits Haiti. Haiti itself is not an important producer of illegal drugs, nor has domestic drug consumption been a significant problem. Narcotics shipments from Colombia reach Haiti's southern coast via high-speed boats and by land and sea drops from light aircraft. A portion of the drugs are exported
directly, but most are smuggled across the border to the Dominican Republic for onward transit to the United States, Canada, and Europe.

The de facto military government of 1991–94 maintained a minimal drug enforcement effort, with the primary responsibility for antidrug operations assigned to the army and police units under army control. The air force and navy did not have the resources to make a material contribution to drug interdiction. Rumors abounded of senior officials linked to drug trafficking, although direct evidence was lacking. After the army command announced that any member linked to drug trafficking would be expelled from the military and subjected to civil prosecution, some low-ranking officers and enlisted personnel were reassigned or dismissed. However, the civil judicial system declined to prosecute military personnel on drug charges. United States efforts to help the Haitian counternarcotics effort were suspended while the military regime was in power.

Under the Préval government, primary responsibility for drug suppression was brought under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security's special adviser on narcotics matters. Enforcement is primarily the responsibility of the Counternarcotics Unit of the national police. The Haitian Coast Guard, activated with United States help, cooperated with the United States Coast Guard in several significant seizures in 1997, its first year. As a result of these operations, the Haitian Coast Guard was able to add to its inventory three high-speed vessels that had been confiscated from drug dealers.

Although Haiti's role is secondary to that of the Dominican Republic in the drug transit trade, the feeble resources of the PNH and the corruption of the Haitian justice system have made Haitian territory increasingly inviting for illegal narcotics shipments. Oceangoing speedboats can leave Colombia at dusk and arrive at the Haitian coast before daybreak with little risk of detection. Drug loads can then be carried across the border to the Dominican Republic or smuggled to Florida on freighters. United States authorities have estimated that nearly sixty-seven tons of cocaine passed through Haiti in 1999. This figure represented 14 percent of the total amount of cocaine produced in South America in that year.

In 1998 the PNH made eighty-six drug-related arrests; none of those arrested were considered major drug traffickers. Of those detained, thirty-four were Colombians. None of those brought before the courts in 1997 or 1998 resulted in success-
ful prosecutions. Although 100 PNH officers were dismissed for drug-related offenses and ten arrested as a preliminary to prosecution, internal corruption persists. Seized cocaine is believed to be marketed by the police. Poorly paid customs agents and judges (whose salaries are often lower than those of the police) contribute to the difficulty of preventing official corruption.

Haiti's enforcement effort remains beyond the capacity of the Haitian security forces alone to control. Haiti's laws are strong, but the country's weak judicial system has brought few traffickers to trial. The Office of the Special Adviser has drafted new legislation to improve narcotics control and to introduce the first law to combat money laundering, but the political impasse of 1998–99 prevented enactment of these measures by parliament.

As of 1999, the Haitian government was still struggling in its attempts to establish functioning internal security and justice administrations in place of systems that had never enjoyed any credibility with the Haitian people. The police continued to be prone to unwarranted abuses, and their inexperience in confronting criminal behavior has led to numerous unjustified killings. Nevertheless, hundreds of police have been cited for misconduct, many have been discharged, and some even jailed. Such efforts to impose a standard of behavior on the security forces have been almost unknown in Haiti's history.

The new police force faces serious challenges in controlling major crime, violence directed against the democratic government, and international commerce in narcotics. It must also build and uphold professional standards against the threats of corruption and politicization. Although the Haitian army and its affiliated organizations have all been dissolved, many of their former members are armed and capable of creating chaotic conditions endangering the regime. As the sole agency in Haiti dedicated to the maintenance of law and order, the PNH is essential to the preservation of a secure environment for democratic government.

* * *

Among the considerable number of scholars who have examined the collapse of the military regime in Haiti in 1994 and the resumption of civilian government, the reports by Rachel M. Neild published by the Washington Office on Latin
America are notable for their detailed record of the development of the Haitian National Police, based on periodic visits for personal observation. In several studies, Donald E. Schulz of the Army War College analyzes the country's internal security problems in a broader framework. The 1998 United Nations report on its civilian police mission appraises the success of its efforts to improve the police and judicial systems three years after the return of civilian rule. A vivid account by Elizabeth Rubin in the *New York Times Magazine* relates the experiences of a Haitian-born New York City policeman helping to deal with the enormous problems of bringing order to a society with no tradition of law and justice.

