





MARINES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1916-1924



HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.





COMMUNICATIONS MAP
 OF THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
 SCALE 1:787,406
 COMPILLED BY THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION,
 DIVISION OF OPERATIONS AND TRAINING,
 HDQTS. U.S. MARINE CORPS.
 SEPT. 1929.
 FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:-

Cover Photo: Mounted Marine detachment with lances in Dominican Republic. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo A701458).

End Sheet Map: Marine Corps communications map of the Dominican Republic, made in 1929. (NatArch RG 127 B356).

MARINES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1916-1924

By

Captain Stephen M. Fuller USMCR
and
Graham A. Cosmas



HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1974

PCN 19000412600



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO

FOREWORD

In this pamphlet the record of the Marine occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916-1924 is presented as an example of the active role played by the Marine Corps in the Caribbean region in the first three decades of the 20th Century. It was prepared principally from primary sources such as official reports, memoirs, personal correspondence, and recollection of the Marines involved.

Captain Stephen M. Fuller, a Marine reserve officer, served on active duty as an aviation supply officer from 1968 to 1971. Subsequently, he spent three summers with the History and Museums Division, two of them in research and writing of this pamphlet and the third in preparation of a forthcoming pamphlet on Marines in Haiti. He has a Ph.D. in History from the University of New Mexico and currently is a candidate for the J. D. Degree at the University of Tulsa College of Law. In addition, he has taught for several years at Northeastern State College in Tahlequah, Oklahoma.

The co-author, Dr. Graham A. Cosmas, joined the staff of the History and Museums Division in December 1973 after teaching at the University of Texas and the University of Guam. He has a Ph.D. in History from the University of Wisconsin and has published several articles on U. S. military history as well as An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War (University of Missouri Press, 1971).

This work is presented as a companion pamphlet to others dealing with separate campaigns in the "Banana Wars." It is hoped that the information contained therein will be helpful in providing further understanding of the Marines' role in interventions and small wars. The History and Museums Division welcomes any comments on the narrative and additional information or illustrations which might enhance a future edition.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "E. H. Simmons".

E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums


Reviewed and approved:
26 February 1975

PREFACE

During the first three decades of the present century, the Marine Corps served as the striking arm of the United States policy of Caribbean intervention. In 1916, Marines landed in the Dominican Republic to protect foreign lives and property and to provide the "muscle" for a United States military government which was trying to bring stability to the troubled island republic. While there, Marines performed a variety of functions not normally assigned to an occupying military force, and they gained experience which helped to provide a pool of combat-trained leaders for future conflicts.

This study is based on primary sources contained in the archives and holdings of the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, Marine Corps, the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, and the National Archives. In these sources, the record of the Dominican occupation is set forth, often in painstaking details. From research in these records, several themes, common to similar Marine campaigns in neighboring Haiti and in Nicaragua, became apparent. The first of these is the paramount role played by the Marine Corps in establishing and training a native constabulary capable of maintaining order after the Marines withdrew. Secondly, effective tactics for the conduct of counter-insurgency operations emerged from these interventions: for example, the coordinated use of air and ground forces began during these campaigns. The third important theme was the gradual development among Marines stationed in these Latin republics of the concept of what would be called in Vietnam "civic action" -- efforts by the occupying troops to "win the hearts and minds" of the population.

All historical writers are indebted to those unsung guardians of source collections, the archivists and reference sections. In this regard, we owe particular gratitude to Mr. Ralph W. Donnelly and Mr. Charles A. Wood for their assistance in locating pertinent records and to Mr. Benis M. Frank for his help in using the Marine Corps Oral History Collection. This manuscript was prepared under the editorial supervision of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Chief Historian, History and Museums Division, and with the support and assistance of Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, Director of Marine Corps History and Museums, and Colonel Herbert M. Hart, Deputy Director for Marine Corps History. The ultimate responsibility for historical accuracy, conclusions, and syntax, of course rests with the authors.


STEPHEN M. FULLER



GRAHAM A. COSMAS

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Foreword.iii
Preface	v
Background to Intervention.	1
American Military Intervention.	7
The March on Santiago	13
Establishment of United States Military Government.	24
The 2d Brigade -- Life and Work in Santo Domingo.	28
The Suppression of Banditry, 1917-1922.	33
Training the Dominican Constabulary	45
The Marines and Civil Administration.	52
Withdrawal of the Marines, 1922-1924.	61
Conclusion.	67
Footnotes	70
Appendix A. Marine Officers and Enlisted Men Who Served with the Policia Nacional Dominicana.	85
Appendix B. Strength of the Policia Nacional Dominicana	88
Appendix C. Marine Personnel Strength in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924.	89
Appendix D. Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916: Photographs from the Album of Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap, USMC	90

MARINES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1916-1924

Background to Intervention

The United States intervention of 1916-1924 had its roots in the Dominican Republic's long and tormented history. Discovered and for almost 300 years ruled by Spain, the small Caribbean nation owed its early importance to the lucrative sugar trade with Europe, a trade comparable in volume to the seventeenth century commerce carried on by the English and Dutch with the East Indies. Attracted by the wealth of Hispaniola, the island which the Dominican Republic shares with Haiti, other European powers challenged Spain's control; and in 1795 in the Treaty of Basle, France forced Spain to transfer ownership of the colony to her. France, however, was preoccupied with war in Europe and revolutionary turmoil at home and never firmly consolidated her rule. As a result, Dominican leaders, fearing domination by the blacks of neighboring Haiti who had thrown off their French masters, asked Spain to reassume power over their half of Hispaniola. Spain agreed and early in 1810, the area now known as Santo Domingo once again became a Spanish colony.


The Dominicans' satisfaction at being returned to Spanish administration soon turned to resentment, as Spanish policy toward the country proved harsh and ill-conceived. In 1821, Santo Domingo joined other Caribbean and South American territories in declaring independence from Spain, and her leaders expressed a desire to attach their country to the new Republic of Columbia far to the south. Instead, independence brought new foreign domination, as the Haitian government in 1822 dispatched troops to conquer its neighbor which could offer no effective resistance. From then until 1844, Haiti ruled Santo Domingo and by a concerted effort to stifle all Dominican cultural and economic activity reduced the nation to stagnation and despair. Such misrule led, quite naturally, to the rise among the Dominicans of virulent nationalism. In 1844, they succeeded in casting off the Haitian yoke, and with this re-establishment of national independence the history

of the modern Dominican Republic begins. (1)

The winning of independence by no means guaranteed progress in the succeeding period. Instead, throughout the nineteenth century a succession of corrupt and arbitrary rulers, who maintained themselves in power by playing upon the people's fear of Haitian domination, diverted the nation's meager resources to serve their own personal designs. Among these leaders, the astute and ruthless General Ulises Heureux, who ruled from the early 1880s to 1899, proved the most long-lived and destructive. Keeping himself in power by methods that foreshadowed those of modern totalitarian regimes, Heureux brought about modest economic growth and strengthened the armed forces and the central government. At the same time, he increased the corruption and violence of Dominican politics and vastly enlarged the national debt, borrowing much of the money from European and American firms which expected their governments to support their claims for repayment. Heureux thus confirmed the developing pattern of Dominican misfortunes. A succession of governments in trouble at home borrowed abroad beyond their means to repay and then tried to play foreign creditors off against each other to prevent the military intervention which their periodical dishonoring of debts invited. (2)

During the 1890s, a group of idealistic young generals and politicians, led by General Horacio Vasquez, organized to oppose Heureux's dictatorship. As figurehead for their movement, they chose the nation's wealthiest planter, Juan Isidro Jimenez, described by the historian Seldon Rodman as "a man totally lacking in character or vision." Denied all means of peaceable opposition to Heureux's regime, the Vasquez group resorted to assassination; on 26 July 1899 Ramon Caceres, one of Vasquez's associates, confronted the tyrant in the main street of the town of Moca and killed him with a pistol shot. (3)

Heureux's murder and the proclamation by Vasquez and Jimenez of a new revolutionary government began the period of political disorder that finally provoked United States intervention. The enemies of Heureux divided into conflicting factions grouped loosely around Vasquez and Jimenez, who refused to remain a figurehead. This feud led to a



succession of weak compromise presidents, coups, and countercoups during which each regime continued to borrow money abroad with which to buy arms to suppress revolution. The republic as a result sank further into debt and political chaos while its foreign creditors, many of them citizens of major European powers, insisted on repayment and often called on their governments to support their claims. (4)

The financial delinquencies and political disorders of the Dominican Republic attracted the increasingly urgent attention of the United States government. Since the 1870s, when President Ulysses S. Grant had sought to annex the island republic, many American leaders had perceived its potential economic and strategic value to the United States. After 1900, concern for the defense of the sea approaches to the Panama Canal intensified American interest. The Dominican Republic's financial entanglements with European powers seemed especially menacing to United States officials because, under the guise of upholding the claims of its citizens, a nation such as Germany might establish a colony and naval base within striking distance of the canal. The combined Anglo-French-German expedition against Venezuela during the early 1900s, when European warships bombarded Venezuelan coastal towns and President Theodore Roosevelt (according to some accounts) threatened to send the United States fleet to drive them off, brought the issue to a head. The United States clearly would have to take strong action to protect the Caribbean.

In December 1904, President Roosevelt took such action. He issued his famous and controversial Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in which he reiterated the long-standing United States opposition to European military intervention in any Western Hemisphere country for any reason. However, lest this pledge of protection be used as a shield by defaulting Latin American regimes, Roosevelt in his Corollary expanded the traditional American defensive posture into an assumption of United States responsibility for the international good behavior--both political and financial--of the Latin American nations. He declared in effect that if nations within the American defensive zone in the Western Hemisphere failed to meet their legal obligations, the United States would see that they did so, by direct military intervention if necessary. Roosevelt

thus expanded the Monroe Doctrine into a claim for the United States of international police power in the Western Hemisphere--power which was to be used, not to create a colonial empire for the United States, but rather to prevent other nations from establishing new colonies of their own. (5)

In the Dominican Republic, the Roosevelt Corollary received its first practical application. At the initiative of the Dominican president, the United States and the Dominican Republic negotiated a treaty under which American representatives would collect the customs revenues at Dominican ports and divide the proceeds between current government expenses and payments on the foreign debt. In February 1905 the agreement was submitted for ratification to the respective national legislatures, and at the same time the two governments established a modus vivendi which had the practical effect of putting the treaty provisions into immediate operation.

The treaty met determined opposition in the U.S. Senate, many members of which insisted on limiting the functions of the American customs representatives. A compromise finally received Senate approval in February 1907 with Dominican acceptance coming in May of the same year. Meanwhile, under the modus vivendi, the claims of the Dominican creditors were reduced from \$30,000,000 to approximately \$17,000,000 with U.S. approval. Besides the customs receivership, the new treaty of 1907 provided for the floating of a bond issue of \$20,000,000 at 5 percent to be devoted exclusively to paying long-dormant accounts and financing specified public works projects to reduce domestic discontent. (6)

Under the first American representative, the capable and industrious Thomas C. Dawson, the customs receivership smoothly began raising income and retiring debts. By 1912, the debt had been reduced to about \$14,000,000. Introduction of the receivership coincided in time with the Dominican presidency of Ramon Caceres, who was elected in 1906. The most honest and capable of the Dominican leaders of this period, President Caceres supported the customs receivership as the best possible solution to his country's financial dilemma and sought to use the revenues being raised to improve public services and stimulate economic development.

However, he fell victim to his country's endemic political plotting. An assassin shot him down on 19 November 1911, and from then on the Dominican Republic's internal stability deteriorated along with her relations with the United States. Another series of transitory regimes resumed the old game of borrowing to suppress revolution, increasing the national debt in violation of the treaty of 1907. The new Wilson administration, represented in Santo Domingo by men less knowledgeable and tactful than Dawson, responded with increasingly peremptory demands that the Dominicans abide by the treaty of 1907 and form a stable government. The United States customs receivership assumed control over all Dominican revenues, and American representatives began supervising public works projects. In 1914, with rival Dominican factions arming for civil war, [a United States show of force backed by the 5th Regiment of Marines on board transports off shore brought about a truce and an orderly] presidential election which brought into power the political veteran Juan Isidro Jimenez. As the constitutionally elected president of the Dominican Republic, Jimenez received from the United States firm guarantees of support against future revolution, accompanied by more demands that he carry out faithfully the treaty of 1907. (7) (*)

The final crisis erupted on 15 April 1916 when President Jimenez arrested two adherents of his popular Minister of War, General Desiderio Arias. Arias, a leading fomenter of the revolt of 1914, established himself in the principal fortress of Santo Domingo City, the national capital, and, supported by troops loyal to himself, raised the standard of revolt. Opponents of the President flocked to join his forces, which soon dominated the streets of the capital. After failing to negotiate a settlement between Jimenez and Arias, the American minister, under State Department instructions to back Jimenez in any final showdown, called

(*) In 1915, United States Marines occupied the Dominican Republic's neighbor, Haiti, in an effort to establish stable government. This, and the subsequent Dominican occupation, were part of the intensive Caribbean intervention policy adopted by President Woodrow Wilson in the hope of "teaching the Latin Americans to elect good men" through constitutional democratic procedures and to safeguard the Caribbean during World War I.

for Marines to protect the United States legation. The Dominican Congress on 2 May, under pressure from Arias, voted to impeach Jimenez, who had fled to his country estate and was gathering troops. On 5 May, the President advanced on the city with elements of the army loyal to him and fighting began between his forces and those of Arias. That same day, the first contingent of United States Marines landed in Santo Domingo City. (8)

American Military Intervention


The Marines who came ashore in Santo Domingo City from the transport Prairie on 5 May 1916 numbered about 150 men in two companies -- the 6th, an infantry unit commanded by Captain Frederic M. Wise, and the 9th, equipped as field artillery with four three-inch guns, under Captain Eugene Fortson, a respected artillery officer. Captain Wise had overall command of the force, which was designated a provisional battalion. Nicknamed "Fritz" and sometimes "Dopey" by fellow Marines, Captain Wise, a strict disciplinarian with a volcanic temper, had orders to occupy the United States legation and consulate, as well as the strategic Fort San Geronimo. Wise also had instructions to assist President Jimenez against Arias's rebels. (9)

Ashore in the Dominican capital, Captain Wise and his Marines found themselves in the midst of a miniature civil war. Some 250 Dominican army troops loyal to Arias, reinforced by hundreds of civilian irregulars to whom Arias had distributed rifles from government arsenals, controlled the central city and were in a position to block the delivery of supplies to the Marines' assigned positions. Other army forces led by President Jimenez, their strength estimated by Captain Wise at about 800, were attacking the city from the north and west. By the time the Marines landed, this initial government assault had failed and the President's troops were running out of ammunition, with less than 20 rounds left per man. (10)

Captain Wise acted with a mixture of boldness and discretion. Knowing that his small force by itself could not defeat over 1,000 armed Dominicans, he put up a brave front. While his men occupied their assigned objectives, he went directly to Arias's headquarters and demanded safe-conduct



A boatload of Marines being towed ashore at Santo Domingo City during the initial landing, 5 May 1916. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 521571).



