



MCWP 2-10

---

# Intelligence Operations

---



U.S. Marine Corps

---

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

PCN 143 000036 01





# UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

6 October 2021


## FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-10, *Intelligence Operations*, builds on the doctrinal foundation established in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2, *Intelligence*. It provides tactics, techniques, and procedures for Marine air-ground task force intelligence operations. This publication is intended for commanders, intelligence consumers, and personnel who plan and execute intelligence operations. Force Design 2030 informs this update to doctrine with the intention that it be updated again in five years, as the Marine Corps of 2030 achieves initial operational capability and refines concepts through the campaign of learning.

MCWP 2-10 integrates lessons learned from nearly two decades of continuous combat operations, addresses operations across the competition continuum in mature and immature theaters, and incorporates key elements from the *Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations*. Readers can expect additional revisions driven by rapid advances in data analytics and experimentation using the expeditionary advanced base operations concept and a force designed and optimized for great power competition against pacing threats. By integrating new concepts and technologies, as well as lessons learned from future expeditionary advanced base operations experimentation or operational application, MCWP 2-10 will remain a relevant resource for preparing Marines to execute effective intelligence operations in support of the naval force.

This publication supersedes MCWP 2-10, *Intelligence Operations*, dated 10 September 2003 and cancels change 1 dated 4 April 2018 and erratum dated 2 May 2016.

Reviewed and approved this date.



MATTHEW G. RAU  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Director, Command Element, Intelligence Division

Publication Control Number: 143 000036 01

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



## Table of Contents

---

### Chapter 1. Fundamentals

Intelligence Objectives .....	1-1
Maneuver Warfare in the 21st Century .....	1-3
Naval Integration .....	1-5
Intelligence Support to Amphibious Operations and Distributed Maritime Operations .....	1-8
Developing Intelligence .....	1-9
Data, Information, and Intelligence .....	1-9
The Intelligence Cycle .....	1-10
Intelligence Operations .....	1-11
Relationship to Command and Control .....	1-12
Relationship to Operations .....	1-12
Principles of Intelligence Operations .....	1-13
Commander's Responsibility For Intelligence Operations .....	1-14
Focus the Intelligence Effort .....	1-14
Direct the Intelligence Cycle .....	1-14
Use Intelligence in Decision Making .....	1-14
Ensure Support for the Intelligence Effort .....	1-15
Evaluate the Results of Intelligence Activities .....	1-15
Intelligence Functions .....	1-15
Develop the Commander's Estimate .....	1-16
Develop the Situation .....	1-16
Provide Indications and Warning .....	1-16
Support Force Protection .....	1-16
Support Targeting .....	1-16
Support Combat Assessment .....	1-17
Intelligence Support to Operations in the Information Environment .....	1-17

---

### Chapter 2. Intelligence Support to Planning

Intelligence and the Marine Corps Planning Process .....	2-1
Developing the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and Intelligence Requirements .....	2-4
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace .....	2-4
Intelligence Requirements .....	2-5
Priority Intelligence Requirements .....	2-6
Characteristics .....	2-6
Commander's Critical Information Requirements .....	2-7

Problem Framing .....	2-7
Course of Action Development .....	2-7
Course of Action War Game .....	2-8
Course of Action Comparison and Decision .....	2-9
Orders Development .....	2-9
Transition .....	2-9
Execution .....	2-10
Resource Allocation .....	2-11
Generating Tempo .....	2-11

---

## Chapter 3. Intelligence Operations

Planning and Direction .....	3-3
Intelligence Requirements Management .....	3-3
Support to Targeting .....	3-4
Collection .....	3-5
Collection Requirements Management .....	3-5
Collections Operations Management .....	3-8
Processing and Exploitation .....	3-14
Processing .....	3-14
Exploitation .....	3-14
Production .....	3-15
Analytical Process .....	3-15
Levels of Production .....	3-16
Dissemination .....	3-16
Form .....	3-17
Delivery .....	3-18
Utilization .....	3-19
Common Operational Picture and Common Intelligence Picture .....	3-19
Feedback .....	3-20

---

## Chapter 4. Concept of MAGTF Intelligence Support

Role of the Organic Intelligence Section .....	4-2
Unit Intelligence Officer .....	4-3
Unit Intelligence Section .....	4-3
Required Capabilities .....	4-4
The Marine Air-ground Task Force Intelligence Section .....	4-4
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Officer .....	4-4
Special Staff Officers under the Cognizance of the MAGTF G-2/S-2 Officer .....	4-6

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Capabilities .....	4-10
Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Level Intelligence Organizations .....	4-10
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Capabilities Employment .....	4-14
Intelligence Coordination .....	4-14
Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group .....	4-14
Intelligence Task Organization .....	4-19
Expeditionary Intelligence Nodes .....	4-19
Disaggregated Intelligence Operations .....	4-20
Intelligence Direct Support Teams .....	4-20
External Intelligence Support to the Marine Air-ground Task Force .....	4-20
Marine Corps Component Command Intelligence Section .....	4-20
National, Theater, Joint, and Coalition Intelligence Support to the MAGTF .....	4-22
National Intelligence Community .....	4-22
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Access to External Support .....	4-26
Required Capabilities .....	4-26
Augmentation, Reachback, and Enabler Support .....	4-27
Marine Corps Supporting Establishment .....	4-27
Headquarters, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Information, Intelligence Division .....	4-28
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Command Element-Intelligence Division .....	4-28
Program Manager, Intelligence Systems, Marine Corps Systems Command .....	4-29
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory .....	4-29
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity .....	4-29
Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion .....	4-30
Marine Corps Intelligence Schools .....	4-30
G-2, Marine Forces Special Operations Command .....	4-30
Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group .....	4-30
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One .....	4-31
Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group .....	4-31
Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups .....	4-31
Marine Corps Reserve .....	4-31
Intelligence Support Battalion .....	4-32

---

## Chapter 5. Joint and Multinational Operations

Joint Force Commander and Component Commander Responsibilities .....	5-2
Joint Intelligence Operations Center .....	5-2
Joint Intelligence Support Elements .....	5-2
Special Operations Forces Liaison Element .....	5-2
Marine Corps Component Command Headquarters or MAGTF Command Element as a Joint Task Force Headquarters .....	5-3

Fleet Marine Force and Joint Force Maritime Component Command ..... 5-3  
    Maritime Operations Center ..... 5-3  
Procedures ..... 5-4  
Marine Intelligence Section and Unit Responsibilities ..... 5-4  
    Multinational Operations ..... 5-4

**Abbreviations and Acronyms**

**Terms and Definitions**

**References and Related Publications**

# CHAPTER 1. FUNDAMENTALS

*We hear, ‘intelligence drives operations’, more often on today’s battlefield than any other expression—it emphasizes the criticality of military intelligence in the 21st century. Yet today that phrase is inadequate. ‘Intelligence is operations’ more accurately describes the symbiotic relationship between intelligence and operations that successful military actions require. Decisive knowledge at the point of action demands full integration of intelligence with operations across all echelons of command. Segregating these elements, either physically or procedurally, is no longer acceptable . . . Whether supporting . . . engagement, counterinsurgency, or conventional regional conflict, information technology and the abilities of the small unit have changed the nature of MAGTF [Marine air-ground task force] intelligence operations. We must ensure that we optimize . . . to operate under these conditions across the full range of military operations.*

—Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart, USMC  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (2015–2017)

The Marine Corps views intelligence as a fundamental component of command and control (C2), inseparable from operations in all environments and domains. One of the warfighting functions outlined in Marine Corps doctrine, intelligence is—at its core—the effort to identify, understand, and anticipate those mission-related factors that lie beyond friendly control. Marines can also look at intelligence as a commodity of value throughout the competition continuum, a body of knowledge from which decision makers can draw to better understand their environment, as well as the capabilities and intentions of their enemies or any other potential parties to a conflict. In any fight, both combatants must work within the complexities and constraints imposed by the weather and the terrain, and even the winners can usually achieve, at best, only temporary control over their opposition. Marines must, therefore, seek to understand those influences they cannot command so they operate more effectively with, around, and against these influences to accomplish their assigned missions.

---

## INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

There is no such thing as absolute certainty. The fog and friction of war will never allow a perfect picture of the operational environment. In the context of each mission, some factors are more important than others, however. Intelligence must fight to collect information about an enemy that is actively trying to keep it from us. Therefore, intelligence efforts focus limited assets on the commander’s intelligence requirements (IRs), trying to manage uncertainty in specific, defined areas by collecting essential information, placing it in the proper context to create knowledge, and conveying it as intelligence in a form that promotes understanding in time to support mission-critical decisions.

Intelligence has two basic complementary objectives. First, intelligence provides accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the enemy (or potential enemy) and the surrounding environment. In other words, the primary objective of intelligence is to support decision making by reducing uncertainty about the hostile situation to a reasonable level—recognizing, of course, that the fog of war renders anything close to absolute certainty impossible. The second intelligence objective is “protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence [CI]” (Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication [MCDP] 2, *Intelligence*). Uncertainty permeates the battlespace and is an attribute of all military activities. Intelligence supports the commander’s decision-making process by validating planning assumptions and by addressing key uncertainties about the situation and the environment. Intelligence accomplishes the following:

- Identifies and evaluates the threat’s existing conditions and capabilities.
- Estimates and anticipates possible enemy courses of action (COAs).
- Assists in identifying friendly critical vulnerabilities.
- Assists in developing and evaluating friendly COAs.

Counterintelligence, as the complementary side of the intelligence effort, is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, or sabotage conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. Counterintelligence supports the protection of friendly forces by identifying friendly vulnerabilities to terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and assists in developing appropriate plans to enhance a unit’s posture against these threats.

Counterintelligence activities consist of active and passive measures, functions, and services that support the four missions of CI:

- Countering espionage, international terrorism, and the CI insider threat
- Providing support to force protection
- Providing support to defense critical infrastructure
- Providing support to research, development, and acquisition to—
  - ♦ Deny adversaries and enemies information they can use to increase the effectiveness of hostile operations against friendly forces.
  - ♦ Detect and neutralize foreign intelligence collection.
  - ♦ Deceive the enemy/adversary as to friendly capabilities and intentions.

Counterintelligence, in conjunction with military information support operations, military deception, and other operations in the information environment (OIE), can magnify the effects of uncertainty on the enemy’s decision-making process, thereby contributing to the success of friendly operations.

---

## MANEUVER WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

To prevail in combat, Marines must be able to operate in unstable, often chaotic environments. War is a violent clash of independent wills, each trying to impose itself on the other, creating friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and complexity. These characteristics, combined with the various dimensions of human nature, make war a fundamentally unpredictable activity. The Marine Corps' philosophy for winning under these conditions is based on rapid, flexible, and opportune maneuver. As stated in MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, "Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope." Maneuver warfare requires maneuver in multiple domains, not just time and space, to achieve superiority over the enemy. Maneuver warfare concentrates on those actions that present the enemy with a series of dilemmas wherein events unfold unexpectedly and more rapidly than the enemy can respond. This is reinforced by MCDP 1-4, *Competing*:

*Marines can use maneuver warfare principles to great effect in competition. We still seek to achieve our goals in a flexible and opportunistic way. We seek to achieve a relative tempo advantage so that we gain the initiative. Marines' in-depth understanding of the OODA [observe, orient, decide, act] loop is relevant everywhere on the competition continuum. Marines should not seek to re-invent maneuver warfare for competition but rather think through how it can be applied across the competition continuum (and not just to the continuum's subset that deals with war and the various forms of warfare).*

While warfighting doctrine focuses on traditional conflict, the principles of maneuver warfare apply equally across the competition continuum. Conflict often involves enemies who live among the civilian population or employ unconventional tactics. Maneuver warfare concepts, enabled through intelligence integration, are essential to separating the enemy from the populace and defeating the enemy system. Concepts central to executing maneuver warfare include—

- *Orienting on the Enemy*. Maneuver warfare attacks the enemy "system," the combination of physical, moral, and mental components that make up an enemy or an enemy force. This means all commanders and echelons' staff members focus outward on the particular characteristics of the enemy, communicate concisely, and develop coherent COAs or assessments derived from collaborative study of enemy tactics and options. Further, "[o]rienting on the competitor is fundamental to successful competition. We develop our understanding of the competitor's system and then exploit the weaknesses we find in it." (MCDP 1-4)
- *Center of Gravity*. The center of gravity (COG) is a concept used to focus planning on deconstructing the system around, or sometimes directly against, the source of power that provides an organization with moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to resist. Critical vulnerabilities are components of the enemy system that are crucial to the continued functioning of that source of power and are thus vulnerable to exploitation. Identifying an enemy's COG and critical vulnerabilities helps planners focus the friendly force's combat power toward a decisive objective or goal to achieve the commander's desired end state.
- *Main Effort*. The main effort is a designated unit whose mission is, at any given point in time, the most critical to overall mission accomplishment. The main effort is usually weighted with

the preponderance of combat power or other supporting capabilities. The main effort is also directed when and where it has the best opportunity to succeed and focused on the objective that will have the most significant effect on the enemy, typically a critical vulnerability.

- *Commander's Intent*. Commander's intent is the commander's clear and concise expression of the purpose of the task assigned during a mission or operation. It provides continuing guidance when the tactical situation changes and permits taking initiative in harmony with the commander's desires.
- *Mission Type Orders*. Mission type orders assign subordinates tasks without dictating how they are to be accomplished, enabling subordinates to exercise initiative while adapting to ever-changing situations.
- *Tempo*. Tempo is relative to the enemy and seeks to keep them off balance by capitalizing on uncertainty and subjecting them to increased friction. Speed, initiative, and flexibility all help generate and maintain a tempo the enemy cannot match.

Timely and accurate intelligence is a prerequisite for success in maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare requires keeping a firm focus on the enemy and taking action to avoid the enemy's strengths while exploiting critical vulnerabilities. It requires decisions and actions based on accurate situational awareness. Marines must be able to maintain a constant, realistic tactical picture, including the friendly and threat situations, as well as the terrain and other relevant information. Intelligence helps manage uncertainty by improving the decision maker's understanding of the enemy situation and the operational environment, allowing the commander to—

- Identify opportunities for success.
- Assess risk.
- Outline intent.
- Make decisions.
- Issue mission type orders that—
  - ♦ Provide focus.
  - ♦ Generate speed and tempo.
  - ♦ Achieve decisive results.

Uncertainty, like risk, will always pervade military operations. Therefore, the key to managing uncertainty lies not only in trying to reduce the levels as much as possible, but in understanding when, where, and how a targeted reduction will provide the greatest possible advantage. The aim is to provide significant, usable insight at the right time and place. In the age of big data analytics, this can be implemented using dashboards. Dashboards use a prepared set of parameters to generate a quick-access display containing the most current data about specific areas of interest. After regular use of a data analytics package, the commander will develop a set of preferred data visualizations that will be used repeatedly. This concept still applies to analog techniques for displaying the right information at the lowest echelons of command and control. The real work is in becoming familiar with the dashboard before it is used in combat operations. Decision making can become more accurate and expedient by tailoring toolsets to exactly what is needed—no more and no less.


The Marine Corps annually assesses capabilities, priorities, long-range vision, and the future operational environment to drive updates to these concepts. Within an ever more complex operational environment, detailed and robust multi-disciplined intelligence operations are essential to mission success. Future Marine Corps warfighting concepts focus on key drivers changing how we organize, train, and equip the Marine Corps to execute the assigned functions, roles, and responsibilities. These key drivers highlight the rapid modernization, globalization, and diplomatic complexities that force constant innovation in the way we fight.

### **Naval Integration**

To effectively integrate with the Navy, the Marine Corps, including its intelligence professionals, must understand the Navy's approach to warfighting; C2 methods and architecture; terminology; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Naval integration is at the core of current and future warfighting philosophies such as the employment of Marine forces in geographically distributed areas in a contested environment. Further, Marines must understand the Navy officer in tactical command (OTC) "may implement a composite warfare organization whenever and to whatever extent required, depending upon the composition and mission of the force and the capabilities of the adversary." (Navy Warfighting Publication 3-56, *Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of War.*)

This allows the OTC to decentralize execution by assigning command functions to warfare commanders, functional group commanders, and coordinators. This is often associated with the phrase "command by negation" and provides the subordinate warfare commanders freedom to plan and conduct their own operations within the boundaries and authorities provided. If the OTC and composite warfare commander (CWC) feel those boundaries or authorities are exceeded, they retain the authority to negate any particular action by the warfare commanders. Within the CWC construct, the N-2 (Navy intelligence) is responsible for providing analysis and operational intelligence to the CWC, warfare commanders, and functional group commanders.

Both the N-2 and the Marine intelligence officer must also integrate and coordinate with and through the information warfare commander (IWC). The IWC (see figure: *Information Warfare Commander Construct*) is responsible to the CWC to create effects and operationally desirable conditions to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the enemy's or adversary's decision making while protecting friendly forces and to assess the information environment to support warfare commanders' objectives in accordance with CWC direction. The IWC accomplishes this mission by understanding and aligning resources, synchronizing and coordinating with subordinate capability areas (including intelligence), and coordinating with the other warfare commanders.



**Figure 1-1. Information Warfare Commander Construct**

The IWC will host information warfare working groups and synchronization meetings. The G-2/S-2 (Marine intelligence) must participate in these meetings to ensure Marine Corps intelligence equities are included in OIE/information warfare operations. For example, working groups will discuss topics such as emissions control and signature management. The G-2/S-2 must consider the degree and length of time that emissions control will be set because it can impact collection capability and the ability to fuse or share data. The S-2 must communicate these actions' impacts when answering the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and building the Marine Corps commander's intelligence picture. The Marine Corps commander can then decide to accept the risk or work an exception or alternate COA with the IWC. The G-2/S-2 must also understand the communication/intelligence architecture (Navy and Marine Corps) to fully understand impacts to collection and analysis. This includes knowing the ways in which the ship or ground sites actively receive data, redundancies in pathways, or abilities to passively receive data. While attending information warfare working groups, G-2/S-2 should also consider prioritized users and data requirements and be able to provide that information to the Navy information professionals (similar to Marine Corps communication officers) who can incorporate those requirements into bandwidth management plans. Although not all encompassing, this paragraph discusses some considerations when the G-2/S-2 attends the information warfare working groups. More importantly, however, this illustrates why the G-2/S-2 must participate in these forums.

Intelligence professionals must also understand how the Navy communicates, promulgates guidance, and its associated terminology. Tactical-level commanders have, at their disposal, different means of tasking their forces. Communication is conveyed through both verbal and nonverbal means. One method for communication is record message traffic. The operation general (OPGEN) and various operational tasking (OPTASK) messages provide written direction from the OTC, CWC, warfare commanders, functional group commanders, and coordinators; they are

foundational references for all tactical commanders. The OPGEN and OPTASK messages provide essential planning and tactical guidance to Navy tactical-level forces and are typically developed as part of the far- and mid-horizon planning. The OPTASK INTEL message allows a force commander to promulgate detailed tasking and instructions for all aspects of intelligence support. The force commander promulgates the message to all subordinate units and commanders, units, and agencies supporting and supported by the force. In addition, the tactical-level commanders may choose to utilize a daily intentions message (DIM). The DIM is defined as an unformatted message with an immediate impact on operations, intended to convey direction from the latest iteration of the commander's decision cycle. The DIM is issued at operational and tactical levels of command to amplify or modify information contained in orders, OPGENs, OPTASKs, and their supplements. (Navy Warfighting Publication 5-01, *Navy Planning*) The G-2/S-2 should be familiar with these types of communications and their contents in order to understand Navy intentions, guidance, and parameters for an area of responsibility or operation.

In addition to the general understanding of Navy warfighting, structure, and communications, the G-2/S-2 will need to understand detailed knowledge of Navy collection and analysis capabilities on ship or available in the area of responsibility. The G-2/S-2 will also need to share Marine Corps collection and analysis capabilities with the IWC, N-2, and N-2 personnel. Integration with the N-2 should involve, at a minimum, presence in their daily update briefs. Integration is a person-to-person job that requires Marines of any rank to know and connect with individuals with whom they are working. A best practice is to co-locate N-2 and G-2/S-2 personnel in the same physical space, whether that be in the joint information center on the ship or in an office at the maritime operations center (MOC). If unable to share or gain access to one another's physical spaces, intelligence professionals should request access to online portals to facilitate information sharing and support. A mutual understanding of collection and analysis capabilities is pertinent to operations across the competition continuum. With this knowledge, the N-2 and G-2/S-2 can understand and prioritize IRs, plan and execute collections, and analyze/produce/disseminate intelligence to decision-makers.

During an amphibious operation, the landing force can contribute to the success of the overall landing by isolating the landing area, reconnoitering coastal and inland defenses, deceiving the enemy, neutralizing or destroying targets protected from attack by other means, and denying areas to the enemy. However, this is only possible if the Marine Corps intelligence section is integrated into the naval intelligence section. Naval integration is just as important as operations-intelligence integration. Products necessary to support an amphibious landing include, but are not limited to—

- Beach, airport, and seaport studies.
- Trafficability/route studies.
- Hydrographic studies (to include sea states).
- Threat assessments (e.g., likelihood of mines, patterns of life of enemy and civilian populations, shipping patterns).
- Weather conditions (produced by meteorological and oceanographic [METOC]) and impacts.
- Line of sight studies.
- Audio detection/noise propagation study (produced by METOC, S-6, or radio battalion).
- Landward and seaward obstacle intelligence in the littoral and/or amphibious operations area.

### **Intelligence Support to Amphibious Operations and Distributed Maritime Operations**

During amphibious operations, the Navy and Marine Corps sustain a supporting/supported relationship between the commander, amphibious task force and the commander, landing force. At the most basic level, the Marine Corps requires naval support during the movement and action phase. Intelligence planners must also realize support to amphibious operations requires an understanding of maritime warfare. To this end, Marines must understand the fight can start at embarkation, or through OIE capabilities from littorals to support sea denial.

Amphibious operations are complex military operations. The joint intelligence support element (JISE) or joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) will secure theater and national level intelligence support for the amphibious force and provide direct intelligence support to amphibious force components. As discussed in JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*, amphibious operations differ from other military operations because of the significant challenges posed by relatively fewer amphibious force intelligence assets in the operational area during the planning phase, a heavy initial reliance on national and theater collection assets, the transition of command and control ashore, and in the case of a withdrawal, transition from ashore to afloat.

In the future, Marines will be employed as a widely disbursed, mutually supporting force and provide a unified framework for Navy-Marine Corps innovation, emphasizing fighting and gaining sea control. Further, in the future operating environment, the Marine Corps will be required to rapidly respond to changing environments made more complex by adaptive enemies/adversaries. Decentralized decision making and distributed forces become key to maintaining and maximizing the commander's ability to employ forces across the depth and breadth of a nonlinear battlespace. Operations in a contested environment widen the aperture from the amphibious force to the fleet. Integrating naval intelligence is essential for synchronized fleet operations across the competition continuum and to contribute to the joint campaign effectively.

Deploying Marines in small decentralized elements across vast areas of operations allows them to maneuver throughout maritime environments while complicating enemy targeting of friendly forces and allows the Marine Corps to support the Navy as they gain and maintain sea control. The ability to disseminate intelligence and communicate over vast distances will be key to supporting distributed and disaggregated operation. During these types of operations, the Marine Corps will employ organic airborne and maritime sensing capabilities or leverage theater and national level assets to create a truly persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. This will afford commanders and other decision makers increased time and space to make decisions and increase battlespace awareness throughout the area of operations.

The following intelligence capabilities are required to support amphibious operations and distributed operations ashore and afloat:

- Redundant intelligence capabilities to support non-mutually supporting positions.
- Coordinated cross-agency intelligence support at the joint, national, and theater level.
- Integration with higher, adjacent, and subordinate Marine Corps and joint intelligence sections.
- Interoperable information systems that provide timely dissemination of information for amphibious planning, rehearsals, and execution.
- Information management systems, to include C2 applications and collaborative information sharing, to coordinate collection and dissemination efforts.


- Standoff collection assets capable of satisfying amphibious assault force and landing force requirements from over the horizon.
- Intelligence dissemination systems linking widely dispersed forces afloat and ashore.
- Flexible intelligence assets capable of rapid transition ashore with minimal support degradation.