The political role of the army from the close of the Duvalier era in 1986 until the restoration of democratic rule in 1994 is recounted in *Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy*, edited by Georges A. Fauriol. The deplorable state of the Haitian judicial system is addressed by William G. O'Neill in a contribution to *Haiti Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects*.

A treatment of the structure, internal conflicts, and ultimate breakdown of the armed forces can be found in the Fauriol work. Two earlier publications, *Armed Forces of Latin America* by Adrian J. English and *World Armies*, edited by John Keegan, provide historical background on the evolution of the FAd'H. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
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10 Dominican Republic: Imports and Exports, 1988–97
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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies

26 Haiti: Civil Jurisdictions and Government Institutions, 2000
27 Haiti: Cabinet Ministers, December 1999
### Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

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<th>When you know</th>
<th>Multiply by</th>
<th>To find</th>
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<td>Centimeters</td>
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| Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)         | 1.8         | degrees Fahrenheit and add 32
### Table 2. Dominican Republic: Population and Percentage Increase, 1981 Census and 1993 Census

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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Subregion</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population 1981</th>
<th>Population 1993</th>
<th>Increase (in percentages)</th>
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<td>Santiago</td>
<td>533,102</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Monsenor</td>
<td>112,932</td>
<td>149,318</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Valverde</td>
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<td>Azua</td>
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### Table 2. (Continued) Dominican Republic: Population and Percentage Increase, 1981 Census and 1993 Census

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1 These provinces became a part of the category after the 1981 census.

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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Technical University</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Dajabon</td>
<td>816</td>
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<td>Montecristi</td>
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Table 3. (Continued) Dominican Republic: School Attendance, Population Five Years of Age and Older by Level of Instruction, 1993 Census

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<td>Total Del Valle</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Southwest</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Southeast</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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Table 3. (Continued) Dominican Republic: School Attendance, Population Five Years of Age and Older by Level of Instruction, 1993 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Subregion</th>
<th>Province</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Primary</td>
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<td>1,499</td>
<td>39,176</td>
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<td>40,423</td>
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<td>1,076</td>
<td>32,971</td>
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<td>1,939</td>
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<td>2,705</td>
<td>40,615</td>
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<td>Hato Mayor</td>
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<td>844</td>
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<td>Total Yuma</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7,319</td>
<td>162,485</td>
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**Appendix**

### Table 4. Dominican Republic: Health Facilities and Personnel, 1996–97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health facilities</td>
<td>1,334</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>213</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hospital beds</td>
<td>15,236</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical schools</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental schools</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing schools</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>17,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>1,898</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


### Table 5. Dominican Republic: Leading Causes of Death by Sex, 1994 (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of Death</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cardiovascular and circulatory diseases</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malignant neoplasms</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicable diseases</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidental injuries and violence</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other causes</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

Table 6. Dominican Republic: Employment by Sector, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Employees</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>310,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>545,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>126,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>13,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>428,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>8,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Communications</td>
<td>185,700</td>
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</table>

Source: Based on information from Banco Central de la República Dominicana.

Table 7. Dominican Republic: Agricultural and Livestock Production, 1997 (in tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>79,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>156,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>521,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>6,296,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information from Banco Central de la República Dominicana.

Table 8. Dominican Republic: Mineral Production, 1993–97

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold (troy ounces)</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>76,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver (troy ounces)</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>296,000</td>
<td>677,000</td>
<td>547,000</td>
<td>399,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel (tons)</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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Source: Based on information from Banco Central de la República Dominicana.
### Table 9. Dominican Republic: Tourism, 1993–97

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of stopover visitors</th>
<th>Number of hotel rooms</th>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>1,719,000</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>1,766,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,490,200(^1)</td>
<td>32,475</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>1,930,000</td>
<td>35,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2,211,000</td>
<td>38,250</td>
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\(^1\) Non-Dominican only.

Source: Based on information from Dominican Republic, Secretariat of State for Tourism.