Marines camped outside Santo Domingo City, May 1916. Note the stacked Springfield rifles and the fieldpiece in the background, standard Marine weapons during the intervention. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 521577).

out of the city for foreign nationals and also the right to move supplies for his Marines through Arias-controlled territory. He secured agreements on both points. The foreign residents were evacuated to the Prairie, and hired civilian carts hauled supplies up to the Marines. (11)

Following his instructions to aid the government forces, Captain Wise established contact with their commander, General Perez. Perez asked first for the loan of 100 rifles and 50,000 rounds of ammunition, which Wise refused to give him, and then for Marine artillery support for a renewed government attack the next day. This Wise agreed to furnish. Accordingly, during the night of 5-6 May he disembarked the 9th Company's field guns and deployed his infantry to assist the government advance. However, the next day (6 May), President Jimenez resigned, giving as his reason his unwillingness to turn American guns on fellow Dominicans. His forces abandoned their attack plans. Jimenez's withdrawal left the country without a president, and the national Congress created a provisional council of ministers to carry on executive functions. With the political situation in confusion, Captain Wise had only his two companies, plus 130 sailors and a small Marine contingent from the gunboat Castine, available for action on shore. To stabilize the situation temporarily, he co-operated with the naval commander and the American minister to arrange a truce between the Dominican factions. Under this agreement, Arias dismantled many of his fortifications and disbanded his civilian irregulars while most of the government troops withdrew to Fort San Geronimo on the edge of the city. The Marines held their original positions and waited for reinforcements. (12)

On 12 May 1916, Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, commander of the Cruiser Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, arrived at Santo Domingo City on board his flagship USS Dolphin and assumed direction of the operation. On that and the following day, more Marines landed--the 4th and 5th Companies from Haiti and a detachment of the 24th Company from Guantanamo. With over 400 Marines now on hand, Rear Admiral Caperton on 14 May met with Arias and demanded that he disband his army and surrender his weapons by 0600 on 15 May or face a full-scale American attack. Arias rejected this demand, but he did agree to evacuate the capital. As a result of this arrangement, the Marines who entered the rebel-held portion of the city on 15 May met no significant resistance, Arias

and his troops having marched northward toward Santiago. (13)
At least one Marine officer greeted this outcome with relief, because, as he later recalled, "If Arias had fought hard, if it had been like it was in Vera Cruz -- sniping from every house and everything, why we had a rough job ahead of us; and nobody was very happy over it." (14) The Marines now had secured a base of operations ashore as well as control of the national capital; they had inflicted an important psychological defeat on the rebel forces.

Marine strength in the Dominican Republic continued to increase. On 23 May, the USS Panther arrived at Santo Domingo City with Colonel Theodore P. Kane on board along with the headquarters of the 2d Regiment and three more infantry companies. Disembarking with his troops, Colonel Kane assumed command of all Marines on shore in the Dominican Republic. He established temporary headquarters in the American consulate building and deployed his forces to protect the capital city. One company took position on the east bank of the Ozama River covering the right flank; two companies guarded the northwestern approaches to the city; and two more companies occupied the Guardia Republicana barracks. Other Marines set up camp in Fort Ozama. American forces also deployed off the Dominican Republic's north coast. The USS Sacramento, with two Marine Companies on board, awaited orders off Puerto Plata while the Panther and Lamson carrying two more companies patrolled offshore near Monte Cristi. On 28 May, Marine strength in the Dominican area totalled 11 companies, drawn mostly from the 1st and 2d Regiments, which were stationed in Haiti as part of the United States occupation force. The force in Santo Domingo numbered about 750 men, a strength which senior officers judged to be still substantially short of that necessary to occupy the entire country. (15)

It was becoming increasingly plain to the American commanders that occupation of the whole country would have to be their next step. The revolution had caused the collapse of Dominican civil government in many interior towns. In the village of Yamasa, for example, arriving Marines found that the local police detachment had marched off to fight for President Jimenez in April when the revolt began, leaving the community completely unprotected. (16) Even more disruptive of order and stable government, General Arias with several hundred armed men remained at large. His

force, which had withdrawn to the northern city of Santiago, furnished a rallying point for the bandits, local strongmen, and malcontents of the rural districts; and his political friends still had influence in the Dominican Congress. The remaining Dominican government troops, estimated on 28 May to number about 300 men, clearly lacked both the will and the capability to crush Arias and restore order in the interior, so the American forces would have to do the job. (17)


As a first step, on 1 June the Marine units deployed off Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi landed under cover of ships' guns to secure those strategic ports. They occupied Monte Cristi without meeting resistance, but at Puerto Plata they had to fight their way into the city under heavy but inaccurate fire from about 500 pro-Arias irregulars. During this landing the Marines sustained several casualties, including the death of Captain Herbert J. Hirshinger, the first Marine killed in combat in the Dominican campaign. Insurgent losses, while never accurately determined, were light, partly because the Marines made only sparing use of their own and the warships' firepower in order to avoid inflicting heavy civilian casualties in the crowded town. (18)

Colonel Kane quickly reinforced the Marines at Monte Cristi and Puerto Plata. He left Santo Domingo City on 3 June with four Marine companies, intending to leave two companies at each port while at the same time inspecting the cities and their garrisons.

In the meantime, Rear Admiral Caperton called upon the Navy Department for more Marines for the Dominican campaign. The Department approved his request, and on 4 June Major General Commandant George Barnett ordered the 4th Regiment to proceed by train with all possible speed from its home base in San Diego, California, to New Orleans. There, a week later, the regiment embarked on the transport Hancock for passage to Santo Domingo where it landed at Monte Cristi on 21 June. At Monte Cristi, the regiment's popular commanding officer, Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, known throughout the Corps by the affectionate title of "Uncle Joe," assumed command under Rear Admiral Caperton of all Marines operating on shore. He and his officers at once began preparations for a drive against Arias's stronghold of Santiago. (19)



A street scene during the Marines' entry into Santo Domingo City, 15 May 1916. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 521582).



Colonel Pendleton (front row, 4th from left) and staff officers of the 4th Regiment, Santiago, late 1916. 1stLt Pedro A. Del Valle (rear, 3d from left) later rose to command the 11th Marines at Guadalcanal and the 1st Division on Okinawa. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 521567).

The March on Santiago

The plan which Pendleton and his staff devised for capturing Santiago and pacifying the great interior valley, or Cibao, provided for two columns of Marines to converge simultaneously on the rebel stronghold. One column, consisting of the 4th Regiment with some artillery attached, would march by road from Monte Cristi. The second, composed of the 4th and 9th Companies and the Marine detachments from the battleships Rhode Island and New Jersey, would follow a railroad inland from Puerto Plata. (*) The two forces would meet at Navarette, from which they would proceed jointly to Santiago for the final attack. During its road march, the Monte Cristi column, the larger of the two and the one which had the longer distance to cover to reach the Navarette rendezvous, would cease to draw supplies from its base about halfway along its route and operate as what Colonel Pendleton called a "flying column." The smaller column from Puerto Plata would secure and reopen the railroad connecting Santiago with the seacoast, thus establishing a line of supply for the combined force during the attack upon and occupation of the city. (20)


On 24 June, before the operation got under way, Colonel Pendleton issued to his troops an order defining the Marines' mission in the Dominican Republic and laying down the principles which should govern their conduct in this campaign and throughout their stay in the country. He pointed out to his officers and men that "our work in this country is not one of invasion;" instead, they were there to "restore and preserve peace and order, and to protect life and property" and to "support the Constituted Government." He continued: "Members of this command will therefore realize that we are not in an enemy's country, though many of the inhabitants may be inimical to us, and they will be careful so to conduct themselves as to inspire confidence among the people in the honesty of our intentions and the

(*) The campaign had to be based on the northern coast because there was no road passable for a large force with a supply train from Santo Domingo City north across the central mountain range.

sincerity of our purpose. Officers will act toward the people with courtesy, dignity and firmness, and will see that their men do nothing to arouse or foster the antagonism toward us that can naturally be expected towards an armed force that many interested malcontents will endeavor to persuade the citizens to look upon as invaders." (21)

He went on to stress that "minimum force" should be used at all times "but armed opposition or attack will be sharply and firmly met and suppressed with force of arms." Enemy wounded and prisoners were to receive humane and liberal treatment, and Marines were to give rigid respect to the inhabitants' property rights, taking nothing "however apparently valueless" from a native except with his consent and in return for payment. Pendleton prohibited the firing of weapons "unless by command of an officer, or in pursuance of orders given by an officer," or "in actual defense of one's life or the life of another." With this order, Pendleton gave expression to the principles that would guide the entire Marine presence in the Dominican Republic, principles to which the Marines, with a few individual exceptions, in the main faithfully adhered. (22)

On 26 June, Colonel Pendleton's force, numbering 34 officers and 803 enlisted men, began its 75-mile march from Monte Cristi to Santiago. While Colonel Pendleton had emphasized in his instructions to his troops the peaceable nature of their mission, he organized his column in anticipation of ambush and battle. An advance guard of Marines mounted on locally procured horses led the column along the Santiago road. They preceded the main body, which consisted of most of the infantry and artillery, at a distance of about 800 yards. The hospital and supply train--a motley collection of 24 mule carts, 7 motor trucks with trailers, 2 motorized water carts, a water wagon, a Holt tractor pulling four trailers, and 11 Ford touring cars--followed the main body escorted by the 6th Company of infantry. During the last part of the march, the troops would have to live and fight entirely on the supplies carried by this train. Until the column broke all contact with Monte Cristi, a signal detachment maintained a telephone line between Colonel Pendleton's headquarters and the coastal base. (23) During the first day of the march, the Marines covered 16 miles without meeting rebel resistance, but that night one of the trucks, dispatched



Brigadier General Joseph Pendleton at his desk in Santiago, D. R., late 1916. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 531255).

for water, came under fire with the result that Corporal Leo P. Cartier of the 13th Company suffered a serious wound and became the first Marine casualty of the march. (24)

The next day, 27 June, the first major engagement of the advance occurred at Las Trencheras. Here the Dominican rebels had dug trenches on two hills, one behind the other, blocking the road to Santiago. Their position, while strong, had the disadvantage that the ground between it and the Americans was flat and covered with brush thick enough to hide advancing Marines from enemy riflemen, yet not so thick as to hamper seriously American movement. At about 0800 on the 27th, the field guns of Captain Chandler Campbell's 13th Company, along with a machine gun platoon, took position on a hill commanding the enemy trenches and opened fire. Under the cover of this fire, the Marine infantry attacked. About 1,000 yards from the trenches, the Marines came under heavy yet high and inaccurate rifle fire which caused a few casualties, but they pressed forward until they could bring their own weapons to bear. Then with a final rush and fixed bayonets, the infantry charged the defenders' first line, covered until the last possible moment by the artillery barrage. The insurgents, unwilling to engage the Marines at close quarters, fled to their trenches on the second hill. They rallied there briefly, then broke and ran again as the American field guns resumed shelling. Within 45 minutes from the opening artillery shots, the Marines, at a cost to themselves of one killed and four wounded, had overrun the enemy positions. They found no dead or weapons in the trenches but later discovered five rebel bodies in nearby woods. (25)

This engagement set the pattern for most Marine contacts with hostile forces in the Dominican Republic. Against Marine superiority in artillery, machine guns, small-unit maneuver, and individual training and marksmanship, no Dominican force could hold its ground. However, with too few men to cover too much terrain, inadequate mounted or motorized forces, and often poor communications, the Marines usually could not force the elusive enemy to stand for a decisive battle. Time after time, the enemy broke and ran, only to return to harass the Marines another day.



Camp of the 4th Marines at Monte Cristi before the march at Monte Cristi, 1916. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 531347).



Marines of the 29th Company preparing to break camp at Monte Cristi, 1916. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 515254).

For the next several days from 28 June to 2 July, Pendleton's column pushed on toward Santiago, severing its supply line to Monte Cristi on 30 June as originally planned. Aside from sniper fire and a couple of ineffective night attacks on Marine outposts, the enemy offered no resistance. The rough and overgrown countryside, the poor roads, and the need to stop and rebuild destroyed bridges did as much or more than the insurgents to slow Pendleton's advance. Toiling and straining, the vehicles of the indispensable supply train managed to keep up with the column, although the heavier trucks burned fuel at an estimated rate of one gallon per mile. Animal fodder and water both were scarce, and Pendleton often had to send parties away from the main column to search for them. (26)

On 3 July at Guayacanas the insurgents made their second major stand against Colonel Pendleton's Marines. In this, the decisive engagement of the advance to Santiago, the Americans again faced an entrenched foe and an approach through thick undergrowth. This time the artillery, unable to find a position from which to observe or fire upon the enemy, could not support the attack; and the infantry and machine gunners had to carry the burden of the engagement. The machine gunners displayed particular gallantry. They dragged their Colts and Benet-Merciers through the brush to within 200 yards of the opposing line and fired burst after burst in an effort to silence the enemy's rifles. Corporal Joseph Glowin set up his gun behind a fallen log and fired until twice wounded, when other Marines forceably dragged him to the rear and a second Marine whose gun had jammed replaced him. First Sergeant Roswell Winans, working a jam-prone Colt gun from an exposed position, stood up under fire to clear a stoppage and keep his weapon in action. For this exploit, he became the first man in the 4th Regiment to be awarded the Medal of Honor.

While the infantry and machine-gunners pressed the attack in front, the 6th Company, under Captain Julian C. Smith, a future lieutenant-general, fought off a rebel force which had slipped around the Marines' flank to attack the supply train. Finally, the enemy broke and fled, leaving the Marines, who had lost one man killed and 10 wounded, in possession of the trenches. Attesting to the superiority of Marine rifle marksmanship and machine gun fire, the rebels lost at least 27 dead and left five prisoners in the Marines'



Marines on the march toward Santiago, showing some of the vehicles of Pendleton's heterogeneous supply train. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 517480).



Marines of the 4th Regiment resting along the road to Santiago. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 531355).

hands. The next day, without meeting further resistance, Colonel Pendleton's column reached its interim destination of Navarette. (27)

While Pendleton's troops advanced from Monte Cristi, the column from Puerto Plata, initially commanded by Captain Fortson, marched along the railroad repairing bridges, track, and roadbed. Many of the men rode on an improvised military train consisting of four boxcars and a locomotive which seemed to be held together with baling wire. On a flatcar pushed along in front of the locomotive, they had mounted a 3-inch gun. After a skirmish at Llanos Perez, where shells from the gun dispersed the insurgents, the column halted on 28 June at Lajas, just south of Puerto Plata. Here, Fortson was replaced in command by Major Hiram Bearss, known to his comrades as "Hike 'em" Hiram because of his preference for extended marches. (28)

Resuming their march, Bearss' Marines on 29 June encountered a force of about 200 rebels entrenched across the railroad line at Alta Mira. Bearss sent the 4th Company over a mountain trail to turn the defenders' right flank while the rest of his force supported by the train advanced along the railroad. By a combination of frontal and flank attack, the Marines forced the insurgents back to a second position covering a tunnel. Again, frontal and flanking attacks dislodged the enemy while Bearss with 60 men charged through the 300-yard long tunnel to prevent the rebels from damaging or destroying this crucial link in the railroad line. When Bearss and his party emerged from the tunnel, they saw the rebels running in full retreat toward Santiago. In this engagement, which lasted about half an hour, the Marines suffered two men wounded, including Second Lieutenant Douglas B. Roben, who was cited for his exemplary actions during 4th Company's flanking maneuvers. The insurgents lost an estimated 50 casualties. After making further extensive repairs to the roadbed and constructing a bridge, the railroad column, which encountered no more serious enemy resistance, joined the main force at Navarette on 4 July. (29)

The commanders of the two columns represented a study in contrasting and yet complementary personalities and styles of leadership. Soft-spoken, retiring, and aloof, Pendleton was noted for his seemingly unlimited patience, but he could assume a stern demeanor. His Marines had faith



Marine railroad patrol, probably on the Puerto Plata-Navarette line, 1916. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 531349).



Marines of the 8th Company on the skirmish line somewhere between Monte Cristi and Santiago, June 1916. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 517356).

in his justice and fairness and responded enthusiastically to his leadership. (30) In contrast, Bearss of the railroad column, a noted extrovert, had a reputation among contemporaries as one of the best storytellers in the Marine Corps. At nightly camps along the road to Santiago, he would entertain junior officers and troops with tales of his past exploits and adventures. His rush through the tunnel at Alta Mira illustrated his spectacular style of personal command. (31)


The march on Santiago came to a peaceful if anticlimactic conclusion. On 5 July, Pendleton received a peace commission sent out from Santiago. The members of the commission informed him that the insurgent General Arias had made an agreement with Admiral Caperton to cease resistance. The commissioners declared that Arias was trying to disband his armed following and asked the Americans to delay their entry into Santiago, which would be unopposed, to give Arias time for this. Pendleton agreed to this request, but he at once pushed troops forward to seize the remaining defensible positions between his camp and the city, just in case Arias should go back on his word. The rebel capitulation, however, went off as planned. On 6 July, Pendleton's column marched into Santiago, signalling the end of large-scale organized resistance to American forces. Colonel Pendleton at once established the 4th Regiment's headquarters in Santiago and opened communications with the Marines to the south in Santo Domingo City. (32)

With organized resistance broken, Marine detachments took up the task of rooting out individual rebel leaders, who often were hard to distinguish from bandits. For example, Major Bearss with a small party went after Juan Calcano, a prominent rebel in the region of San Pedro de Macoris in southeastern Santo Domingo, who was wanted for robbing the customs house at La Romana the previous year. On 24 August, Bearss and his men arrested Calcano in his home and brought him to Santo Domingo City for confinement in the Ozama Fortress. (33) During the period from July through October, Marine detachments apprehended other rebel leaders as well as beginning the disarmament of Dominican civilians and irregular armed forces. (34)

Besides rounding up insurgents and bandits, the Marines began helping the Dominicans reconstruct their country's economy. Bearss and Wise, for example, organized a regular



Field hospital of the 4th Regiment at Las Trencheras, 27 June 1916. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 531358).