## DEVELOPING INTELLIGENCE

### Data, Information, and Intelligence

Intelligence, when viewed as a commodity, is more than an element of data or a grouping of information; it is a body of knowledge with a specific purpose. Knowledge occupies a unique place in the information hierarchy, which is a framework to distinguish between various classes of information (see figure: *Information Hierarchy*).

*Note:* Information, within this context, is separate from OIE and speaks to information as facts provided or learned about someone or something.



**Figure 1-2. Information Hierarchy**

There is a clear and important distinction between raw data, information, and intelligence. Intelligence is not a mass of unfocused data or a collection of related facts. Giving commanders every piece of available data can magnify the effects of uncertainty by overloading them with irrelevant, incomplete, or contradictory information. Access to increasing quantities of raw data also poses a significant challenge for big data analysis. To be considered intelligence, data must be focused and placed in context. Intelligence is developed by analyzing and synthesizing data and information to produce knowledge about the threat and the environment. The commander combines this knowledge with knowledge of the friendly and enemy situation and employs experience, judgment, and intuition to understand the situation. The commander then applies this understanding to make decisions. Intelligence is the output of a process to convert data and information into knowledge tailored to a specific military decision. The process used to develop intelligence is called the intelligence cycle (planning and direction, collection, processing and

exploitation, production, dissemination, and utilization). This cycle is a series of actions by which required information is identified, obtained, assembled, converted through analysis into intelligence that is provided to decision makers, and ultimately used to inform decisions. In this era of big data analytics and migration to the cloud, speed generates decisive advantage. This concept applies to the intelligence cycle and the capability to conduct multiple modeling and simulation iterations over a short period of time, with large amounts of data, to render knowledge into understanding.

Activity-based intelligence methods integrate large volumes of multidiscipline, multi-domain data to establish and maintain a baseline that reveals patterns and anomalous behavior, identifies gaps in knowledge to drive further collection, and provides a real-time understanding of the operational environment. Activity-based intelligence is found in the capabilities-based assessment for intelligence and can be viewed as a spiral process of intelligence fusion within the intelligence cycle for big data analytics.

---

## THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The intelligence cycle consists of a series of related activities that translate the need for intelligence about a particular aspect of the operational environment or threat into a knowledge-based product the commander uses in the decision-making process. In this sequence, intelligence needs are identified; a plan is developed to satisfy these needs; and data is collected, processed into information, and converted into intelligence through analysis and synthesis. The resulting knowledge is then provided to the commander as an intelligence product to assist planning or inform decisions. The information used to produce intelligence is derived from a variety of sources. Automation and machine learning can be applied to steps throughout the cycle to augment intelligence specialists. This enables analysts to manage larger quantities of data at higher rates, achieving an aggregate increase in the decision cycle tempo.

Intelligence information (i.e., information used to generate intelligence through the process of analysis) is commonly drawn from three types of data—intelligence data, sensor data, and combat data—described as follows:

- Intelligence data is derived from assets primarily dedicated to intelligence collection (e.g., imagery, electronic intercept, human intelligence [HUMINT] sources).
- Sensor data is derived from manned and unmanned systems used for reconnaissance, surveillance, or target acquisition (e.g., air surveillance radar, counterbattery radar, unmanned aircraft systems [UASs], remote ground sensors).
- Combat data is derived from reporting by subordinate, adjacent, or other friendly units.

Because of its highly perishable and critical nature, combat and sensor data is sometimes used to inform decisionmaking through an abridged or compressed version of the intelligence cycle, wherein target system analysis (TSA), risk analysis, or other applicable intelligence production activity takes place prior to collecting certain IRs. This body of analytical work not only drives intelligence collection and other ongoing operations, but it also provides context. This allows commanders to

make rapid, informed decisions once the appropriate indicators are observed. Although the demands of the ongoing battle may require rapid action, making decisions based solely upon raw, partially analyzed data or single pieces of information should be avoided whenever possible.

Processing data and information into intelligence can be accomplished rapidly at all levels. Decision makers require knowledge—useful, focused, evaluated intelligence—to enhance their situational understanding. The intelligence cycle works continuously to satisfy knowledge shortfalls and to confirm or refute fragmentary information. The process is complete only when the relevant knowledge has been applied to command decision making (see table: *Key Considerations of the Intelligence Cycle*).

Information is analyzed to determine its significance and then synthesized with other relevant information to build a coherent picture of existing conditions. Analysts then produce an intelligence estimate by predicting probable future environmental conditions or enemy actions and conveys these results to the commander. Because we usually understand situations best as images, intelligence should be produced and disseminated in graphic form whenever possible.

**Table 1-1. Key Considerations of the Intelligence Cycle**

<b>Intelligence Cycle</b>	<b>Key Considerations</b>
Planning and direction	Plan intelligence operations and activities Support the commander in formulating an estimate of the situation
Collection	Develop the required intelligence structure Use organic, attached, and supporting intelligence sources to collect intelligence
Processing, exploitation, and production	Convert raw data and information into a suitable form of intelligence
Dissemination	Provide timely intelligence in an appropriate form to those who need it
Utilization	Use of intelligence

---

## INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Intelligence operations, by definition, consist of various intelligence and CI tasks that are carried out by intelligence organizations and activities within the intelligence process. This supports decision making down to the small-unit level. Tactical intelligence (i.e., intelligence that supports planning and conducting tactical actions) is typically the primary focus of Marine Corps intelligence operations. Despite this focus, Marine planners must nevertheless draw upon both strategic and operational intelligence resources and, in certain circumstances, be prepared to conduct intelligence operations at the operational and strategic levels. Intelligence operations support the decision-making process by—

- Describing the operational environment in all domains.
- Identifying key factors in the operational environment that can influence operations.
- Establishing and maintaining a multi-domain baseline of the operational environment.
- Defining and evaluating threat capabilities.

- Identifying the enemy's COG and critical vulnerabilities.
- Assessing enemy intentions.

### **Relationship to Command and Control**

Intelligence is a warfighting function that enables command and control. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (*DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, hereafter referred to as *DOD Dictionary*) Intelligence operations support command and control by helping commanders understand the operational environment and threat, thus enabling sound and timely decisions. Within a continuous, effective intelligence effort, the commander also receives quality feedback about the unfolding situation; this feedback allows the commander to modify the unit's actions and aggressively exploit opportunities to out-pace the enemy.

Intelligence requires command involvement. The commander focuses the intelligence effort by defining the mission, articulating the commander's intent, and designating priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Priority intelligence requirements often seek to validate planning assumptions and are the subset of the CCIRs focused on the enemy or environmental impacts. Both PIRs and CCIRs are defined and discussed in chapter 2.

### **Relationship to Operations**

Intelligence operations are often the initial operations conducted during a mission. This may involve tasking other agencies or units to collect IRs or employing reconnaissance as a tactical action. Intelligence drives operational planning and execution by supplying insight into the many factors a commander considers when making a decision. Specifically, intelligence—

- Identifies potential opportunities offered by the environment or threat activities.
- Describes limitations imposed by the environment.
- Ascertains and assesses enemy strengths to be avoided.
- Uncovers enemy critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
- Recommends COAs based on factors about the operational environment and threats.
- Validates assumptions made about the enemy/adversary and the environment during planning.
- Supports rapid decision making to generate and maintain tempo.

Operational decisions develop logically from intelligence. A commander and staff provided with effective intelligence understand the terrain, weather conditions, composition and status of the infrastructure, makeup and attitude of the population, and the combined influence of these effects on military operations. Intelligence provides knowledge of the threat's capabilities, strengths, COG, and critical vulnerabilities, and insight into key actors' intents. Integrating intelligence about the threat and the operational environment with knowledge about friendly objectives, plans, and operations provides the commander true situational understanding that can then help determine the decisive time and place to act. Intelligence must be integrated throughout the planning, execution, and assessment stages. It identifies situational changes that may require modifying plans or that may alter or trigger decisions. Still, the nature of the mission and the concept of operations focus and shape the intelligence effort. Irrelevant and unutilized intelligence wastes time, effort, and resources. Intelligence operations and IRs must be continually reevaluated to ensure they are focused on, and useful to, the mission.

---

## PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) intelligence operations are conducted in accordance with the following principles:

- *Produce Tactical Intelligence.* Marine Corps intelligence operations focus on generating tactical intelligence. However, there are no clear boundaries between levels of intelligence; they merge and form a spectrum. In some instances, Marine Corps tactical intelligence operations support operational and strategic IRs.
- *Intelligence Drives Operations.* The Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy depends on timely, accurate intelligence early in the planning process. Therefore, intelligence operations planning and intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) must proactively establish situational awareness across all domains through ISR operations.
- *Intelligence Activities Require Centralized Management.* Valuable intelligence results from integrating many separate, often specialized, efforts and resources. The scarcity of some assets, coupled with the requirement to focus on the commander's PIRs, creates a need for centralized coordination and management. At the MAGTF level, this centralized coordination occurs within the command element (CE), under the direction of personnel who are trained and experienced in multidiscipline, all-source intelligence operations management. Centralized coordination and management should not be confused with centralized control. Whereas centralized control implies all decisions about collection are made through a single entity, centralized coordination and management means each element conducts and coordinates its own collection assets, while ensuring its collection plan is nested in the higher overall collection and production plans and completes adjacent plans.
- *G-2/S-2 Facilitates Using Intelligence.* The intelligence officer is the principal advisor to the commander on all matters related to command intelligence and intelligence processes. The intelligence officer identifies, implements, and manages activities required to address the commander's intelligence and CI requirements. Additionally, the intelligence officer is an invaluable participant in the commander's decision-making process, ensuring intelligence is effectively utilized throughout all phases of mission planning, execution, and assessment. The intelligence officer accomplishes this by educating and training the staff about intelligence processes; advising the staff by explaining sensor capabilities and limitations; and disseminating intelligence to higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting commands.
- *Intelligence Must be Tailored and Timely.* Intelligence must be tailored to mission requirements, provided in a useful format, and received in time to influence decision making. The goal of dissemination is to deliver the right intelligence—not simply data or information—to the right personnel at the right time.
- *Intelligence Must be Utilized and Feedback Provided.* Intelligence has no inherent value; its benefit is realized through the decisions and activities it supports. The intelligence cycle is not complete until it has been applied to operational planning or execution.

---

## COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Although gathering intelligence is a team effort, the responsibility for directing intelligence activities (collection, analysis, and intelligence production) rests with the commander. The commander must be personally involved in the intelligence process and provide both general and specific guidance. Additionally, the process through which the command's collection efforts will be integrated to satisfy supported commanders' IRs must also be considered. Command, intelligence, and operations are inseparable processes, dependent on one another for success. The commander uses his/her intent to scope the IRs and provide guidance, direction, and prioritization to the intelligence section. This is a continual process during which the commander must assess the effectiveness of collections and adjust planning efforts as new information becomes available. Feedback is used to assess and further facilitate the intelligence section's ability to provide required intelligence. Commanders must understand both the theory and the practice of intelligence work, just as they must understand the other warfighting functions (maneuver, fires, command and control, information, force protection, and logistics).

### Focus the Intelligence Effort

Effective intelligence operations are guided by two critical elements: the commander's intent and PIRs. The intelligence effort must be focused on clearly articulated priorities, which drive intelligence support and the associated collection, production, and dissemination efforts.

### Direct the Intelligence Cycle

Although the intelligence officer coordinates the unit's intelligence effort, the commander remains responsible for its success or failure. Effective leaders must understand the capabilities and limitations of intelligence personnel, equipment, procedures, and products. Unit leadership must drive the intelligence cycle by providing guidance and direction at key points to ensure the effort adheres to the commander's intent (e.g., the commander must define the IPB effort's scope and focus, identify the preferred intelligence product format, and establish priorities among the command's IRs).

### Use Intelligence in Decision Making

The most significant purpose of intelligence operations is to support the commander's decision-making process. The commander makes an informed assessment based on the intelligence officer's assessment, is provided products and explanations as to how the intelligence officer arrived at this assessment, and arrives at an overall estimate of the situation that serves as the basis for all command decisions. This act remains the responsibility of solely the commander. The intelligence officer must ensure decision makers at all levels have access to intelligence products and share a common understanding of their significance.

### Ensure Support for the Intelligence Effort

Through the intelligence officer, the commander integrates MAGTF supporting elements with collection assets and other intelligence resources into a unified effort. Intelligence operations using organic assets require support from throughout the command. For example, reconnaissance teams must be inserted and resupplied throughout their mission, and fires and other appropriate agencies must be aware of their position, plans, and requirements. This effort will likely require

MAGTF aviation, communications, fires, and logistics support to coordinate through the CE staff. Commanders must ensure every Marine in the unit understands the unit’s intelligence priorities and plans to conduct and support the intelligence effort. Commanders and staffs must also be prepared to request or coordinate external support when requirements exceed the MAGTF’s organic capabilities. The intelligence staff may execute the actions necessary to arrange or obtain support for the unit but does so on behalf of the commander.

**Evaluate the Results of Intelligence Activities**

The commander must provide feedback to the intelligence cycle. Through feedback, the intelligence team identifies strengths and deficiencies within their intelligence processes. Key areas for evaluation include product content, focus, clarity, timeliness, accuracy, and overall usefulness. The commander’s evaluation serves as the basis for the intelligence effort’s continual adjustment and improvement and should incorporate measures of performance and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) when possible.

---

**INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS**

Intelligence operations in the MAGTF are divided into six functional areas: develop the commander’s estimate, develop the situation, provide indications and warning (I&W), support force protection, support targeting, and support combat assessment. All six functions occur continually at all levels throughout the force, although particular functions may receive more emphasis at certain points during an operation. Different units may also emphasize one or two functions over the others based on their individual missions. The table *Relationship Between Intelligence Functions and Operations* displays the intelligence functions and their relationship to decision making and operations.

**Table 1-2. Relationship Between Intelligence Functions and Operations**

Intelligence Functions	Decision Making	Operational Activities
Develop the commander’s estimate	Plan a mission	Develop and analyze COAs
Develop the situation	Execute the mission	Monitor execution Modify plan as necessary
Provide indications and warning	Orient on contingencies	Increase readiness Develop contingency plans
Support force protection	Employ preventive measures	Support operations security CBRN defense Support deception plan
Support targeting	Plan fire support	Attack targets
Support combat assessment	Reorient forces Plan future operations	Consolidate, pursue, exploit Re-attack targets
Legend		
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear		

**Develop the Commander's Estimate**

Intelligence helps form and modify the commander's estimate by providing assessments of the threat and operational environment. A principal example is the IPB, which is a staff process involving the systematic, continuous evaluation of the threat and environment. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace helps the commander and staff understand, for example, the area of operations and its characteristics, the enemy's capabilities, and potential COAs. This knowledge affords commanders an appreciation of the risks they must accept or seek to mitigate, as well as their units' most favorable opportunities to exploit critical enemy vulnerabilities.

**Develop the Situation**

Situation development requires continuous, timely knowledge of unfolding events. It is a dynamic process used to assess the current situation and confirm or negate the adoption of specific enemy COAs. Successful situation development refines our understanding of the operational environment throughout planning and execution and provides a basis for managing uncertainty and risk, adapting plans, and exploiting opportunities.

**Provide Indications and Warning**

Indications and warning efforts detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information when potential, impending threat activity exists. Indications and warning assists in preventing surprise and allows a unit to manage risk from threat actions running contrary to friendly planning assumptions.

**Support Force Protection**

Force protection efforts involve preventive measures taken to mitigate the effects of hostile actions against friendly resources, facilities, and critical information. Intelligence supports force protection by identifying, locating, and countering threat activities. Such threat activities may include targeting/engagement, intelligence collection, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism. Support to force protection requires detailed and accurate assessments of threat capabilities and intentions and facilitates efforts to deny the enemy the opportunity to take offensive action against friendly forces.

**Support Targeting**

Intelligence efforts support targeting by—

- Identifying, selecting, and assessing high-value targets (i.e., something or someone the enemy requires to achieve its goals).
- Identifying high-payoff targets (i.e., enemy targets and entities whose loss would contribute significantly to the success of the friendly COA).
- Providing intelligence required to engage targets effectively and efficiently.

Targeting includes using traditional weapon systems and information-related capabilities to achieve lethal or nonlethal effects. This includes OIE that influence or engage in friendly, neutral, and threat networks.

**Support Combat Assessment**

Combat assessment is the process of determining the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment consists of three major components: battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment, and re-attack recommendations.

Intelligence efforts underpin the entire combat assessment process and are responsible for conducting initial BDA by providing estimates of physical damage to particular targets, functional damage to targets, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations.

---

## **INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

Throughout this publication, the information environment is understood as an integral component of the operational environment. Operations in the information environment describes the integration, coordination, and synchronization of all actions taken within the information environment to create an operational advantage for the commander. These operations provide opportunities for Marines to gain a decisive advantage by integrating information-related capabilities. Specific intelligence is necessary for planning, deconflicting, and employing available military disciplines to generate effects in the information environment. Planning for OIE cannot be conducted without intelligence about the enemy, adversary, civilian population, information systems, perceptions, and potential avenues of approach into their decision-making processes. Developing the situation in the information environment requires establishing a baseline through exhaustive research and extensive, long-term collection. The information environment officer, or information coordination cell, must provide IRs to the intelligence section and continually re-evaluate their requirements' focus and usefulness to the OIE.

Changes in enemy, adversary, and third-party attitudes, actions, operating patterns, and information systems must be detected, analyzed, and reported to ensure OIE continues to create the desired operational effect. Assessing ongoing OIE activities is a crucial, although extremely challenging, function of intelligence operations, as key targets and/or populations must be monitored to determine the effectiveness of the OIE efforts. The MAGTF must incorporate OIE into its intelligence, targeting, and combat assessment cycles. Because the impact of many actions in the information environment may be difficult to measure, indicators identifying success or failure must be crafted carefully in advance.



# CHAPTER 2.

## INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PLANNING

*Effective decision making requires both the situational understanding to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. Hence, an essential function of planning is to promote understanding of the problem—the difference between existing and desired conditions—and to devise ways to solve it.*

—MCWP 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*

Intelligence support to planning begins with a basic description of the environmental conditions and enemy situation within the projected area of interest. As plans are developed and refined, the intelligence effort becomes more narrowly focused on answering the commander's PIRs and generating mission-specific intelligence products to support detailed planning and executing specific operational activities. For a list of intelligence products that support the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP), see table: *Intelligence Products Produced in Support of the Marine Corps Planning Process*. See MCWP 5-10 for detailed information about the planning process.

---

### INTELLIGENCE AND THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS

Planning is an essential part of the broader function of command and control. Command and control enhances the commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions. MCDP 2, *Planning*; and MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, recognize the commander's critical decision making role. Effective decision making requires both the situational understanding to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. Hence, an essential planning function is to promote an understanding of the problem—the difference between the existing and desired conditions—and to devise ways to solve it. Planning involves elements of both art and science, combining analysis and calculation with intuition, inspiration, and creativity.

Planning is the process of developing practical schemes for taking future actions. It represents an effort to project operational concepts and designs forward in time and space. During the planning process, the commander assesses the situation, builds a vision of the operational environment, and develops the desired outcome for the battle or operation. Planning is oriented on the future; hence, the primary objective of intelligence is to help manage uncertainty about the future. To support planning, a substantial portion of intelligence development must already be completed before planning can begin in earnest.

**Table 2-1. Intelligence Products Produced in Support of the Marine Corps Planning Process**


Product/Tool	Problem Framing	COA Development	COA War Game	COA Comparison & Decision	Orders Development	Transition
Modified combined obstacle overlay	X	X	X		X	X
Adversary template	X	X	X			
Situation template	X	X	X		X	X
Event template	X	X	X			
Event matrix	X	X	X			
Decision support template			X	X	X	X
Decision support matrix			X	X	X	X
COA graphic and narrative		X	X	X	X	X
Synchronization matrix		X	X	X	X	X
COA war game worksheet			X	X	X	
Comparison and decision matrix with comments				X		

The command staff produces the IPB, which provides planners a common image of the operational environment and the threat. It also helps commanders plan for constant or predictable aspects of the environment, understand the general direction of future actions, and anticipate possible threat force actions and reactions (see figure: *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and the Marine Corps Planning Process Steps*).

The MCPP promotes common understanding between the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders. The process is applicable across the range of military operations and at every echelon of command. The process can be as detailed or abbreviated as time, staff resources, experience, and the situation permit or require.

The six steps of the MCPP are problem framing, COA development, COA war game, COA comparison and decision, orders development, and transition. The rapid response planning process, used primarily by Marine expeditionary units (MEUs), is a condensed version of the MCPP. Intelligence has a critical role throughout each step of this planning process.

Intelligence support to planning should never be viewed as an isolated activity or process. Not only is planning a critical element of command and control, but it is an integral part of the operations process, execution, and assessment. Planning is the basis for execution, while assessments are used to determine how and why the environment has changed, which then leads to subsequent planning and execution. These three essential military activities are cyclical in nature—once underway, they have no beginning or end. Individually and together, they interact and evolve over time through countless interrelated events (see figure: *Intelligence Support to Planning*).



**Figure 2-1. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and the Marine Corps Planning Process Steps**

Because situations change continually, Marines make decisions in the face of relative uncertainty. Planners and commanders should expect problems to evolve, even as they try to solve them. While it is the aim of intelligence to reduce certain aspects of uncertainty, the effort always comes at the expense of time. Success in such a fluid environment demands Marines think critically, examine both the nature of the problem and the purpose of the operation, and learn and adapt throughout the entire operations process. Many factors, some of which cannot be controlled, contribute to making planning endeavors highly complex and nonlinear. These factors include—

- Environmental factors.
- Enemy actions.
- Actions of other actors and stakeholders.
- Updated intelligence.
- Changing resources.
- Revised guidance from higher headquarters (HHQ).
- Input provided from ongoing operations.
- Concurrent planning by subordinate, adjacent, and supporting units.




Figure 2-2. Intelligence Support to Planning

## DEVELOPING THE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

### Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace “is the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area.” (Marine Corps Reference Publication [MCRP] 2-10B.1, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace*) This is fundamentally the mission of intelligence in the competition continuum below armed conflict. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is developed by the entire command’s staff (G-1/S-1 through G-6/S-6 and special staff), not just the intelligence section, and it is the primary method used to ensure all staff members understand the operational environment and the enemy.

The IPB process consists of four steps, led by the intelligence officer. After each step, the staff assesses and refines the brief to ensure IPB products remain complete and relevant. Once the operation begins, the intelligence section is responsible for continued assessment and refinement. The IPB steps are—

- Define the operational environment.
- Describe environmental effects on operations
- Evaluate the enemy/adversary.
- Determine adversary COAs.

The IPB provides a means to interpret information and understand the operational environment. This comprehensive assessment considers the physical and cognitive aspects of the operational environment, to include the air, land, maritime, and space domains, the information environment (to include cyberspace), and the electromagnetic spectrum. Frameworks such as PMESII [political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure] and ASCOPE [areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events] help to account for operational variables. Additionally, relevant information about the nature and interaction between enemy, friendly, and neutral systems is used to estimate and anticipate possible outcomes affecting mission accomplishment. The result is mission-tailored intelligence incorporated into various products. The time available to complete the IPB might not permit the performance of each step in detail. Planners must understand the mission, develop and leverage basic/encyclopedic intelligence products, and conduct periodic reviews of their own material to ensure they are making efficient use of time and resources.

Successful application of the IPB process hinges upon the participation of the commander and the involvement of the entire command staff. The commander, responsible for intelligence production and IPB, must focus the effort by defining the area and key factors to be studied. The commander's guidance and complete staff involvement are necessary to ensure the IPB effort encompasses the concerns of all warfighting functions and provides sufficient detail for COA development and detailed planning. During planning, products generated from IPB place other information into context, providing situational awareness for everyone involved. These products form the basis of, and are combined with, the planning tools and decision support aids prepared by the staff. Together they provide an integrated planning and execution support product.

