Chapter 4. Government and Politics
ON MARCH 1, 1990, Uruguayans and representatives of many foreign governments witnessed the reaffirmation of Uruguay's revived democratic tradition: the transfer of power from one elected president to another. Having completed a full five-year term in office, Julio María Sanguinetti Cairolo (1985–90) of the liberal Colorado Party (Partido Colorado) transferred the presidential sash to Luis Alberto Lacalle de Herrera of the rival conservative National Party (Partido Nacional, usually referred to as the Blancos). Lacalle was elected to serve for the 1990–95 period as the country's fiftieth president.

An urbane lawyer, rancher, and senator, Lacalle was only the third National Party candidate ever to be elected president. After only five years as a National Party leader, he achieved what his legendary grandfather, Luis Alberto de Herrera, the National Party's dominant caudillo during the first half of the twentieth century, attained after a half-century of political battles: the defeat of the Colorados and the ascension of the Blancos to power. Technically, Lacalle became the first National Party president because Uruguay was formally ruled by a nine-member collegial executive (colegiado) when his party won its previous victories.

Uruguayan democracy had been reinstated five years earlier—a result of Sanguinetti's victory in the November 25, 1984, election and referendum. Those national polls were held in accordance with the Naval Club Pact of 1984, a political agreement between the armed forces and four political parties: the Colorado Party, the National Party, the Broad Front (Frente Amplio, a leftist alliance), and the Civic Union (Unión Cívica—UC) (see The Military Government, 1973–85, ch. 1). The military regime, however, blocked the proposed presidential candidacies of the National Party's Wilson Ferreira Aldunate and the Broad Front's Liber Seregni Mosquera. Running, in effect, unopposed, Sanguinetti won approximately 41 percent of the votes, followed by the National Party's 34 percent, the Broad Front's 21 percent, and the UC's 2.5 percent.

Sanguinetti was the first Uruguayan president to be elected, albeit in a semidemocratic election, after the period of repressive military rule. He had been a lawyer, journalist, representative, minister of education and culture, and minister of labor and social welfare. During his term of office, Sanguinetti consolidated Uruguay's multiparty democracy, restored the country's prestige and respect
abroad, increased its export markets, and avoided financial dis-
order. He symbolized Uruguay’s political opening by visiting the 

In what proved to be its most active electoral year, Uruguay held 
two national elections in 1989. The first was a referendum on the 
government’s amnesty law for abuses committed by the military 
regime. The second, the November 26 poll—the first totally free 
presidential elections to be held in Uruguay since 1971—demon-
strated the country’s return to its democratic tradition of free and 
honest elections.

Although voting was compulsory in Uruguay, the turnout in the 
November 26, 1989, elections was nonetheless impressive: 88 per-
cent of the electorate of 2.3 million people participated. The high 
turnout did not necessarily mean that Uruguayan voters were 
among the most politically sophisticated in the world, although Ur-
guayans usually discussed and debated political issues exhaustively 
at all levels of society. The high voter turnout in 1989 demonstrated, 
however—as it had in 1984 when 88.5 percent participated—that 
Uruguay was a very politicized country and that it had one of Lat-
in America’s longest democratic traditions.

Despite Sanguinetti’s accomplishments, his party’s historic and 
decisive defeat reflected widespread dissatisfaction with two years 
of economic stagnation. The elections also challenged Uruguay’s 
traditional two-party system of the Colorado and National parties. 
For the first time, a third party, the Broad Front, reached impor-
tant levels by winning the country’s second most powerful post (after 
president of the republic): the mayorship of Montevideo, which 
had over 40 percent of the country’s population and more than 
two-thirds of its economic activity. The new Marxist mayor, Ta-
baré Vázquez, immediately began pressing Lacalle for greater 
municipal autonomy (see Democratic Consolidation, 1985–90, this 
ch.). The prospects for the success of a “co-habitation arrange-
ment,” i.e., harmonious cooperation, however, were doubtful be-
cause Uruguayans continued to support a strong presidential system 
and because Lacalle was assertive of his executive powers. Thus, 
in addition to the challenges posed by a resurgent political left, labor 
unrest, and economic crisis, the Lacalle government faced the pos-
sibility of political clashes with the municipal government.