Marines of the 4th Regiment with a captured rebel "spray gun" at Santiago. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 531230).

freight business on the Puerto Plata-to-Santiago railroad to supplement the military traffic. They established first-class, second-class, and third-class rates and accommodations. As Wise later recalled, first-class passengers rode in the caboose, second-class rode in the boxcars, and third-class on the roof. While crude, these accommodations represented a vast improvement over the previous situation when the trains rarely ran at all. (35)

Establishment of United States Military Government

Although the Marines were well on the way to controlling the Dominican military situation, political developments during 1916 continued to be unfavorable to United States interests. The Dominican Congress on 25 July managed to elect a provisional president, Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, who promised not to seek re-election when his six-month term expired. Henriquez's government, however, was strongly influenced by pro-Arias elements in the Congress. Henriquez refused to agree to the two pre-conditions which the United States set for granting his regime diplomatic recognition and which the United States considered indispensable to Dominican stability. Those conditions were that the Dominicans permit American authorities to collect and disburse all of the Republic's revenues and that the national army be replaced by a Dominican constabulary under American command. The two governments remained deadlocked on these issues throughout the summer and into the fall. Further increasing tension, President Henriquez indicated that he planned to run for a second term, in spite of his earlier promises. (36)

In October, the military situation showed new signs of deterioration, reflected in a growing number of violent clashes between Marines and Dominicans in and near the capital city. The most serious of these encounters occurred at Villa Duarte on 24 October. On that day, a Marine detachment attempted to capture a noted bandit named Ramon Batista who seized a rifle and resisted arrest. Other armed Dominicans rallied to his aid, and a confused shoot-out ensued in which two Marines, Captain William Low and Sergeant Frank Atwood, were killed along with Batista and three Dominicans. (37)

Faced with continued political conflict and public disorder in Santo Domingo, the United States took what seemed to be the inevitable next step. On 29 November, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Harry S. Knapp, who had succeeded Admiral Caperton in overall command, issued a proclamation declaring the Dominican Republic to be under the military jurisdiction of the United States. The proclamation accused the Dominican government of violating the financial provisions of the Treaty of 1907 and of failing to maintain internal order and stability. The United States military government now being established would have as its purpose, not the destruction of Dominican sovereignty, but rather "is designed to give aid to that country in returning to a condition of internal order that will enable it to observe the terms of the treaty (of 1907), and the obligations resting upon it as one of the family of nations." (38)

The proclamation made it clear that the United States military government would assume complete control of Dominican finances and would supervise law enforcement, the judiciary, and internal administration. However, Dominican laws were to continue in effect "in so far as they do not conflict with the objects of the Occupation or necessary regulations established thereunder." The ordinary administration of both civil and criminal justice would remain the responsibility of Dominican courts and officials, except in cases involving American military personnel or resistance to the Military Government, which would be tried by United States tribunals. Captain Knapp concluded his proclamation with a call to all "citizens of, and residents and sojourners in," the Dominican Republic to co-operate with the American authorities in restoring peace and prosperity and with a promise that the United States occupation forces would respect the personal and property rights of all Dominican citizens and residents. (39)

Although most Dominicans received the proclamation without enthusiasm, less violence than was realistically anticipated accompanied its publication. Colonel Pendleton believed in fact that "ninety-five percent" of the people "have wanted just what they are now getting but have been afraid to say so, fearing the small percentage of politicians and professional disturbers." (40) Whatever their privately held opinions, most Dominicans seemed content to comply at least passively with the decrees of the military government.

Isolated resistance did flare up, with the most significant incident taking place in the interior province of San Francisco de Macoris. There the local governor Juan Perez, a supporter of Arias, along with a band of his followers, occupied the fortaleza (*) in the provincial capital and refused to surrender their weapons to the Americans. The governor's action violated a directive promulgated by the military government very early in its tenure which required disarmament of the populace. On the night of 29 November, First Lieutenant Ernest C. Williams led a detail of 12 Marines from the 31st and 47th Companies of the 4th Regiment in a surprise attack on the fort. While other Marines of the two companies waited in support, Williams and his picked men rushed the open gate and stormed inside before the enemy could close it. The surprised insurgents poured in a volley that wounded eight of Williams' party, but within 10 minutes Perez's followers had surrendered or fled. Lieutenant Williams later received the Medal of Honor for his exploit, the second one awarded to the 4th Marines in this campaign. (41)

Other scattered clashes contributed their toll of Marine casualties. These included Captain John A. Hughes, nicknamed "Johnny the Hard" by his troops who regarded him as a "rough customer," who suffered a severe leg wound during a patrol action near San Francisco de Macoris on 4 December. (42) By the end of the year, however, most American observers believed that the country was quieting down. In the Santiago region, even the pro-Arias element publicly called for peace and co-operation with the military government. (43)

Indicating American confidence in returning stability, the Marine companies of the 1st Provisional Regiment, which had entered the country back in May, sailed for Philadelphia on 19 December. They left behind the 4th Regiment in occupation of northern Santo Domingo with headquarters at Santiago. The headquarters and staff of the 1st Regiment

(*) Each Dominican provincial capital contains a fortaleza, a stone-built square enclosure, usually with a single ornamented entrance gate. The fortaleza contains a barracks, offices, an armory, and sometimes a prison and functions as the political as well as military center of provincial government. It was the logical place for Perez to make a stand.



The Fortaleza at San Francisco de Macoris a few days after its capture by Lieutenant Williams. The dark marks on the walls around the gate are bullet pocks. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 521787).



Marine riflemen in a skirmish line. Note the spotter with field glasses in the foreground. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 515008).

remained at Santo Domingo City when the troops left for the United States. Now redesignated the 3d Provisional Regiment, this headquarters controlled the Marine units still stationed in the southern part of the country. Together, the 3d and 4th Regiments constituted the 2d Provisional Brigade under Brigadier General Pendleton, who had received his promotion late in 1916. (44)

The 2d Brigade -- Life and Work in Santo Domingo

From late 1916 on, the 2d Brigade was deployed as an army of occupation to enforce the decrees of the military government and maintain public order. Initially, the military government divided the country into two military districts: the Northern District, with headquarters at Santiago, was garrisoned by the 4th Regiment while the Southern District had its headquarters at Santo Domingo City and was the responsibility of the 3d Regiment. In 1919, the military government created an Eastern District composed of the provinces of El Seibo and Macoris, the centers of banditry and political unrest throughout the occupation. To garrison this district, the 15th Regiment, commanded by Colonel James C. Breckinridge and numbering 50 officers and 1,041 men, came down from the United States. Landing at San Pedro de Macoris on 26-28 February 1919, this regiment re-inforced the 2d Brigade to its peak strength of about 3,000 officers and men. Also strengthening the occupation force, the 1st Marine Air Squadron established itself in Santo Domingo during 1919. (45)

Within the military districts, the regimental commanders enjoyed wide latitude in deploying their troops. They always maintained strong contingents in the principal sea-ports. These garrisons secured the country's economic and political centers, protected the brigade's bases of supply, and safeguarded the customs houses--still the main source of revenue for the Dominican government. Other Marines, stationed at posts in the interior, patrolled against the ever-present bandits. Particularly in the Eastern District, the prevalence of banditry and the extent of country to be covered required wide dispersal of the Marines. Often detachments as small as eight men under a lieutenant or an NCO occupied isolated posts as far as 35 or 40 miles from their company headquarters. (46)

Pendleton remained in command of the brigade until October 1918. He proved as successful in civil administration as he had been in leading the march on Santiago. His superior officer, Rear Admiral Knapp, wrote that he "has added strength to the military government by his firmness in handling essentials, coupled with a courtesy of manner towards Dominicans and a consideration for their susceptibilities." (47) Pendleton left Santo Domingo to take command of the Marine Barracks at Parris Island, S.C., and later of the 2d Advance Base Force and the 5th Brigade of Marines at San Diego. He retired on 24 June 1924. When he died on 4 February 1942, he was mourned as one of the loved and respected leaders of the Marine Corps. (48)

After Pendleton, the 2d Brigade had a succession of commanders. Brigadier General Ben Hebard Fuller, a veteran of the Boxer Uprising and the occupation of Vera Cruz and a future Major General Commandant, held command until November 1919. He was followed by Brigadier General Logan Feland, who would command the Marines in Nicaragua in the 1920s, and by Brigadier General Charles G. Long. Each of these officers served with the brigade for about one year. On 9 August 1921, Brigadier General Harry Lee succeeded Brigadier General Long; he remained in command of the brigade until the final Marine withdrawal in 1924. (49)

The personnel of the brigade which these generals successively commanded varied in numbers and to some extent in quality as the Marine Corps rapidly expanded and reorganized to meet the exigencies of World War I. When the United States entered the war in 1917, many of the 2d Brigade's best officers left it for the battle front in France. Others who had to stay behind in Santo Domingo probably would have endorsed the sentiment expressed by Pendleton who wrote: "It is hard lines to be in this service nearly thirty-nine years and then when the first real war of one's service comes, to be shelved down here." (50) Particularly after mid-1918, Marine commanders in the Dominican Republic complained of a shortage of junior officers and that the officers sent to them often were ill-prepared for their jobs. One company commander who later rose to high rank recalled that late in 1918 he found himself stationed in the hills of eastern Santo Domingo with only two lieutenants for 150 enlisted men. He soon had to relieve one of the lieutenants from field duty for



Marines from the 13th Company, 4th Regiment, rest during a hike; a typical scene from the anti-bandit campaign. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 531210).



Marines searching a native hut for weapons; a typical view of one of the 2d Brigade's major police functions. (Nat Arch RG 127-G Photo 515012).

misconduct and pressed a Navy medical officer into temporary troop command to replace him. (51)

The enlisted force also changed in character as a result of the war. The units that went into Santo Domingo in 1916 were composed of seasoned men of the "Old Corps"-disciplined career Marines. Later, the companies received drafts of men who had volunteered for the World War, most of whom also made good Marines, although, as an officer who commanded them remembered it, they "were disappointed and disgruntled because they had had to serve in Santo Domingo instead of fighting in Germany." (52)

Then, late in 1918, the World War I draftees (*) came flooding in, many of them less thoroughly trained than previous recruits. One detachment of these men in bandit territory, on their first night in camp, mistook the flare of lighted cigarettes for enemy rifle flashes. They blazed away with their own weapons, and only their poor marksmanship prevented them from mowing down the battalion commander's escort. (53) Veterans of Dominican service often commented on the discipline problems presented by these recruits, many of whom resented being kept in service after the Armistice. In the 15th Regiment, the future Lieutenant General Edward A. Craig, then a temporary captain, joined a company early in 1919 and found his men "very poorly trained. They were practically mutinous when I arrived there." Joining forces with two trustworthy NCOs and for a while sleeping at night "with a BAR by my bed," he worked them into a disciplined unit after "a number of bad experiences." (54)

Marines posted in the villages and smaller towns lived primitively in tent camps or native huts. Their rations were brought in over winding, muddy trails by bull cart and mule train and consisted largely of canned meat and vegetables, bacon, flour, and other nonperishables. The ration

(*) By order of the Secretary of the Navy, voluntary recruiting for the Marine Corps was suspended on 8 August 1918 and not resumed until 4 December 1918. In the interval, drafted men would be accepted for induction into the Marine Corps if they met Marine standards. Many of these men, who had been called for induction before 11 November 1918, were inducted after that date.

usually included cans of sardines (called "goldfish" by the troops) which the Marines exchanged with the local inhabitants for eggs, chickens, and fresh vegetables if the poor peasants had any of those commodities to spare. Marines in the interior received no regular issue of fresh meat. When they could they purchased it locally, and some detachments were not above appropriating a stray cow if one wandered by. Patrols chasing bandits usually carried a couple of days' rations on their persons and perhaps more on a pack mule. If they remained in the field after those supplies ran out, an officer recalled, "we would forage through the country, obtaining what we could from the natives in the various towns and villages." As a veteran summed up the supply situation: "Our stores were very meager. Nobody got fat down there." (55)

In spite of the brigade's many occupation duties, Marine commanding officers spent much of their time devising ways to combat idleness and boredom among their troops. Marines in the scattered garrisons played almost daily games of baseball, either among themselves or as members of civilian teams. In La Romana, for instance, several Marines from the nearby post joined a baseball club sponsored by the local sugar company which played against other Dominican squads and occasionally against traveling teams from Puerto Rico. Their commander encouraged this activity both as giving his men something to do and as a way of improving the Marines' relationship to the native community. On all national holidays, the 2d Brigade held athletic meets, either at Santo Domingo City or at Santiago, at which teams from each of the three military districts would compete in military exercises, horsemanship, track and field events, and the inevitable baseball. To sharpen the brigade's military skills, the commander during 1919 opened a training center in Santo Domingo City. Assigned to this center in rotation, each company in the country spent six weeks in standard Marine training and received special schooling in occupation duties. Marine officers from interior stations welcomed these sessions as "an opportunity to see a little night life and do some dancing at the club." (56)

Life in isolated outposts, where they often exercised wide authority under minimal supervision from superiors, offered temptations to corruption and the misuse of power to which a few Marines fell victim. From time to time,


officers and enlisted men extorted money and goods from natives, made arbitrary arrests, assaulted civilians or each other, and misappropriated government supplies. When found out, such offenders, who comprised a small minority of the brigade, usually underwent swift trial by Marine courts-martial and if found guilty were punished. (57)

One of the most serious instances of reported Marine misconduct involved Captain Charles F. Merkel, who was accused of beating and disfiguring one native prisoner and having four others shot during operations against bandits near Hato Mayor in the eastern district. After Major Robert S. Kingsbury, the brigade adjutant, conducted a thorough investigation of the incident, Captain Merkel was arrested and confined to quarters to await trial. There, on 2 October 1918, he killed himself with a small pistol which he had concealed on his person. (58)

Against these individual lapses should be set the generally disciplined and law-abiding conduct of the officers and men of the brigade as they went about their difficult and demanding task of pacification. Of all the jobs which taxed the ingenuity, skill, and patience of the Marines in Santo Domingo, three were of special importance to the success of the occupation: the suppression of banditry, the training of a native constabulary, and civil administration.

The Suppression of Banditry, 1917-1922

When General Arias disbanded his army at Santiago early in July 1916, he brought to an end formal, organized resistance to the American occupation. Yet throughout the 2d Marine Brigade's service in the Dominican Republic, hardly a month went by without an armed clash between Marines and hostile forces usually lumped together by the Americans under the label "bandits." The Marines' struggle against these elements, which they waged with varying degrees of intensity from 1917-1922, required, as Pendleton pointed out, "really more forces than a concentrated insurrection, because we have to have a force in so many different places to suppress the trouble." (59) It was to meet the demands of this campaign that the 15th Regiment and the 1st Air Squadron had to be added to the 2d Brigade during 1919. (60)



A mounted patrol of Marines from the 33d Company, 4th Regiment. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 522005).



Mounted Marines at a stream crossing, a favorite site for rebel ambushes. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 518240).