### **Intelligence Requirements**

On-hand intelligence is rarely sufficient to support comprehensive planning and decision-making needs—gaps will remain. To fill these gaps, IRs identify questions about the enemy and the environment, the answers to which a commander requires to make sound decisions. Intelligence requirements are typically enemy/adversary or terrain focused, and drive collections and the overall intelligence cycle. Intelligence requirements are questions typically generated by the staff that, though important, are not critical to the commander's bid for success. These requirements typically stem from the planning process and other related or subsequent analysis. Intelligence requirements are also prioritized to support efficient intelligence planning and operations.

### Priority Intelligence Requirements

Priority intelligence requirements are IRs associated with a decision containing the potential to critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. Priority intelligence requirements constitute the commander's guidance for the intelligence collection, production, and dissemination efforts. The list of PIRs is further prioritized according to urgency, even as priorities change over the course of an operation. While the intelligence officer holds a critical role in PIR development, the commander has sole responsibility for identifying PIRs and is therefore the final approval authority for all PIRs. The lowest-priority PIR takes precedence over the highest priority IR. While there are ideally few PIRs, there may be many IRs.

Priority intelligence requirement, combined with friendly force information requirements, make up the CCIR list—a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as critical to timely decision making. A PIR differs from an IR because a PIR is tied to a critical decision and usually related to an important planning assumption; whereas, IRs are not tied to critical decisions. For example, the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs, in relation to the friendly COA, are assumptions most commanders will seek to validate by designating one or more associated PIRs. Developing useful PIRs is predicated on a thorough understanding of the operational environment (through IPB) combined with a clear understanding of the mission and the commander's intent (through problem framing).

### Characteristics

Priority intelligence requirements and IRs share the following characteristics:

- They ask only one question.
- They solicit an answer related to specific facts, events, or activities concerning the enemy or the operational environment.
- They are tied to a specific unit, time, terrain, decision point, or target.
- They contain geographic and time elements to limit the scope of the requirement.

Example PIRs:

- Will the 84th Artillery Battalion emplace artillery forward phase line red prior to D-day?
- Will the enemy conduct screening operations forward of their mechanized units in the vicinity of alternate supply route Chicago between D-2 and D-day?
- What existing subterranean infrastructure within (specific location) will insurgents use to bypass security forces and attack government facilities?

The nature and scope of PIRs and IRs will vary with the mission, echelon of command, and possibly from one phase or stage of an operation to the next. Requirements will generally become more focused as planning and operations progress, COAs mature, and the intelligence cycle reduces decision makers' uncertainty. During execution, the collection effort should be directed against a small number of PIRs closely linked to the concept of operations (CONOPS). As the situation unfolds in execution, PIRs must be continuously evaluated to identify whether they are answered by collections and reporting or if they become irrelevant due to changes in the operational environment.

### **Commander's Critical Information Requirements**

The CCIRs identify information the commander deems critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed decision making. Each numbered PIR and friendly force information requirement will include anticipated decisions and their associated branches and sequels as developed during the MCPP. Operations divided into multiple phases may have separate CCIRs for each phase. Each PIR must be represented on the decision support matrix.

### **Problem Framing**

The primary objective of intelligence is to support decision making by reducing uncertainty to a reasonable level. The purpose of problem framing is to gain an enhanced understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. An output of problem framing is the mission statement, which articulates the “in order to.” Commander’s intent is the commander’s clear and concise expression of the operation’s purpose and desired military end state.

No amount of subsequent planning can solve an insufficiently understood problem. It is imperative planners identify and solve the correct problem. Therefore, problem framing is the most important step in the MCPP. The understanding developed from problem framing allows the commander to visualize and describe how the operation may unfold. This is articulated in the operational approach, which is a broad framework for solving the identified problems. As planning continues, the commander’s guidance may be narrow and directive, or it may be broad and inquisitive, depending on available time, the level to which the problem is understood, and its complexity.

The intelligence officer is a full participant in problem framing and should accomplish the following objectives:

- Orient the commander and other members of the staff to the operational environment and threat.
- Identify the threat’s COG and/or critical vulnerabilities as well as indicate potential advantages and limitations imposed by the environment.
- Utilize the commander’s guidance and intent to shape the intelligence effort. Guidance can take various forms—the commander’s intent or the commander’s direct instructions stating intelligence needs or concerns.

### **Course of Action Development**

Under the commander’s COA development guidance, planners begin developing possible ways to accomplish the mission. The number of COAs and level of detail depend on the commander’s guidance and the time available for planning. Intelligence efforts support this process by—

- Developing initial COAs the enemy/adversary is capable of executing.
- Following friendly COA development and providing the enemy’s most dangerous COA and most likely COA in relation to (based on) the friendly COA.
- Providing feedback on COAs to ensure they are feasible, acceptable, complete, distinguishable, and suitable (also referred to as FACDS).
- Continually updating knowledge about the operational environment.
- Clarifying operational possibilities through the IPB process.
- Identifying intelligence gaps.

- Identifying and updating the threat's COG, critical vulnerabilities, and potential COAs, emphasizing the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs in relation to the friendly COA.
- Ensuring the commander and staff receive, understand, and integrate relevant focused intelligence to enhance their situational understanding.
- Developing an initial intelligence staff estimate, which includes a list of available intelligence assets, resource shortfalls, facts, assumptions, specified and implied intelligence tasks, limitations, risks, and recommendations.

The intelligence officer interacts with the staff throughout the COA development process, integrating intelligence collection and production efforts with potential COAs to ensure intelligence will be available to support any COA selected.

### **Course of Action War Game**

The staff conducts a war game to examine and refine each COA based on relevant actors' reactions to friendly actions and the impact of the operational environment. Each principal staff officer provides an estimate of supportability. The purpose of COA wargaming is to improve the plan. During COA wargaming, the COA is examined and refined while considering the enemy's capabilities and potential actions/reactions. Additional factors within the operational environment are also examined, such as the local population and its response to friendly, enemy, and adversary interactions. Done well, wargaming improves COAs while enhancing the participants' understanding of the environment, the problem, and friendly and enemy forces involved. Planners evaluate refined COAs using the commander's chosen criteria.

Intelligence efforts support COA analysis by—

- Providing a staff estimate detailing planned use of available friendly intelligence assets and resources.
- Identifying key friendly intelligence actions that take place during each turn of the war game, such as employing intelligence capabilities and assets. These assets may be forward deployed or garrison based.
- In collaboration with the red and green cells, identifying and refining threat, civil, or any other relevant reactions to friendly actions during each turn of the war game.
- Independently evaluating each friendly COA based on an understanding of the environment and the potential threat response. Friendly forces' ability to provide intelligence support to that COA must also be considered.
- Assisting the staff as they focus on factors related to the environment and the enemy, emphasizing the degree of uncertainty and risk associated with each COA.

The intelligence officer's full participation is crucial to successful COA analysis because the implications of the intelligence estimate are absorbed and applied during this step. To maximize this contribution, the intelligence officer must be able to analyze the situation from the enemy's perspective while simultaneously understanding friendly force intent, plans, and operations. Combining these two perspectives enables the intelligence officer to assess the potential effects of threat force actions on the potential COAs.

### Course of Action Comparison and Decision

During COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates each COA against established criteria, compares them with each other, and selects the COA that will best accomplish the mission. The COA comparison and decision inputs require graphics and narratives to support the commander's evaluation criteria and each wargamed COA. The commander will select a COA and then provide further guidance to develop the detailed CONOPS and supporting plans or orders.

The concept of intelligence support for the selected COA is refined to include intelligence assets allocated to support the CONOPS. Course of action analysis and war game results help planners develop and implement collection, processing and exploitation, production, and dissemination plans. The intelligence effort now shifts to satisfying PIRs and developing the intelligence required for additional detailed planning.

Intelligence sections prepare and disseminate products that contribute to a shared understanding of the operational environment at all levels of the force. At the same time, the intelligence section delivers mission-specific intelligence in response to the extensive and precise functional and detailed planning requirements for units executing the operation. Counterintelligence plans and measures help conceal intentions and protect the force. These intelligence activities shape and develop the overall plan and supporting annexes and appendices.

### Orders Development

*The purpose of orders development is to translate the commander's decision into oral, written, and/or graphic communication sufficient to guide execution and promote initiative by subordinates. A form of detailed planning, the OPLAN [operation plan] or OPORD [operation order], once completed, becomes the principal means by which the commander expresses his/her decision, intent, and guidance. (MCWP 5-10)*

During orders development, the intelligence officer combines the intelligence staff estimate, the concept of intelligence support, and various IPB products into Annex B (Intelligence) and its associated appendices, as appropriate.

On larger staffs, the METOC Marines (usually under the intelligence officer's charge) develop Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations) and geographic intelligence specialists develop Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services). During this critical step, the intelligence officer participates in an orders cross-walk to ensure these annexes agree with the base operation order and the other annexes. For example, Annex B and Annex W (Aviation Operations) must agree regarding the employment of aircraft and UASs, and Annex A (Task Organization) must list the intelligence capabilities attached to or provided in support of subordinate units.

### Transition

Transition may involve a range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals necessary to successfully shift from planning to execution. At a minimum, this step includes a CONOPS brief along with handing-over and explaining execution tools developed during planning, such as a decision support matrix or execution checklist.

If time and resources allow, subordinate units may conduct rehearsals and confirmation briefs during the transition phase. Successful transition enhances situational understanding,

maintains the commander's intent, promotes unity of effort, and generates tempo. During the brief, the intelligence officer should not only be prepared to orient everyone to the map or terrain model but also be prepared to brief the intelligence concept of support throughout every phase of the operation.

---

## **EXECUTION**

The rapid and fluid nature of operations requires timely, accurate, and responsive intelligence support during execution. Therefore, the intelligence section supports current operations and assists the commander and staff in anticipating and continually assessing PIRs for branch and sequel plans. Responsive intelligence ensures intelligence is continually disseminated throughout the command as changes occur in the operational environment. This continual flow of information provides a more coherent and equally shared picture of the threat as it relates to the operational environment, and it uncovers new requirements developed by subordinate units.

During execution, the plan is further refined, implemented, and subsequently adapted in response to changes in the situation. The intelligence effort must remain responsive to the needs of the mission and help the staff maintain a shared picture of the operational environment while satisfying any new requirements developed by the commander and staff. Maintaining a shared picture of the operational environment, particularly the common intelligence picture (CIP), is most challenging under conditions of disconnected, degraded, intermittent, and limited bandwidth communications. The intelligence section integrates intelligence operations within the CONOPS. The results of these operations help the staff and commanders modify the plan or exercise tactical options, enabling rapid decision making and generating a tempo that can ultimately overwhelm the enemy's cognitive or physical capability.

Intelligence support to execution can typically be expected to develop in hours, minutes, or even seconds. Success often depends on the ability to provide immediate answers to critical questions concerning threat dispositions, actions, and likely intentions. Intelligence support during execution focuses on providing practical knowledge that presents potential advantages and opportunities over the threat and can be exploited.

Finally, the uncertainty and disorder inherent in war manifests most strongly during execution. Once execution begins, interaction between the opposing wills of friendly and enemy forces can cause significant, fundamental changes in the situation. Although eliminating uncertainty is impossible, intelligence sections must exhibit the flexibility and tactical agility required to maintain situational awareness, identify opportunities, and facilitate rapid decision making to meet this challenge.

Key factors to ensure effective intelligence support during execution include appropriate resource allocation and the strong integration between intelligence collection assets and supported units' plans and activities.

### Resource Allocation

While the number of possible IRs is unlimited, intelligence capabilities are finite resources. Therefore, intelligence operations must focus on areas that have the greatest effect. During orders development, the commander designates appropriate command relationships for all supporting intelligence assets (e.g., general support, direct support, attached). Intelligence capabilities are allocated and prioritized between the main effort and supporting efforts in accordance with the commander's intent, CONOPS, and designated PIRs.

Those intelligence resources best suited towards satisfying current, tactical, mission-specific IRs, such as reconnaissance units, UASs, or terrain analysts, are often best allocated to units responsible for executing the mission. Sensors that support force protection through reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition platforms can also be leveraged for comprehensive collection plans. The key to successful resource allocation is the integrated coordination of all intelligence collection assets throughout all levels of command—subordinate collection plans must be nested in HHQ collection plans. For more detailed information regarding resources organic to the aviation combat element, see MCRP 2-10A.9, *Air Intelligence*; Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-20G, *Air Reconnaissance*; and MCRP 3-20.5, *Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations*. For additional information regarding collections, see MCTP 2-10A, *MAGTF Intelligence Collections*.

### Generating Tempo

Intelligence generates tempo by supporting the decision-making process, providing situational awareness, and recognizing emerging patterns, thereby enabling the commander to make rapid decisions. The critical factor is not the amount of information provided, but in providing key, focused intelligence, when needed, in a useful form capable of improving the commander's knowledge of the situation and ability to act. Intelligence operations must have the flexibility, agility, and responsiveness to rapidly collect and process relevant information, develop a focused product, and deliver products to the impacted unit in an easily understandable format in time for the commander to take appropriate action.

The commander and staff use intelligence products to record, track, display, and analyze critical planning information. These products help the commander, planners, and staff better understand the environment, facilitate the commander's decision making, assist in the preparation of plans and orders, and increase tempo. Products and tools must serve the needs of the commander and situational requirements. Many of these tools are either directly or indirectly included in the operation order.



## CHAPTER 3. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

*“To lack intelligence is to be in the ring blindfolded.”*

—General D. M. Shoup

Twenty-second Commandant of the Marine Corps (1960–1963)

*Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*

The intelligence cycle provides a framework for intelligence operations. This process consists of a sequence of related activities designed to translate requirements for various types of information into intelligence that is then furnished to the commander for use in decision making. During this sequence, intelligence gaps are identified; a plan is formulated and directions are given to resolve those gaps; and data is collected, processed, and exploited for usable information to produce a tailored, useful intelligence product. The product is then disseminated and utilized by the appropriate commander or unit. A parallel process is used to develop CI plans and measures aimed at denying information to an enemy/adversary, thereby protecting friendly forces and maximizing operational effectiveness.

The six steps of the intelligence cycle are depicted in the figure: *Intelligence Cycle*. These steps define a sequential and interdependent process for intelligence development (see figure: *Intelligence Development and the Intelligence Cycle*). Intelligence operations are conducted within the framework of the intelligence cycle. A particular intelligence activity focuses on either the entire cycle or a specific step within it. All intelligence, regardless of the scope of the requirement or echelon of command, is developed by following these steps.




Figure 3-1. Intelligence Cycle

Influenced by the realities of combat, all six phases of the intelligence cycle may occur simultaneously or out of order, but none may be bypassed altogether. For example, while a request for imagery always requires planning and direction, it may not necessarily involve new collection, processing, or exploitation. Rather, it might be satisfied by an imagery product already on file. Such a request could go directly to a production facility, where previously collected and exploited imagery is reviewed to determine whether it will satisfy the request. All the steps of the intelligence cycle are present in this example, but the sequence has changed. Likewise, during processing and exploitation, relevant information may be disseminated directly to the user (e.g., UAS full-motion video in support of targeting) because the unit has already received detailed, all-source analysis and intelligence products to support target development.




Figure 3-2. Intelligence Development and the Intelligence Cycle

In these situations, collected information must sometimes be made simultaneously available to both the supported commander (for time-critical decision making) and the intelligence specialist (for validation, integration with other related information, and production of a final, all-source product). This dual-track information flow can be particularly important in target development efforts for which a TSA previously occurred. The next step is waiting for an indicator to be detected by a collection asset, which then sets a predetermined sequence of decisions or activities

in motion. Intelligence planning is updated as IRs are satisfied during collection and new requirements are identified during analysis and production. The MAGTF's mission provides the focal point around which the intelligence cycle is organized.

---

## PLANNING AND DIRECTION

Planning and direction identifies intelligence needs and develops a plan for satisfying those needs. (MCTP 2-10B, *MAGTF Intelligence Production and Analysis*) This step consists of conducting IPB, developing PIRs and IRs, and identifying the means for satisfying those requirements. Intelligence planning and direction are ongoing functions throughout intelligence operations. The commander directs the intelligence effort, which the intelligence officer manages based on the commander's intent, PIRs, and other specific guidance provided during the planning process.

### **Intelligence Requirements Management**

Intelligence direction consists of the requirements development and management process combined with the associated collection, production, and dissemination management. This ensures the intelligence effort remains focused on the PIRs.

**Processing Requirements.** Developing requirements and designating PIRs are continual efforts. As an operation progresses, new requirements are identified, existing requirements are satisfied or determined to be no longer relevant, and the relative importance of each requirement changes. The intelligence officer leads in developing IRs, validating, refining, and tracking IRs as they are developed. Validation ensures the requirements are relevant to the mission, have not already been satisfied, and do not duplicate other requirements. Refining a requirement entails placing it in the proper format, identifying all information components related to it, and adding appropriate qualifiers such as geographic limitations or time constraints. During refinement, similar or related requirements may be combined into a single comprehensive requirement.

A requirements management system monitors the effort to satisfy each requirement. The minimal components include a numbering scheme, identification of who submitted the requirement, and designated collection and production resources (or note the date submitted to HHQ or supporting forces if organic assets are not available), time requirements, dissemination instructions and information, and a feedback mechanism to track user satisfaction. It is important for requirements managers and intelligence professionals to understand both the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) and the process through which national requirements are prioritized. This is important because throughout the competition continuum, maneuver forces' intelligence operations and IRs are closely linked to and reliant upon the national priorities. Most of the tactical requirements will rank low on the NIPF. Often, satisfying the IRs will fall upon the originating command. Therefore, requirements managers must appreciate the virtues and limitations of national intelligence. For additional information about the NIPF, including national intelligence issues and its role in resourcing, refer to Intelligence Community Directive 204.

**Determining Priorities.** The intelligence officer must work continually with the operations officer and other key members of the staff to assess the emphasis given to each requirement and realign

intelligence priorities according to the commander's intent and the current phase of the operation. The intelligence officer is responsible for ensuring the intelligence effort remains focused on and aligned with the commander's guidance.

**Satisfying Requirements.** Once a requirement has been identified, validated, refined, and prioritized, the intelligence officer must task/request the appropriate intelligence assets to develop the desired intelligence. If the requirement cannot be satisfied by organic assets, it must be submitted to HHQ or supporting forces/agencies for satisfaction. When determining the means to satisfy a requirement, the intelligence officer must consider each step in the intelligence cycle to ensure the plan encompasses the entire process from planning and direction through utilization.

The intelligence officer identifies the information needed, where and how to obtain it, how to package the intelligence into an appropriate product, and how to deliver the product. Typically, an IR initiates the following steps:

- Collect data or information.
- Process and produce intelligence within the scope of information required and in a form that answers the question.
- Disseminate the information to a particular user by a specific time: either the “requested by time/date” or the latest time information is of value (LTIOV). The requested by date/time is the date/time by which an individual requested the information, while the LTIOV is the time at which intelligence is no longer useful. In the terms of aviation operations, the operations officer may want a product by 1500 for a flight departing at 1800. In this scenario, the requested by date/time would be “today/1500” and the LTIOV would be “today/1800.”

### Support to Targeting

A target is an entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement or other action. (DOD Dictionary) Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. During IPB steps three and four, the intelligence staff identifies high-value targets associated with each enemy capability or COA. This aids the fires cell as they conduct TSAs.

An example targeting model, decide, detect, deliver, and assess (also referred to as D3A) for the targeting process is as follows:

- Decide:
  - ♦ IPB supports identifying potential targets and entities through COG and critical vulnerability analysis. (Note: CARVER is a target analysis and vulnerability assessment framework—criticality, accessibility, recognizability, vulnerability, effect, and recuperability.)
  - ♦ Intelligence prioritizes, develops, and nominates targets to include on appropriate target and engagement lists in coordination with operations.
- Detect:
  - ♦ Intelligence requirements are developed.
  - ♦ Collection assets and resources are leveraged; the target or entity is acquired and tracked.

- Deliver:
  - ♦ Intelligence assesses the ability to create desired effects.
  - ♦ Intelligence supports developing MOE.
  - ♦ Intelligence supports collateral damage estimates and weaponeering for commander approval.
- Assess:
  - ♦ Intelligence supports BDA by identifying the functional, operational, and system effects of engaging the target or entity.
  - ♦ Collection assets are leveraged to support collecting MOEs and measures of performance.

*Note:* Additional targeting process models include find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (referred to as F3EAD) and find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (referred to as F2T2EA).

Further information about targeting can be found in the following publications: JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*; JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*; MCWP 3-31, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fires*; MCTP 3-02A, *MAGTF Network Activities*; and MCTP 3-10F, *Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element*.

---

## COLLECTION

Collection methods gather intelligence data and information to satisfy identified requirements. (The collection phase is continual, answering emerging requests for information and continually validating assessments or updating the operational picture. During competition, collection is also persistent, constantly refining the understanding of the operational environment. As a result, the collection phase encompasses assembling relevant information from organic sources or requesting collection support from other intelligence organizations (e.g., intelligence databases, studies, maps, workbooks, situation maps.) This phase also includes organic, attached, and supporting intelligence collection assets' activities to gather new data and deliver it to the appropriate processing or production agency (i.e., processing and exploitation). In this step, information used to generate intelligence is drawn from—

- Intelligence data derived from assets primarily dedicated to intelligence collection (e.g., imagery systems, electronic intercept equipment, HUMINT sources).
- Sensor data derived from sensors (e.g., air surveillance radar, counterbattery radar, remote ground sensors) whose primary mission is surveillance or target acquisition.
- Combat data derived from operational unit reporting.

### Collection Requirements Management

The collection requirements management process uses the following four steps to translate broad inquiries into concrete questions, tasks, and orders for collection organizations to perform:

**Step 1. Identify, Validate, and Prioritize.** Identifying, validating, and prioritizing PIRs and IRs form the foundation of the collection requirements management process and are the basis for collection planning and execution. As such, these types of requirements must be specific. Writing a concise,

detailed PIR or IR is paramount to enabling effective collection and is the linchpin of the entire intelligence collection requirement development process. Refer to “Priority Intelligence Requirements” section in Chapter 2 for additional information on PIRs.

**Step 2. Identify Indicators.** Once the PIR or IR has been determined, the next step is to identify observable activities related to the specified event. These activities, called indicators, are usually stated in general terms, such as “forward deployment of artillery.” Indicators provide evidence of threat activity or a characteristic of the environment capable of influencing the commander’s selection of a particular COA. An indicator is associated with a named area of interest (NAI), which is a geospatial area where activity is expected to occur that will confirm or deny an enemy COA. Below are the principles for indicator development:

- *Indicators must be focused and specific.* Good requirements (whether PIRs or IRs) ask only one question, focusing on a specific fact, event, or activity. The intelligence specialist uses indicators to correlate particular events or activities that occur—or fail to occur—to determine probable enemy COAs.
- *Negative information can be as important as positive information.* Negative or negating evidence can provide the intelligence specialists insight about the enemy’s rejection of a COA. Negative information can lead to further investigation of a possible branch COA.

**Step 3. Derive Specific Information Requirements.** Indicators must be broken down into very specific questions known as specific information requirements (SIRs). This process consists of identifying the specific sets of information that will provide an answer, partial or complete, to each indicator. Specific information requirements are the observable or collectible data outlining the information necessary to answer all or part of an IR. A completed SIR describes the information required, the location (NAI) where the required information can be collected, and the timeframe it can be collected. Drafting SIRs requires a thorough understanding of the particular PIR or IR.

The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity’s (MCIA’s) 1540-003-03, *Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH)*, facilitates rapid, time-sensitive, crisis intelligence planning for MAGTFs. The GIRH is a compilation of frequently asked IRs organized by mission profile, orders of battle, and terrain. The GIRH is used primarily as a checklist to rapidly organize planning and determine gaps in information. It serves as a sort of brevity code to request information efficiently and a baseline intelligence support tool for intelligence centers providing operational intelligence to forward-deployed forces. The GIRH is not a standalone substitute for SIR development. Collection managers should not copy lists of requirements from the GIRH into their collection requirements list without going through the entire IR development process.