### Table 10. Dominican Republic: Imports and Exports, 1988–97

(in millions of United States dollars)

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1,608</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>2,588</td>
<td>766</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>3,205</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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<tr>
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<th>PL-480 Programs²</th>
<th>ESF³</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>22.8</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>11.7</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
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<td>32.2</td>
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<td>14.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
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<td>41.0</td>
<td>80.6</td>
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<td>25.3</td>
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<td>27.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>34.0</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>95.0</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>64.9</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>25.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>542.1</td>
<td>557.6</td>
<td>471.1</td>
<td>1,570.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ FY—fiscal year, e.g., October 1, 1962—September 30, 1963.
² PL—Public Law (see Glossary).
³ ESF—Economic Support Funds.

Source: Based on information from US Agency for International Development.
### Table 12. Dominican Republic: Major Army Equipment, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMX-13 light tanks, 76mm gun</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-41A1 light tanks, 76mm gun</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-150 Commando armored personnel carriers</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-2/M-3 half-track armored personnel carriers</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-101 105mm howitzers, towed</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars, 120mm</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars, 80mm</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>n.a. 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 13. Dominican Republic: Major Navy Equipment, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohoe class, 855 tons, two 76mm guns</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balsam class cutter, 1,034 tons, two 12.7mm</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine guns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral class gunships, 905 tons, one 76mm</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satoyomo class patrol boat, 960 tons, one 76mm</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canopus class large patrol craft, 95 tons, one</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm gun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM-11 class large patrol craft, 145 tons, one</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm machine gun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellatrix class coastal patrol craft, 60 tons,</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>three 12.7mm machine guns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgency aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna A-37B Dragonfly</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-47 Douglas Dakota</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aero Commander 680</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 210</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA-31 Navajo</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beechcraft Queen Air 80</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beechcraft King Air</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell 205</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aérospatiale SA-318C</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aérospatiale SA-365</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American AT-6</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech T-34B Mentor</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech T-41D Mescalero</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. Haiti: Estimated Population by Geographic Department and Rural-Urban Residence, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent Urban</th>
<th>Percent Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artibonite</td>
<td>1,013,779</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>490,790</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand' Anse</td>
<td>641,399</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord</td>
<td>759,318</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-Est</td>
<td>248,764</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-Ouest</td>
<td>420,971</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest</td>
<td>2,494,862</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud</td>
<td>653,398</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud-Est</td>
<td>457,013</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,180,294</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Population projections are based on national census data from 1950 and 1982. The population of urban areas may be underestimated, especially for the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (Ouest). The most recent national census of Haiti occurred in 1982.

Source: Based on information from Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique, Tendances et perspectives de la population d’Haïti au niveau régional (département, arrondissement, et commune), 1980-2005, Port-au-Prince, 1992, 12, 15, 35.
Table 16. Haiti: Estimated Population by Department and Arrondissement, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Arrondissement</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artibonite</td>
<td>Gonaïves</td>
<td>188,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gros Morne</td>
<td>142,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saint-Marc</td>
<td>235,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dessalines</td>
<td>311,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marmelade</td>
<td>134,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Artibonite</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,013,779</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Hinche</td>
<td>148,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirebalais</td>
<td>150,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lascahobas</td>
<td>124,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cerca la Source</td>
<td>67,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Centre</strong></td>
<td><strong>490,790</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand' Anse</td>
<td>Jérémie</td>
<td>189,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anse-d'Hainault</td>
<td>82,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corail</td>
<td>114,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miragoâne</td>
<td>97,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anse-à-Veau</td>
<td>157,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Grand' Anse</strong></td>
<td><strong>641,399</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord</td>
<td>Cap-Haïtien</td>
<td>173,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acul du Nord</td>
<td>125,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grande Rivière du Nord</td>
<td>62,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saint-Raphaël</td>
<td>129,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borgne</td>
<td>91,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limbé</td>
<td>57,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plaisance</td>
<td>119,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Nord</strong></td>
<td><strong>759,318</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-Est</td>
<td>Fort Liberté</td>
<td>41,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Puanaminthe</td>
<td>82,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trou du Nord</td>
<td>69,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vallières</td>
<td>54,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Nord-Est</strong></td>
<td><strong>248,764</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-Ouest</td>
<td>Port-de-Paix</td>
<td>174,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saint-Louis du Nord</td>
<td>77,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Môle Saint-Nicolas</td>
<td>169,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Nord-Ouest</strong></td>
<td><strong>420,971</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 16. (Continued) Haiti: Estimated Population by Department and Arrondissement, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Arrondissement</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ouest</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>1,639,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Léogane</td>
<td>295,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croix des Bouquets</td>
<td>315,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arcahaie</td>
<td>155,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Île de la Gonâve</td>
<td>88,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ouest</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,494,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud</td>
<td>Cayes</td>
<td>264,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port-Salut</td>
<td>73,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aquin</td>
<td>166,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coteaux</td>
<td>56,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chardonnières</td>
<td>91,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sud</td>
<td></td>
<td>653,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud-Est</td>
<td>Jacmel</td>
<td>248,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bainet</td>
<td>128,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belle-Anse</td>
<td>79,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sud-Est</td>
<td></td>
<td>457,013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Population projections are based on national census data from 1950 and 1982. The population of urban areas may be underestimated.