The bandits whose activities thus necessitated the enlargement of Marine strength were not a homogeneous group. Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Miller, Chief of Staff of the 2d Brigade from 1921-1924, separated them into five categories. These included professional highwaymen or "gavilleros," discontented politicians who used banditry to advance their own ambitions, unemployed laborers driven by poverty, peasants recruited by duress, and ordinary professional criminals -- murderers, kidnapers, and the like. Many of the rank and file lived as peaceful farmers by day and roamed as bandits by night. (61)

Operating in bands that rarely exceeded 200 men and usually numbered less than 50, these brigands robbed and terrorized rural communities; they extorted money, ammunition, and supplies from large sugar estates; and sometimes they aggressively attacked small Marine units. At all times, their armed presence in the countryside threatened the security of the rural population and challenged the authority of the central government. The gangs usually coalesced around a leader noted for his dynamic personality, ferocity, or physical strength. Many of these men were little more than hoodlums, but a few had the character of local political chiefs or warlords. In this category could be placed the murderous Vincentico Evangelista, who for a while could muster almost 300 armed men and threatened to become the extra-legal governor of eastern Santo Domingo, and Dioz Olivorio, who attracted a large following by preaching his own home-made religion. Whether to reinforce their local prestige or to assert territorial dominance, these major leaders were responsible for most bandit attacks on American Marines and civilians. The bandits' armament varied from gang to gang. Some carried little more than machetes, a few pistols, and black-powder rifles. Others possessed late-model small arms including an occasional U.S.-made Krag-Jorgensen or Springfield. (62)

Bandit activity centered in the two eastern provinces of Seibo and Macoris, partly because the sparsely populated

and densely thicketed terrain favored the operations of the gangs and partly because the presence of large foreign-owned sugar estates, which often were harsh employers, kept social unrest at a high level. In these provinces and to a lesser extent elsewhere, the bandits had at least passive support from the country people, according to Marine officers who tried to assess local opinion. While they suffered at the bandits' hands, the peasants and villagers often admired and respected leaders like Vicentico, and many of them resented the Marines as foreign intruders. Out of hostility toward the Americans or fear of bandit reprisals, Dominican civilians rarely would provide the Marines with accurate or timely intelligence. (63)

The Marines scored an early success against Vicentico Evangelista. Vicentico attacked a Marine patrol at El Cerrito on 19 March 1917 but was sharply repulsed. He publicly pledged to kill all North Americans who fell into his hands, and he actually executed with machetes two captured civilian engineers. Against this ferocious partisan, the 3d and 4th Regiments launched numerous patrols. The Military Government also hired one of Vicentico's rivals among the bandits, Fidel Ferrer, who knew the terrain and the enemy, to lead his gang against Vicentico. Most important, the Marines introduced a civilian agent, Antonio Draiby, himself a part-time outlaw, into Vicentico's band. Eventually, Draiby arranged a meeting with Vicentico for himself and Marine First Sergeant William West, who bravely accompanied Draiby unarmed into the bandit's stronghold. By a mixture of persuasion and deception, West and Draiby persuaded Vicentico to bring his men out of the hills and surrender. This Vicentico did on 5 July 1917, ending a major threat to public order in eastern Santo Domingo. The Marines disarmed and released most of Vicentico's nearly 200 men, many of whom had been impressed into the bandit ranks. They held the leader and 48 of his chief thugs for trial on charges which included 11 murders and scores of rapes, but Vicentico was killed while trying to escape before he had to face trial. (64)

While unconventional methods brought down Vicentico, the Marines usually resorted to more strictly military tactics. From 1917 to 1922, they relied primarily on small

patrols which roamed the rural districts. These patrols, which usually numbered less than 30 men under a lieutenant or a sergeant, often went out mounted for greater mobility on locally procured horses and stayed in the field for days or even weeks at a time. Their objectives were, first, to cover bandit-infested areas so thoroughly that bandits could not escape encountering them and, second, by their small numbers to bait the enemy into attacking them. In the resulting engagements, the Marines relied on their superiority in marksmanship, small-unit maneuver, and individual training to outfight enemies who might outnumber them by as much as 10 to one. (65) At times, higher commanders carefully directed and co-ordinated these patrols. During 1918, for example, Lieutenant Colonel George C. Thorpe established a specific patrol zone for each company of the 3d Regiment. At other times and in other districts, however, patrols went out more or less at random or in response to intelligence reports or bandit contacts. (66)

Such patrols, if guided by timely and accurate information, sometimes were able to seek out and attack bandit groups, even surprising them in their camps. Thus on 20 February 1919, a patrol led by Captain William C. Byrd, acting on what proved to be very reliable information from local sources, surprised a bandit hideout in difficult, mountainous terrain. In the ensuing engagement, the Marines killed 12 of a gang of about 50 bandits and captured a large supply of arms and ammunition. (67) More often, such Marine expeditions found only empty campsites or exchanged shots with the rearguards of fleeing gangs. Most clashes were bandit-initiated, either when Marine patrols encountered bandit positions or when Marine camps came under hit-and-run night attacks. As Thorpe put it, "Most of our contacts developed from the enemy's attacking. It was looking for a needle in a haystack to expect to find the enemy in the dense brushwood or in the network of mountain trails. . ." (68)

Typical of dozens of bandit contacts was the action of 2nd Lieutenant Harold N. Miller's mounted patrol of 19 men from the 44th Company, who ran into about 125 bandits near Hato Mayor at about 1030 on 22 March 1919. The bandits lay in wait for the Marines at a point where the trail along which the patrol was riding made a sharp left turn to avoid an animal pen. Part of the enemy force occupied the pen,

which was overgrown with brush and from which they could fire directly down the trail into the Marine column; the rest had taken position in the brush along the side of the trail to the Marines' right. Both groups opened heavy but ill-directed fire as the Marines approached. Lieutenant Miller dismounted his men, formed a skirmish line, and returned fire with rifles and also a machine gun, which concentrated on the animal pen. The machine gun quickly silenced the riflemen in the pen, and the Marines rushed the other bandits who fled, then halted and opened fire from the far side of a little clearing. Again, the machine gun drove them into retreat, and the fight, which had lasted about 45 minutes, came to an end. The Marine patrol suffered no casualties and estimated bandit losses at about 15. (69)

When bandit attackers had enough of an advantage in numbers or position, they sometimes rushed the Marines with machetes and knives, initiating short but savage hand-to-hand clashes. On 13 August 1919, a patrol from the 44th Company consisting of Corporal Bascome Breedon and three privates, had such an encounter with tragic results. At a stream crossing, what was described as "a large group" of bandits surrounded the four Marines and attacked them at close range with guns and knives. The Marines defended themselves, killing and wounding several bandits, but only one Marine survived. The lone survivor, Private Thomas J. Rushforth, wounded in both hands and in the hip, managed to mount a horse, fight his way through the enemy, and ride back to the nearby Marine camp for re-inforcements. There, according to the official report, "He wanted to return to the fight although both hands were useless and his horse, saddle and equipment literally varnished with blood." (70) Actions of this intensity, however, were rare, and most attempted bandit machete rushes collapsed quickly under Marine rifle fire. (71)

Marine aviation entered the bandit campaign early in 1919 with the arrival of the 1st Air Squadron, commanded by Captain Walter E. McCaughtry, a Marine pilot who had risen from warrant officer ranks. Equipped with six JN-6 (Jenny) biplanes, the squadron began operations from an airstrip hacked out of the jungle near Consuelo, 12 miles from San Pedro de Macoris. In 1920, the squadron moved to another



Marines with packhorses on patrol in the Dominican countryside. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 528494).



A DH-4B, workhorse aircraft of the Marines in the Dominican Republic. It carries the famous Ace of Spades insignia still used by VMA-231. This is the oldest continually used squadron emblem in Marine aviation. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 530759).

improvised field near Santo Domingo City and was re-equipped with DH-4Bs. These single-engine two-seater biplanes, improved versions of a British-designed World War I day bomber, proved sturdy, maneuverable, and versatile. They met the demands of the squadron's varied missions more effectively than had the JN-6s. In December 1920, the squadron received a new commander -- Major Alfred A. Cunningham, the first Marine to qualify as a pilot. Cunningham had organized and led the 1st Marine Aviation Force in France and came to the Dominican Republic after completing a tour as Director of Marine Aviation. He in turn was succeeded late in 1922 by Major Edwin A. Brainard, a future Director of Marine Aviation, who commanded the squadron for the rest of its stay in the Dominican Republic. Under these successive commanders, the squadron maintained an average strength of about nine officers and 130 enlisted men and most of the time kept six aircraft in operation. (72)

Whether flying from the jungle strip near Consuelo or from the field near Santo Domingo City, the squadron's pilots carried out their missions in the face of great dangers and difficulties. The mountainous terrain of the Dominican Republic, the absence of landing strips in most regions, and the lack of navigational aids made even routine flying extremely hazardous. The squadron also had to cope with continual maintenance difficulties, the result largely of the long lead time required for the delivery of spare parts and supplies from the United States. (73)

Aircraft of the squadron occasionally engaged in direct combat against bandits. For example, on 22 July 1919, Second Lieutenant Manson C. Carpenter and his observer and rear gunner, Second Lieutenant Nathan S. Noble, flying in response to a telephoned report to the air base of a ground skirmish near Guaybo Dulce, caught about 30 mounted bandits fleeing across an open meadow. Carpenter launched a strafing attack, diving to an altitude of 100 feet and maneuvering so as to bring both his front and rear cockpit guns to bear. As Carpenter climbed to regain altitude before beginning a second strafing run, the bandits scattered into the trees bordering the meadow. On their second pass over the now empty area, the Marine fliers counted six bodies on the ground.

Such comparatively successful attacks, however, were rare in the anti-bandit war. The squadron lacked any rapid means of communication between its planes and the ground troops, so that neither the transmission of current intelligence nor close co-ordination of field operations were possible. (74)


The squadron's great value lay instead in its supporting services. Its planes carried military mail and personnel rapidly from the capital city to various outlying posts. At times they delivered supplies to remote units or evacuated wounded men. In 1922, they helped ground commanders to control the operations of widespread patrols by dropping messages to them from the air and keeping the regimental headquarters informed of their whereabouts. The squadron conducted an aerial survey of the Dominican coastline and the important rivers and made photographic maps, of obvious help in planning ground operations. Some commanders sent newly joined officers up in planes of the squadron for orientation flights over the regions they later would patrol on foot. All in all, while Marine aviation did not prove to be a decisive combat arm in Santo Domingo, it accomplished enough in other areas to establish its value--indeed its indispensability--to Marine forces operating on the ground. (75)

In mid-1922, in a summary of operations, the commander of the 2d Brigade reported that since 1916 the brigade had engaged in 467 bandit contacts in which they claimed 1,137 bandits killed or wounded for a Marine loss of 20 killed and 67 wounded. (76) Yet banditry still continued in 1922, as usual, mostly in the eastern district. If anything, the bandits had become harder to run down because after 1921 they rarely attacked even small Marine patrols. Instead, they concentrated on terrorizing the peasants and the sugar estates. (77)

Marine officers in Santo Domingo attributed their lack of success up to this point in extirpating banditry to three main problems. First, they pointed to the continuing difficulty of obtaining accurate current intelligence of bandit movements and positions. Second, they emphasized the brigade's lack of rapid means of communication between its scattered units. Until well into 1919, for instance, none



Marine tents somewhere in the Dominican Republic. (Nat Arch RG 127-G Photo 516643).




The 4th Marines encamped in Fortaleza San Luis at Santiago, July 1916. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 521562).

of the companies operating against the rebels had field radios. (78) The third deficiency to which officers called attention grew out of the second: the absence of effective planning and co-ordination of Marine patrols. Most of the time regimental and even company commanders had little knowledge of where their patrols were; sometimes patrols from two or three commands might be operating in the same area, totally unaware of each other's presence. (79)

The anti-bandit campaign took on new intensity and cohesion late in 1921 and early in 1922. Then, with American withdrawal from the Dominican Republic imminent, Brigadier General Harry Lee, the new commanding officer of the 2d Brigade, and Colonel William C. Harllee, now in command of the 15th Regiment, launched a systematic drive to finish off banditry in the eastern district. In the 15th Regiment, the lack of field communications which had hampered previous operations had been remedied by late 1921. Every company now possessed a radio set at its headquarters plus one or more portable field sets. Where radios could not be used, pilots of the 1st Air Squadron could drop messages to the ground units. (80)

Exploiting these assets, Colonel Harllee, between 24 October 1921 and 11 March 1922, used the entire 15th Regiment, reinforced by units of the new Dominican Policia Nacional, in a series of nine large-scale cordon operations in the provinces of Seibo and Macoris. In these drives, patrols deployed in a rough circle around a given area and then, directed by radio and air-dropped messages, swept inward, engaging any bandits they encountered and rounding up all suspicious persons (in practice, every adult male) at a central collecting point. There, the detained men would be lined up under bright lights while native informers, hidden in tents or behind canvas screens, identified known bandits. These drives netted in all over 600 bandit suspects. However, on 5 March 1922, General Lee ordered the abandonment of this tactic. He did so partly because it met vehement opposition from Dominican civilians and even more because it failed to trap the bandit leaders and their hard-core followers whose depredations, according to General Lee, actually increased during February and March 1922. (81)

After giving up the cordon system, General Lee and Colonel Harllee resumed the old practice of patrolling but



A rebel band of the type the Marines pursued in the Eastern District. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 521559).



Marines on patrol in the village of Castillo near San Francisco de Macoris. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 521792).

with more careful co-ordination of effort and with experienced Marine officers and NCOs in charge who knew the country and the bandits. Within less than a month, these patrols had seven contacts with the enemy, four of which resulted in heavy bandit casualties. (82)

Also, early in March, General Lee authorized the formation of civilian home guard units at Consuelo, Santa Fe, La Paja, Hato Mayor, and Seibo. Each unit was composed of about 15 Dominicans recommended by their municipal or sugar estate officials, usually men who "have suffered some injury at the hands of the bandits and are eager to operate against them." Armed by the Marines and led by a Marine officer, these men patrolled their own localities, usually reinforced by two or three enlisted Marines with an automatic rifle. Marine leadership and firepower, combined with the natives' familiarity with the countryside and their strong motivation to engage the bandits, quickly produced results. Between 19 and 30 April, the civil guards had six major contacts which, in Lee's words, "fairly broke and led to the disintegration of the bandit groups. In all of these contacts the bandits suffered severe casualties and losses." Lee believed that these patrols of armed citizens, more than any other single factor, finally broke banditry in the eastern district. (83)

The combination of intensified patrolling and civil guard operations proved too much for the remaining bandits. In April, a group of prominent Dominicans, acting under authority of the United States Military Governor, negotiated the surrender of one of the most notable bandits still in the field. Subsequently, during an armistice granted by Lee, seven important brigands gave themselves up, along with 169 of their hard-core henchmen. In return for coming in voluntarily, they received for their crimes sentences to prison and hard labor which would remain suspended during their good behavior. By 31 May 1922, General Lee could report that organized banditry had ceased in the eastern district. The nation at last was fully pacified. (84)

Training the Dominican Constabulary

Closely related to the anti-bandit campaign was the Marines' second major responsibility: the training of an efficient Dominican national constabulary. Such a force,

Americans hoped, could take over most of the work of suppressing banditry. Even more important, the Americans realized that their presence in Santo Domingo was only temporary and that the Dominican civilian government which one day would replace them must have for its support a police force efficient enough to prevent a renewal of banditry and revolution.