The process for developing SIRs follows:

- *Focus Each Indicator to Identify Where to Collect (i.e., the NAI).* For example: the indicator “forward-deployed artillery,” would be rewritten as “artillery deployed within NAI 12.”
- *Refine the Time to be Observed.* Starting from the LTIOV, collection personnel plan backward to determine collection times and the time required to sort through collected data, report it, process it, analyze it, and further disseminate it to those needing it.
- *Determine the SIRs.* Next, consider the specific observables, or what to collect, by identifying the specific information supporting the indicator. For example, the specific information

supporting the indicator, “artillery deployed within NAI 12,” might include artillery weapons, fire direction control equipment or vehicles, artillery-associated communications equipment, and artillery ammunition carriers.

- *Complete the SIR.* A complete SIR describes the information required, the location from which it can be collected, the time it can be collected, reporting criteria, and principal and secondary recipients. Generally, each IR generates sets of SIRs.
- *Refine the SIR.* Develop each indicator further by identifying the specific types of equipment or other collectible/observable characteristic associated with each SIR. For example—
  - ♦ “Artillery weapons” should be refined with specifics, such as “120mm mortars” or “107mm multiple rocket launcher battery,” if that is what should be present within the NAI if the enemy has artillery.
  - ♦ “Artillery-associated communications” should be refined to “the [communication unit] data signal,” if that is the type used by the enemy unit in question. This specificity helps collection or asset managers optimize their collection capabilities against the target in question.

Up to this point, the collection manager has taken a focused PIR, matched indicators to it, and developed SIRs to support focused collection. A well-developed IR contains all information needed to develop its supporting SIRs. In short, the IR often states “where” and “when” to collect; the collection manager needs only to refine “what to collect” through SIR development.

**Step 4. Develop Specific Order or Request.** Each indicator generates numerous SIRs. Each SIR generates a specific order or request (SOR) used to task collection assets or request collection resource support. A well-written SIR is easily translated into an effective SOR by making a directive (vice interrogative) statement. In other words, if an SIR is a question, the SOR directs a collection asset or resource to find an answer. An SOR is the order or request that generates the planning and execution of a collection mission or the analysis of database information and intelligence. The SORs sent to subordinate commands, including collection assets, are orders. The SORs sent to other commands, usually collection resources, are requests. After SORs are developed, the collection manager builds the collection plan. The collection plan reflects the SORs assigned to selected collectors for each IR.

Overly restrictive reporting criteria and guidelines should be avoided. Allowing collectors appropriate latitude enables them to obtain not only the requested information, but possibly other valuable information not specifically requested. A sample SIR and SOR follow.

*SIR: Will more than 17 reconnaissance vehicles subordinate to the 3d Tank Division or its regiments pass through NAI 8 or NAI 9 between 041800 and 052000 May? LTIOV: 052000 May.*

*SOR 1A: Report the presence of reconnaissance vehicles in NAI 8 or NAI 9 between 041800 and 052000 May. Specify the direction of movement and the numbers and types of vehicles. LTIOV: 052000 May.*

*SOR 1B: Report the presence of communications nodes associated with reconnaissance elements of the 3d Tank Division or its subordinate regiments in NAI 8 or NAI 9 between 041800 and 52000 May. LTIOV: 052000 May.*

Successful intelligence operations require access to data from both organic assets and supporting resources. Collection operations are executed to gather data from all suitable modalities, balancing the capabilities of one type of collector against the limitations of another to provide persistent multidiscipline data input to both the processing and exploitation and analysis and production phases.

### **Collections Operations Management**

Collections operations management is a key component of intelligence operations and activities. After IRs are identified, collection assets and resources are subsequently directed to support them. Intelligence assets are assigned based on their capability to support the operational commander's IRs. Collection operations management directs, schedules, and controls collection platforms, sensors, and intelligence capabilities against established NAIs.

The following are pillars to successful collections operations management:

- The collection plan must support operations.
- Task organic assets first.
- Integrate intelligence disciplines.
- Incorporate redundant capabilities within the collection plan.
- Use a detailed communications plan to support timely reporting.
- Effectively communicate collection requirements with collection assets.
- Consider weather effects on collection operations.
- Pair feasibility of collection capability with the collection requirement.

Intelligence data and information are collected by various intelligence assets, each with unique capabilities and limitations. The value of a collection asset is not determined by its sophistication or cost, but rather by its ability to gather pertinent data from its assigned target—the enemy, adversary, or environmental consideration. Successful intelligence operations require access to data from all types of collection resources—organic, joint, national, and multinational, as well as individual Marines (the “every Marine a collector” concept). Collection operations are executed to gather data from all suitable and capable assets, balancing the capabilities of one type of collector against the limitations of another, to provide all-source data input to the processing, exploitation, and production phases. For more detailed information on collection activities and resources, see MCTP 2-10A.

***Intelligence Disciplines.*** The primary types of intelligence data used to produce tactical intelligence are described in the following paragraphs.

*Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence.* While CI and HUMINT are separate functions, they can be performed by the same CI/HUMINT Marines.

- *Counterintelligence.* Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. (*DOD Dictionary*) Counterintelligence information identifies foreign intelligence threats within the local population while CI activities

identify individuals and organizations attempting to collect and exploit friendly information through espionage or degrade a unit's capabilities through acts of terrorism, sabotage, or subversion. Counterintelligence can also identify the key affiliation patterns and relations exploited by enemy forces attempting to subvert the attitudes and sway the behavior of the local population. As an activity, CI is supported and integrated with a command's Insider Threat Program, Physical Security Program, and Antiterrorism Force Protection Program. Informed by CI information, these programs identify friendly vulnerabilities, evaluate security measures, and implement appropriate security plans. The integration of all intelligence disciplines into a multidisciplinary CI effort culminates in a cohesive unit force protection program (see MCRP 2-10A.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence*).

- *Human Intelligence*. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (DOD Dictionary) It must be noted that HUMINT, of all the intelligence disciplines, can be the least timely in addressing IRs. Human intelligence can provide insight into intangible factors, such as plans, intentions, tactics, training, morale, and combat effectiveness, otherwise not capable of being collected by technical means. This insight allows the commander to gain and maintain decision-making advantage. Additionally, HUMINT effectively identifies and monitors critical sociocultural aspects of both the enemy and local populations. In areas of conflict or other disruption, sociocultural patterns can shift rapidly and unpredictably. This requires direct observation and human interaction to ensure a commander has the most current and accurate information.

*Geospatial Intelligence*. Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. Geospatial intelligence encompasses all activities that are related to the planning, collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of spatial information that is used to gain intelligence concerning national security or the operational environment. It visually depicts this knowledge and fuses the acquired knowledge with other information through analysis and visualization processes. For more detailed information, see MCRP 2-10B.4, *Geospatial Information and Intelligence*, and JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations*.

Elements of GEOINT although similar is composed of four distinct and different elements: imagery, imagery intelligence, GEOINT, and METOC:

- *Imagery*. Imagery is a likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made feature or related object or activity and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or representation was acquired, including: products produced by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems; and likenesses or presentations produced by satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar means (except that such term does not include hand-held or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations). (DOD Dictionary)
- *Imagery Intelligence*. Imagery intelligence is derived from the exploitation of collected images—by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar—wherein the images are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media.

- *Geospatial Information.* Geospatial information identifies the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on the Earth. Geospatial information includes statistical data and information derived from remote sensing, mapping, and surveying technologies as well as mapping, charting, geodetic data and related products.
- *Meteorological and Oceanographic.* Collectors of METOC information assess and characterize the current and future conditions, phenomena, and associated effects influencing the operational area's physical environment and integrate these time-sensitive essential elements of information into the continuous MCPP to mitigate adverse conditions/exploit conditions of opportunity.

*Measurement and Signature Intelligence.* Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) is “obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the emitter or sender, and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted.” (MCRP 2-10B.5, *Imagery Intelligence*) Although the primary tactical application of these devices is to collect sensor data, which is generally provided directly to operations centers for immediate decision making, the data collected can also provide significant intelligence information about enemy movements and activities.

Key MAGTF MASINT capabilities include acoustic and seismic ground sensors, weapon-locating radar, and air surveillance radar. These sensors provide an efficient means to maintain surveillance over large portions of the operational environment. Their limitations include the logistic support required to maintain the equipment, the requirement to place the sensors in proximity to the surveillance area, and the exploitable electronic signatures associated with some types of sensors. For more detailed information, see MCRP 2-10A.5, *Remote Sensor Operations*, and MCRP 2-10B.5.

*Open-Source Intelligence.* Open-source intelligence (OSINT) “is intelligence that is produced from publicly available information and is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement (Public Law 109-163).” (MCRP 2-10A.3, *Open-Source Intelligence*) Open sources include publicly available sources such as social media, books, magazines, newspapers, maps, commercial data, websites, electronic networks and databases, and radio and television broadcasts. The OSINT production uses only publicly available information. Open-source intelligence does not draw upon classified information at its origin, but analysis or synthesis of OSINT may result in classified products. The MCIA, along with other Service and national intelligence production centers, have access to a range of OSINT sources and capabilities. Certain MAGTF and theater intelligence centers produce OSINT as well.

Marine air-ground task force, major subordinate command (MSC), or major subordinate element intelligence sections can receive OSINT through these centers. They can also collect publicly available information directly from open sources. Open-source intelligence can be a valuable source of geographic, political, economic, sociological, and cultural information, particularly in security, foreign humanitarian assistance, or peace operations. In multinational operations, OSINT is readily sharable with members of a multinational force. However, OSINT sources should be

carefully evaluated to determine the accuracy and reliability of the information they provide. For more detailed information, see MCRP 2-10A.3.

**Signals Intelligence.** Signals intelligence (SIGINT) “is intelligence gained by exploiting an adversary’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum with the aim of gaining undetected firsthand intelligence on the adversary’s intentions, dispositions, capabilities, and limitations.” (MCRP 2-10A.1, *Signals Intelligence*) Signals intelligence is obtained through the radio battalion and an integrated network of national, theater, and joint force SIGINT support agencies. Signals intelligence can provide timely data on enemy forces and may include details on enemy composition, identification, and location. It can also give insight into the enemy’s current status and activities and future intentions. Signals intelligence interception, collection, and exploitation can only occur when the enemy/adversary or their equipment is transmitting a signal. This is a principal limitation of SIGINT.

**Technical Intelligence.** Technical intelligence is intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s technological advantages. (JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*) Explosive ordnance and munitions components captured or found on the battlefield can be of intelligence value. Explosive ordnance disposal personnel can perform technical intelligence evaluations on first-seen, modified, or unidentified ordnance items; report the required intelligence information; and perform render safe procedures and transportation of these items to the rear area for further exploitation. Further details on technical intelligence evaluation can be found in Marine Corps Order 8020.10, *Marine Corps Ammunition and Explosives Safety Program*. (See MCTP 10-10D, *MAGTF Explosive Ordnance Disposal*)

**Electronic Warfare.** Electronic warfare (EW) provides three distinct capabilities: electronic support, electronic attack (EA), and electronic protection. For EW capabilities to be effective, the commander must provide his/her intent and clear guidance to the operations officer, intelligence officer, and subordinate commanders in support of intelligence collections, fires (EA), and supported commanders’ PIRs. Although electronic support is a function of the intelligence section, EA and electronic protection fall under OIE; therefore, either the fires and effects coordination center (FECC) or information command center (ICC) is responsible for planning and coordinating these operations. Regardless of the section of primary responsibility, the tactical employment of EW capabilities must be left to the discretion of the commanders of the forward-most units with organic or attached EW-capable elements and where they can best provide collections and effectively employ their systems. For more detailed information, see MCRP 2-10A.1 and MCRP 3-32D.1, *Electronic Warfare*.

**Debriefing.** Debriefing is the means by which information is obtained from Marines. Any air or ground reconnaissance mission should be debriefed as soon as possible, preferably within 2 hours of mission completion. All participants of the reconnaissance mission should attend every phase of the debriefing process. The debriefing chronologically covers the mission’s actions and all related details from the start of the mission through arrival at the debriefing site. Specific information collected as a result of the mission is obtained during debriefing. Additionally, through questioning, a mission participant can provide information regarding sightings or observations, the significance of which may not always be apparent to non-intelligence Marines.

Debriefing is an important part of the intelligence collection effort, particularly when it is used to clarify and expound on information received via reporting. Debriefings will result in various reports, allow the G-2/S-2 to gather information that may not otherwise be available, and enable analysts to establish trends over time. Through this process, they can identify deviations from established baselines and recognize both significant and minute changes in the battlespace.

**Reporting.** The purpose of reporting formats is to provide information in a standardized manner within or between units. Standardized formats simplify and speed the accurate, timely flow of information from collectors to analysts. Formats minimize confusion and generate tempo. In modern warfare, operations are often conducted as part of a joint or allied/coalition force; this makes the disciplined use of accepted formats a requirement.

While it is important to report pertinent information, excessive information can overload and confuse higher and adjacent units. It is critical Marines distinguish between fact and opinion when reporting. Marines must report the facts first, then report their own assessment. If information is second-hand, this should also be distinguished in the report. When reporting (or receiving) information, Marines should consider to whom the information may be critical by using the “HASS principle,” which stands for higher, adjacent, supporting, and security. A Marine does not always report up the chain of command. Rather, a Marine must be able to determine whether the information is valuable to other individuals or units in the area.

Data management, formatting standards, and natural language processing are all important concepts that ensure reporting, regardless of format, provides context, can be easily utilized, and be easily integrated into other products/tools leveraged throughout the Marine Corps and the intelligence community. Data management standards are expected to evolve with technology or current mission needs. However, the data management principles from Marine Corps and Department of Defense leadership should underlie the specific standards with each new iteration. Most units, regardless of their purpose or function, have standing operating procedures that outline and standardize information reporting requirements, reporting formats, and intelligence information dissemination procedures. Although no Marine Corps-wide or intelligence community-wide standard exists for all reports, there are standards and minimum expectations for various reports. For instance, to the greatest extent possible, any automated input and report processing should employ natural language processing technology. Natural language processing is a branch of artificial intelligence that helps computers understand, interpret, and manipulate human language.

*Ground Reconnaissance Reporting.* At the company and battalion level, ground reconnaissance units should utilize, to the greatest extent possible, level I through level IV reports. These standardized reports are used to facilitate the supported commander’s PIRs. Without clear reporting or deliberate debriefing, observed information is not effectively collected and stored. This information must be conveyed in a manner that answers IRs and supports intelligence production to answer the CCIRs. The generation of level I through level IV intelligence reports will come primarily from reconnaissance battalions and light armored reconnaissance battalions, companies, or platoons. For more information about ground reconnaissance reporting, see MCRP 2-10A.6, *Ground Reconnaissance Operations*, and MCRP 2-10A.7, *Reconnaissance Reports Guide*.

*Aerial Reconnaissance Reporting.* At the squadron and group level, aerial reconnaissance units should utilize, to the greatest extent possible, inflight reports and mission reports. These standardized reports are used to facilitate the supported commander's PIRs. Without clear reporting or deliberate debriefing, observed information is not effectively collected and stored. This information must be conveyed in a manner which answers IRs and supports intelligence production to answer the CCIRs. See MCTP 3-20G, *Air Reconnaissance*, for more information about aerial reconnaissance reporting. The types of aerial reconnaissance reports generated include—

- *Inflight Report.* When utilized by flight crew, inflight reports allow aircrew to immediately communicate information to the direct air support center. Inflight reports are not limited to air reconnaissance information; therefore, the intelligence watch in the direct air support center should monitor all inflight reports and analyze them for any intelligence value.
- *Mission Reports.* Following a flight, all aircrew should be debriefed by their intelligence section. During this debriefing, the aircrew should walk through the flight/mission, validate their aircraft information and load out, and either provide amplifying information if an inflight report was sent or report any significant actions that occurred during the flight. Following the debriefing, the intelligence section generates a mission report and disseminates it as appropriate.

*Signals Intelligence Reporting.* Those in the SIGINT production chain prepare product reports for commanders, planners, and all-source intelligence specialists. A product report contains timely, accurate, thorough, relevant, and useful SIGINT information about the enemy/adversary in response to the supported commander's PIRs and IRs. Reports may be sent periodically or may be sent whenever highly perishable data is acquired in accordance with specified intelligence reporting criteria. Generally, SIGINT product reports will fall into one of three categories:

- *Signals Intelligence Report.* In SIGINT reports, the content and classification markings imply that the source of information is SIGINT. Such reports generally contain a SIGINT assessment and pertinent SIGINT technical information. These reports are handled within sensitive compartmented information (SCI)-controlled facilities and communications channels.
- *Non-Codeword Report.* Non-codeword reporting procedures may be used only when authorized by Director, National Security Agency (NSA). Non-codeword reporting allows time-sensitive information to be disseminated quickly, which is its principal value.
- *Sanitized Report.* Sanitized SIGINT reports contain SIGINT information that is reported via GENSER (general service) communications means in a manner that does not reveal SIGINT as the source of the information. The level of sanitization authority allowed by the MAGTF commander is established by DOD Directive TS-5105.21-M-2, *Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual, Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Policy*.

See MCRP 2-10A.1 for more information about SIGINT reporting.

*Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Reporting.* There are two categories of reporting produced by CI/HUMINT personnel: operational reports and informational reports.

- *Operational Report.* Operational reports record HUMINT operational details, such as source meetings, interrogations, and interviews. Operational reports do not include information

answering intelligence collection requirements, but rather information that describes the mechanics behind collecting such information. Operational reports are used solely within HUMINT management channels to guide the planning and execution of further HUMINT activities.

- *Informational Report.* Informational reports record information of intelligence value that answers intelligence collection requirements. They contain unevaluated information, not finished intelligence. Informational reports are generally intended for the widest dissemination within the intelligence analytic community. The HUMINT informational reports are intended to provide a means of disseminating raw information containing intelligence value, obtained directly from a source, into the intelligence cycle for evaluation, analysis, and fusion with other intelligence information.

See MCRP 2-10A.2 for more information about CI/HUMINT reporting.

---

## PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION

After a collection operation is executed, collected data enters the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) phases of the intelligence cycle. During processing and exploitation, collected information is translated “into an understandable form suitable for the production of intelligence. Processing is accomplished during collection or production. Data collected in a form suitable for analysis is processed automatically during collection. Other types of data require extensive processing, which can affect the timeliness and accuracy of the resulting information. Because processing and production are often accomplished by the same organization, production management generally encompasses the processing functions that are required to convert raw data into a usable format.” (MCTP 2-10B)

### Processing

Processing is largely a technical function of converting data into a form people can understand. Processing is becoming more automated, using machine speed to increase tempo and expand battlespace awareness. Examples of processing include translating a document or communications intercept from a foreign language, converting electronic data into a standardized report to be analyzed, or analyzing electronic signatures collected by unmanned systems. In some instances, processing may take place automatically during collection. Some types of data require extensive processing, which can affect the timeliness and utility of the resulting information.

### Exploitation

After data is processed, it must be exploited for intelligence information. Advances in artificial intelligence are augmenting analytical functions to exploit large amounts of information in a timely manner. For example, an aerial photograph or a frame of UAS video may be exploited by imagery analysts and computer vision to identify specific pieces of equipment or to measure the dimensions of structures found on the image. When resources are required to conduct the processing and exploitation phase, it is crucial that the processing requirements are prioritized and managed according to the PIRs to ensure critical information is extracted first.

---

## PRODUCTION

*“Production . . . converts data into intelligence and creates the knowledge . . . needed for the planning and execution of operations. The intelligence must deliver knowledge, in context, in time, and in a form usable in the decision-making process.”* (MCTP 2-10B) Intelligence production involves filtering, recording, evaluating, analyzing, synthesizing, and assessing all information relevant to a particular IR. During the production phase, information is—

- Evaluated to determine the reliability of the source and the credibility of the information.
- Analyzed to isolate significant elements.
- Integrated with other relevant information and previously developed intelligence.
- Interpreted to form logical conclusions and predictions that clarify the situation and support the commander’s decision-making process.
- Produced in the format most suitable to the customer (i.e., a person or system).

### Analytical Process

Intelligence specialists use a framework described as analysis, synthesis, and estimation. This framework calls for a disciplined approach to gathering and understanding information. The analyst must place information in context and relate it to planned or ongoing operations.

**Analysis.** Analysts must possess a thorough knowledge of military operations, the operational environment, the friendly situation, IRs, and the threat situation. As outlined in MCTP 2-10B, intelligence specialists—

- View collected information in the context of a unit’s mission, commander’s intent, and IRs.
- Identify key elements of the situation to formulate hypotheses, make deductions from those hypotheses, and reach conclusions.
- Divide the battlespace into component parts to isolate and define the elements of significant information—physical dimension, time, threat force structure, battlespace activities, and other characteristics—to facilitate understanding and satisfy the unit’s needs.
- Compare the existing situation to new information to determine whether it relates to identified IRs and to assess its impact on the current intelligence estimate.

**Synthesis.** Synthesis determines relationships that exist among information and pieces the information together into a coherent, meaningful picture. As outlined in MCTP 2-10B, intelligence specialists—

- Identify and integrate relationships between individually significant pieces of information with the existing operational environment to provide a new picture of the situation.
- Discern emerging patterns in environmental conditions or enemy activity.

**Estimation.** Estimation, the bottom line of the analytical process, is based on detailed studies of the tactical situation, experience, intelligence successes, the application of specific tools and methods,

and the supported commander's intelligence needs. Estimation must describe the current conditions and present an image of future possibilities. Analysts then determine a threat's—

- Capabilities.
- Intent.
- Probable COAs.
- Likely reactions to friendly operations.

Well-founded estimates help manage uncertainty about the situation and facilitate planning and executing successful operations.

### **Levels of Production**

Intelligence does not result solely from the investment of time or resources. Intelligence is developed by placing relevant information in context, converting it into knowledge through analysis and synthesis, and applying the knowledge to the decision-making process. There is inherent friction between the desire to provide as complete and accurate an intelligence product as possible and the time-sensitive requirement to support urgent tactical decision making. These conflicting demands must be balanced using stated direction, such as the commander's intent and PIRs, and knowledge of the operational situation. To provide a framework to make these determinations, intelligence production can be viewed as deliberate and immediate. There is no absolute distinction between the two types. The nature of the situation and pertinent IRs will dictate the amount of time available to complete each production effort.

***Deliberate Production.*** Deliberate production occurs when there is sufficient time to thoroughly evaluate, analyze, and synthesize all available information and produce a formal intelligence product, such as a written intelligence estimate, report, or detailed objective area study.

***Immediate Production.*** Immediate production is a time-limited, highly focused effort to satisfy an immediate tactical requirement. Immediate production is conducted to identify, process, and contextualize data, information, and intelligence that have a direct effect on ongoing or near-term operations, or upon which planners and intelligence personnel have already conducted extensive analysis. The production process is compressed, and the resulting product is rapidly disseminated. Immediate production is typically conducted during execution and results in simple, mission-specific intelligence products, the implications of which are likely to be readily understood by concerned decision makers.

---

## **DISSEMINATION**

“What do I know, and who else needs to know it?” Dissemination is the timely conveyance of intelligence to users in an appropriate form and must be planned and supervised to the same degree as collection and production. Determining the form and the means by which to deliver products are key aspects of the dissemination process. For more detailed information, see MCTP 2-10C, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Dissemination*.

## Form

Several factors govern the form of dissemination: the purpose of the intelligence product, the urgency and relevance of the intelligence to ongoing operations, the type and volume of the intelligence, the user's capability to receive intelligence products, the dissemination means available, and the format requested by the user. For example, many Marine Corps elements have only limited access to secret and no spaces accredited to brief large audiences and no access to top secret or SCI spaces or networks. The intent of intelligence dissemination is to convey a useful picture of the operational environment or threat to the decision maker in a form that facilitates rapid understanding.

An important aspect of dissemination, intelligence must be discoverable in a search. This requires a cohesive infrastructure that presents intelligence products in such a manner that allows subjects to be refined into more detailed intelligence as time and requirements dictate.

**Standard Formats.** Imagery, overlays, diagrams, and schematics, enhanced with appropriate textual data and annotations, comprise the baseline dissemination format whenever possible. As technology advances and adapts, intelligence production should leverage advances in visualization and user experience concepts, including virtual reality. However, in time-sensitive situations, a verbal report or short message may be the most expeditious dissemination form. Whether oral, textual, or graphic, intelligence products should use standard formats whenever possible. Products in standard formats are easy to prepare, disseminate, and understand. Standard formats are established by MAGTF G-2/S-2s in Annex B of the operation order and unit-specific standing operating procedures.