### Table 17. Haiti: Education Facilities and Personnel by Department, 1996–97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Primary Schools</th>
<th>Secondary Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artibonite</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>222,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>83,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand’ Anse</td>
<td>1,099</td>
<td>149,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>162,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-Est.</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>62,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-Ouest</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>103,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest</td>
<td>2,332</td>
<td>419,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>128,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud-Est.</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>96,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9,528</td>
<td>1,429,280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 These figures are based on statistics drawn from the education census of 1996–1997.


### Table 18. Haiti: Education Facilities by Level of Instruction and Sector, 1996–97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preschool</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>4,949</td>
<td>5,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>8,457</td>
<td>9,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>1,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Data on preschool, primary, and secondary education are based on the education census of 1996–97 undertaken by the Ministry of Education. Data on higher education are from 1994–95.

## Table 19. Haiti: Health Facilities and Personnel by Department, 1994<sup>1</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Health Facilities</th>
<th>Hospitals and In-patient Facilities</th>
<th>Beds</th>
<th>Beds/100,000 Population</th>
<th>Physicians</th>
<th>Nurses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artibonite</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand' Anse</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-Est</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-Ouest</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouest</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3,372</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud-Est</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>6,473</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>785</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> Figures are based on 1994 data for physicians and nurses and population projections for 1995.

Source: Based on information from Pan American Health Organization, *Health Situation Analysis, Haiti, Port-au-Prince, 1996*, 93, 102.

## Table 20. Haiti: Imports and Exports, 1988–97

(in millions of Haitian gourdes)<sup>1</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2,414</td>
<td>1,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2,727</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4,555</td>
<td>1,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>1,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9,866</td>
<td>1,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10,448</td>
<td>1,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>10,792</td>
<td>1,995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> For value of gourde, see Glossary.

### Table 21. Haiti: External Debt, Fiscal Years 1991–95  
(in millions of United States dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Long-term</th>
<th>Short-term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 22. Haiti: Grants Received, FY 1991–92–FY 1996–97  
(in millions of Haitian gourdes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grants Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1991–92</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1992–93</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1993–94</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1994–95</td>
<td>696.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1995–96</td>
<td>354.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1996–97</td>
<td>694.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 For value of gourde, see Glossary.

### Table 23. Haiti: Sources and Amounts of Development Assistance, 1990–99
(in millions of United States dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>European Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>193.7</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>85.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>97.3¹</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>97.0¹</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Planned.