The old Guardia Republicana Dominicana had broken up during Arias' revolution, and even before that had been a threat rather than a support to governmental stability. The men of the old Guardia had been ragged and untrained, their officers ignorant and corrupt. For years, in fact, greedy officers had considered membership in the Guardia a splendid opportunity to appropriate large sums of government money for their own use. So deeply ingrained was this practice among the Dominican constabulary that they expressed amazement at the Americans' concern about the proper management of funds. Rival candidates for political office competed for the support of the Guardia by promising still freer access to the national treasury, and the Guardia usually sided with the candidate who appeared to be the most powerful and to have the largest bankroll. A major reason for the proclamation of the military government in November 1916 had been President Henriquez's refusal to accept the creation of a new American-trained and controlled constabulary. (85)

It was thus no surprise when, on 7 April 1917, one of the first executive orders of the Military Governor authorized the creation of a new national police force to be called the Guardia Nacional Dominicana (GND). The order appropriated \$500,000 from the national revenues for equipping, training, and maintaining the new force, which would replace the old Dominican Army, Navy, Guardia Republicana, and frontier guard. The Military Governor subsequently fixed the strength of the GND at 88 commissioned officers and 1,200 enlisted men and placed it under the command of a Marine officer who in turn was under the authority of the general commanding the 2d Brigade. The GND soon developed its own central staff and a territorial district organization which paralleled that of the Marine brigade. A company of the Guardia was stationed in each province. (86)

Although Rear Admiral Knapp had hoped to officer the GND largely with native Dominicans and in 1917 delayed its formation in an effort to do so, as late as 1920 all but 33 of the 68 Guardia officers then in service were Marines - officers and NCOs, who accepted GND commissions in return for extra pay authorized by an act of the United States Congress. Most of the Dominican (*) officers had risen from the ranks or received their commissions from friendly politicians; veterans of various constabulary organizations, they had learned bush fighting from hard experience but otherwise lacked adequate training. The enlisted personnel consisted entirely of Dominicans, many of them former members of the old regime's armed forces, and others, new recruits drawn by the GND's pay scale of \$17.00 U.S. per month, a princely sum to peasants accustomed to working 12 hours a day on a sugar plantation for 25¢ U.S. or less. (87)

During its first five years of existence, the GND labored under many handicaps. It underwent frequent changes in top command. Of the six Marine officers who headed the Guardia between 1917 and 1921, only one -- Major Charles F. Williams who stayed for two years -- held the job longer than seven months. (88) Systematic training of the officers and men proved to be almost impossible, as companies had to take the field as rapidly as they were formed. Most of what training the GND did receive came from its Marine company commanders in the time those officers could spare from their many other duties, and few of the Marines themselves had received any special instruction in constabulary work. The GND often suffered cuts in its budget to the point where, in 1921, the Guardia's commander had to reduce the active enlisted force to 346 men for lack of funds. (89) Austerity budgets led, too, to inadequate provisions for equipping the Guardia. The force's Krag-Jorgensen service rifles deteriorated rapidly under the rough handling of Dominicans untrained in cleaning and maintenance, and spare parts proved hard to obtain. Sufficient pistols (Colt automatic, cal. 45) could be found to arm only the officers, first sergeants, and

(*) Many of the non-Marine GND officers were North Americans who had served in the old Dominican Frontier Guard or other police agencies. Under the Executive Order of 1917, captaincies in the GND were open to veterans of the old forces and U.S. citizens, as well as Marines.

trumpeters. The Guardia possessed only three automatic rifles; it had no machine guns, tentage, or signal equipment, and the men's field equipment was old and badly worn. For mobility, the GND by the early 1920s possessed only 18 motor vehicles, 22 riding horses, and 81 mules. (86) The Guardia's native officers and men, used to the corrupt and arbitrary methods of earlier Dominican constabularies, all too often robbed and abused the peasantry, blackening the public imagine of the force and reducing its effectiveness in maintaining order. (91)

In spite of its handicaps, the GND substantially assisted the Marines in the campaign against banditry. Between 1917 and 1921, the Guardia sent out over 5,500 patrols and had 122 contacts with bandits in which it claimed 320 enemy killed or wounded. The GND's losses in the same period amounted to three officers and 24 enlisted men killed and one officer and 46 enlisted men wounded. (92) By itself, however, the GND, before 1922, never attained the numerical strength and tactical effectiveness which it had to have if it was to take sole responsibility for maintaining order. (93)

In 1921, with the United States committed to an early withdrawal from the Dominican Republic, the Military Government intensified its effort to develop the GND into a fully professional force. An executive order changed the organization's name to Policia Nacional Dominicana (PND), both to emphasize its character as a police agency and because the old name reminded Dominicans too much of the corrupt forces of pre-occupation days. A new recruiting campaign began, along with an effort to weed out of the ranks the less desirable veterans. By August 1922, this effort had brought the PND's enlisted strength up to 800 men out of its authorized 1,200. (94)


Marine Lieutenant Colonel Presley M. Rixey, Jr., who took over as commandant of the PND on 1 June 1921, did more than any other single individual to make the Policia a success. A veteran combat commander and superb administrator, Colonel Rixey had served on the brigade staff before assuming charge of the PND. He developed a detailed plan of organization for the force which emphasized mobility. Under his plan, he would place 500 men in the capital city

and another 500 in Santiago; the rest would guard the Haitian border. The two larger contingents would have enough truck transportation to be able to move quickly from their bases to any area where their presence might be required. To provide early warning of rebel or bandit activity, Colonel Rixey proposed creation of a network of combat outposts at strategic points throughout the country. (95)

Recognizing that improved training was his force's most urgent immediate need, Colonel Rixey established two training centers, one at Haina near Santo Domingo City for the southern district, and one at Santiago for the northern district. The Haina center also included a school for the training of Dominican officers. The Marine in charge of the officers' school, First Lieutenant Edward A. Fellowes, arrived at Haina early in August 1921 to find an abandoned agricultural experiment station and the partly finished campus of a college that had never opened. He knew little Spanish and lacked textbooks and most other academic supplies. Nevertheless, with the aid of an American-born PND major who had lived in Santo Domingo for years and knew the language and people, and relying on the two commodities he had in abundance--enthusiasm and ingenuity--Lieutenant Fellowes had his academy ready for its first class when they arrived around 14 August. (96)

This first class consisted of the PND's veteran Dominican officers, whom Colonel Rixey had assembled from their scattered posts. These officers spent five months studying military administration, tactics, musketry, topography, first aid, hygiene, and agriculture (taught by the former extension agent who was still at the station). Lieutenant Fellowes thought the latter subject would be useful to them in improving the living conditions of the people. After these officers completed the course, they went back to their units to apply what they had learned, and beginning in late 1922 regular classes of Dominican cadets entered the Haina academy, graduating as 2d lieutenants in the Policia. (97)

Among the members of the first officer graduating class at Haina was a second lieutenant whose name would dominate the post-intervention era of Dominican history--Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. Born near San Cristobal in 1891, Trujillo had spent his adolescence and young manhood



A unit of the Policia Nacional Dominica assembled for chow call. Note the American noncoms in the second rank. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 528974).



The Marines often provided convict labor for public works. Here Marines guard such a work detail outside the Fortaleza of San Francisco de Macoris. Note the bullet scars from the Marine attack in 1916. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 521788).

drifting in and out of minor jobs and petty crime until about 1916, when he achieved steady semi-respectable employment as a security officer on a sugar estate. Trujillo evidently was attracted by the action and excitement of military life. In December 1918, he applied to Major Williams for a commission in the Guardia Nacional, and on 11 January 1919 he was sworn in as a second lieutenant. Stationed at Seibo with the 11th Guardia Company, Trujillo earned good efficiency reports from his superiors. Marine Captain Omar T. Pfeiffer, a future major general, once placed him under arrest for allegedly trying to extort money from a local Dominican civilian but the charges were dismissed. Trujillo attended the Haina academy in 1921 and graduated with the first class. Thereafter, he rose rapidly through the ranks of the PND, ingratiating himself with a number of high-ranking American officers and building up a reputation for ruthless efficiency. Within two years, he went from second lieutenant to major, and on 6 December 1924, shortly after the Marines left the Dominican Republic, he reached the rank of lieutenant colonel and the post of Chief of Staff. The following year, promoted to Colonel Commandant of the PND, he began the drive for power that would make him one of the Caribbean's longest-lived and most fearsome dictators. Perhaps he had realized from the start that in the Dominican Republic, as elsewhere in Latin America, the military offered the most promising avenue to fortune and power. (98)

At both Haina and Santiago, the Marines also ran training courses for the enlisted men, who were brought into the centers a company at a time for two-month sessions. Training for the enlisted men emphasized guard duty, discipline, personal cleanliness and hygiene, and above all, marksmanship, which would give the Policia a clear tactical advantage over the average Dominican bandit. At these sessions, the Marines worked hard and successfully to inculcate in their men a sense of unit pride that the old pre-intervention Guardia never possessed. (99)

To function effectively as a guarantor of stability, the PND had to win the confidence of the Dominican people, and it could do so only by treating them with fairness and consistency. Hence the Marine instructors in the training schools emphasized military justice--proper court-martial procedure, methods of investigation, and forms of punishment.

To make sure that men in the field maintained a high standard of conduct toward the citizenry, the Policia began punishing violators and also established a record of offenses for each man, which would be consulted in determining his eligibility for promotions and pay increases. (100)


Lieutenant Colonel Rixey became ill and returned to the United States before he could see his plans carried to completion, but his successor, Colonel Richard M. Cutts, continued his work until the end of the occupation in 1924. By that time, the Marines had moulded the Policia Nacional Dominicana into a force capable of maintaining public order and suppressing revolt. As evidence of this success, political violence did not increase substantially after the withdrawal of the Marines. Dominican officers of the PND, especially Colonel Commandant Trujillo, always emphasized the debt their force owed to its Marine creators, to the extent of retaining a uniform patterned after that of the Marines and using Marine bugle calls. On one occasion, Trujillo presented a visiting Marine general with a Policia officer's sword which was almost an exact replica of a Marine officer's sword, saying "we want you to know that we cherish the memory of the Marines and that we have adopted your sword as our sword." (101) Marines aware of the character of Trujillo's later career as a Caribbean arch-despot might question the value of this compliment, but there can be no question that between 1917 and 1924 the Marines had created a disciplined, modern police force out of the rag-tag remnants of the former regime's motley constabulary.

The Marines and Civil Administration

The American organizers of the Military Government followed the principle that the United States was administering the affairs of the Dominican Republic temporarily on behalf of the Dominican people. Hence, they retained the organization and much of the personnel of the indigenous government. Under the Military Governor who possessed final executive, legislative, and judicial authority, United States naval and Marine officers took charge of the national executive departments, while Dominican officials in the provinces and municipalities, as well as the judiciary, continued their customary functions under American supervision. (102) (*)

(*) See chart on page 38 for a schematic diagram of the U.S. Military Government and the Marines' place in it.

THE U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1916-1922



NOTE: These combinations of departments varied at times with changes in the availability of American officers to administer them. The above represent the most usual patterns of combination.

(*) For some purposes, the personnel of the GND (PND) acted under the orders of the Dominican courts, which were supervised by the Department of Justice and Public-Instruction.

As part of this arrangement, the commanding officer of the 2d Brigade headed the combined Ministries of War and Marine and Interior and Police. He thereby inherited the latter ministry's constitutional authority over the provincial governors, who were appointed by the national chief executive, and over the municipal mayors (Jefes Comunales) and elected councils (Ayuntamientos). The Marines of the brigade thus found themselves charged with two related civil functions: the direct enforcement of the decrees and orders of the Military Government and the supervision of local law enforcement and public services. (103) Because of this day-to-day involvement with government activities which directly affected the life of the ordinary people, the Marines, more than any other of the United States agencies involved in the Military Government, personified the American regime for the individual Dominican. Therefore, the Marines' effective performance of the seemingly dull and routine chores of this civil affairs assignment contributed as much to the success of the Military Government as did their more dramatic combat operations.

The Marines carried out their civil affairs duties through the military districts into which the country had been divided. Each district Marine commander, who was also usually a regimental commander, acted as the civil governor of his area of responsibility. Under his supervision, a series of Marine provost marshals' officers extended the authority of the occupation into towns and villages. Each Marine post usually had one of these offices attached to it, and the number in operation varied as the military and political situation changed. Staffed by Marine junior officers (the post commander in a small garrison), with Marine enlisted men attached to them as military police, and with a few native interpreters and office workers, the provost marshals' offices, as one writer on the occupation put it, were "the most intimate point of contact between the Military Government and the people." (104)

These offices enforced the executive orders and decrees of the Military Government and arrested offenders. They prepared charges and specifications against persons who were to be tried in military courts and executed sentences of the courts. Possessing wide power to arrest and detain suspected enemies of the occupation and to investigate political and military matters, these offices in some

instances carried on surveillance and espionage against bandits and suspected rebels. They issued and cancelled all firearms permits and controlled the storage and sale of all civilian guns, ammunition, and explosives. They enforced road and traffic laws and looked after the care, custody, and treatment of local prison inmates. They received and passed on to the Department of Foreign Affairs all passport applications from Dominican citizens. Most important to the occupation's relations with the people, they investigated citizen complaints against American military personnel, members of the PND, and local officials; and they observed Dominican civil officials in the performance of their duties and reported any misconduct. (105)

Marine arrests of Dominican citizens, arrests usually made by the provost marshals' detachment, constituted a sensitive and controversial issue throughout the occupation. As an occupying force, the Marines under international law could claim unlimited power to arrest inhabitants of the territory under their control; and in the early days of American rule, with the country disrupted by revolution, the Marines often exercised general police power, even making arrests for violations of municipal ordinances. However, under the policy of leaving as much of the government as possible in Dominican hands, the Marines soon restored jurisdiction over most offenses to the PND and to the reconstituted municipal police forces and confined themselves to cases involving violation of Military Government regulations or assaults upon American personnel. They always stood ready to assist the PND and the local police in performance of their duties. (106)

Under the terms of Rear Admiral Knapp's proclamation of 29 November 1916, Dominican civilian courts continued in operation and retained jurisdiction over all civil criminal cases except those involving members of the United States forces or the interests of the Military Government. To try such cases, the Military Governor, in September 1917, permitted the brigade commander to establish provost courts staffed by Marine officers and normally acting under the rules for Navy courts-martial. As a result of these arrangements, military courts attached to the various provost marshals' offices tried Dominican citizens for such offenses as illegal possession of firearms, aiding and

abetting banditry, theft of United States property, and sale of liquor to military personnel. Above the local provost courts, superior provost courts and special military commissions dealt with the more serious crimes of banditry, murder, and insurrection. In these tribunals, and usually before the Marine junior officers who manned the provost courts, thousands of Dominicans received their only experience of American justice. (107)

Through the power of arrest and through the provost courts, the Marines enforced the will of the Military Government directly upon the individual Dominican. At the same time, they supervised the Dominican officials responsible for local police, schools, road maintenance, and other municipal functions. Unlike the members of the national cabinet whose resignations in 1916 had forced Admiral Knapp to put Americans in charge of the ministries, most Dominican provincial governors and municipal Jefes and council members remained at their posts under military rule. They acted either from a sense of public duty or, as a Marine officer put it, because they "realized that they could ill afford to lose the emoluments of their offices." (108) Marine provost marshals watched over the activities of these officials and in the first years of the occupation had discretionary power to remove and replace them. Major General Omar T. Pfeiffer later recalled how as a young captain he acted as provost marshal in La Romana, a city of about 15,000 people. He "interested myself in the performance of the mayor, the chief of police, and the local jail. I would make periodic inspections there." His regimental commander allowed him to dismiss office-holders who were derelict in their duties provided that he nominated a replacement. This often involved a choice of the lesser evil: "It was a question of getting the more capable or less crooked man into office." (109) Gradually, as the quality of Dominican administration improved, the brigade commander restricted his officers' right to make summary removals. Eventually he allowed them to act only when they had strong proof of disloyalty to the Military Government or violation of a criminal statute. (110)

Upon these Marine provost marshals, then, fell much of the burden of representing the United States day by day to a people of different language and customs, many of whom regarded Americans with suspicion and hostility. Few, if

any, of these officers--usually captains or lieutenants--had received special training for their delicate and complex tasks. Most found themselves in the Dominican Republic because their units had been sent there or because the 2d Brigade needed replacements when they were available. Lacking fluency in Spanish and understanding of Latin culture and customs, some made mistakes as provost court judges, provoking Dominican charges of illegal and arbitrary conduct. Most, however, learned by experience to understand and respect the language, culture, and people. They managed to act, in the words of one observer, as "impartial intermediaries between the Military Government and the people." (111)