**Data Storage and Translation.** Intelligence dissemination first requires a central location where data is stored. Data from many sources is stored in its raw form in a data lake. Before data can be used, to some extent, the raw data must be processed. The extract/transform/load process is sufficient to move data into a more organized data warehouse, where it can be used. Alternatively, tools utilizing data as a service skip the data warehouse, so the data is manipulated directly in the data lake. Ideally, a versatile data infrastructure would be flexible enough to use either data as a Service or a data warehouse, depending on the best solution for current mission needs. Intelligence dissemination can and should occur in a piecemeal fashion, but it must always remain linked. As such, care should be used during extract/transform/load to preserve linkages. Linkages provide valuable context to intelligence in the form of relationships and dependencies.

**Data Security.** Security underlies the entire technical process of intelligence dissemination. Secure dissemination includes granular privilege management, which customizes intelligence access to individual users. In addition, stewards should prevent security issues resulting from data aggregation.

**Advanced Technology.** The ability to amass big data in cloud constructs and to automate data processing with algorithms running on high-capacity graphic processing units offers new approaches for production and dissemination.

With virtualized data, intelligence specialists can provide real-time data from multiple sources and deliver dynamic analytics to predefined views. In this approach, consumers receive intelligence through a configurable, interactive dashboard updated in real-time, rather than a static product.

This common environment for intelligence and operations facilitates collaboration and expedites decision making.

Systems such as distributed common ground/surface system—Marine Corps (also referred to as DCGS-MC) provide all-source capabilities such as automating analytical work flows for battlespace awareness; processing and analyzing big data; and naval and joint integration through analytical reachback, data discovery, and access to more exquisite ISR capabilities.

### **Delivery**

Delivering an intelligence product to the right person in a timely manner is managed by using a combination of methods, channels, and modes. The future of littoral operations in a contested environment highlights delivery challenges under denied, degraded, intermittent, and low-bandwidth conditions.

**Methods.** There are two basic methods used to disseminate intelligence: supply-push and demand-pull. A supply-push system pushes intelligence from the collectors/producers to the users as it becomes available. There is significant potential for information overload in a supply-push system. To prevent this, the dissemination node must evaluate and tailor what it passes through the system and not simply push everything it receives or develops to the customer.

The demand-pull mode provides access to intelligence on an as-needed basis. The user draws the required intelligence from the intelligence support system through a series of requests, searches, or inquiries. The demand-pull method decreases the volume of transmitted intelligence and diminishes the potential to overwhelm the user. However, demand-pull can also reduce timeliness, as intelligence is only developed and provided after a request is received. This method requires intelligence to be indexed and discoverable.

Dissemination systems must provide the flexibility to use either method or both, “pushing” important or time-sensitive intelligence directly to the users, while at the same time permitting them to “pull” other relevant intelligence as needed from readily accessible sources, such as a database or a watch section at an intelligence center. The methods, particularly if mixed, must be clearly articulated so that a user does not assume critical intelligence will be pushed when a producer expects a user to pull.

**Channels.** Intelligence is disseminated using two types of channels: standard and alarm. Standard dissemination is used for routine intelligence and is transmitted according to a set order and format, usually along established command or staff channels. Examples include the formal staff briefing and standardized reports. Although the standard channel is used to satisfy most dissemination requirements, its content flow must be monitored to ensure intelligence is timely and pertinent.

The alarm channel is used to disseminate critical, time-sensitive intelligence with the potential to have an immediate effect on operations, such as I&W of hostile activity. Indications and warning alarms must be rapidly disseminated to all pertinent units. Intelligence must flow laterally between units, as well as up and down the chain of command. The exchange of intelligence between all elements of the MAGTF is particularly important to ensure all commanders and staffs maintain a shared picture of the operational environment.

**Modes.** Intelligence is disseminated in one of three modes: broadcast, point-to-point, and subscription. In broadcast dissemination, intelligence is sent simultaneously to a broad audience, regardless of whether the intelligence affects them or not. This is most commonly executed through distribution lists for daily, weekly, or as-needed intelligence updates. Successful use of the broadcast mode depends on several factors, including judiciously selecting the intelligence broadcasted, users' ability to monitor the broadcast, and employing processing methods or systems to filter and select, for detailed examination, only those broadcast items pertinent to the user's requirements. Undisciplined use of this mode can quickly lead to information overload.

In the point-to-point mode, intelligence is sent to a specific user(s), typically in response to a specific request or requirement. Dissemination across the system is slower, but it is more focused and can provide intelligence tailored to the needs of each individual unit. Both broadcast and point-to-point dissemination are enhanced by using encrypted communications or secured network systems.

Technology is moving toward dynamic and interactive data delivered in real-time and removing the concept of static intelligence products. Rudimentary rules-based automation, such as subscription, provides a dissemination method where the pull is nearly transparent to the user, and the system delivers products or updates as they are published or reported. Although not the only option, this is best demonstrated by really simple syndication feeds. Once established, really simple syndication feeds allow users to subscribe and receive notifications about updated intelligence as it becomes available. The subscription mode relies on access to information technology assets (e.g., laptops, networks) by both the producer and the user.

---

## UTILIZATION

The value of intelligence is realized only when it is used to enhance planning and effectively conduct operations. Decision advantage requires integrating intelligence with operations in both a timely manner and in an easily understood format. This facilitates decision making at all levels, while at the same time maximizes the amount of relevant information available. The commander is responsible for effectively using the intelligence and ensuring decisions are founded upon the best, most recent estimates available. The intelligence officer facilitates effectively using the intelligence, supervises the intelligence effort, and assists the commander and staff in understanding the intelligence product and its application.

### **Common Operational Picture and Common Intelligence Picture**

The common operational picture (COP) is the primary vehicle for integrating intelligence and operations. Intelligence must be disseminated in a manner that can be rendered or visualized in the COP, thereby facilitating a shared operations/intelligence view. At subordinate levels, the common tactical picture is maintained and supports the COP. The CIP feeds the COP with enemy force and environmental information and reporting, allowing for immediate utilization throughout the command.

Reporting between the COP and CIP should never be a copy/paste effort. Instead, analysis should be performed to ensure all reports are compiled and properly interpreted. Rather than ask *What does it all mean?* putting forth a question like, *If platoon x is at y location, where are the other two platoons?* typically results in an improved CIP and COP. Understanding basic concepts, such as *platoons seldom stray far from their company*, will aid analysts and generate increased battlespace awareness. Additionally, doctrinal and historical templating assists in this analysis and can be automated through modeling and simulation to identify gaps and propose possible situations to create comprehensive CIPs and COPs.

Finally, when creating an accurate picture of the battlespace, assessments must be grounded in factual, all-encompassing reporting.

### **Feedback**

Through feedback, intelligence utilization provides guidance that initiates the next iteration of the intelligence cycle. Customer feedback determines whether a requirement has been satisfied. Unsatisfied requirements require additional intelligence development efforts. The satisfaction of one requirement typically generates new or additional requirements, the answers to which are necessary to further refine or focus the decision-making process. The cycle begins again.

# CHAPTER 4. CONCEPT OF MAGTF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

*All Marines involved in operations are involved in intelligence in one way or another, and all Marines involved in intelligence are involved in operations.*

—MCDP 2, *Intelligence*

By developing tactical intelligence, Marine intelligence operations facilitate planning and executing MAGTF operations. The MAGTF intelligence sections ensure required intelligence is available to commanders at all levels throughout the force in time to influence their decision-making processes. Key requirements for this support include—

- Staffing, training, and equipping organic intelligence sections down to the maneuver company and squadron level.
- Directing the intelligence effort and maintaining a robust collection, processing and exploitation, production, and dissemination capability.
- Employing specialized intelligence units to provide dedicated collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and production of all-source intelligence.
- Creating key intelligence nodes—through task organization and by using intelligence direct support teams (DSTs)—scalable at any echelon to concentrate intelligence support at critical times, C2 nodes, operational planning teams, and locations. An intelligence DST is task-organized to provide an enhanced intelligence capability to a supported intelligence section. The MAGTF intelligence operations center (IOC), MAGTF intelligence center (MIC), and Marine expeditionary force information group (MIG) ICC are the largest such nodes, created to support a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) G-2's requirement for a robust intelligence production capability whether deployed or garrison based. The MCI, intelligence battalions, radio battalions, reconnaissance battalions, and Marine unmanned aerial vehicle squadron (VMU) form smaller DSTs to support MEUs, special purpose MAGTFs, other MSCs, or subordinate units as required.
- Leveraging intelligence support available from national, theater, joint, other Service, and multinational forces to enhance MAGTF intelligence capabilities.
- Augmenting from global sourcing (i.e., noncommitted operating forces, the supporting establishment, and the reserve) to enhance intelligence support to the MAGTF.

The MAGTF G-2/S-2 coordinates through the IOC or operations control and analysis center (OCAC) to provide centralized tasking direction for the collection, processing and exploitation, production, and dissemination efforts of organic and supporting intelligence assets and ensures these efforts remain focused on satisfying the commander's PIRs. Concentrating specialized intelligence capabilities provided by the radio battalion, the intelligence battalion, the force reconnaissance company, and the VMU under this centralized direction facilitates unity of effort, effectively employs limited assets, and produces focused, all-source intelligence.

Depending on the CONOPS, task-organization, or mission requirements of the MEF or Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), the commanding general (CG) or staff may task the MIG commander to direct subordinate units to fulfill the tasking requirements. The ICC exists to support the MIG; however, the MIG commander provides ICC-like control and coordination to augment and enhance the ability of supported units and staffs to plan and conduct OIE.

The MAGTF can draw on the full range of national, theater, joint, and coalition intelligence resources. When available, these capabilities will be fully integrated into the IOC and OCAC. The applicable Marine Corps component command headquarters, in conjunction with the relevant numbered fleet or Navy counterpart, supports the MAGTF G-2 by—

- Conducting operational-level intelligence planning.
- Providing Marine intelligence liaison to joint task force (JTF) and other component intelligence elements.
- Monitoring the status of MAGTF intelligence collection and production requests for supporting and external support requirements.
- Planning, developing, and monitoring the adequacy of the JTF's and MAGTF's intelligence architectures and intelligence flow to the MAGTF.
- Supporting MAGTF participation in the joint targeting process.

The MAGTF command element's IOC or the MIC performs these functions. Major subordinate commands and other MAGTF elements will be able to access these external capabilities through the MAGTF intelligence architecture and pull available intelligence products. Specialized intelligence units (e.g., the radio battalion) will liaise with appropriate external agencies to coordinate tasking or support.

A MAGTF committed to an operation can be supported by non-deployed MAGTF intelligence assets, the supporting establishment, or reserve forces. Support can consist of augmented personnel, equipment, or specialized capabilities. The Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISRE) also offers the MAGTF a distributed production capability at the MICs and the fixed site—located at the MCI—located at the MCI—to provide additional processing and exploitation or production capacity. The flexibility to draw on assets from across the MCISRE enables MAGTF intelligence sections to tailor and enhance intelligence capabilities based committed units' requirements.

---

## **ROLE OF THE ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE SECTION**

Most commands from the battalion/squadron level and higher have an organic intelligence section. The unit intelligence officer and section occupy a central role in MAGTF intelligence support. They focus on developing, disseminating, and ensuring the effective use of intelligence and combat information in support of tactical operations specific to that unit, commander, and the given situation. Intelligence drives operations and remains responsive to mission requirements only through close and direct contact with the commander, key staff officers, and subordinate unit

leaders. Intelligence also feeds off of all the other warfighting functions to include operations; from their contact reports to their niche expertise, understanding how logistics to tactics will limit or expand an enemy's capabilities.

### **Unit Intelligence Officer**

The intelligence officer is the principal advisor to the commander on all matters related to intelligence within the command. The intelligence officer identifies, implements, and manages the command's intelligence and CI activities in order to meet the commander's requirements. Additionally, the intelligence officer has an invaluable role in the commander's decision-making process by ensuring intelligence is effectively integrated and utilized throughout all phases of mission planning, execution, and assessment. The intelligence officer accomplishes this by educating and training commanders and staffs about intelligence capabilities; providing advice on capabilities, limitations, and intelligence processes; and disseminating intelligence to higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting commands. The intelligence officer must be a full and contributing participant throughout operational planning and execution. The unit intelligence officer executes the following key responsibilities:

- Integrates intelligence and operations.
- Supports the chief of staff or executive officer as they synchronize staff activities during IPB.
- Develops and implements a collection plan based upon the commander's PIRs.
- Ensures the command's IRs are received, understood, and acted upon by organic and supporting intelligence assets.
- Develops and disseminates intelligence products tailored to the unit's mission and CONOPS.
- Monitors the flow and utility of intelligence throughout the command.
- Provides combat assessment data and analysis to assist the operations section.

### **Unit Intelligence Section**

The unit intelligence section supports the commander, the intelligence officer, and the rest of the command by producing and disseminating mission-oriented intelligence products. The intelligence section also—

- Conducts IPB analysis appropriate to the unit's mission and area of interest.
- Develops and maintains a comprehensive intelligence estimate.
- Tailors intelligence to meet specific unit requirements.
- Forms collection plans and support requests to satisfy unit PIRs and IRs.
- Maintains a current picture of the operational environment and threat.
- Prepares TSAs and target intelligence products.
- Recommends CI and force protection measures.
- Coordinates with supporting intelligence assets.

Each organic intelligence section performs all six intelligence functions described in chapter 1. However, the priority and level of effort applied to the different functions vary with the type of unit, the level of command, and the assigned mission.

### **Required Capabilities**

Organic intelligence sections must have the following capabilities:

- Sufficient personnel to carry out assigned responsibilities.
- Personnel trained in all aspects of tactical intelligence operations, emphasizing the production of tailored, all-source intelligence specific to the unit's mission.
- Organic collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination assets appropriate to the unit's mission and level of command, including information systems and automation (i.e., automated processes for processing and exploitation or automated processes throughout all steps of the intelligence cycle).
- Connectivity to other MAGTF intelligence assets to provide a common picture of the operational environment, receive warning and other critical intelligence, and to "pull" pertinent intelligence in response to unit requirements.

---

## **THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE SECTION**

The MAGTF CE intelligence section is the focal point for intelligence planning and operations within the MAGTF.

### **Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Officer**

The MAGTF G-2/S-2, supported by the IOC and/or MIC and subordinate unit intelligence sections, provides comprehensive, centralized direction for the MAGTF's intelligence effort. While the G-2/S-2 serves as the intelligence officer for the MAGTF commander, the IOC or MIC serves as the primary intelligence support node for the entire MAGTF and, as such, must remain responsive to the requirements of all MAGTF elements. The MAGTF intelligence officer performs the following tasks:

- Provides centralized direction for intelligence operations and intelligence training for MAGTF and MSC personnel.
- Plans and implements intelligence operations based on the mission, CONOPS, and commander's intent.
- Submits consolidated requests for external intelligence support to appropriate agencies through the Marine Corps component command headquarters.
- Links the MAGTF to theater, national, and multinational or coalition intelligence units.
- Integrates intelligence and operations.
- Develops intelligence support requirements.
- Coordinates with the G-3/S-3 to publish request for support messages to HHQ and orders to subordinate intelligence elements.
- Tasks organic MAGTF collection assets via the G-3/S-3.
- Supports situation development and the commander's estimate of the situation by coordinating the staff's requirements and input during IPB.
- Recommends, consolidates, integrates, and refines MAGTF PIRs and IRs.

- Plans, develops, and directs the MAGTF collection, production, and dissemination plans and operations.
- Ensures the command's IRs are received, understood, and acted upon by organic and supporting intelligence assets.
- Manages MAGTF-organic collection assets through the surveillance and reconnaissance coordination center (SARCC), the OCAC, and the reconnaissance operations center.
- Prepares a comprehensive CI plan and recommends force protection measures.
- Develops and coordinates intelligence dissemination plans and supporting architectures for voice and data networked communications.
- Develops and disseminates all-source intelligence products that are tailored to the mission and CONOPS.
- Develops dissemination priorities and intelligence reporting criteria and determines dissemination means.
- Monitors intelligence development and utilization throughout the MAGTF.
- Oversees intelligence training and readiness, including manning and talent management.
- Directs and supervises the MIC, which may include an all-source production section; GEOINT production section; targeting section; still and motion imagery PED section; OSINT production section; SIGINT PED section or OCAC; METOC section; and an enterprise management team.
- Develops, consolidates, and refines approved and/or recommended PIRs and IRs to support MAGTF planning and operations.
- Plans, develops, integrates, and coordinates MAGTF multi-intelligence processing and exploitation, production, and dissemination plans, to include the organic and external integration, employment, and staff cognizance of MAGTF SIGINT and GEOINT/full-motion video PED and all-source, targeting/engagement, topographic, and OSINT production and dissemination operations.
- Plans, develops, integrates, and coordinates intelligence and CI support to the commander's estimate, situation development, I&W, force protection, targeting/engagement, and combat assessment.
- Manages and fuses relevant information and intelligence from subordinate units and external commands and intelligence agencies.
- Plans, develops, and coordinates intelligence communications and information systems architecture, to include its integration with and support of distributed and enterprise production, as well as MAGTF targeting/engagement efforts, SIGINT and GEOINT PED, and other ISR requirements as necessary.

The MAGTF G-2/S-2 has staff responsibility for intelligence operations and intelligence support. The MAGTF intelligence section performs the following tasks:

- Analyzes the MAGTF's area of responsibility, operations, and interest.
- Develops and maintains a comprehensive current intelligence estimate.
- Tailors intelligence produced at all levels to meet specific MAGTF requirements.
- Forms collection plans and supports requests to satisfy unit PIRs and IRs.
- Maintains a graphic depiction of the current operational environment and threat (i.e., the CIP) and integrates it with the COP.

- Prepares target analysis and target intelligence products.
- Recommends CI and force protection measures.
- Provides liaison to supporting intelligence assets and MOC.
- Prepares appropriate intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance plans and orders for the MAGTF and reviews and coordinates the all-source intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance plans implemented by JTFs and other organizations.
- Submits and coordinates requests for collection, production, and dissemination requirements beyond the capability of the MAGTF.
- Prepares the intelligence estimates to support G-2 plans.
- Facilitates understanding and use of intelligence to support MAGTF operations planning and execution.
- In conjunction with the G-2 plans officer and G-2 operations officer, develops and completes annexes B, H, and M of MAGTF operation orders.
- Implements the concept of intelligence operations developed by the G-2 plans officer and approved by the MAGTF G-2.
- Conducts the intelligence watch turnover, which includes an overview of significant events that occurred during the previous shift; the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs, as supported by current reporting and terrain analysis; and an overview of the CIP/COP.

The MAGTF G-2/S-2 exercises staff cognizance over subordinate staff intelligence officers and units/organizations.

### **Special Staff Officers under the Cognizance of the MAGTF G-2/S-2 Officer**

**G-2/S-2 Operations Officer.** The G-2/S-2 operations officer has primary responsibility for intelligence support to the MAGTF commander and the remainder of the CE in support of current and future operations. Specific responsibilities are as follows:

- Serves as the G-2/S-2 representative to the MAGTF CE crisis action team.
- Coordinates, provides, and supervises intelligence support to the MAGTF CE current operations center, future operations center, FECC, and ICC.
- Coordinates and provides intelligence support to the commander and staff, including briefs and intelligence summaries.
- Recommends PIR and IR validation, prioritization, and tasking to the MAGTF G-2/S-2 and the intelligence support coordinator (ISC). The intelligence battalion commander is designated as the ISC.
- Coordinates and supervises the transition of intelligence planning and operations from G-2/S-2 plans to G-2/S-2 future operations, and from G-2/S-2 future operations to G-2/S-2 current operations, to effectively support the MAGTF's single battle transition process.
- Plans, directs, and supervises MAGTF liaison teams to external commands (e.g., the JTF, joint component headquarters, other intelligence organizations).
- Provides intelligence input and other support to MAGTF warning and fragmentary order development and operations-related reporting.

- Coordinates intelligence training for the MAGTF G-2/S-2 section and provides oversight for and integration of the MAGTF's intelligence training program.

**G-2/S-2 Plans Officer.** The G-2/S-2 plans officer is primarily responsible for intelligence support to the future operations and plans cell. The plans officer's specific responsibilities are to—

- Plan the MAGTF concept of intelligence operations for MAGTF G-2/S-2 approval and for subsequent implementation.
- Lead, coordinate, and provide intelligence support to the MAGTF G-5/S-5 plans and G-3/S-3 future operations sections.
- Plan and coordinate intelligence support requirements for and the deployment of intelligence elements and resources into the operational environment.
- Recommend PIR and IR validation, prioritization, and tasking to the MAGTF G-2/S-2 and the ISC.
- In conjunction with the ISC, the G-2/S-2 operations officer and the intelligence section develop annexes B, H, K, M, N, and V to MAGTF operation plans and orders.
- Apprise the G-2/S-2 section, other CE staff sections, intelligence liaison personnel, and augments of MAGTF intelligence planning actions and requirements.
- Coordinate and develop policies for MAGTF intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance operations.
- Plan, direct, and supervise the MAGTF G-2/S-2 GEOINT, CI/HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, and METOC sections.

**Intelligence Battalion Commander/Intelligence Support Coordinator.** The intelligence battalion commander/ISC is responsible for providing intelligence support to the MAGTFs, MSCs, and other commands as directed.

*In Garrison.* The intelligence battalion commander's principal task in garrison is to organize, train, and equip detachments in support of MAGTFs or other designated commands by integrating collection, analyzing and producing intelligence, and disseminating intelligence products. Such detachments typically include the personnel who staff the IOC, the MIC, and the MEU S-2 sections. Similarly, the radio battalion commander provides personnel to the OCAC or operational control element, virtual SIGINT operations centers, and MEU S-2s.

*During Operations.* The intelligence battalion commander/ISC performs the following tasks during operations:

- Implements the concept of intelligence operations developed by the G-2 plans officer and approved by the MEF G-2.
- Establishes and supervises the MIC, which may include the fusion/intelligence watch section, GEOINT production section, all-source fusion platoon, OCAC, and SARCC to support the MEF CE and provide reachback support to MSCs and subordinate MAGTFs.
- Plans, develops, integrates, and coordinates MAGTF intelligence collection, production, and dissemination plans, to include the effective organic and external integration, employment, and staff cognizance of MAGTF SIGINT, CI, HUMINT, GEOINT, MASINT, OSINT, ground reconnaissance, and tactical air reconnaissance intelligence collection, production, and dissemination operations.

- In conjunction with the G-2 plans officer and G-2 operations officer, develops and completes annexes B, H, and M to MAGTF operation orders.
- Plans, develops, integrates, and coordinates intelligence and CI support to the commander's estimate, situation development, I&W, force protection, targeting/engagement, and combat assessment.
- Manages and fuses CIP inputs from subordinate units and external commands and intelligence agencies into the MEF's COP and/or MAGTF's CTP.
- Provides intelligence support to the MAGTF G-2 section and MSCs.
- Prepares the intelligence and CI estimates to support G-2 plans.
- Plans, develops, and coordinates intelligence communications and information systems architecture, to include its integration with and support of MAGTF GEOINT and other intelligence and reconnaissance requirements.
- Coordinates and integrates all-source intelligence operations with other Service components, the JTF JISE, the theater JIOC, and national and coalition intelligence agencies and operations.
- Assists with evaluating and improving MAGTF all-source intelligence and CI operations.

**Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Center Director.** The MIC director supports the MEF G-2's mission in garrison to answer PIRs/IRs for decision makers throughout the MEF command element and provides intelligence support to subordinate MAGTFs, MSCs, and other commands as directed. The MIC director works under the direct staff cognizance of the MEF G-2 with the G-2 operations element.

**Collection Manager.** The collection manager is sourced from either the MEF G-2 staff or the intelligence battalion and is subordinate to the G-2. As the mission dictates, the duties of the collection manager can be split between the G-2 and the intelligence battalion. When this occurs, a member of the G-2 staff serves as the lead collection manager and the intelligence battalion provides collections officers in charge (OICs). Under this model, the collection manager provides direction to the collections OICs, who then implement the collection plan by tasking assets and requesting resources.