### Table 24. Haiti: Heads of State, 1971–99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Claude Duvalier</td>
<td>1/1/71 – 2/7/86</td>
<td>President-for-Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Henri Namphy</td>
<td>2/7/86 – 2/7/88</td>
<td>Chairman, National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leslie E. Manigat</td>
<td>2/7/88 – 6/20/88</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Henri Namphy</td>
<td>6/20/88 – 9/17/88</td>
<td>President, Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Prosper Avril</td>
<td>9/17/88 – 5/12/90</td>
<td>President, Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Hérard Abraham</td>
<td>3/10/90 – 5/13/90</td>
<td>President, Provisional Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ertha Pascal-Trouillot</td>
<td>3/13/90 – 2/7/91</td>
<td>President, Provisional Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Bertrand Aristide</td>
<td>2/7/91 – 10/1/91</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Bertrand Aristide</td>
<td>10/1/91 – 10/11/94</td>
<td>President-in-exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Raoul Cédras</td>
<td>10/1/91 – 10/10/91</td>
<td>President, Military Junta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph C. Nerette</td>
<td>10/10/91 – 6/19/92</td>
<td>Provisional President under Military Rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc-Louis Bazin</td>
<td>6/19/92 – 6/15/93</td>
<td>Provisional President and Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Bertrand Aristide</td>
<td>6/15/93 – 5/12/94</td>
<td>President recognized by Military Junta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Émile Jonassaint</td>
<td>6/11/94 – 10/12/94</td>
<td>Provisional President under Military Rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Bertrand Aristide</td>
<td>10/12/94 – 2/7/96</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>René Garcia Préval</td>
<td>2/7/96 –</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 25. Haiti: Prime Ministers, 1988–99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martial Celestine</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>René Garcia Préval</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Bazin</td>
<td>1992 – 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Malval</td>
<td>1993 – 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smark Michel</td>
<td>1994 – 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudette Werleigh</td>
<td>1995 – 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosny Smarth</td>
<td>1996 – 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— vacant —</td>
<td>1997 – 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques-Édouard Alexis</td>
<td>1999 –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Table 26. Haiti: Civil Jurisdictions and Government Institutions, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE BRANCH</th>
<th>EXECUTIVE BRANCH</th>
<th>THE JUDICIARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Court of Cassation (Supreme Court)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Senate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chamber of Deputies</td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent Electoral Council¹</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdepartmental Council</td>
<td></td>
<td>Delagates and Vice Delegates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departments (9 départements)</td>
<td>Departmental Assembly¹</td>
<td>Departmental Council¹</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities (133 communes)</td>
<td>Municipal Assembly¹</td>
<td>Municipal Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Sections (565 sections communales)</td>
<td>Communal Section Assembly¹</td>
<td>Communal Section Administrative Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Not yet formally in place.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and Territorial Collectivities</td>
<td>Jacques Édouard Alexis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development</td>
<td>François Séverin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>Gérald Germain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Culture</td>
<td>Jean-Robert Vaval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Economy and Finance</td>
<td>Fred Joseph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Environment</td>
<td>Yves Cadet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Fritz Longchamp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Haitians Living Overseas</td>
<td>Jean Généus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Justice and Public Safety</td>
<td>Camille Leblanc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of National Education, Youth, and Sports</td>
<td>Paul Antoine Bien-Aimé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Planning and External Cooperation</td>
<td>Anthony Dessources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Public Health and Population</td>
<td>Michaëlle Amédée Gédéon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Public Works, Transportation, and Communication</td>
<td>Max Alcé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Social Affairs</td>
<td>Mathilde Flambert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Women's Affairs</td>
<td>Nonie Mathieu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies


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Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)—A major United States foreign economic policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean enacted by the United States Congress as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act in 1984. The act was revised on August 20, 1990, and given an indefinite life. Primarily a trade promotion program, the CBI provides duty-free access to the United States market for some 3,000 products, provides expanded bilateral economic assistance, and allows some limited tax breaks for new United States investments in the region. The CBI has helped serve as a catalyst toward economic diversification in a number of Caribbean Basin countries.

Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom)—Caricom was formed in 1973 by the Treaty of Chaguaramas, signed in Trinidad, as a movement toward unity in the Caribbean. The Dominican Republic is an observer; Haiti was accepted as a full member in July 1997. The organization is headed by a Community Council of Ministers, which is responsible for developing strategic planning and coordination in the areas of economic integration, functional cooperation, and external relations.

colono(s)—As used in the Dominican Republic, refers to a small independent sugarcane grower. In other Latin American countries, the word usually designates a settler or a tenant farmer.

Dominican Republic peso (RD$)—Dominican monetary unit, divided into 100 centavos. The Dominican government officially maintained a one-to-one exchange rate between the peso and the United States dollar until 1985, when the peso was allowed to float freely against the dollar for most transactions. After experiments with multiple exchange rates, all rates were unified in 1997 on a free-market basis and at an initial rate of US$1 = RD$14. After Hurricane Georges, official rate dropped to US$1 = RD$15.46. Commercial rate was US$1 = RD$16 in October 1998.

fiscal year (FY)—The Dominican Republic's fiscal year is the calendar year, except in the case of the State Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal del Azúcar—CEA), which runs in the cycle of October 1 to September 30. Haiti's fiscal year is
the same as that of the United States government, running from October 1 to September 30. Fiscal year dates of reference for these two countries therefore correspond to the year in which the period ends. For example, FY 2000 began on October 1, 1999, and ends on September 30, 2000.