Throughout the Dominican Republic, the 2d Brigade became involved, largely by force of circumstance, with the problems of disarming the civilian population and reforming the prisons. Years of revolution and turmoil had left the Republic almost an armed society, and the removal of this lethal hardware constituted the indispensable first step toward establishing public order. Thus, on 29 November 1916, one of the Military Government's first decrees forbade the possession of firearms, ammunition, or explosives by Dominican civilians and ordered the Marine brigade to collect or confiscate these items. Working in co-operation with the Guardia Nacional and with provincial and local Dominican officials, Marines collected in the course of the occupation some 53,000 firearms, most of them of obsolete type, along with 200,000 rounds of ammunition and about 14,000 edged weapons. They also instituted and enforced through the provost marshals' offices a system of gun permits and controls on the importation and sale of arms, ammunition, and explosives. (112)

In the Dominican Republic, most of the major prisons were located in the provincial fortalezas so that when the Marines took over these centers of political and military authority in the course of the occupation they also found themselves with custody of most of the nation's convicts. Furthermore, since Dominican prisons were a favorite source of manpower for revolutionary armies, considerations of military security dictated that they be kept under American control. Thus, the Marine brigade, working with the Department of Justice and Education (itself headed by Marine Colonel Rufus Lane), took charge of the Dominican prison system. (113)

The system cried out for reform. In most jails, prisoners of all ages, sexes, and offenses lived together in large common cells. Corrupt officials and guards had pocketed most of the money appropriated for care of the inmates with the result that in some prisons even eating utensils were lacking. No parole system existed, and convicts had no opportunity to work or learn trades while behind bars. The prisons contained many unfortunates who had spent years in cells awaiting trial or had been incarcerated arbitrarily for angering some politician. The Marines in the course of their custody of the prisons released those unjustly held. They introduced most of the features of up-to-date (for that day) prison administration, including segregation of prisoners by sex and offense, paroles, vocational training, an "honor system" for the well behaved, and improved food and medical care. In co-operation with the Department of Justice and Education, they arranged for the construction of a new national penitentiary, two houses of correction, and a new jail for each judicial district. (114)

To facilitate its own operations against bandits and also to assist in the overall work of the Military Government, the 2d Brigade built up an elaborate and, for that day, sophisticated intelligence organization. Centered in a Brigade Intelligence Office and regimental or district offices staffed by selected Marines, this network used special patrols from posts along with hired Dominican interpreters, investigators, and spies to collect a steady stream of information. This information, which concerned bandit activities, political affairs, and economic and social conditions, the regimental and brigade offices assembled into daily situation reports and monthly summaries. Copies of these documents went regularly to the brigade commander, the Military Governor, the Major General Commandant, and the Bureau of Naval Operations and Intelligence. The information thus obtained proved valuable not only in planning anti-bandit operations but also in making political and economic decisions for the occupation. (115)

Under Second Lieutenant Leslie H. Wellman, director of mapping for the brigade, the Marines systematically prepared maps of the Dominican Republic. The job proved complicated and difficult, but by 1924 Wellman's men had prepared 12 contour sheets covering the entire country, as

well as a comprehensive road map. Along with the maps, the brigade prepared a strategic handbook containing a great mass of detailed information about the Dominican Republic. The handbook was published in two parts with the first volume devoted to the Southern and Eastern Districts centering on Santo Domingo City. The second volume covered the Northern District, including Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata, Santiago, Navarette, and La Vega. The handbooks contained a wealth of information which the brigade had assembled on resources, geographic features, population, local customs, and political and economic conditions. Altogether, the efforts of the Brigade Intelligence Office, Wellman's mapping program, and the preparation of the handbooks represented the most systematic effort made by anyone up to that time to obtain information about the Dominican Republic. (116)

The Marine brigade in the Dominican Republic had no organized, nationwide program for improving the economic and social condition of the people, but some Marine officers as part of their work as district commanders, provost marshals, and commanders of GND or PND units made efforts in that direction. Lieutenant Colonel George C. Thorpe, for example, while commanding a battalion of the 3d Marines in Seibo Province in May 1918, called meetings of provincial and municipal officials in his district to promote agricultural development and improve the facilities for marketing local crops. He also organized Red Cross drives and rallies in the various towns on the theory that support for charity and war relief would bring Americans and Dominicans closer together. (117) Marine Sergeant William Knox, while captain of a GND company in Seibo Province, attempted, in Colonel Thorpe's words, to show the people "how they could improve their conditions by utilizing the means at hand." Winning the confidence of the Dominicans, Knox persuaded them to clear new land for farms and obtained volunteers to work on road repairs and improvements. When he was killed by bandits, Dominican community leaders in grief and respect declared two days of mourning during which all businesses were closed and public and private entertainments forbidden. (118)

In Puerto Plata Province, Captain Holland M. Smith, later to win fame as a general in World War II, earned the following tribute to his service as military governor, a

tribute which also summed up the work of many Marine officers in these positions:

Captain Smith's activities and interest covered a wide field. He had to settle all kinds of disputes among the people and no matter how small the case was, it had his undivided personal attention down to the last detail. He not only saw people daily in his office at the fort, but frequently during his lunch hours and evenings he had them at his house. He worked with the local Road Junta in improving the streets and the health conditions; had his men playing baseball with the Dominicans. I am sure that it was entirely through the good feeling felt towards Captain Smith that all the Americans here were invited to the first ball held here since the American occupation. (119)

The Military Government, working through the various Dominican executive departments, undertook extensive improvements in many areas of national life. The educational and health care systems underwent major expansion and reform. A large-scale road-building program for the first time in the Republic's history linked all regions and major towns with the capital, and it was combined with development of ports, lighthouses, and other commercial facilities. Americans reorganized the postal service and rebuilt the telephone and telegraph systems. They made important improvements in the nation's financial condition. The Military Government imported experts from the United States Department of Agriculture to teach the Dominicans better farming techniques and reformed land titles and tax laws. (120)

In these projects, the Marine brigade played at most a limited role. Marine units in the towns co-operated with Navy medical officers in enforcing sanitary regulations and carrying out mass inoculations against disease. As prison custodians, the Marines occasionally provided convict labor for road-building projects. The reopening of the Puerto-Plata-Santiago Railroad by Major Bearss and Captain Wise early in the occupation gave northern farmers a welcome

means for shipping their coffee and cacao to the ports and thence to world markets. The very presence of the brigade with its civilian payroll and demands for goods and services stimulated the economy of many towns. In the main, however, the 2d Brigade provided the shield of public peace and order behind which other agencies and the Dominican people themselves attempted to rebuild the nation. (121)

Withdrawal of the Marines, 1922-1924


As early as December 1920, the Wilson administration expressed its intention to withdraw United States forces from the Dominican Republic as soon as stability and constitutional government could be restored. However, the administration's detailed proposal for reorganizing the government met rejection from Dominican politicians who claimed it continued too much United States control. In 1921, President Warren G. Harding, who had promised during his election campaign to withdraw the Marines from Santo Domingo, offered to remove American forces from the Dominican Republic within eight months if the Dominicans would co-operate with the United States in setting up a stable government and if they would ratify the laws and decrees of the Military Government, continue to abide by the customs treaty of 1907, and maintain an efficient national constabulary, officered by Dominicans but organized and trained by a United States military mission. Again, the Dominicans rejected the plan, demanding instead immediate and unconditional American withdrawal.

At this point, the American government took a harder line. A United States Senate committee investigating conditions in both Santo Domingo and Haiti recommended late in 1921 that, since the Dominicans had rejected the Harding proposals and since the committee could not recommend any change in those proposals, the United States occupation should continue indefinitely. Realizing that they had run out of room for maneuver, the Dominicans formed a new four-man negotiating team headed by General Horacio Vasquez, popular hero of the struggle against the tyrant Heureux. The new team, representing most Dominican political factions, went to Washington early in 1922 to reopen negotiations. (122) The new round of talks produced an agreement, named the Hughes-Peynado Plan after Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and Dominican negotiator

Francisco Peynado which incorporated most of the Harding proposals and which subsequently was approved by the Dominican people. Under this plan, the Dominicans accepted a convention ratifying all contracts made by the Military Government and all of its executive orders and administrative acts which had levied taxes, authorized expenditures, or created rights on behalf of third parties. The agreement further stipulated that the Military Government's bond issues of 1918 and 1922 would be recognized and that the Customs Convention of 1907, which provided for American control of Dominican revenues, would remain in force until these bonds were paid off. For its part, the United States agreed to the immediate formation of a Dominican provisional government which would oversee elections for a permanent constitutional regime. During the provisional government's tenure, the United States forces would concentrate in a maximum of three assembly areas, and control over the PND, which would assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, would pass from the Marine brigade to the provisional president. When the constitutional government took office, all United States troops would leave the Dominican Republic. (123)

In Santo Domingo, Brigadier General Harry Lee, who took command of the 2d Brigade on 9 August 1921, led the Marines in carrying out their duties under the Hughes-Peynado Plan. A hard-driving, self-educated officer who had won both the Croix de Guerre and the Distinguished Service Medal while commanding the 6th Regiment in France, (124) completed the defeat of banditry in the eastern district. In June 1922, he received from the Major General Commandant an order outlining his new missions. The Commandant laid out four tasks. Lee was to assemble the troops in the three agreed concentration areas while turning military control of the country over to the PND. He was to reduce the brigade's strength and reorganize it from three regiments into two. He was to continue the rapid development and training of the PND, and he was to indoctrinate the American troops in their new role and in the proper attitude toward the Dominican people. (125)

The Military Governor selected Santo Domingo City, Santiago, and Puerto Plata as the brigade's concentration points, and during 1922 the Marines began closing up their posts in the interior and moving to these stations. As the



Marine and Navy officers in Santo Domingo with Colonel Harry Lee, first officer on right, front row. (NatArch RG 127-G Photo 530542).

Marines withdrew from the villages and countryside, the PND assumed all constabulary duties. During July, the brigade turned over to the PND the Provinces of Azua, Barahona, La Vega, and Espaillat. During August, they did the same for the Provinces of Consuelo, Quisqueya, Colon, Guaymate, La Campina, La Pajo, and Cristobal. Later in the year, the PND assumed control of Monte Cristi and Samana. By 21 October 1922, inauguration day for the provisional government, all the Marines had assembled at their planned stations except for two mounted detachments of the 44th Company left at their posts in the eastern district to aid the PND in controlling banditry. (126)

On 1 August 1922, General Lee ordered the reorganization of the 2d Brigade. The 3d and 15th Regiments were disbanded and units from them formed a new 1st Regiment. This regiment, along with a Headquarters Company, a Service Company, the 4th Regiment, and the 1st Air Squadron, now constituted the brigade. Marine personnel strength fell at the same time from about 2,500 in August to around 1,850 in October. (127)

The Marines continued their effort to recruit the PND up to authorized strength and train it to assume its new responsibilities. This task took on new urgency during 1922 after Mr. Sumner Welles, the United States Commissioner appointed by President Harding to oversee implementation of the Hughes-Peynado Plan, agreed with the Dominicans that all American officers would leave the PND upon inauguration of the Provisional Government. The force from then on would be officered solely by Dominicans trained in the schools set up by Colonel Rixey. Marine officers, however, would continue as instructors to the PND until the brigade left the country. To give these instructors the necessary authority after the Provisional Government took command of the force, the Military Government agreed with the Dominicans to divide the PND into two components. A Field Force under a Dominican commander and responsible to the provisional president would conduct all active operations. A Training Center Force under the control of the Marine brigade commander, comprising the centers at Haina and Santiago with all PND members serving there as instructors or undergoing training, would continue the development work already begun by the Marines. (128)

As the Marines' role changed from that of an occupying force in full control to that of allied troops temporarily stationed in a friendly sovereign nation, the maintenance of good relations with Dominican civilians and with the new native government became extremely important. Hence, under orders from the Major General Commandant, General Lee launched a comprehensive troop indoctrination program. The brigade law officer, 1st Lieutenant Robert C. Kilmartin, prepared lectures explaining to Marines their new position and mission in Santo Domingo and particularly stressing the need to show respect for the PND. Before distribution to unit commanders, these lectures received the personal examination and approval of Major General Commandant John A. LeJeune and other high officials. (129) Commanders reinforced frequent repetition of these lectures with strict punishment, in serious cases by general court-martial, of Marines who mistreated Dominicans. Under instructions from the Major General Commandant, Lee sent monthly reports to Headquarters, Marine Corps, listing offenses committed by Marines against Dominicans and the punishments assessed in each case. This policy, combined with close restriction of rank-and-file contacts with Dominican civilians and with the construction of new athletic and recreational facilities for the troops, held disturbances to a minimum during the last years of the occupation and fostered an atmosphere of good will. This situation was in marked contrast to that in neighboring Haiti where racially generated antagonism between Haitians and Marines of the 1st Provisional Brigade remained intense. (130) Much credit for fostering this congenial atmosphere between Marines and Dominicans belonged to General Lee, who insisted that his men not bring dishonor upon themselves during this critical time of the occupation.

On 21 October 1922, the Provisional Government formally took power under Provisional President Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos. A wealthy sugar planter of Italian extraction nominated by the four Dominicans who had negotiated the Hughes-Peynado Plan, President Vicini enjoyed the respect of all political factions and had the background and temperament to perform his intended function of caretaker chief of state. (131)

With the inauguration of the Provisional Government, new restrictions were placed on the activities of the Marine brigade. Provost marshals and courts continued in operation, but they now could make arrests and conduct trials only in cases involving direct assaults on United States military personnel or thefts of United States property. Even in such cases, their jurisdiction did not extend to the Dominican clergy or to any members or employees of any branch of the Provisional Government. Marines could not carry arms outside their assembly areas and could travel on liberty only in the vicinity of their camps. For regular troop movements, the brigade now had to secure permission from the Dominican authorities. The Marines now turned administration of the prisons over to the PND with the exception of the jail in the Ozama Fortress in Santo Domingo City, a Marine assembly area. In summary, the brigade now adopted a passive role and represented for Dominican politicians a final reserve upon which they could call if their experiment in keeping order among their own people broke down. (132)

The experiment did not break down. After almost a year of political wrangling in which United States High Commissioner Sumner Welles played a crucial moderating role, the Dominican factions agreed on rules for electing a permanent president and congress. On 15 March 1924, over 100,000 Dominicans cast their ballots in an atmosphere of peace and order that surprised American representatives who had expected disorder and difficulty. From the nation's first free and fair election in many years, the popular hero General Horacio Vasquez emerged the winner for the presidency, and his Alianza Party gained majorities in both houses of Congress. A special assembly then met and drafted a new national constitution, completing its work in June. On 13 June, President Vasquez assumed office, and the American flag which had flown for eight years over the Ozama Fortress was replaced by the Dominican colors, clearly signalling the end of military rule. (133)

Immediately after Vasquez's inauguration, units of the 2d Brigade began leaving the Dominican Republic under orders to return to the United States. Among the first to go was the 1st Air Squadron, which departed for its home base of Quantico, Virginia, on 18 July. Other units followed until, on 18 September 1924, the last Marines of the 2d Provisional

Brigade slung their arms and filed quietly on board ship at Santo Domingo City. As they left, it seemed to most observers that "a new era of liberty and independence had commenced" for the Dominican Republic. (134)

Conclusion

From their stay in the Dominican Republic, the Marines learned valuable lessons in counter-insurgency, or what was called then the conduct of "small wars." In the operations against bandits, they had tested a wide variety of tactics and techniques, including patrols of various types, cordons and roundups, and the employment of civil guards. Many officers and men acquired useful experience in organizing and training a native constabulary which they would apply later in Nicaragua. Marines had begun to perceive the usefulness of aviation, both in combat and for reconnaissance and logistical support; although other Caribbean campaigns, notably that in Nicaragua, probably contributed more to the evolution of the Marine air-ground team. Many Marine officers had learned from hard experience the necessity of securing support from the local populace in combating guerrillas, and on a sporadic, localized basis they had experimented with methods for obtaining such support.