The collection manager formulates detailed intelligence collection requirements and coordinates internal and external operations to satisfy them. The collection manager receives validated PIRs/IRs and direction from the G-2/S-2, then plans, manages, and requests methods best suited to employ organic and/or supporting collection resources. The collection manager is also responsible for validating and forwarding national and theater intelligence collection requests from the MAGTF and MSCs.

During operations, the collection manager works within the SARCC or as part of the IOC. The collection manager is responsible to the G-2 for—

- *Collections Planning.* Determines and coordinates collection efforts to satisfy requirements that may be collected via organic intelligence assets.
- *Collections Requirements Management.* Tracks collection requirements, requests, and completion status. Receives and processes requests for collection from subordinate elements. Requests support from the aviation combat element to fill collection requests with MEF UAS

and nontraditional ISR assets and requests incorporation into the air tasking order. Requests support from HHQ and external agencies for collections beyond organic MAGTF capabilities.

- *Collections Operations Management*. Develops integrated intelligence collection plans with MAGTF, JTF, theater, and national intelligence collection and production operations and monitors their execution. Provides recommendations for tasking and allocating collections resources and assets to G-3 in accordance with intelligence and operations requirements.
- *Dynamic Targeting Support*. Recommends dynamic collection asset retasking to G-3/FECC to support dynamic targeting efforts.
- *Evaluating Effectiveness*. Assesses the effectiveness of MAGTF and supporting intelligence collection operations and adjusts as necessary to optimize their effectiveness.

**Surveillance and Reconnaissance Coordination Center Officer in Charge.** The SARCC OIC is an immediate subordinate to the ISC and is responsible for supervising and executing MAGTF surveillance and reconnaissance operations. The SARCC OIC's specific responsibilities are—

- Coordinate, monitor, and maintain the status of all ongoing intelligence, CI, HUMINT, and reconnaissance collection operations. These include missions, tasked intelligence collection requirements, and reporting criteria for all collection missions; the locations and times for all pertinent fire support control measures; and the primary and alternate communications and information systems plans for routine and time-sensitive requirements.
- Conduct detailed intelligence collection planning and coordination with MSCs and intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance organizations' planners, emphasizing clear understanding of the collection plan and specified intelligence reporting criteria.
- Ensure other MAGTF C2 nodes (e.g., the current operations center, FECC) are apprised of ongoing collection operations.
- Receive routine and time-sensitive intelligence reports from deployed collection elements and coordinate cross-cueing among intelligence collectors, as appropriate. Disseminate intelligence reports according to unit PIRs and IRs, intelligence reporting criteria, the intelligence dissemination plan, and the current operational situation.

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Current Operations Manager.** The ISR current operations manager acts as a liaison between the collection manager, Air Force ISR liaison officer, joint terminal attack controllers, current operations officer/noncommissioned officer, and command team. At the MEF-level, the ISR OIC is normally located in the combat operations center near the FECC, ICC, intelligence current operations officer, and air liaison officer to facilitate communications regarding target refinement, fires/airspace coordination, collateral damage, BDA, and re-attack recommendations.

The ISR current operations manager manages the current collection plan and maintains situational awareness of all ISR platforms within the operating environment. The ISR current operations personnel advise the command team on the consequences of dynamically retasking ISR platforms. Additional duties include communicating, to all concerned parties, changes to essential elements of information, SIRs, NAIs, and other IRs.

**Production and Analysis Cell Officer in Charge.** The production and analysis (P&A) cell OIC is the third principal subordinate to the ISC or MIC director and is primarily responsible for managing

and supervising the MIC's or IOC's all-source intelligence processing and production efforts. The P&A OIC's specific responsibilities are to—

- Interface with the OCAC.
- Plan, direct, coordinate, and integrate P&A cell operations, estimates, and products with the MIC director in garrison.
- Maintain all-source intelligence databases, files, workbooks, country studies, and other intelligence studies.
- Plan and maintain imagery, mapping, topographic resources, and other intelligence references.
- Analyze and fuse intelligence and other information into tailored, all-source intelligence products to satisfy supported commanders' stated or anticipated PIRs and IRs.
- Develop and maintain current and future intelligence assessments and target intelligence products based upon all-source analysis, interpretation, and integration.
- Manage and fuse CIP inputs from subordinate units, external commands, and intelligence agencies into appropriate terrain, population, or threat-focused layers of the MAGTF command element's COP.

---

## MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

Centralized management is essential because of the limited number of specialized intelligence assets available to the MAGTF and the requirement to integrate and focus intelligence operations to satisfy the commander's PIRs. Intelligence capabilities and organizations providing either direct or general support to the entire MAGTF are employed in general support with staff cognizance exercised through the G-2 or the MIG. Many intelligence units perform operational tasks in addition to their primary intelligence functions.

The MAGTF G-2 provides centralized direction for these assets and facilitates unity of effort and the effective use of limited resources in support of the entire force's requirements. The G-2/S-2 provides direction primarily through MAGTF-level intelligence C2 agencies (i.e., IOC, MIC, OCAC, and SARCC). Subordinate elements of the MAGTF retain organic intelligence assets and operational control appropriate to their mission and level of command (e.g., light armored reconnaissance and division reconnaissance units remain under the operational control of the ground combat element [GCE] commander).

### Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Level Intelligence Organizations

***Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Center.*** The MIC is led by the MEF G-2 and a designated MIC director. It is a garrison-based organization tasked with directing, planning, coordinating, and producing federated, multidiscipline intelligence to support MEF forces, operational planning, and MEF priorities. The MIC is a task-organized intelligence center, similar in concept to the MEF IOC, but it operates from the MEF's garrison facilities to fulfill the IRs of the MEF commander, staff, and subordinate commands. Each MEF has different, regionally focused missions and IRs; consequently, each MIC's structure is tailored to meet the needs of its

command. This flexible, mission-oriented composition is a valuable attribute of MIC operations, and it allows the MIC to scale as needed to accommodate emergent tasks and conditions. This includes distributed support to deployed MAGTFs and other organizations when appropriately tasked. Although the capabilities and makeup of a MIC may expand as mission or tasking dictate, the following list reflects its common core functionality:

- *All-Source Intelligence Production.* Each MIC can perform an array of all-source analysis and intelligence production.
- *GEOINT Processing, Exploitation, and Production.* Each MIC can produce a range of GEOINT products, to include those that support targeting/engagement processes.
- *OSINT Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Production.* Each MIC can collect, process, and exploit publicly available information to create OSINT products.
- *SIGINT Processing and Exploitation.* Each MIC is linked to, or collocated with, its associated radio battalion virtual SIGINT operations center and can leverage the efforts of cyberspace and SIGINT professionals to satisfy customer requirements.
- *METOC Analysis.* Each MIC has a METOC section and can perform METOC research, analysis, forecasting, and impact assessments in support of MEF planning and operations.
- *IRs Management.* The MIC manages the bulk of the G-2's daily IRs for the MAGTF CE, but it also serves as an access point through which subordinate commands can leverage intelligence expertise and resources external to the MEF.
- *Federated and Distributed Intelligence Support.* When appropriately tasked and resourced, the MIC also provides a platform for federated and distributed intelligence support to deployed MAGTFs, Service component organizations, combatant commands, and coalition partners. This support may be virtual/distributed in nature, but it may also include augmentation or intelligence exchange personnel.

Because of its enduring focus on the MEF's mission, the MIC also provides a favorable environment for intelligence specialists to cultivate specific regional or functional knowledge and to develop relationships with other analysts and organizations focused on the same areas and subjects. Some of these Marines may deploy with MAGTFs bound for areas in which they have developed specific expertise, augmenting deployed units with a greater understanding than their own intelligence sections could have otherwise initially provided. In this way, the MIC serves not only as a focal point for IRs, products, and analytical expertise within the MEF, but it also functions as the MEF's access point to intelligence from other theater intelligence organizations, the other MEFs, MCIA, and by extension, across the national intelligence community.

In garrison, the MIC provides many of the services typically provided by the IOC. The IOC will provide the necessary services required by the deployed commander, while the MIC will provide augmentation capabilities and those services best suited for reachback.

**Intelligence Operations Center.** The intelligence battalion commander/ISC establishes and operates the IOC under the staff cognizance of the G-2. The intelligence battalion's detachment commander will similarly operate under the staff cognizance of the G-2/S-2 of the supported MSC

or subordinate MAGTF. The IOC (see figure: *Intelligence Operations Center*) is collocated with the MAGTF's main command post and includes the—

- Fusion/intelligence watch section.
- GEOINT production section.
- All-source fusion platoon.
- OCAC.
- CI/HUMINT operations cell.
- SARCC.
- SCI security and communications.

**Reconnaissance Battalion and Force Reconnaissance Company.** The reconnaissance battalions and force reconnaissance companies conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in support of MAGTF operations. Reconnaissance Marines use specialized insertion, patrolling, reporting, and extraction techniques to conduct amphibious and deep reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. Future operations in the littorals will require reconnaissance units to support maritime domain awareness, patrol in small boats, working with attached intelligence specialists, operate unmanned systems, and employ unattended ground and maritime sensors.

A reconnaissance company can also perform other operational tasks. The MAGTF commander prioritizes the reconnaissance unit's tasks based on recommendations from the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3. The reconnaissance battalion is organic to the Marine division. While the force reconnaissance company remains under the administrative control of the reconnaissance battalion, the company is under the operational and tactical control of the MAGTF commander.

**Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron.** The VMUs conduct electronic warfare and multisensor reconnaissance and surveillance during expeditionary, joint, and combined operations. Unmanned aircraft system capabilities include imagery intelligence, SIGINT collection, and communications relay. Real-time, electro-optical/infrared imagery can also provide support to target acquisition, engagement, and BDA and it can assist in controlling supporting arms and maneuver. Squadrons are under the administrative control of the Marine aircraft wing. Due to the limited assets and the critical capabilities VMUs provide to the entire force, the MAGTF commander retains operational and tactical control of them.

**Engineer Support Battalion.** The Marine logistics groups' engineer support battalions and Marine divisions' combat engineer battalions are tasked to support mobility, countermobility, and survivability enhancements and can provide valuable information about terrain and enemy/adversary tactics.

In addition to being trained in route clearance, breaching, and clearing and proofing minefields, the explosive ordnance disposal elements within an engineer support battalion have the potential to provide weapons intelligence expertise by identifying, collecting, exploiting, and analyzing captured enemy explosives and components.




Figure 4-1. Intelligence Operations Center

Engineering unit equipment is being upgraded to include more advanced survey technology, which provides more expedient and higher fidelity information about routes and terrain to augment battlefield awareness. More specifically these can support route reconnaissance and high fidelity terrain analysis using electro-optical, infrared, and light detection and ranging sensors attached to UAS or vehicles and analyzed by program of record software.

**Light Armor Reconnaissance Battalion.** Light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalions conduct reconnaissance, security, economy of force operations, and limited offensive or defensive

operations that exploit a unit's mobility and firepower. Given the battalion's mission set, LAR is particularly suited to provide intelligence collection on enemy composition, disposition, and strengths. Additionally, given their mobility, these battalions can be particularly useful in support of route, zone, and area reconnaissance missions. Radio battalion attaches light armored vehicle-electronic warfare (LAV-EW) teams to the LAR element for forward SIGINT collection and EW capabilities.

**Nontraditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.** Air reconnaissance is one of six functions of Marine aviation. The VMUs primarily fulfill this function, but other aviation units can conduct surveillance and reconnaissance as a secondary mission during other primary tasking. By coordinating with the Marine aircraft wing G-2/G-3, the MAGTF G-2/G-3 can leverage numerous flight operations as collection opportunities. The primary tasking authority to ensure this is translated via official channels through the means of the aviation combat element is the daily publishing of the air tasking order with associated coordinating instructions.

Infantry units will employ organic SIGINT/EW teams with their companies, as well as small UASs with payload mixes tailored to their mission. Dispersed widely in the littorals, companies contribute to the force's persistent sensing, while maintaining the ability to conduct reconnaissance pull as needed.

Logistics units participate in various programs and conduct projects in remote locations, and travel through varying routes and terrain, affording valuable insights into human behavior, physical terrain, cultures, and environments. This interaction can enrich battlespace awareness through debriefing.

### **Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Capabilities Employment**

The MAGTF intelligence capabilities are employed to meet the requirements of the entire force and tailored to directly support the threat level, mission, and task organization at hand given the situation. The MAGTF G-2/S-2 develops a concept of intelligence support that satisfies the needs of the MAGTF commander's mission, PIRs, CONOPS, and intent. This concept must integrate intelligence activities with operations to enable rapid, effective decision making. Based on intelligence analysis and operational CONOPS, collection assets are positioned to satisfy PIRs, expose enemy vulnerabilities, monitor key locations, assist in network engagement activities, and identify opportunities as they arise.

### **Intelligence Coordination**

Establishing and supervising MAGTF IOC operations—including the support cell, the SARCC, the OCAC, and the P&A cell—requires a high degree of coordination at all levels and close coordination with MAGTF operations, particularly with the FECC and ICC.

### **Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group**

The mission of the MIG is to coordinate, integrate, and employ capabilities to ensure the MAGTF commander's ability to facilitate friendly forces maneuver and to deny the enemy freedom of action in the information environment. The MIG provides capabilities and units that support—

- Communications.
- Intelligence.

- Supporting arms liaison.
- Electromagnetic spectrum operations.
- Inform, influence, and deception operations.
- Cyberspace and space operations in support of MAGTF operations.

The Marine expeditionary force support battalion (MSB), which falls under the MIG, coordinates the combat service support and security and administrative services for both the MEF and MEB headquarters in garrison and a single MAGTF (MEF or MEB) CE when deployed.

The MIG employs its capabilities in accordance with the following principles, command relationships, and primary functions:

- The MIG commander exercises command over its assigned forces and reports directly to the MEF CG. Based on the MEF or MEB CONOPS, task-organization, or mission requirements, the MIG commander directs and coordinates subordinate command relationships, which may include directing subordinate units to support the MEF or MEB CE, supporting MSCs' operational requirements, or providing information-related capabilities to MSCs. The MIG retains operational control of its subordinate units. Any CEs or other MAGTF's support requirements will be fulfilled via typical tasking channels.
- The MIG is organized with a headquarters and subordinate units to provide and integrate communications, intelligence, electromagnetic spectrum operations, information engagement, cyberspace, space, supporting arms liaison, administration, security, infrastructure, and sustainment support to a MAGTF or assigned units. The MIG employs task-organized elements to support a MAGTF or other assigned units.
- The MIG commander exercises command and control through the MIG staff and subordinate commanders and supports MAGTF command and control through the ICC and by employing its subordinate units. The MIG commander also serves as the MEF OIE coordinator.
- The MIG, in coordination with the MEF CE staff, leverages capabilities resident within its subordinate units to conduct offensive, defensive, and exploitative actions within the information environment.


The MIG performs the following seven OIE functions in support of the MAGTF commander:

- Assures enterprise command and control and critical systems.
- Provides information environment battlespace awareness.
- Attacks and exploits networks, systems, and information.
- Informs domestic and international audiences.
- Influences foreign target audiences.
- Deceives foreign target audiences.
- Controls OIE capabilities, resources, and activities.

**Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group Headquarters.** The mission of the MIG headquarters is to provide the MIG commander the means to exercise command and control over its elements to effectively coordinate, integrate, and employ information capabilities, supporting arms liaison,

and law enforcement capabilities. To execute MAGTF OIE functions, the MIG headquarters establishes the ICC and provides planning and coordination support to both the MEF and MEB CEs in garrison and to a single MAGTF (MEF or MEB) CE when deployed.

The MIG headquarters includes a group headquarters, staff sections, company headquarters, and individual augments, as required, to support the MIG commander exercise command and control over subordinate units. Subordinate MIG units include an MSB, communication battalion, intelligence battalion, radio battalion, air/naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO), communication strategy and operations company, and expeditionary operations training group (EOTG). Each MEF has one MIG. The MIG headquarters consists of a headquarters company, communication strategy and operations company, and special staff. The MIG headquarters supports the MIG commander and either a MEF or MEB CE executes OIE. The headquarters deploys as a unit or task-organized element attached to the supported MEF or MEB CE. A notional MIG structure is displayed in the figure: *Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group Notional Structure*.



**Figure 4-2. Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group Notional Structure.**

**Marine Expeditionary Force Support Battalion.** The MSB provides HHQ support and coordinates combat service support and administrative, training, and logistical support to the MEF CE, MEB CE, MIG headquarters, and subordinate MIG units.

The MSB typically collocates with the supported MEF CG and operates intact, performing headquarters commandant functions. When deployed, the MSB may task-organize elements from throughout the MIG to sustain the MEF CE, MEB CE, MIG headquarters, and other MIG units. The MSB may also receive assistance from the Marine logistics group.

**Communication Battalion.** Each MEF has an organic communication battalion consisting of a headquarters company, a general support company, defensive cyberspace operations-internal

defense measures company, direct support companies (one at 7th Communication Battalion and three at 8th and 9th Communication Battalions), and a service company.

The mission of the communication battalion is to establish, maintain, and defend communication networks in support of MAGTF CEs (MEB CEs or larger), Marine component headquarters, or combined/JTF headquarters to facilitate effective command and control of assigned forces. Elements of the battalion are organized to provide general support or direct support to the Marine Corps component commander or MAGTF CE. The MAGTF CE G-6/S-6 exercises staff cognizance over MAGTF communications to facilitate system planning and engineering. The communication battalion conducts concurrent planning with the MAGTF G-6/S-6. The battalion also provides communication detachments and teams, as required, to install, operate, and maintain unclassified and secret level beyond line-of-sight wideband transmission systems, tactical network services, cyberspace security, and telephone services in support of designated battalion direct support communication detachments and MEU CEs.

**Intelligence Battalion.** The intelligence battalion plans, directs, analyzes, produces, and disseminates intelligence to the MAGTF, MSCs, and other commands as directed. The intelligence battalion also provides organic intelligence collection capabilities through its terrestrial sensors and CI/HUMINT company, which receives tasking through the intelligence battalion. At the MEB level and above, intelligence battalion IOCs plan and coordinate activities and conduct analysis. Support to lower echelons is usually provided by task-organized detachments. Elements of the battalion are organized to provide general support or direct support to the Marine Corps component commander or MAGTF CE. The MAGTF CE G-2/S-2 exercises staff cognizance over MAGTF intelligence to facilitate planning and execution. The intelligence battalion conducts concurrent planning with the MAGTF G-2/S-2. The battalion also provides detachments and teams as required to provide intelligence and collection support. As previously described, the main hub of the intelligence battalion is the IOC. It serves as the primary intelligence support node for the entire MAGTF and, as such, must remain responsive to the requirements of all MAGTF elements. The battalion is also responsible for providing top secret-level communications and temporary SCI facility support for the MEF CE in operations. See the P&A OIC and/or IOC section for more information.

**Radio Battalion.** The radio battalion provides SIGINT, ground EW, cyberspace operations, and special intelligence communications support to the MAGTF and joint force commander (JFC). The radio battalion serves as the coordination center between the MAGTF and external commands/agencies on all matters concerning SIGINT operations and production.

The radio battalion consists of a battalion headquarters, a headquarters and service company, and designated operational companies. At the MEB level and above, radio battalions plan and coordinate these activities through the OCAC. The radio battalion task-organizes smaller elements into operational control elements, SIGINT/EW teams, LAV-EW teams, and radio reconnaissance teams, depending on the size and scope of the requirement. When a task-organized element is employed, the team is typically attached to a similarly capable unit. For example, an LAV-EW team would be attached to the LAR element to conduct forward SIGINT collection and EW operations. The MAGTF commander determines direct support and general support relationships, which are usually mission dependent.

The OCAC consists of the following:

- OCAC OIC.
- Watch officer/watch chief.
- Collection manager.
- Senior analyst.
- SIGINT geospatial analysis cell.
- Digital network intelligence cell.
- Cryptologic linguist cell.
- SIGINT report writers.
- Special intelligence communications.

***Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.*** The mission of ANGLICO is to provide the MAGTF commander with a liaison capability to plan, coordinate, employ, and conduct terminal fire control in support of joint, allied, and coalition forces.

The ANGLICO consists of a headquarters section and two brigade air-naval gunfire platoons in the Active Component and three brigade air-naval gunfire platoons in the Reserve Component. Each brigade platoon consists of a headquarters element and two supporting arms liaison teams (SALTs). Each SALT consists of one headquarters element and two firepower control teams. An ANGLICO is organized to support MAGTF, joint, allied, or coalition forces up to the division level. The headquarters section is designed to collocate with the supported division headquarters and the brigade platoons are organized to support brigade- or regiment-sized units. A SALT supports battalion-sized units, while firepower control teams support company-sized units within the supported battalion. A notional ANGLICO structure is displayed under the MIG in the figure *Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group Notional Structure*.

A MAGTF commander employs ANGLICO elements to provide a liaison capability between the MAGTF headquarters and subordinate or adjacent joint, allied, or coalition units. This liaison focuses on fire support coordination and employing ground and aviation fire support assets. The capability of the supported unit determines the level of required support. Less capable coalition foreign military forces may require more support than joint or allied forces operating with the MAGTF.

***Expeditionary Operations Training Group.*** The mission of EOTG is to provide training in select special skills. It conducts and evaluates collective training to prepare MEUs and other designated forces to support combatant commander requirements. The EOTG also executes MEF training requirements.

The EOTG is organized to plan, coordinate, conduct, evaluate, and supervise specified training for the MEF and is organized into branches and sections by function and associated training sets. The branches and sections are organized into cadres of instructors, special skills instructors, and support personnel. Instructors are organized around closely associated skills.

The EOTG is employed by branch, section, and cadre to accomplish specified training mission. Selected members are task-organized to meet the supported commander's and combatant commander's directed training requirements.

---

## INTELLIGENCE TASK ORGANIZATION

Intelligence must be integrated with the mission, commander's intent, and CONOPS, and should be weighted to support the main effort. The MAGTF intelligence structure has the flexibility to meet the requirements of various types of expeditionary operations and adapt to changing requirements and operational imperatives during execution. For each operation, the MAGTF G-2/S-2 develops a concept of intelligence support and postures intelligence assets to satisfy PIRs and IRs. Specialized intelligence capabilities can enhance the ability or capacity of supported G-2/S-2 sections to develop timely, mission-focused intelligence. For certain operations and missions, the MIC and MCISRE architecture can enable the G-2/S-2 to deliver reliable, comprehensive intelligence support while simultaneously reducing the size of the deployed force.

Intelligence capabilities are employed in general support, in direct support, or attached to a supported unit. In general support, units are tasked by the MAGTF commander through the G-3/S-3 to satisfy the requirements of the entire force. In direct support, the requirements of a supported commander are given priority. Direct support focuses intelligence support on particular phases of an operation or enhances support to specific MAGTF subordinate elements.

MAGTFs smaller than a MEF or MEB are typically supported by attached, task-organized detachments, providing tailored intelligence, from the intelligence battalion, the reconnaissance battalion, the radio battalion, and/or the VMU. When intelligence capabilities are attached, the Marines are typically under the administrative, tactical, and operational control of the unit they are supporting. This is best displayed when radio battalion attaches LAV-EW teams to LAR elements. Once attached, the LAV-EW Marines receive all support (e.g., food, water, maintenance) and tasking (tactical and collection) from the LAR element to which they are attached (i.e., battalion, company, or platoon). Some sensitive collection activities, however, remain under a higher unit's or agencies technical control. Technical control dictates how particular capabilities, such as SIGINT or HUMINT, are employed.

### Expeditionary Intelligence Nodes

The MAGTF can distribute a series of expeditionary intelligence nodes to provide focused intelligence support to specific units or areas, based on the tactical situation. The MAGTF G-2/S-2 task-organizes the MAGTF's intelligence units and uses DSTs to provide the required intelligence capabilities. Although these nodes typically support a specific unit, they can also be used in a mission support or area support mode, supporting numerous units engaged in a particular effort or operating in a particular sector of the operating environment.