**Constitutional Background**

Since achieving independence in 1828, Uruguay has promul-
gated five constitutions: in 1830, 1917, 1934, 1952, and 1967. When 
it became independent on August 27, 1828, the Oriental Republic
of Uruguay (República Oriental del Uruguay) drew up its first constitution, which was promulgated on July 18, 1830.

The 1830 constitution has been regarded as Uruguay’s most technically perfect charter. Heavily influenced by the thinking of the French and American revolutions, it divided the government among the executive, legislative, and judicial powers and established Uruguay as a unitary republic with a centralized form of government. The bicameral General Assembly (Asamblea General) was empowered to elect a president with considerable powers to head the executive branch for a four-year term. The president was given control over all of his ministers of government and was empowered to make decisions with the agreement of at least one of the three ministers recognized by the 1830 constitution.

Like all of Uruguay’s charters since then, the 1830 constitution provided for a General Assembly composed of a Chamber of Senators (Cámara de Senadores), or Senate (Senado), elected nationally, and a Chamber of Representatives (Cámara de Representantes), elected from the departments. Members of the General Assembly were empowered to pass laws but lacked the authority to dismiss the president or his ministers or to issue votes of no confidence. An 1834 amendment, however, provided for juicio
As established by the 1830 constitution, the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), and lesser courts, exercised the judicial power. The General Assembly appointed the members of the high court. The latter—with the consent of the Senate in the case of the appellate courts—appointed the members of the lesser courts. The constitution also divided the country into departments, each headed by a governor appointed by the president and each having an advisory body called a Neighbors' Council (Consejo de Vecinos).

Although the 1830 constitution remained in effect for eighty-seven years, de facto governments violated it repeatedly. In the 1878—90 period, the Blancos and Colorados initiated the framework for a more stable system through understandings called “pacts between the parties.” This governing principle, called coparticipation (coparticipación), meaning the sharing of formal political and informal bureaucratic power, has been formally practiced since 1872.

In 1913 President José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903–07, 1911–15), the father of modern Uruguay, proposed a constitutional reform involving the creation of a Swiss-style collegial executive system to be called the colegiado. A strong opponent of the one-person, powerful presidency, Batlle y Ordóñez believed that a collective executive power would neutralize the dictatorial intentions of political leaders. It met intense opposition, however, not only from the Blancos but also from members of his own Colorado Party. The proposal was defeated in 1916, but Batlle y Ordóñez worked out a deal with a faction of the Blancos whereby a compromise system was provided for in the second constitution, which was approved by plebiscite on November 25, 1917.

In addition to separating church and state, the new charter, which did not become effective until 1919, introduced substantial changes in the powers of the presidency. The executive power consisted of the president, who controlled foreign relations, national security, and agriculture, and the National Council of Administration (Consejo Nacional de Administración), or colegiado, which administered all other executive governmental functions (industrial relations, health, public works, industry and labor, livestock and agriculture, education, and the preparation of the budget). The colegiado, embodying the political mechanism of coparticipation, consisted of nine members: six from the majority party and three from the minority party. The first colegiado (1919–33) was thereby established without eliminating the office of president.
The history of successive constitutions is one of a lengthy struggle between advocates of the collegial system and those of the presidential system. Although the 1917 constitution worked well during the prosperous time after World War I, recurring conflicts between the president and the colegiado members made the executive power ineffective in coping with the economic and social crises wracking the country. These conflicts eventually led to the presidential coup of 1933. The ad hoc government suspended the constitution and appointed a constituent assembly to draw up a new one.

The 1934 constitution abolished the colegiado and transferred its power to the president. Nevertheless, presidential powers remained somewhat limited. The executive power once again was exercised by a president who had to make decisions together with the ministers. The 1934 charter established the Council of Ministers (Consejo de Ministros) as the body in which these decisions were to be made. This council consisted of the president and the cabinet ministers. The constitution required the chief executive to appoint three of the nine cabinet ministers from among the members of the political party that received the second largest number of votes in the presidential election. The General Assembly, for its part, could issue votes of no confidence in cabinet ministers, with the approval of two-thirds of its members.