The Marine Corps early began to make use of its Dominican experience. Soon after the last units of the 2d Brigade left Santo Domingo in 1924, the Department of Military Tactics at the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, Virginia, began collecting and evaluating tactical and strategic data produced by the brigade. The Department prepared manuals and handbooks reflecting this new information and distributed them throughout the Corps. (135)

One of the earliest of these publications, Major Samuel M. Harrington's "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars," published in 1922, listed six steps in the conduct of a small war as illustrated by the Dominican campaign and other similar operations. First, Harrington said, the peace-keeping force had to seize ports or border towns commanding routes of trade and entrance. Second, it should occupy the major interior cities commanding the resources of the territory and establish there bases of supply. In the course of these steps, the force should try to engage and destroy any large bodies of opposing troops. The third

step, the writer suggested, should be division of the theater of operations into military districts. Fourth, the occupying troops should begin operations against remaining enemy forces, using captured cities or fortified installations as supply bases. Steps five and six encompassed the seizure of livestock and supplies and the confiscation of arms. Most of these steps, which were supposed to provide the basis for establishing a stable indigenous government, clearly had their parallels in the Dominican campaign, as they would in later struggles in other places. (136)

During their eight years in the Dominican Republic, the Marines accomplished the missions assigned to them. Initially required to occupy a nation in the midst of civil war and disperse insurgent forces, the Marines demonstrated their ability to assemble and deploy well-trained troops quickly in an emergency and to plan and execute efficient regimental-sized operations in rough, ill-mapped country. Employing force with restraint and displaying increasing tactical resourcefulness, they suppressed endemic banditry and brought public order to regions that seldom had enjoyed that blessing. The Marines organized an efficient national constabulary which, given stronger civilian institutions and traditions of constitutional government, might well have functioned as the agent of stability it was intended to be. Faced with the inevitably difficult and unpopular task of enforcing the Military Government's decrees upon a hostile and suspicious Dominican citizenry, Marine officers and men, although untrained for this exacting job, in the main performed honorably and effectively. Some Marines, by interesting themselves in the life and culture of the people under their charge and attempting to improve their condition, won for the Military Government a measure of Dominican good will.

The performance of the United States Military Government, of which the Marine brigade was the most conspicuous agent, and indeed the entire American policy of Caribbean intervention under the Roosevelt Corollary, remains controversial to this day. By improving the road network, building up communications, promoting education and public health, and improving the police and other government agencies, the Military Government clearly did much to establish what present-day experts call the "infra-structure" for a modern nation in the Dominican Republic. However,

most authorities agree that the Military Government failed to solve the fundamental economic and social problems of the country and that it did not establish strong or lasting foundations for democratic government; instead, many of its achievements became mainstays of the Trujillo dictatorship. Probably in the time the Military Government had, with the resources available and with the local conditions it faced, it never could have built a stable Dominican democracy.

Whatever the verdict on the policy of intervention or the works of the Military Government, the words of a Marine officer who served in the Dominican Republic still stand as an accurate summation of the Marine effort and achievement there:

The members of the Second Brigade were a force representing law and order, and restored public tranquility to a country, whose inhabitants had not enjoyed for generations that state of peace so indispensable to happiness and prosperity. The records of the Brigade stand as proof that this task was accomplished under the most trying and adverse circumstances, and at cost of great hardship, sickness, bloodshed and death. (137)

The Marine Corps could claim for its service in Santo Domingo that it had fulfilled its mission and preserved its honor intact. No military service could ask a higher tribute.

Footnotes

- (1) Chester Lloyd Jones, The Caribbean since 1900 (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1936), pp. 73-75. Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vinyard (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928), v. I., pp. 45-52. J. Fred Rippy, The Caribbean Danger Zone (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1940), p. 161. Welles's two-volume work is still the standard among Dominican histories, although contemporary historians vigorously contest some of its interpretations.
- (2) Seldon Rodman, Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 59-105. Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938), pp. 275-289. Jones, op. cit., pp. 82-108, passim.
- (3) Rodman, op. cit., pp. 91-105.
- (4) Rodman, op. cit., pp. 106-117. Jones, op. cit., p. 101. Wilfred Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), pp. 166-191, passim.
- (5) Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 125-127. Jones, op. cit., p. 106. Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), pp. 157-159.
- (6) The complete text of the treaty is given in U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910), pp. 307-310. Curtis Wilgus, The Caribbean Area (Washington: George Washington University Press, 1934), pp. 108-110. Stuart, op. cit., pp. 290-292.

- (7) J. Fred Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic," The Hispanic American Historical Review, v. XVII, pp. 419-517, passim. Rodman, op. cit., pp. 106-121. Maj Edwin N. McClellan, "Operations Ashore in the Dominican Republic," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. XLVII (February, 1921), p. 238.
- (8) The development of this crisis can be traced in the correspondence printed in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925), pp. 221-225.
- (9) Capt Frederic M. Wise, Memo. to the Major General Commandant, HQMC, Subject: "Report of Operations Ashore at the American Legation, Santo Domingo City, 5-11 May 1916" (Geographical Files, Historical Reference Section (HRS), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC), hereafter cited as Wise, "Report of Operations." Frederic M. Wise, A Marine Tells It to You (New York: J.H. Sears and Company, 1929), pp. 138-139.
- (10) Wise, "Report of Operations."
- (11) Wise, "Report of Operations." LtGen Julian C. Smith, USMC (Ret.), Interview by Oral History Unit, Historical Division (HD), HQMC, dtd November 1967 (Oral History Collection, HD, HQMC), pp. 38-39.
- (12) Wise, "Report of Operations."
- (13) McClellan, op. cit., pp. 238-240. List of Units of 1st Regiment, 1st Brigade, in the Dominican Republic, (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (14) LtGen Julian C. Smith, Interview, p. 42.
- (15) Col T.P. Kane, Memo. to the Major General Commandant, HQMC, Subj.: "Report of Operations, 18-28 May 1916" (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). McClellan, op. cit., p. 240. Maj John H. Johnstone, USMC, A Brief History of the 1st Marines (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, Rev. 1960), pp. 11-12.

- (16) Commanding Officer Mounted Detachment, Dispatch to Commanding Officer, U.S. Forces South Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, dtd 16 December 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (17) Commander Harris Lanning, Memo. to Commander Cruiser Squadron and Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces Operating in Santo Domingo and Dominican Waters, Subj.: "Report of Operations and Conditions, Monte Cristi, D.R.," dtd 6 June 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). Col T.P. Kane, "Report of Operations, 18-28 May 1916" (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). RAdm W.B. Caperton, ltr to Col Joseph H. Pendleton, dtd 11 July 1916, Joseph H. Pendleton Papers (Manuscript Collection, Washington Navy Yard).
- (18) Maj Charles B. Hatch, Memo., Subj.: "Landing at Puerto Plata, 1 June 1916" (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (19) James S. Santelli, A Brief History of the 4th Marines (Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1970), p. 6. Col J. H. Pendleton, Dispatch dtd 26 June 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (20) Col J.H. Pendleton, Memo., Subj.: "Comprehensive Report of Provisional Detachment, U.S. Expeditionary Forces Operating Ashore in Santo Domingo," dtd 20 July 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC), hereafter cited as "Report of Provisional Detachment." Santelli, op. cit., p. 6.
- (21) Col J.H. Pendleton, "Instructions to All Officers of the Forces," dtd 24 June 1916 (Pendleton Papers, Manuscript Collection, Washington Navy Yard).
- (22) Ibid.
- (23) Field Order No. 1, Headquarters, Provisional Detachment, Naval Forces Operating in Santo Domingo, dtd 26 June 1916 (Pendleton Papers, Manuscript Collection, Washington Navy Yard). Pendleton, "Report of Provisional Detachment."

- (24) Col J. H. Pendleton, Dispatch, dtd 26 June 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (25) Pendleton, "Report of Provisional Detachment." Maj M.J. Shaw, USMC, "Report of Operations of 2d Battalion, 4th Regiment, USMC, from 21 June to 10 July 1916," dtd 11 July 1916 (Pendleton Papers, Manuscript Collection, Washington Navy Yard).
- (26) Pendleton, "Report of Provisional Detachment." Col J.H. Pendleton, Dispatches dtd 28 June-2 July 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (27) Pendleton, "Report of Provisional Detachment." Santelli, op. cit., p. 7. LtGen Julian C. Smith, Interview, pp. 87-89 245, describes the defense of the supply train and the proneness of the Colt machine gun to jamming.
- (28) Capt Eugene Fortson, Dispatch, dtd 29 June 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (29) Maj H.I. Bearss, "Report of Operations from 21 June 1916 to 11 July 1916," dtd 13 July 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). McClellan, op. cit., p. 242.
- (30) Joseph H. Pendleton, Subject Card (Biographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (31) Wise, op. cit., pp. 150-155.
- (32) Pendleton, "Report of Provisional Detachment."
- (33) Cdr Cruiser Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Memo. to Maj H.I. Bearss, dtd 21 August 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (34) Dispatch from RAdm Charles F. Pond to the Secretary of the Navy, dtd 5 October 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (35) Wise, op. cit., pp. 150-155.
- (36) Rodman, op. cit., p. 122. McClellan, op. cit., p. 243.

- (37) Col J.H. Pendleton, Memo., dtd 25 October 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC) reports in detail on the incident at Villa Duarte. For other disturbances, see RAdm Charles F. Pond, Message to the Secretary of the Navy, dtd 27 October 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (38) Text of the proclamation is in U. S. Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 246-247.
- (39) Ibid.
- (40) BGen J.H. Pendleton, ltr to MGen George Barnett, Commandant, USMC, dtd 18 December 1916 (Pendleton Papers).
- (41) Santelli, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
- (42) John A. Hughes, Subject Card (Biographical Files, HRS, HQMC). Wise, op. cit., pp. 216-225.
- (43) Col T.P. Kane, Dispatch, dtd 27 April 1917 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (44) Johnstone, op. cit., p. 12. Benis M. Frank, A Brief History of the 3rd Marines (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1961), p. 3.
- (45) Frank, op. cit., p. 4.
- (46) LtCol Charles J. Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs: Our Experiences in Santo Domingo," Marine Corps Gazette, v. XIX (February 1935), pp. 46-47. This article will be cited hereafter as Miller, op. cit., with month and page numbers. For an example of how Marines were spread out over the Eastern District, see Commander, District of Seibo and Macoris, Memo. to Brigade Commander, 2d Provisional Brigade, Subj.: "Weekly Report of strength and distribution," dtd 14 June 1919 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).

- (47) Rear Admiral Knapp is quoted in Major General Commandant George Barnett, Memo. to the Secretary of the Navy, Subj.: "Recommendation of award of Navy Distinguished Medal to BGen J.H. Pendleton, USMC," dtd 20 November 1919 (Joseph H. Pendleton, Subject Card, Biographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (48) BGen J.H. Pendleton, Subject Card (Biographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (49) For BGen Feland, Long, and Lee, see Subject Cards (Biographical Files, HRS, HQMC). A short sketch of BGen Fuller is in Karl Schuon, Home of the Commandants (Washington: Leatherneck Association, 1966), pp. 186-189.
- (50) BGen J.H. Pendleton, ltr to MGen George Barnett, Commandant, USMC, dtd 9 April 1917 (Pendleton Papers).
- (51) MGen William A. Worton, USMC (Ret.), Interview by Oral History Unit, HD, HQMC, dtd 31 January 1967 (Oral History Collection, HD, HQMC), p. 73. MGen Omar T. Pfeiffer, USMC (Ret.), Interview by Oral History Unit, HD, HQMC, dtd 24 May 1968 (Oral History Collection, HD, HQMC), pp. 22-23.
- (52) MGen Omar T. Pfeiffer, Interview, p. 26. See also LtGen Julian C. Smith, Interview, pp. 84-86.
- (53) MGen Omar T. Pfeiffer, Interview, pp. 29-30.
- (54) LtGen Edward A. Craig, USMC (Ret.), Interview by Oral History Unit, HD, HQMC, dtd 16 May 1968 (Oral History Collection, HD, HQMC), pp. 19-20, 33-34. Report of the MGen Commandant, USMC, 1918, in U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1918 (Washington, 1919), v. II, p. 1598. Report of the MGen Commandant, USMC, 1919, in U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1919 (Washington, 1920), v. II, pp. 2631-2633, outline World War I recruiting policies and problems.

- (55) LtGen Edward A. Craig, Interview, pp. 22-23. MGen Omar T. Pfeiffer, Interview, pp. 23, 31-33. Both of these officers served as captains in the Dominican back-country, and their reminiscences provide a vivid picture of the daily life of Marines at the isolated rural posts.
- (56) MGen Omar T. Pfeiffer, Interview, pp. 34, 36, 41-43. Frank, op. cit., p. 4.
- (57) For a particularly serious instance of several kinds of abuse occurring in the same area at the same time, see LtCol George C. Thorpe, "Confidential report upon conditions in Seibo and Macoris Provinces," dtd 30 May 1918 (Pendleton Papers). The names of two officers mentioned in this report do not appear on the Muster Rolls of the 2d Brigade for this period or in the Naval Register list of Marine Corps officers. They probably were non-Marines of North American origin serving in the Guardia Nacional Dominicana. MGen Omar T. Pfeiffer, Interview, pp. 26-30, recounts the stern treatment meted out to a Marine who killed a Dominican while drunk.
- (58) BGen J.H. Pendleton, "Report of Investigation and Arrest of Captain Charles F. Merkel," dtd 18 October 1918 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (59) BGen J.H. Pendleton, ltr to MGen George Barnett, Commandant, USMC, dtd 9 April 1917 (Pendleton Papers).
- (60) Strength and Distribution, 2d Provisional Brigade, February 1919 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). Muster Rolls, 2d Provisional Brigade, March 1919.
- (61) Miller, op. cit., (Feb. 1935), p. 46.
- (62) Col T.P. Kane, Dispatch to Commander, U.S. Forces Ashore in Santo Domingo, dtd 12 December 1916 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). Commanding Officer, 70th Company Detachment, Dispatch to Commanding Officer, 70th Company, Subj.: "Report of Engagement," dtd 16 October 1918 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). Quarterly Report of the Military Governor of Santo Domingo from 1 July to 30 September 1921, dtd 17 October 1921 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).

- (63) Miller, op. cit., (Feb. 1935), p. 49. LtCol George C. Thorpe, "Confidential report upon conditions in Seibo and Macoris Provinces," dtd 30 May 1918 (Pendleton Papers). Commander, 1st Battalion, 3rd Provisional Regiment, Dispatch dtd 1 June 1917 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). LtGen Edward A. Craig, Interview, pp. 23, 28-29. MGen Omar T. Pfeiffer, Interview, pp. 33-34.
- (64) LtCol George C. Thorpe, "Confidentail report upon conditions in Seibo and Macoris Provinces," dtd 30 May 1918; and LtCol George C. Thrope, ltr to BGen J.H. Pendleton, dtd 25 July 1918 (Pendleton Papers). LtCol George C. Thorpe, Memo. to Brigade Commander, Subj.: "Disarmament of Vicentico Evangelista's band," dtd 8 July 1918 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (65) LtCol George C. Thorpe, Memo. to Commandant, USMC, Subj.: "Certain Gallant Services in Santo Dominto," dtd 14 May 1919 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). Even companies not officially mounted or supplied with horses usually obtained "unofficial" horse herds; see MGen Omar T. Pfeiffer, Interview, pp. 25, 31.
- (66) Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, ltr to Regimental Commander, 3rd Provisional Regiment, dtd 9 August 1918 (Pendleton Papers).
- (67) Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1939), p. 364.
- (68) LtCol George C. Thorpe, Memo. to Commandant, USMC, Subj.: "Certain Gallant Services in Santo Domingo," dtd 14 May 1919 (Geographical Files, HRS, USMC). The Geographical Files on Santo Domingo in HRS, USMC, especially the folders for 1917, 1918, and 1919, contain numerous reports on bandit contacts. LtGen Edward A. Craig, Interview, pp. 37-38, describes the frustration of an aborted attack on a bandit camp.
- (69) 2dLt Harold N. Miller, USMC, "Report of engagement with bandits, 22 March 1919," dtd 23 March 1919 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).