### Disaggregated Intelligence Operations

Disaggregated intelligence operations involve providing access to critical capabilities within the area of operations while maintaining certain high-demand or resource-intensive intelligence functions in rear areas at intermediate support bases, staging areas, or garrison locations. Through this remote access, the MCISRE can reduce a deployed force's footprint, thereby decreasing the on-site administrative and logistic support requirements associated with its intelligence detachment. Situations conducive to disaggregated intelligence operations include—

- Operations conducted in areas with minimal infrastructure and reliable, robust communications.
- Operational or deployment environments constrained by personnel limitations.

- Deployment environments that could limit the capabilities or effectiveness of certain supporting elements.

The advantages and disadvantages of disaggregated operations must be assessed. Significant disadvantages include the dependence they create on reachback responsiveness and reliable communications support, as well as their potential to increase the MAGTF's electronic signature. Long-range, high-bandwidth communication signals can render the MAGTF more vulnerable to detection and targeting by enemy/adversaries with modern EW and fires capabilities.

### **Intelligence Direct Support Teams**

Direct support teams are composed of personnel with a mix of specialty intelligence skills; provide an enhanced collection, analytical, and dissemination capability to a unit's intelligence section; and link its intelligence structure to other units. As assigned by their chain of command, DSTs augment the supported unit's intelligence section to—

- Perform intelligence production in support of future operations.
- Tailor external source intelligence products to the needs of the supported commander.
- Assist with managing external intelligence support requirements.
- Disseminate intelligence received from external sources.

The MAGTF and MSC G-2s use their DSTs to tailor and focus intelligence support to units designated as the main effort or to create enhanced intelligence nodes at key times and places. The MIC may form a special DST in garrison to provide the MAGTF with dedicated intelligence capabilities to leverage during training or for distributed intelligence reachback operations. During MEF operations, intelligence assets are tasked via the G-3/S-3, through the chain of command, to provide tailored intelligence capabilities or to enhance an intelligence node in support of an MSC or other MAGTF element.

---

## **EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE**

### **Marine Corps Component Command Intelligence Section**

The commanders of Marine Corps component commands (MCCCs) at the operational level of warfare to advise and assist the CGs of Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) and JFC to employ MAGTF intelligence collection capabilities, analysis capabilities, and other intelligence assets and integrate their tasking and collection requirements. The MCCC commander integrates operational actions with the FMF and for the JFC and other Services' component commanders, while the MAGTF commander concentrates on warfighting.

*Note:* The commanders of Marine Forces Pacific and Marine Forces Command are dual-designated as the CGs of FMF, Pacific and FMF, Atlantic respectively.

**Responsibilities.** The MCCC supports and enhances planning and executing MAGTF intelligence operations through integration with fleet counterparts and centers and close, continuous

coordination with the JFC and other component intelligence organizations. The MCCC G-2 supports the component commander and staff as they provide intelligence support to the MAGTF and the fleet. The MCCC component command G-2 section maintains situational awareness and provides a limited analytical capability to support the component's future planning responsibility. It facilitates, but does not control, the flow of intelligence to the MAGTF.

**Functions.** The MCCC is transitioning to closer operational and staff integration with the corresponding fleet. Similarly, MEFs are integrating with their numbered fleet counterpart. Under an evolving FMF construct with more operational support capability, G-2 staff sections will be linked with N-2 and the fleet commander's MOC. For major joint operations, the Marine Corps component intelligence section provides the following functions:

- *Planning.* Often with the support of other MCISRE and naval nodes, the intelligence section provides the MAGTF timely, tailored national and theater intelligence. The component G-2 coordinates additional Service or naval intelligence support (i.e., units, personnel, and equipment) to the MAGTF through the Service chain of command.
- *Collection Management.* The intelligence section monitors the status of MAGTF external collection requests and leverages joint and national collection resources to support the MAGTF. It advocates for Service component and MCCC requirements in theater and JFC collection forums and recommends allocating and tasking national, JFC, and other component assets to meet MCCC requirements.
- *Production.* The intelligence section provides situational awareness to the component commander and staff and intelligence production to support the future planning responsibilities of the component command headquarters. This function may require establishing a watch section and an analytical element to produce operational-level intelligence products to satisfy component command planning cell needs. The component command G-2 coordinates support and monitors the status of MAGTF production requirements and requests for intelligence submitted to the joint force or supporting intelligence agencies.
- *Dissemination.* The intelligence section monitors the adequacy of the intelligence architecture and facilitates the flow of intelligence when necessary. Intelligence from theater and national-level organizations is still disseminated directly to the appropriate elements, not through the component command headquarters, unless specifically required. However, the component command intelligence section remains aware of current higher headquarters requirements and ensures any relevant theater or JTF intelligence is appropriately disseminated.
- *Support to Targeting.* The intelligence section supports Marine Corps component command participation in the joint targeting process, including representation at various joint target intelligence and/or targeting/engagement forums as required. This ensures adequate support for MAGTF target intelligence collection and production requirements, as well as combat assessment/BDA.
- *Support to the Fleet.* The intelligence section integrates with Navy and Coast Guard counterparts to provide support to naval forces, both within and outside the continental United States, as requested and necessary.

**Liaison.** The MCCC intelligence section provides liaison elements and personnel augmentation to various FMF, JFC, and other component intelligence organizations. Liaison officers should be selected based on the trust, confidence, and respect of the commander/unit leader. Liaison officers

should be of sufficient rank and experience and directly represent the commander or unit leader. Liaison officers provide critical information to help develop and maintain situational awareness, and solve problems. Liaison elements may be provided to the following:

- JISE.
- Other Service or functional component intelligence sections.
- Regional SIGINT operations center.
- Joint force J-2X.
- Various coalition partner intelligence elements.

### **National, Theater, Joint, and Coalition Intelligence Support to the MAGTF**

Marine Corps intelligence assets are optimized to produce tactical intelligence in support of MAGTF operations. National, theater, joint, and other Service intelligence assets provide unique capabilities not resident within the MAGTF intelligence support structure. The MAGTF can access external intelligence assets to enhance its organic capabilities, bringing the full range of these resources to bear on MAGTF requirements. The following are external organizations that support MAGTF operations.

### **National Intelligence Community**

The US intelligence community is made up of 17 different intelligence agencies and activities. Collectively, these agencies and activities are known as the National Intelligence Community (see figure: *The National Intelligence Community*) and are overseen by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Each entity focuses on a different aspect of the common mission.

**Office of the Director of National Intelligence.** The DNI serves as the head of the intelligence community and principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for matters related to national security. The DNI is responsible for the performance of the Nation's intelligence capability, which is dispersed across six governmental departments. Recognizing the heightened role of the DOD as both a producer and primary consumer of intelligence, DNI works closely with the presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

**Air Force Intelligence.** The US Air Force ISR enterprise provides finished intelligence derived from airborne, space, and cyberspace sensors. Air Force intelligence also operates the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, which analyzes military intelligence on foreign air and space forces, weapons, and systems and provides in-depth reachback analysis for forward deployed units.



**Figure 4-3. The National Intelligence Community.**

**Army Intelligence and Security Command.** US Army Intelligence and Security Command executes mission command of the Army’s intelligence and security forces and delivers linguist support and intelligence-related advanced skills training, acquisition support, logistics, communications, and other specialized capabilities in support of Army, joint, and coalition commands and the intelligence community. This command is responsible for the Army’s geographically-aligned military intelligence brigades and groups, which provide multi-disciplined intelligence support to combatant commanders. The Army is also responsible for the National Ground Intelligence Center, which maintains a major foreign weapons database and can provide in-depth reachback analysis and personnel augmentation for forward-deployed units.

**Central Intelligence Agency.** The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) primary areas of expertise include HUMINT collection, all-source analysis, and political and economic intelligence

products. The Director, CIA also serves as the national HUMINT manager and the National Clandestine Service Director. The CIA is the largest producer of all-source national security intelligence for senior US policymakers and provides extensive political and economic intelligence to DOD senior decision makers. The CIA also oversees the Open Source Enterprise and is the publishing authority for the “World Intelligence Review.”

**Coast Guard Intelligence.** The Coast Guard’s broad responsibilities include maritime safety, security, and stewardship. The Coast Guard’s persistent presence in the maritime domain, due to its diverse mission sets and broad legal authorities, allows it to fill a unique niche within the intelligence community. Because of its unique access, emphasis, and expertise in the maritime domain, Coast Guard intelligence can collect and report intelligence that not only supports Coast Guard missions but also supports national objectives.

**Defense Intelligence Agency.** The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The DIA serves as the DOD lead for coordinating intelligence support to meet combatant command requirements. The DIA provides analytical and operational support in areas such as CI, counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, computer network operations, personnel recovery, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, United Nations peacekeeping and coalition support, MASINT, noncombatant evacuation operations efforts, I&W, targeting, BDA, current intelligence, collection management, intelligence architecture and systems support, and document and media exploitation capabilities. The DIA also operates the National Media Exploitation Center, which provides exploitation services; the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, which provides intelligence assessments on foreign weapons systems for warfighters, weapons developers, policy makers, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and the National Center for Medical Intelligence. The National Center for Medical Intelligence is responsible for monitoring, tracking, and assessing global health events that could negatively impact the health of the US military and civilian populations.

**Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.** The Department of Energy (DOE) analyzes information relevant to polices, nonproliferation issues, and national science labs under its authority. The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence directs the DOE’s development of policies, plans, and procedures relating to arms control, nonproliferation, export controls, and safeguard activities. It also provides the intelligence community access to the DOE’s energy information and technical expertise.

**Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis.** The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis provides I&W support to the Homeland Security Advisory System, assesses the scope of terrorist threats to the US homeland, and integrates terrorist-related information from DHS components, other government agencies, and private sector entities. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis focuses on threats related to border security; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear issues, to include explosives and infectious diseases; critical infrastructure protection; extremists within the homeland; and travelers entering the homeland.

**Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research.** The Department of State’s (DOS’s) Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) performs intelligence analysis and produces studies on a range of political and economic topics essential to foreign policy determination and execution.

The INR coordinates programs for intelligence, analysis, and research. The bureau also produces intelligence studies and current intelligence analyses for the Secretary of State and other DOS policymakers, including ambassadors, special negotiators, country directors, and desk officers. The INR is responsible for policy development and coordinating intelligence activities in support of diplomacy. Additionally, the INR conducts open-source public opinion surveys, polls, and media trend analyses. The DOS publishes travel advisories and country clearance guides and manages US embassies abroad.

**Department of the Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis.** The Department of the Treasury analyzes foreign intelligence related to US economic policy and participates, with the DOS, in overtly collecting general foreign economic information. The Department of the Treasury is also responsible for maintaining the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

**Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Program.** The Drug Enforcement Administration is an intelligence and law enforcement agency responsible for combating drug trafficking and distribution within the United States. It also investigates major drug organizations and provides policy makers with illegal drug trade information. Specifically, the Drug Enforcement Administration collects and produces intelligence related to illegal drugs in support of federal, state, and local agencies.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation.** The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is an intelligence and law enforcement agency responsible for understanding threats to national security and penetrating national and transnational networks that desire to and are capable of harming the United States. The FBI coordinates these efforts with its intelligence community and law enforcement partners. It focuses on terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, and criminal enterprises. As the principal investigative arm of the Department of Justice, the FBI has primary responsibility for CI and counterterrorism operations conducted in the United States. All CI operations contemplated by other organizations in the United States must be coordinated with the FBI.

**Marine Corps Intelligence.** The Marine Corps produces tactical and operational intelligence for battlespace support. The Service's intelligence community component (MCIA) is the fixed site for global analytics for expeditionary intelligence and is the hub of the MCISRE. The MCIA is composed of all intelligence professionals in the Marine Corps responsible for policy, plans, programming, budgets, and staff supervision of intelligence and supporting activities.

**National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.** The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) exists under the Secretary of Defense and is dual-tasked as a member of the intelligence community under the DNI. The Director, NGA serves as the functional manager for GEOINT and is the principle GEOINT advisor to the DNI, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and combatant commanders. As functional manager, NGA develops strategic guidance and procedures, sets tradecraft standards, and ensures coordination across intelligence disciplines and intelligence community elements. The NGA combines imagery intelligence and GEOINT to produce tailored, actionable intelligence to support customers across the DOD and the US Government. The NGA provides direct support at the combatant command JIOCs and the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center.

**National Reconnaissance Office.** The National Reconnaissance Office systems play a crucial role in providing global communications, precision navigation, early warning of missile launches and potential military aggression, SIGINT, and near-real-time imagery to US forces. The National Reconnaissance Office also provides support to DOD missions abroad by developing and managing analysis toolsets used to process, exploit, and disseminate collected information from its systems.

**National Security Agency.** The NSA exists under the Secretary of Defense and is a member of the intelligence community under the DNI. The Director, NSA exercises operational control over the United States Cryptologic System. The director is the principal SIGINT advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the DNI, and the CJCS, and is designated as the national manager responsible for securing the government's national security telecommunications and information systems. The Marine Cryptologic Office is the Marine Corps' point of contact at NSA, directly supports Marine Corps SIGINT missions worldwide, and serves as a liaison to the offices and organizations found within NSA.

**Office of Naval Intelligence.** The Office of Naval Intelligence serves as the US Navy's intelligence team and is the leading provider of maritime intelligence to naval and joint/combined warfighting forces, national decision makers, and other partners/consumers in the US National Intelligence Community. Naval intelligence comprises active duty, reserve military, and civilian personnel, serving at sea and ashore around the world.

**Space Force Intelligence.** The US Space Force organizes, trains, and equips space forces to protect US and allied interests in space and to provide space capabilities to the joint force. Space Delta 7 is the operational ISR element of the US Space Force. The ISR Delta provides critical, time sensitive, and actionable intelligence for space domain operations to allow for the detection, characterization, and targeting of enemy/adversary space capabilities. Space Delta 7 employs a variety of fixed and mobile sensors across the globe operated by ISR professionals to enable the US Space Force to gain and maintain space superiority.

### **Marine Air-Ground Task Force Access to External Support**

Either the MCCC headquarters or the MAGTF intelligence section (MAGTF CE) is the focal point for all external intelligence support to the MAGTF. Intelligence derived from external sources is integrated into organic products and provided to all MAGTF elements. MSCs and other subordinate units will be able to access external intelligence support resources through the MAGTF's intelligence architecture.

### **Required Capabilities**

Truly integrating external intelligence support resources requires the following capabilities:

- Personnel trained and experienced in the capabilities, limitations, tasking, and employment procedures of external intelligence support resources.
- Sufficient, reliable internet connectivity and interoperability with national, theater, and other Service intelligence C2 centers and architectures.
- Architecture to receive, process, and disseminate information gathered by national and theater collection assets.
- Adequate facilities and security to handle highly sensitive, classified information.

- Marine intelligence specialists integrated into national, theater, and Service intelligence organizations to articulate Marine Corps capabilities and requirements and to optimize intelligence support to expeditionary forces.
- Cooperation between the MCCC, MAGTF, and supporting intelligence agencies through dedicated communications and liaison officer exchange.

---

## **AUGMENTATION, REACHBACK, AND ENABLER SUPPORT**

Intelligence support assets are flexible and can respond to myriad missions. They are configured for rapid deployment and can be tailored to meet the requirements of a particular operation. Although each MAGTF has a baseline intelligence capability to accomplish its anticipated mission, situation or mission changes can create a demand for augmentation. When a MAGTF is committed to an operation, the intelligence assets of any non-deployed unit can be called upon to provide support. Augments may include entire units, selected equipment, or personnel with specialized skills. Support can also consist of intelligence products outside the capabilities of the deployed MAGTF or its supporting joint intelligence activity.

On request, intelligence resources located outside the operating environment can also provide support to the MAGTF. This reachback support can come either from nondeployed units or agencies or forward-based enablers embedded within the FMF. Intelligence enablers can be tailored to the mission and can either provide a capability not resident within MAGTF intelligence units or reinforce existing capabilities. Enablers can be collocated within the IOC, attached to subordinate units, or provide reachback support via communications assets from within or outside the operating environment. Enablers can be separated into three categories:

- Staff augments, which can provide specialized functions (e.g., geospatial support), access or authorities, or reinforce existing capabilities. They may be military or civilian personnel and may be collocated with the MAGTF.
- Forward support representatives or teams from supporting organizations, which may collocate with the MAGTF headquarters or provide support from other locations within the area of operations.
- Organizations outside the operating environment, which can provide distributed PED, intelligence production, or other forms of reachback support. For examples of nonorganic enabler support to the MAGTF, see MCTP 10-10C, *MAGTF Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations*.

---

## **MARINE CORPS SUPPORTING ESTABLISHMENT**

Marine Corps intelligence personnel and organizations within the supporting establishment enhance and sustain FMF intelligence activities. Collectively, the MCISRE comprises the following supporting establishments.

**Headquarters, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Information, Intelligence Division**

The Intelligence Division is responsible for policy, plans, programming, budgets, and staff supervision of intelligence and supporting activities within the Marine Corps. The division supports the Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the Commandant's CJCS role, represents the Service in joint and intelligence community matters, and exercises supervision over MCIA. The Intelligence Division has Service staff responsibility for advanced GEOINT, SIGINT, CI/HUMINT, and ensures a single, synchronized strategy for MCISRE development.

Organizations that fall under this division include the following:

- *Intelligence Joint Matters/Administration Division*. Leads the Intelligence Division's actions within the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System, Joint Doctrine, the Intelligence Community Executive Committee, the Deputy Executive Committee, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Mission Requirements Board, and the Marine Requirements Oversight Council. The division manages Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (HQMC) intelligence communication with the Office of the DNI, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff regarding policy. The division also maintains the Director of Intelligence's (DIRINT) correspondence with DNI, such as the annual performance plan agreement.
- *Intelligence Operations Division*. Provides intelligence support to HQMC, CI and HUMINT management, and Special Security Office support to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Commandant's staff, and the Marine Corps forces.
- *The Intelligence Plans Division*. Focal point for planning, coordinating, and governing the MCISRE. On behalf of the DIRINT, this division provides oversight for executing the Marine Corps' intelligence warfighting function. The division also participates in the Marine Corps' capabilities-based assessments and associated processes within the Marine Corps, joint, and intelligence community. The division drafts and coordinates intelligence policy for all-source, GEOINT, SIGINT, and METOC to aid intelligence systems architecture development.

**Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Command Element-Intelligence Division**

The Command Element-Intelligence Division within Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration supports the development, delivery, operations, and sustainment of fully integrated ISR capabilities. The division also manages requirements from the FMF; these requirements are submitted as urgent or deliberate intelligence needs statements that identify emerging requirements necessary for mission success. The intelligence division compiles and creates capability requirements, in the form of Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System documents, on behalf of the MCISRE, and submits them to the Marine Requirements Oversight Council to support funding for various intelligence programs and initiatives. The intelligence division oversees the transition and integration of emerging concepts and technologies from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory into programs of record at Marine Corps Systems Command. The Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration also supports operational units by managing the Marine Corps Total Force System and the intelligence occupational field.

**Program Manager, Intelligence Systems, Marine Corps Systems Command**

Marine Corps Systems Command serves as the Department of the Navy's acquisition authority for Marine Corps ground weapon and information technology system programs. These programs equip and sustain the MCISRE with full-spectrum, current and future expeditionary, and crisis-

response capabilities. The Program Manager Intelligence Systems acquires the necessary capabilities to collect, process, exploit, and disseminate SIGINT, HUMINT, and GEOINT and other forms of intelligence-related information and is responsible for managing the systems throughout their lifecycles.

### **Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory**

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory generates and examines threat-informed operating concepts and capabilities and provides analytically-supported recommendations to inform subsequent force design and development activities. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is partnered with the Office of Naval Research (also referred to as ONR), the principal technology developer for the Marine Corps. The Office of Naval Research identifies science and technology solutions to address naval needs and explores the science and technology landscape for future opportunities. The Office of Naval Research is responsible for developing projects from basic research to advanced technology development with the goal of eventually transitioning the technologies into programs of record. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory conducts wargaming, experiments, testing, operational assessments, and user evaluations, and develops emerging technologies and concepts to support the materiel acquisitions process that enhances the Marine Corps' current and future warfighting capabilities.

### **Marine Corps Intelligence Activity**

The MCIA is the Marine Corps' Service intelligence center and fixed site—the hub for the MCISRE's distributed production capability at the MICs. It provides additional processing and exploitation or production capacity. It is primarily located at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia and Fort Meade, Maryland. The MCIA also maintains a detachment at National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville, Virginia.

The MCIA provides HQMC, Marine Corps component commands, and MAGTFs with the following types of support:

- Threat assessments, estimates, and intelligence for Service planning and decision making.
- Intelligence support for doctrine and force structure development, systems, and equipment acquisition.
- Support to wargaming.
- Training and education.
- Predeployment planning, training, and exercise support for Marine Corps units.
- Route and hydrology studies.
- Reachback support.
- Liaison officer deployments.
- Coordinated support from multiple, National-level intelligence organizations.
- Counterintelligence activities, to include functional services.

### **Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion**

Marine cryptologic support battalion employs and deploys Marines to conduct SIGINT, information assurance, and National Tactical Integration activities that satisfy NSA/Central Security Service, MAGTF, and joint force IRs. These Marines operate under the operational

control of the Director, NSA and the Chief, Central Security Service via the DIRINT, who serves as the Marine Corps Service Cryptologic Component Chief.

### **Marine Corps Intelligence Schools**

Marine Corps Intelligence Schools (MCIS) and its subordinate detachments train Marine Corps personnel in basic, intermediate, and advanced intelligence methods and applications. The MCIS are also responsible for the Intelligence Training Enhancement Program, which manages the Regional Intelligence Training Centers at I and II MEF. The Regional Intelligence Training Centers serve III MEF through mobile training teams. The MCIS are the lead proponent for foreign language training for Marine Corps intelligence professionals.

### **G-2, Marine Forces Special Operations Command**

The G-2, Marine Forces Special Operations Command trains, mans, and equips its worldwide deployable subordinate elements to conduct multidiscipline intelligence operations at the team- and company-level. Multidiscipline intelligence operators receive specialized training in intelligence disciplines, systems, policy, missions, and tactics. Intelligence operators also receive training that enables access to national intelligence community databases, systems, collectors, and analysts. As such, Marine Forces Special Operations Command maintains a robust working relationship with the larger intelligence community.

Marine Forces Special Operations Command provides the Marine Corps a link to the rest of the special operations community and theater special operations commands (TSOCs). The TSOCs command and control special operations units in support of respective combatant commanders.

### **Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group**

The Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group provides advanced collective and individual, billet-specific, training programs. The battle staff training provides battalion and regiment staffs constructed scenarios in complex environment from European cities to Middle Eastern regions to South Pacific island chains. For intelligence Marines, the Advanced Maneuver Warfare Course, certifies GCE battalion and regimental intelligence officers and chiefs as intelligence tactics instructors (ITIs), enabling them to better integrate intelligence and operations through training, planning, and execution.

The ITI course prepares intelligence Marines to serve in critical combat S-2 assignments at the battalion- and regimental-levels by teaching them to:

- Understand specific IRs and integrate intelligence into GCE planning and execution to support the GCE commander and unit mission.
- Excel at the art of applying ISR tactics in support of maneuver warfare.
- Use approved, current terms and symbols to convey IRs during the execution of operations.
- Better express intelligence concepts and their application in the GCE.
- Better train their Marines and support unit training.

### **Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One**

The Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One provides standardized advanced tactical training and certifies unit instructors in qualifications

supporting aviation training and readiness and developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. The squadron S-2 section trains select intelligence Marines from the Marine aircraft wing, alongside the aviators they support, as part of the course. The course is conducted semiannually at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona. The Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course provides aviation intelligence Marines many of the same benefits and advantages conferred upon their GCE counterparts through the ITI programs taught by Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group.

### **Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group**

Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group provides standardized, advanced individual training in MAGTF logistic operations and unit readiness planning at the battalion and regimental levels. Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group conducts battle staff training, facilitates logistics education, and manages doctrine, training standards, tactics, and institutional training programs to enhance the combat preparation and performance of logistics combat element units in MAGTF operations. The S-2 provides specialized, logistics-focused intelligence instruction to intelligence officers and analysts who work within the logistics combat element through the Intermediate MAGTF Logistics Operations Course.