The constitution divided the Senate between the Blancos and the Colorados or, as political scientist Martin Weinstein has pointed out, between the Herrerist faction of the Blancos (named after Luis Alberto de Herrera) and the Terrist wing of the Colorados (named after Gabriel Terra; president, 1931–38). The party that garnered the second largest number of votes automatically received 50 percent of the Senate seats. In addition, the 1934 charter empowered the Supreme Court of Justice to rule on the constitutionality of the laws. This system, which lasted eighteen years, further limited the power of the president and his government.

Although Uruguay returned to a more democratic system in 1942, the failure of political sectors to reach an agreement on the proposed constitution drafted that year resulted in the postponement of constitutional reform. On July 31, 1951, a formal pact between the rightist Batllist faction of the Colorados—the Colorado and Batllist Union (Unión Colorada y Batllista—UCB)—and the Herrerist Movement (Movimiento Herrerista) of the Blancos called for a plebiscite on constitutional reform. The plebiscite the following December 16 drew less than half of the 1.1 million voters to the polls, but the collegial system was approved by a small margin.

As the culmination of an effort to reestablish the colegiado and the plural executive power, a fourth constitution was promulgated...
Uruguay: A Country Study

on January 25, 1952. It readopted Batlle y Ordóñez’s original proposal for coparticipation by creating a nine-member colegiado, this time called the National Council of Government (Consejo Nacional de Gobierno), with six majority-party seats and three minority-party seats. The presidency of the council rotated among the six members of the majority party. The chief executive could nominate only four of the nine ministers from his own party faction; the General Assembly selected the other five through separate votes in both chambers. An absolute majority (more than two-thirds), however, of the full membership of the two legislative chambers had to support the appointments. It thereby ensured that either the Colorados or the Blancos would get the minority seats on the colegiado. The 1952 constitution also provided for impeachment of the president by the General Assembly.

This nine-member colegiado, which headed the executive branch from 1954 to 1967, was ineffective because the president lacked control over the ministers and because the majority was seldom united. During most of this period, the National Party held power, having been elected in 1958 for the first time in over ninety years and again in 1962 when a different faction of the party was elected. The ineffectiveness of these governments caused the public to turn against the colegiado arrangement.

In the elections of November 27, 1966, nearly 59 percent of Uruguayans voted to amend the 1952 constitution and to reestablish a presidential system of government, thus ending a fifteen-year experiment with the colegiado. The new constitution, which became operative on February 15, 1967, and has remained in effect since then, created a strong one-person presidency, subject to legislative and judicial checks. In free and fair elections held in 1968, Uruguayans approved the new charter and elected the Colorado Party to power again.

The 1967 constitution contains many of the provisions of the 1952 charter. However, it removed some of the General Assembly’s power to initiate legislation and provided for automatic approval of bills under certain conditions if the legislature failed to act. If, on receiving a bill, the president has objections or comments to make, the bill must be returned to the General Assembly within ten days. If sixty days elapse without a decision by the General Assembly, the president’s objections must be considered as accepted. The 1967 document also established the Permanent Commission, composed of four senators and seven representatives, which exercises certain legislative functions while the General Assembly is in recess.
The 1967 charter can be amended by any of four different methods. First, 10 percent of the citizens who are registered to vote can initiate an amendment if they present a detailed proposal to the president of the General Assembly. Second, two-fifths of the full membership of the General Assembly can approve a proposal presented to the president of the General Assembly and submitted to a plebiscite at the next election (a yes vote of an absolute majority of the full membership of the General Assembly is required, and this majority must represent at least 35 percent of all registered voters). Third, senators, representatives, and the president of the republic can present proposed amendments, which must be approved by an absolute majority of the full membership of the General Assembly. And finally, amendments can be made by constitutional laws requiring the approval of two-thirds of the full membership of each chamber of the General Assembly in the same legislative period.

In 1976, however, the military government issued a series of constitutional decrees that amended the 1967 constitution by creating the Council of the Nation (Consejo de la Nación) to serve as the supreme governmental body, with executive and legislative functions. It consisted of the thirty members of the Council of State (Consejo de Estado, the body created by the regime in June 1973 to act in lieu of the General Assembly, which dissolved by the regime) and the twenty-eight senior officers of the armed forces (sixteen from the army, six from the navy, and six from the air force). The Council of the Nation appointed the president of the republic and the members of the Council of State, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Tribunal of Administrative Claims, which had been dissolved in 1985. Eight institutional acts substituted for many of the functional provisions and guarantees of the 1967 constitution. For example, in addition to giving the Council of the Nation the power to appoint the president of the republic and to set general policy for the country, institutional acts deprived previous officeholders and candidates of their political rights and permitted the arbitrary dismissal of public employees.