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)—The United States Generalized System of Preferences provides preferential duty-free entry for more than 4,650 products from some 140 beneficiary countries and territories. The program's intent is to foster economic growth by expanding trade between the United States and the developing GSP beneficiaries. Instituted January 1, 1976, the GSP authorization has been renewed by Congress a number of times since. The latest renewal occurred in December 1999.

gourde (G)—The Haitian monetary unit, divided into 100 centimes. The official exchange rate was originally set in 1919 at G5 = US$1. Political crises of the early 1990s, the international embargo, and the sharp drop in government revenues had reduced the value of the gourde by about 80 percent as of 1994. In 1999 the value of the gourde fluctuated between G17.5 and G18.3 to US$1.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure of the flow of domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods for final consumption and investment are included because the values of primary and intermediate production are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. See also gross national product.

gross national product (GNP)—The gross domestic product (q.v.) plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

industrial free zone(s)—Also known as free trade zones, or free
zones, these industrial parks play host to manufacturing firms that benefit from favorable business conditions extended by a given government in an effort to attract foreign investment and to create jobs. In the Dominican Republic, free-zone enterprises pay no duties on goods directly imported into, or exported from, the free zone. These enterprises also enjoy exemptions from Dominican taxes for up to twenty years, and they are allowed to pay workers less than the established minimum wage.

International Development Association (IDA)—See World Bank.

International Finance Corporation (IFC)—See World Bank.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations; it is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance-of-payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

latifundio—A piece of landed property, usually a great landed estate with primitive agriculture and labor, often in a state of partial servitude.

Lomé Convention—A series of agreements between the European Economic Community (EEC, subsequently the European Union—EU) and a group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states, mainly former European colonies, that provide duty-free or preferential access to the EEC market for almost all ACP exports. The Stabilization of Export Earnings (Stabex) scheme, a mechanism set up by the Lomé Convention, provides for compensation for ACP export earnings lost through fluctuations in the world prices of agricultural commodities. The Lomé Convention also provides for limited EEC development aid and investment funds to be disbursed to ACP recipients through the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank. The Lomé Convention has been updated every five years since Lomé I took effect on April 1, 1976. Lomé IV, which included the Dominican Republic and Haiti for the first time, entered into force in 1990 and was to cover the ten-year period 1990–99.
minifundio—A small landed estate (see latifundio).

Organization of American States (OAS)—Established by the Ninth International Conference of American States held in Bogotá on April 30, 1948, and effective since December 13, 1951. Has served as a major inter-American organization to promote regional peace and security as well as economic and social development in Latin America. Composed of thirty-five members, including most Latin American states and the United States and Canada. Determines common political, defense, economic, and social policies and provides for coordination of various inter-American agencies. Responsible for implementing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) when any threat to the security of the region arises.

Paris Club—The informal name for a consortium of Western creditor countries (Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States) that have made loans or guaranteed export credits to developing nations and that meet in Paris to discuss borrowers' ability to repay debts. Paris Club deliberations often result in the tendering of emergency loans to countries in economic difficulty or in the rescheduling of debts. Formed in October 1962, the organization has no formal or institutional existence. Its secretariat is run by the French treasury. It has a close relationship with the International Monetary Fund (q.v.), to which all of its members except Switzerland belong, as well as with the World Bank (q.v.) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The Paris Club is also known as the Group of Ten (G-10).

Public Law-480 (PL-480)—Law passed by the United States Congress in 1954 authorizing the shipment of surplus United States agricultural produce to nations in need in return for local currencies at advantageous rates. The local currencies have been used primarily to cover expenses of United States diplomatic installations overseas.

special drawing rights (SDRs)—Monetary units of the International Monetary Fund (q.v.) based on a basket of international currencies including the United States dollar, the German deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, the British pound sterling, and the French franc.

World Bank—Name used to designate a group of four affiliated
international institutions that provide advice on long-term finance and policy issues to developing countries: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less-developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The MIGA, which began operating in June 1988, insures private foreign investment in developing countries against such noncommercial risks as expropriation, civil strife, and inconvertibility. The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—q.v.).
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