### **Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups**

The expeditionary warfare training groups conduct training and instruction on naval expeditionary warfare doctrine, tactics, and techniques. The expeditionary warfare training group's instruction focuses on amphibious operations that support operational commanders maintaining forces to project military power from the sea. The S-2 provides specialized training to MEU S-2s and expeditionary intelligence enablers.

---

## **MARINE CORPS RESERVE**

The Marine Corps Reserve intelligence disposition consists of three components: individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) program, Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR), and Active Reserve program. These components provide trained units and/or personnel to augment, reinforce, or reconstitute active duty units during times of war or national emergency.

The SMCR includes intelligence Marines attached to the intelligence support battalion (ISB), the Marine Forces Reserve G-2, and intelligence sections throughout the 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and 4th Marine Logistics Group. The SMCR's intelligence capabilities are complementary to those of the Active Component. Intelligence Marines in the IMA program are individual selected reservists assigned to an active component organization billet. The Marine Corps has IMA billets at its component headquarters, HQMC Intelligence Division, MCIA, and MCIS. The Active Reserve program allows intelligence Marines to serve on a full-time basis to support organization, administration, recruiting, retention, instruction, and training requirements.

### **Intelligence Support Battalion**

The ISB provides organized, trained, and equipped detachments of tactical intelligence Marines capable of executing multidiscipline, all-source intelligence operations in support of all-domain missions and diverse commands. The ISB maintains two CI/HUMINT companies, one direct

support company, one operational support company, a battlespace surveillance company, and a headquarters company, all of which are spread across twelve sites in ten states. The ISB can provide team-level intelligence support capabilities in all areas except for the battlespace surveillance company, which is only capable of providing platoon-level support via the ground sensor platoon. During times of contingency or crisis and across the competition continuum, ISB Marines can be activated in place, providing a reachback capability, or can be deployed to augment and support their active duty counterparts. The ISB Marines can be deactivated as conditions de-escalate or missions dictate.

# CHAPTER 5. JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

*A more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust constellation of allies and partners, will sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order.*

—Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America

Each operation presents unique intelligence support challenges and considerations. Many MAGTF operations are executed as joint operations and with allies, coalition, or multinational partners. Intelligence activities in joint and multinational operations require special planning and coordination. A coordinated intelligence effort makes a critical contribution to the success of joint operations. The MAGTF's intelligence operations are fully integrated with joint intelligence activities to ensure unity of effort, mutual support, and the effective, efficient employment of limited intelligence resources.

The success of joint and multinational operations and interorganizational coordination hinges upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing. To prevail, the JFC's decision and execution cycles must be consistently faster than the adversary's and be based on better information. Being faster and better requires unfettered access to the tasking, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information derived from all available sources. An intelligence and information environment that integrates joint, multinational, and interagency partners in a collaborative enterprise enables cooperation, collaboration, and coordination. For more detailed information, see JP 2-0 and JP 2-01.

Marine Corps forces will participate in multinational operations ranging from routine bilateral exercises to coalition warfare in a major contingency. Marine Corps units must be prepared to carry out intelligence operations in the context of multinational operations. Effective intelligence support in joint and/or coalition operations depends on the following:

- Thorough understanding of operations and intelligence authorities and permissions.
- Agreement on intelligence-sharing as well as other policies and procedures.
- Mutual intelligence support between Marine Corps units and host nation, coalition, and US intelligence agencies and activities.
- Shared intelligence capabilities and assets among Marine Corps, joint, and coalition units.
- Interoperability and connectivity among participants.
- Robust liaison among Marine Corps units and external, joint, and national-level intelligence agencies, activities, and entities.

---

## JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND COMPONENT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

The JFCs are responsible for all aspects of intelligence support and intelligence functions within their commands. They have the responsibility and authority to determine, direct, and coordinate all mission-related collection and analysis activities through centralized or apportioned collection and production management efforts. Component commanders are also responsible for using organic intelligence capabilities to support their assigned missions. The JFC makes national, theater, and joint force intelligence assets available to support the efforts of the component commanders. At the same time, component capabilities must be available to assist the joint intelligence effort.

### Joint Intelligence Operations Center

The JIOC is the primary intelligence organization supporting joint forces at the operational and tactical levels from within the combatant commands. The JIOC integrates the capabilities of the intelligence community, interagency, Services, combat support agencies, and combatant command intelligence assets to coordinate intelligence planning, collection management, analysis, and other support to combatant command, national defense strategy, and national security strategy objectives. This construct combines all intelligence functions, disciplines, and operations into a single organization and fully integrates and synchronizes intelligence and operations planning and execution across the combatant command area of responsibility.

### Joint Intelligence Support Elements

At the discretion of a subordinate JFC, a JISE may be established in an operation's initial phases to augment the subordinate joint force J-2 element. Under direction of the joint force J-2, a JISE usually manages the intelligence collection, production, and dissemination for a joint force.

### Special Operations Forces Liaison Element

The special operations forces liaison element (SOFLE) is an ad hoc organization consisting of special operations forces (SOF) personnel from across United States Special Operations Command. A SOFLE is provided to a deploying amphibious ready group (ARG) and MEU to improve the ARG/MEU's ability to access and leverage the global SOF network, improve coordination with respective geographic TSOCs, and facilitate interdependent ARG/MEU-SOF operations, actions, and activities. This improves the support provided to the combatant commander's steady state and crisis response operations.

The OIC and team sergeant are both special operators and conduct the primary liaison and advisor activities with the ARG/MEU in support of the TSOC and their subordinate commands. A SOFLE includes support for intelligence enablers, intelligence analysis, and communications. A SOFLE's mission-essential tasks are to—

- Gain and maintain situational understanding of the relevant TSOC's COP.
- Disseminate and integrate operational intelligence.
- Communicate operational information.
- Synchronize and integrate ARG/MEU-SOF operations.

---

## **MARINE CORPS COMPONENT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS OR MAGTF COMMAND ELEMENT AS A JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS**

Specific Marine Corps component headquarters or a specified MAGTF CE may be designated to provide the nucleus of a JTF headquarters. The Service component command or MAGTF G-2 must be prepared to function as the JTF J-2, with the G-2's intelligence section serving as the base for establishing a JISE. To carry out this function, Service component command and MAGTF G-2 sections must prepare plans to operate as a JTF J-2 and conduct the necessary training to execute these plans. Plans should be based on joint doctrine and theater TTP and should include J-2/JISE organization, personnel, and equipment requirements (with their augmentation sources); a baseline intelligence architecture; and standing operating procedures. To develop these plans, designated Service component command and MAGTF G-2 sections should establish a standing JTF intelligence planning cell consisting of intelligence specialists knowledgeable in joint force and other Service intelligence capabilities, limitations, and operating procedures. For more detailed information, see JP 2-01.

---

## **FLEET MARINE FORCE AND JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMAND**

Naval integration is defined by complementary authorities, capabilities, capacities, processes, and systems across all domains in such a way that command elements and subordinate units can operate singly or in concert, to accomplish naval campaign objectives across the competition continuum in support of a joint and/or multinational force. Integrated maritime C2 at the component-level effectively provides the maritime component commander with those authorities and tools to effectively operate day to day. This integrated maritime C2 command arrangement requires clear roles and authorities for component headquarters, staffing and responsiveness to the combatant command, alignment and apportionment of intelligence resources in accordance with priorities, and seamless fluidity across the competition continuum. In concert with an integrated maritime command and control is the necessity for clear alignment and integration of multi-domain capabilities that leverage joint and national intelligence.

### **Maritime Operations Center**

The MOC is a construct designed to provide operational capability and capacity using organization, tools, and a procedural framework through which maritime commanders can employ the force. The MOC enables the commander's ability to command and control forces by supporting commander's decision-making process and setting the conditions for subordinate success. In support of each numbered fleet, the MOC and fleet management organizations leverage similar skills and facilities for different responsibilities. The MOC is responsible for supporting operational missions including combatant command theater security cooperation plan, operation plans, concept plans, and contingencies.

---

## PROCEDURES

Joint intelligence activities are governed by authorities set forth in approved CJCS and combatant command orders and guided by joint intelligence doctrine contained in JP 2-0 and other supporting joint publications. Joint intelligence doctrine is supplemented by each combatant commander's intelligence TTP, which may vary by command. During joint operations, Marine intelligence activities adhere to joint doctrine and any published theater TTP pertaining to the operation.

---

## MARINE INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES

When participating in joint or multinational operations, Marine intelligence sections and subordinate units conduct the following tasks:

- Operate in accordance with joint intelligence authorities, permissions, doctrine, theater TTP, and JTF procedures.
- Participate in joint intelligence boards, bureaus, cells, centers, and working groups to coordinate collection management, intelligence production, HUMINT and SIGINT collection operations, target intelligence support, intelligence architectures, CI activities, and other intelligence operations.
- Provide intelligence support to the joint force headquarters or other JTF components as directed.
- Contribute personnel and other assets to augment the J-2 section and JISE if requested.
- Employ joint or other component intelligence assets.
- Exchange liaison elements with the J-2, JISE, and/or other JTF components as required.

### Multinational Operations

There is no single intelligence doctrine covering multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance must develop its own doctrine and coalition commanders should determine standardized procedures for coalition forces. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standardization agreements and standing agreements among the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and other forces provide interoperability standards and guidance with which to conduct military operations by forces in these alliances. The NATO Standardization Agreement 2190, *Intelligence Doctrine*, governs intelligence operations within NATO. Further information can be found in MCRP 2-10B.3, *Coalition Intelligence Handbook*. Joint intelligence doctrine and architectures provide a framework for developing the multinational intelligence support structure. Multinational intelligence operations are based on the following principles:

- *Maintain Unity of Effort*. Intelligence operations must be directed at the common threat.
- *Remain Flexible*. Effective multinational operations require minimizing the differences in national concepts of intelligence support. Special arrangements should be considered for developing, communicating, and using intelligence when differences exist among nations' languages, culture, doctrine, terminology, organization, and equipment.

- *Anticipate and Plan Concurrently.* Multinational forces' IRs and procedures should be identified, planned, coordinated, and exercised before execution.
- *Conduct Complementary Intelligence Operations.* Each nation's intelligence strengths should be capitalized upon and the weaknesses of other members' assets offset.
- *Share all Necessary Intelligence.* Commanders and their intelligence officers must be willing to share intelligence, within classification and dissemination restrictions, and integrate intelligence operations when possible. Each coalition member should share intelligence in support of planning and execution. However, information about intelligence sources and methods may be protected. The methodology for exchanging intelligence should be developed and exercised before operations begin. Authorization for foreign disclosure should be obtained and procedures to write for release and for sanitation and declassification should be developed as part of this planning process. During execution, the exchange must be monitored and adapted to ensure that it is meeting the needs of all coalition partners.

Many potential allies may not possess the range of US intelligence capabilities; therefore, US intelligence sections must expect to take the lead during multinational operations. All partners access network has been specifically developed should be used for unclassified and nongovernmental organizations collaboration.

Multinational intelligence sharing should be facilitated by establishing a shared local area network using systems such as the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System, the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), or other emerging coalition mission networks. The CENTRIXS defines the standards for establishing and maintaining multinational connectivity at the tactical and operational level and includes reachback capability at the strategic level. Started by United States Central Command, CENTRIXS links into Global C2 System COP servers. The system facilitates operations/intelligence sharing at releasable levels by using multilevel database replication safeguards, which allows rapid coalition access to US databases without human intervention.

Foreign disclosure must be consistent with the *National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations* (short title: *National Disclosure Policy [NDP-1]*). When conducting multinational operations, MAGTF intelligence sections must coordinate with theater or combatant command foreign disclosure officers for the appropriate authorities and designations to disclose intelligence to coalition or allied nations. Intelligence plans must provide for connectivity with multinational forces and liaison elements with appropriate linguistic and area specialist skills.



# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<b>ANGLICO</b>	air/naval gunfire liaison company
<b>ARG</b>	amphibious ready group
<b>BDA</b>	battle damage assessment
<b>C2</b>	command and control
<b>CCIR</b>	commander's critical information requirement
<b>CE</b>	command element
<b>CENTRIXS</b>	Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
<b>CG</b>	Commanding General
<b>CI</b>	counterintelligence
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>CIP</b>	common intelligence picture
<b>CJCS</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>COA</b>	course of action
<b>COG</b>	center of gravity
<b>CONOPS</b>	concept of operations
<b>COP</b>	common operational picture
<b>CWC</b>	composite warfare commander
<b>DHS</b>	Department of Homeland Security
<b>DIA</b>	Defense Intelligence Agency
<b>DIM</b>	daily intentions message
<b>DIRINT</b>	Director of Intelligence (USMC)
<b>DMO</b>	distributed maritime operations
<b>DNI</b>	Director of National Intelligence
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DOE</b>	Department of Energy
<b>DOS</b>	Department of State
<b>DST</b>	direct support team
<b>EA</b>	electronic attack
<b>EABO</b>	expeditionary advanced base operations

<b>EOTG</b>	expeditionary operations training group
<b>EW</b>	electronic warfare
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>FECC</b>	fires and effects coordination center
<b>FMF</b>	Fleet Marine Forces
<b>G-1</b>	assistant chief of staff, personnel/personnel staff section
<b>G-2</b>	assistant chief of staff, intelligence/intelligence staff section
<b>G-3</b>	assistant chief of staff, operations and training/operations and training staff section
<b>G-5</b>	assistant chief of staff, plans/plans staff section
<b>G-6</b>	assistant chief of staff, communications/communications system staff section
<b>GCE</b>	ground combat element
<b>GEOINT</b>	geospatial intelligence
<b>GIRH</b>	Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook
<b>HHQ</b>	higher headquarters
<b>HQMC</b>	Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
<b>HUMINT</b>	human intelligence
<b>I&amp;W</b>	indications and warning
<b>ICC</b>	information command center
<b>IMA</b>	individual mobilization augmentee
<b>INR</b>	Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DOS)
<b>IOC</b>	intelligence operations center
<b>IPB</b>	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
<b>IR</b>	intelligence requirement
<b>ISB</b>	intelligence support battalion
<b>ISC</b>	intelligence support coordinator
<b>ISR</b>	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
<b>ITI</b>	intelligence tactics instructor
<b>IWC</b>	information warfare commander (USN)
<b>J-2</b>	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
<b>J-2X</b>	joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element
<b>JFC</b>	joint force commander
<b>JIOC</b>	joint intelligence operations center

<b>JISE</b>	joint intelligence support element
<b>JP</b>	joint publication
<b>JTF</b>	joint task force
<b>LAR</b>	light armored reconnaissance
<b>LAV-EW</b>	light armored vehicle-electronic warfare
<b>LTIOV</b>	latest time information is of value
<b>MAGTF</b>	Marine air-ground task force
<b>MASINT</b>	measurement and signature intelligence
<b>MCCC</b>	Marine Corps Component Commands
<b>MCDP</b>	Marine Corps doctrinal publication
<b>MCIA</b>	Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
<b>MCIS</b>	Marine Corps Intelligence Schools
<b>MCISRE</b>	Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise
<b>MCPP</b>	Marine Corps Planning Process
<b>MCRP</b>	Marine Corps reference publication
<b>MCTP</b>	Marine Corps tactical publication
<b>MCWP</b>	Marine Corps warfighting publication
<b>MEB</b>	Marine expeditionary brigade
<b>MEF</b>	Marine expeditionary force
<b>METOC</b>	meteorological and oceanographic
<b>MEU</b>	Marine expeditionary unit
<b>MIC</b>	MAGTF intelligence center
<b>MIG</b>	Marine expeditionary force information group
<b>MOC</b>	maritime operations center
<b>MOE</b>	measure of effectiveness
<b>MSB</b>	Marine expeditionary force support battalion
<b>MSC</b>	major subordinate command
<b>N-2</b>	intelligence officer
<b>NAI</b>	named area of interest
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGA</b>	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
<b>NIPF</b>	National Intelligence Priorities Framework
<b>NSA</b>	National Security Agency

<b>OCAC</b>	operations control and analysis center
<b>OIC</b>	officer in charge
<b>OIE</b>	operations in the information environment
<b>OPGEN</b>	operation general (message)
<b>OPTASK</b>	operational tasking (message)
<b>OSINT</b>	open-source intelligence
<b>OTC</b>	officer in tactical command
<b>P&amp;A</b>	production and analysis
<b>PED</b>	processing, exploitation, and dissemination
<b>PIR</b>	priority intelligence requirement
<b>S-1</b>	personnel officer/personnel office
<b>S-2</b>	intelligence officer/intelligence office
<b>S-3</b>	operations and training officer/operations and training office
<b>S-5</b>	plans officer/plans office
<b>S-6</b>	communications system officer/communications staff office
<b>SALT</b>	supporting arms liaison team
<b>SARCC</b>	surveillance and reconnaissance coordination center
<b>SCI</b>	sensitive compartmented information
<b>SIGINT</b>	signals intelligence
<b>SIR</b>	specific information requirement
<b>SMCR</b>	Selected Marine Corps Reserve
<b>SOF</b>	special operations forces
<b>SOFLE</b>	special operations forces liaison element
<b>SOR</b>	specific order or request
<b>TSA</b>	target system analysis
<b>TSO</b>	theater special operations command
<b>TTP</b>	tactics, techniques, and procedures
<b>UAS</b>	unmanned aircraft system
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>VMU</b>	Marine unmanned aerial vehicle squadron

# TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

## **all-source intelligence**

Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence. (DOD Dictionary, part 1 of a 2-part definition.)

## **battle damage assessment**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. Battle damage assessment estimates physical damage to a particular target, functional damage to that target, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations. Also called **BDA**. (USMC Dictionary)

## **battlespace**

The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and/or complete the mission. It includes the physical environment (air, land, maritime, and space domains); the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the electromagnetic spectrum; and other factors. Included within these are friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral entities contained within or having an effect on the operational areas, areas of interest, and areas of influence. (USMC Dictionary)

## **center of gravity**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) A key source of strength without which an enemy cannot function. Also called **COG**. (USMC Dictionary)

## **collection**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The gathering of intelligence data and information to satisfy the identified requirements. (USMC Dictionary)

## **collection management**

In intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking, as required. See also collection; intelligence. (DOD Dictionary)

## **command and control**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. Command and control is one of the seven warfighting functions. Also called **C2**. See also warfighting functions. (USMC Dictionary)

## **counterintelligence**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions. Also called **CI**. (USMC Dictionary)

## **critical vulnerability**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) An aspect of a center of gravity that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to an enemy's and/or adversary's ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a key strength. Also called **CV**. (USMC Dictionary)

## **dissemination**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. (USMC Dictionary)

**fires**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Those means used to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities as well as affect the enemy's will to fight. Fires is one of the seven warfighting functions. See also warfighting functions. (USMC Dictionary)

**force protection**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while protecting, concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities. Force protection is one of the seven warfighting functions. Also called **FP**. See also warfighting functions. (USMC Dictionary)

**geospatial intelligence**

The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. Also called **GEOINT**. (DOD Dictionary)

**human intelligence**

A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called **HUMINT**. (DOD Dictionary)

**imagery intelligence**

The technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials. Also called **IMINT**. See also intelligence. (DOD Dictionary)

**indications and warning**

Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied and/or coalition military, political, or economic interests or to United States citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of hostile actions or intentions against the United States, its activities, overseas forces, or allied and/or coalition nations. Also called **I&W**. (USMC Dictionary)

**information requirement**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) All information elements the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations, that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available  
time available. Also called **IR**. (USMC Dictionary)

**intelligence**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding environment needed to support decision-making. Intelligence is one of the seven warfighting functions. See also warfighting functions. (USMC Dictionary)

**intelligence cycle**

A six-step process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. The six steps are planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, production, dissemination, and utilization. (USMC Dictionary)

**intelligence preparation of the battlespace**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called **IPB**. (USMC Dictionary)

**intelligence requirement**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Questions about the enemy and the environment, the answers to which a commander requires to make sound decisions. Also called **IR**. (USMC Dictionary)

**joint intelligence support element**

A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete enemy and adversary situation. Also called **JISE**. See also intelligence. (DOD Dictionary)

**logistics**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) 1. The science of planning and executing the movement and support of forces. 2. All activities required to move and sustain military forces. Logistics is one of the seven warfighting functions. See also warfighting functions. (USMC Dictionary)

**maneuver warfare**

A warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. (USMC Dictionary)

**measurement and signature intelligence**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Intelligence information gathered by technical instruments such as radars, passive electro-optical sensors, radiation detectors, and remote ground sensors. Also called **MASINT**. (USMC Dictionary)

**meteorological and oceanographic**

A term used to convey all environmental factors, from the sub-bottom of the Earth's oceans through maritime, land areas, airspace, ionosphere, and outward into space. Also called **METOC**. (DOD Dictionary)

**multinational operations**

A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (DOD Dictionary)

**open-source intelligence**

Relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to known or anticipated intelligence requirements. Also called **OSINT**. See also intelligence. (DOD Dictionary)

**priority intelligence requirement**

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) An intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. Also called **PIR**. (USMC Dictionary)

**signals intelligence**

Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called **SIGINT**. See also intelligence. (DOD Dictionary, part 2 of a 2-part definition.)

**situational awareness**

Knowledge and understanding of the current situation that promotes timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of friendly, enemy, and other operations within the battlespace in order to facilitate decision-making. An informational perspective and skill that foster an ability to determine quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding. Also known as **SA**. (USMC Dictionary)

**warfighting functions**

The seven mutually supporting military activities integrated in the conduct of all military operations. The seven warfighting functions are command and control, fires, force protection, information, intelligence, logistics, and maneuver. See also command and control; fires; force protection; intelligence; logistics; maneuver. (USMC Dictionary)



# REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

## National Security Publications

National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations (Short Title: National Disclosure Policy [NDP-1])

## Joint Issuances

### Joint Publications (JPs)

2-0	Joint Intelligence
2-01	Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations
2-03	Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations
3-02	Amphibious Operations
3-09	Joint Fire Support
3-60	Joint Targeting

### Miscellaneous

	DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
	NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)
2936	Intelligence Doctrine–AIntP-1(A)

## United States Navy

### Navy Warfighting Publications

3-56	Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of War
5-01	Navy Planning

## United States Marine Corps

### Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1	Warfighting
1-4	Competing
2	Intelligence
5	Planning
6	Command and Control

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

- 3-31 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fires
- 3-32 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations
- 5-10 Marine Corps Planning Process

Marine Corps Tactical Publications (MCTPs)

- 2-10A MAGTF Intelligence Collection
- 2-10B MAGTF Intelligence Production and Analysis
- 2-10C Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Dissemination
- 3-02A MAGTF Network Engagement Activities
- 3-10F Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element
- 3-20G Air Reconnaissance
- 10-10C MAGTF Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations
- 10-10D MAGTF Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

- 2-10A.1 Signals Intelligence
- 2-10A.2 Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence
- 2-10A.3 Open-Source Intelligence
- 2-10A.5 Remote Sensor Operations
- 2-10A.6 Ground Reconnaissance Operations
- 2-10A.7 Reconnaissance Reports Guide
- 2-10A.9 Air Intelligence
- 2-10B.1 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace
- 2-10B.3 Coalition Intelligence Handbook
- 2-10B.4 Geospatial Information and Intelligence
- 2-10B.5 Imagery Intelligence
- 3-20.5 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations
- 3-32D.1 Electronic Warfare

Miscellaneous

- Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (USMC Dictionary)
- Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 1540-003-03: Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH)
- Heinl, Robert Debs, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*, Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1966.

A non-cost copy of this document is available at:

<https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/MCPEL/>

### **Copyright Information**

This document is a work of the United States Government and the text is in the public domain in the United States. Subject to the following stipulation, it may be distributed and copied:

- Copyrights to graphics and rights to trademarks/Service marks included in this document are reserved by original copyright or trademark/Service mark holders or their assignees, and are used here under a license to the Government and/or other permission.
- The use or appearance of United States Marine Corps publications on a non-Federal Government website does not imply or constitute Marine Corps endorsement of the distribution service.