- (70) Report of Field Operations near San Pedro de Macoris, dtd 4 September 1918 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (71) LtCol George C. Thorpe, Memo., Subj.: "Engagement at Dos Rios," dtd 8 September 1918 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). This report describes a river-crossing attack by bandits on a 10-man Marine patrol which resulted in disaster for the bandits, many of whom were cut down by Marine fire while charging with machetes.
- (72) For details on the command, organization, strength, and equipment of the 1st Aviation Squadron, see Reports of the Major General Commandant -- Aviation, 1919-1924 (Topical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (73) "Special Report on the Activities of the 1st Air Squadron, Marine Aviation Force, Santo Domingo" (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (74) For strafing operations, see the following: 2nd Lt Manson C. Carpenter, USMCR, Memo. to Commanding Officer, Squadron D, Marine Aviation Force, Subj.: "Contact with Bandits," dtd 28 July 1919; and 2nd Lt H.N. Miller, USMC, "Report of Skirmish, 10 June 1919," dtd 11 June 1919 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). BGen Ivan W. Miller, USMC (Ret.), Interview by Oral History Unit, HD, HQMC, dtd 10 December 1973 (Oral History Collection, HD, HQMC), pp. 11-12, describes the air-ground communication problem.
- (75) Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952), pp. 22-27. "Special Report on the Activities of the 1st Air Squadron, Marine Aviation Force, Santo Domingo" (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC); in this collection, especially the folders for 1920 and 1921, can be found weekly operation reports of the squadron. LtGen Edward A. Craig, Interview, pp. 59-60, describes an orientation flight.
- (76) BGen Harry Lee, "Special Report of activities of the 2d Brigade, U.S. Marines, Dominican Republic, for the Year ending 30 June 1922," dtd 24 August 1922 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC), hereafter cited as "Special Report, 1922."

- (77) BGen Harry Lee, "Report of activities in the Accomplishment of the Mission of the 2d Brigade, U.S. Marine Corps, during incumbency of BGen Harry Lee, USMC, from 9 August 1921, to 18 July 1924, in the Dominican Republic," dtd 18 July 1924 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC), hereafter cited as "Report of activities, 1921-1924."
- (78) District Commander, Southern District, Memo., to Commanding General, Subj.: "Reports requested by Senate Committee re Santo Domingo," dtd 30 December 1921 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (79) LtGen Edward A. Craig, Interview, pp. 21, 25-26, describes the lack of co-ordination and a near firefight between two Marine patrols chasing the same bandits and unaware of each other's presence.
- (80) District Commander, Eastern District, Memo., to Commanding General, 2d Brigade, USMC, Subj.: "Control of Field Forces by Regimental Headquarters, 15th Regiment," dtd 2 January 1922 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (81) BGen Harry Lee, "Special Report, 1922." LtGen Edward A. Craig, Interview, pp. 41-43.
- (82) BGen Harry Lee, "Special Report, 1922."
- (83) BGen Harry Lee, "Special Report, 1922." BGen Harry Lee, Memo., to MGen Commandant, USMC, Subj.: "Operations against Bandits," dtd 1 July 1922; District Commander, Eastern District, Dispatch, dtd 12 June 1922; BGen Harry Lee, ltr to Commanding Officer, Eastern District, dtd 19 June 1922; (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (84) BGen Harry Lee, "Report of Activities, 1921-1924." District Commander, Eastern District, Dispatch, dtd 12 June 1922 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). A tabulation of surrendered bandits is in the 1922 Dominion Republic folder (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).

- (85) 1stLt Edward A. Fellowes, "Training Native Troops in Santo Domingo," Marine Corps Gazette, v. VIII (December 1923), pp. 215-219. Miller, op. cit., (May 1935), p. 19.
- (86) "Report of Organization, Duties, Operations, and Cost of Maintenance of the Policia Nacional Dominicana since Date of Organization" (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC), hereafter cited as "Report of PND."
- (87) BGen J.H. Pendleton, ltr to MGen George Barnett, Commandant, HQMC, dtd 9 April 1917; RAdm H.S. Knapp, ltr to BGen J.H. Pendleton, dtd 2 July 1917 (Pendleton Papers). Col George C. Reid, Memo. to Commanding General, Santo Domingo, Subj.: "Information Relative to the Guardia Nacional Dominicana...", dtd 7 August 1920 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). Maj Charles F. Williams, USMC, "LaGuardia Nacional Dominicana," Marine Corps Gazette, v. III (September, 1918), pp. 197-198. Fellowes, op. cit., pp. 221-222.
- (88) "Report of PND."
- (89) LtCol George C. Thorpe, ltr to BGen J.H. Pendleton, dtd 22 July 1917 (Pendleton Papers). Fellowes, op. cit., p. 216. "Report of PND."
- (90) "Report on the Materiel Provisions of the Policia Nacional Dominicana" (Marine Corps Archives, Federal Records Center (FRC), Suitland, Maryland).
- (91) LtCol George C. Thorpe, ltr to Brigade Commander, dtd 11 May 1918 (Pendleton Papers) passes on complaints from local Dominican officials in Seibo Province of horse-stealing by GND members. "Report of PND," discusses the force's public image.
- (92) "Report of PND."
- (93) Col Rufus Lane, USMC, "Civil Government in Santo Domingo in the Early Days of the Military Occupation," Marine Corps Gazette, v. VII (June 1922), p. 136.

- (94) "Report of PND." BGen Harry Lee, "Special Report to the Major General Commandant," dtd 13 September 1922 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (95) LtCol Presley M. Rixey, Subject Card (Biographical Files, HRS, HQMC). Fellowes, op. cit., pp. 216-218. "Report of PND."
- (96) Fellowes, op. cit., pp. 218-221.
- (97) Ibid., pp. 221, 229.
- (98) Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York, 1966), pp. 22-49. MGen Omar T. Pfeiffer, Interview, pp. 44-46.
- (99) Fellowes, op. cit., pp. 222-230. 1st Lt Robert C. Kilmartin, "Indoctrination in Santo Domingo," Marine Corps Gazette, v. VII (December 1922), pp. 377-386.
- (100) Kilmartin, op. cit., pp. 377-386. "Records of Court Cases Involving Members of the Policia Nacional Dominicana" (Marine Corps Archives, FRC, Suitland, Maryland). The records are incomplete due to a dock fire in Washington in 1925 but, from those which remain, the reader is able to gain a clear impression of military justice in the PND.
- (101) "Santo Domingo after the Marines," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 15 (November 1930), p. 11.
- (102) For a general account of the reorganization and work of the Military Government, see LtCol Thomas J. Saxon, Jr, USMC, The United States Military Government in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1922 (Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Maryland, 1964).
- (103) Saxon, op. cit., pp. 42-44, 56-58, 122-123. Miller, op. cit., (February 1935), p. 46. Lane, op. cit., pp. 135-136.
- (104) Saxon, op. cit., pp. 57-58. Miller, op. cit. (February 1935), pp. 47-48, (May 1935), pp. 22-23.

- (105) Miller, op. cit. (May 1935), p. 23.
- (106) Saxon, op. cit., pp. 59-61. Miller, op. cit. (May 1935), pp. 54-55, (August 1935), p. 35.
- (107) Lane, op. cit., pp. 141-142. Saxon, op. cit., pp. 92-93. Miller, op. cit. (August 1935), pp. 41-42.
- (108) Miller, op. cit. (August 1935), p. 39.
- (109) MGen Omar T. Pfeiffer, Interview, p. 37.
- (110) Miller, op. cit. (August 1935), p. 39.
- (111) Saxon, op. cit., p. 123. Miller, op. cit. (May 1935), pp. 23-24, (August 1935), p. 42. Thorpe, op. cit., pp. 322-326, vividly describes the pressures on Marine officers in civil government roles and the qualifications displayed by those who were successful.
- (112) Saxon, op. cit., pp. 31-33.
- (113) Miller, op. cit. (August 1935), p. 35.
- (114) Saxon, op. cit., pp. 93-95.
- (115) Miller, op. cit. (August 1935), pp. 36-39.
- (116) 2dLt Leslie H. Wellman, "Mappin Activities and Compilation of Handbooks by the 2d Brigade, USMC, in the Dominican Republic," Marine Corps Gazette, v. VIII (September 1923), pp. 161-168. See Handbook of the Dominican Republic Prepared by Second Brigade, USMC (Marine Corps Archives, FRC, Suitland, Maryland).
- (117) LtCol George C. Thorpe, "Report on Affairs in Seibo Province," dtd 11 May 1918 (Pendleton Papers).
- (118) Thorpe, op. cit., pp. 317-318. Cdr C.C. Baughman, "United States Occupation of the Dominican Republic," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. LI (December 1925), p. 2312.

- (119) Special Inspector of Customs N.L. Prince, ltr to the Secretary of the Navy, dtd 5 June 1919 (Geographical File, HRS, HQMC).
- (120) For a general description of the improvements made by the Military Government, see Saxon, op. cit.
- (121) Miller, op. cit. (August 1935), p. 44. Saxon, op. cit., pp. 28-29, 72, 82.
- (122) Rodman, op. cit., pp. 125-127. Saxon, op. cit., pp. 103-104. Miller, op. cit. (August 1935), pp. 44-45.
- (123) Saxon, op. cit., pp. 104-108.
- (124) "Military History of BGen Harry Lee" (Biographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (125) BGen Harry Lee, "Report of Activities, 1921-1924."
- (126) BGen Harry Lee, "Special Report to the Major General Commandant," dtd 13 September and 10 October 1922 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). BGen Harry Lee, "Report of Activities, 1921-1924."
- (127) BGen Harry Lee, "Report of Activities, 1921-1924."
- (128) Saxon, op. cit., pp. 108-109. Sumner Welles ltr to the Secretary of State, dtd 13 October 1922, copy in Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (129) Kilmartin, op. cit., pp. 377-386.
- (130) BGen Harry Lee, "Special Report to the Major General Commandant," dtd 13 January 1923 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). Subsequent special reports were sent on the following dates: 10 February, 10 April, 8 May, 13 July, 7 August, 12 September, 11 October, 10 November, 1923; 8 January, 8 March, 9 April, 8 May, 10 June, 12 July 1924. These reports clearly reveal the extent of the Marine policy of avoiding provocative incidents with Dominicans.
- (131) Rodman, op. cit., p. 127. Saxon, op. cit., p. 105.

- (132) Saxon, op. cit., pp. 104-108.
- (133) Saxon, op. cit., p. 106. Rodman, op. cit., pp. 126-127. BGen Harry Lee, "Supplementary Report of Activities in the Dominican Republic," dtd 24 September 1924 (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).
- (134) Muster Rolls, American Expeditionary Forces, 2d Provisional Brigade, July 1924. Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea--The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis; United States Naval Institute, 1962), p. 251. Rodman, op. cit., p. 127.
- (135) Miller, op. cit. (August 1935), pp. 43-45.
- (136) Maj Samuel M. Harrington, "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars" (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC). This pamphlet was later published in the Marine Corps Gazette, issues of December 1921 and January 1922. Maj Harold H. Utley, "An Introduction to the Tactics of Small Wars," Marine Corps Gazette, v. XVI, No. 1 (May 1931), pp. 50-53; v. XVIII, No. 2 (August 1933), pp. 44-48; No. 3 (November 1933), pp. 43-47.
- (137) Miller, op. cit. (August 1935), p. 45.

APPENDIX A

Marine Officers and Enlisted Men Who Served With The Policia Nacional Dominicana (Dominican Constabulary)

I. COLONELS

James C. Breckinridge
Richard M. Cutts
George C. Reid

II. LIEUTENANT COLONELS

Frederick A. Ramsey
Presley M. Rixey, Jr.

III. MAJORS

Thomas S. Clarke
John Dixon
Arthur Kingston
John Potts

Arthur Racicot
Clarence C. Riner
Wilbur Thing
Charles F. Williams

IV. CAPTAINS

Victor F. Bleasdale
Gustave F. Bloedel
Percy D. Cornell
Andrew E. Creesy
Franklin A. Hart
Robert S. Hunter
Charles G. Knoechel
Glenn D. Miller

Earl C. Nicholas
Roger W. Peard
Ernest L. Russell
Walter G. Sheard
Thomas E. Watson
William A. Worton
Charles A. Wynn

V. LIEUTENANTS

William T. Bales
Charles G. Cameron
St. Julien R. Childs
Nicholas E. Clauson
Roy W. Conkey
Harry E. Darr
Edward A. Fellowes
Earl W. Garvin

Francis Kane
Herbert S. Keimling
Thomas J. Kilcourse
John D. Lockburner
George H. Morse, Jr.
Stephen A. Norwood
Richard O. Sanderson
Leland S. Swindler

V. LIEUTENANTS (Continued)

William C. Hall
Sidney J. Handsley
Kenneth A. Inman
Herbert G. Joerger

James D. Waller
Erwin R. Whitman
Gregon A. Williams

VI. MARINE GUNNERS

Robert C. Allan
Silas M. Bankert

William J. Holloway
Daniel Loomis

VII. FIRST SERGEANTS

Arthur E. Abbott
Lee T. Bowen
Charles E. Grey
Harry E. Hurst
Charles A. McLaughlin

William B. Mitchell
Samuel J. Sorrells
Johnnie C. Vaughan
James L. Wilson

VIII. QUARTERMASTER SERGEANTS

Frank L. Hudson
James F. Reddish
Frank J. Rothenburgh

IX. GUNNERY SERGEANTS

Ambrose F. Churchill
George D. Faulkner
Lewis Miller

Joseph A. Saunders
Edmund S. Sayer
James K. Watson

X. SERGEANTS

William J. Carter
Ernest E. Devore
Charles L. Freeman
Fred J. Fuchs
Charles Gage
Jowell M. Hearn
Louis V. Hensley
Josiah D. Johnson
Stephen F. Kent
Warren F. Lear

Cecil J. Rivard
Allen B. Romsas
John Schroeder
LeRoy Snowden
Gerald L. Sowers
Bernice M. Stoudt
Walton J. Van Horn
George R. Wallace
William M. Whitmire

XI. CORPORALS

Luther B. Ballou
John L. Barr
Charles N. Billington
Frank M. Brown
Arthur A. Deam
George D. Eckerson
Wilford D. Fields
Chester P. Fullerton
Charles Gage
Thomas D. Gibson
William Irwin
Donald R. Jack
William L. Judd
Theodore Knapp
Theodore W. LaDuke

Richard LaFalle
Samuel Lobick
Barney Machovic
Donald McDonald
Frank G. Miller
William B. Mitchell
Clement L. Pickett
Lewis B. Straub
Rudolph W. Thompson
Frank Walcutt
Basil F. Weakland
Lester E. Wentworth
Edward S. Winfield
Elmer Yarbrough

XII. QUARTERMASTER CLERK

David L. Ford

XIII. PRIVATEES

John G. Arnold
Henry Boschen
Charles R. Buckalew
Joseph J. Fox
John S. Hale
Harry E. Hurst
Otis F. Marlin

Gideon L. Rice
Harold Stott
Joseph P. Verderber
Otis O. Wilson
John C. Wishon
Mark Woods

SOURCE: Muster Rolls, April 1917-August 1924. Reference
Section, Historical Division, USMC.

APPENDIX B

<u>Month</u>	Training of <u>Policia</u> <u>HAINA</u>	Recruits <u>SANTIAGO</u>	Total Strength of <u>Policia</u>	Reported Cases of friction involving Marines and <u>Dominicans</u>
Dec 1922	169	149	1213	6
Jan 1923	161	141	1227	5
Feb 1923	121	198	1268	7
Mar 1923	161	193	1183	8
Apr 1923	166	203	1208	0
May, June 1923	241	227	1252	1
July 1923	218	218	1249	2
Aug 1923	230	211	1251	3
Sept 1923	254	209	1270	0
Oct 1923	249	209	1266	3
Nov, Dec 1923	270	240	1270	2
Jan, Feb 1924	216	212	1266	2
Mar 1924	235	210	1272	3
Apr 1924	250	215	1259	7
May 1924	210	216	1243	1
June 1924	239	196	1243	0

Source: Special Reports sent from BGen Harry Lee to the Major General Commandant (Geographical Files, HRS, HQMC).