Under the 1976 constitutional amendments, the president exercised executive power, acting with the concurrence of one or more ministers as appropriate or with the National Security Council (Consejo de Seguridad Nacional—Cosena). The Cosena had been formed in 1973 and consisted of the commanders of the army, navy, and air force, plus an additional senior military officer, and the ministers of national defense, interior, and foreign affairs. It participated in any decision related to the “national security” or in any formulation of overall plans or objectives.
The constitutional decrees declared generally that the maintenance of the national security was of "exclusive competence," i.e., the sole prerogative, of the armed forces. These decrees deprived local governments of all budgetary powers. The Council of State continued to pass laws that the executive normally would have submitted for approval. Only the executive could initiate the procedure for approval of legislation on budgetary or other matters that could be related in any way to national security. The decrees also created the Ministry of Justice, responsible for relations between the executive and judicial powers.

In 1980 the military regime drew up a charter that would have provided for a strong, continuing role for the military along the lines of the 1976 constitutional decrees, including legitimizing the Coseña's new role. The document also would have greatly reduced the roles of the General Assembly and political parties. In a plebiscite held November 30, 1980, however, Uruguayans, by a margin of 57 percent to 43 percent of the popular vote, rejected the new military-drafted constitution. Nevertheless, a new thirty-five-member Council of State was installed on August 20, 1981, before President Gregorio Alvarez Armelino (1981–85) took office. Its powers were expanded to include responsibility for calling a constitutional assembly, a plebiscite, and general elections.

In discussions held during 1983, the military commanders and the leaders of the Colorado and National parties prepared a new text of the 1967 constitution. Accords negotiated by the military, the Colorados (but not the Blancos), and most of the Broad Front in July and August 1984 provided for a return to democracy without the Coseña.

Following the return to civilian rule in 1985, Uruguay's human rights record quickly improved. One of the Sanguinetti government's first acts in this area was—with the approval of the newly restored General Assembly—to grant amnesty to all political prisoners, who consisted chiefly of members of the National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros—MLN-T). In the late 1980s, there were no credible reports of human rights violations, according to the United States Department of State.

Since 1985 Uruguay's democratic governments have respected the sixty-five articles in the 1967 constitution concerned primarily with the rights of citizens. The document provides for freedom of religion, thought, speech and press, peaceful assembly and association, collective bargaining, movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration and repatriation, respect for political rights, and the inviolability of property and privacy. The constitution does
not provide for a state religion, although Roman Catholicism predominates, or for capital punishment (that was abolished during Batlle y Ordóñez's second term). There are two forms of citizenship: natural (persons born in Uruguay or those who were of Uruguayan parents and were registered residents) and legal (individuals established in Uruguay with at least three years' residence in the case of those with family in Uruguay or five years' residence for those without family there). Primary and secondary education is both free and compulsory. Every citizen eighteen years of age or older has the right and obligation to vote, which is compulsory (see The Electoral Process, this ch.).

Uruguay has long been one of the most egalitarian countries in the world. Women's suffrage was enacted in 1932. In 1946 a statute was passed repealing all laws that established legal differences in the rights of women. Uruguayan women, who constituted one-third of the work force in the 1980s, enjoyed complete equality under the law. Nevertheless, some barriers still existed in practice because of traditional social patterns and restricted employment opportunities. Women often received less pay than men, especially in less skilled jobs. By early 1990, very few women held high political positions, but women had served in the cabinet, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the diplomatic corps, including at the ambassadorial level, and a few had served as alternates in the General Assembly.

**Governmental Structure**

Uruguay is a republic with three separate branches of government (see fig. 9). The 1967 constitution institutionalizes a strong presidency, subject to legislative and judicial checks. The electorate exercises sovereignty directly through elections, initiatives, or referendums and indirectly through representative powers established by the constitution.

**The Executive**

Executive power is exercised by the president of the republic, acting with the advice of the Council of Ministers. The vice president of the republic serves as the president of the General Assembly and the Senate. The president and vice president are elected for five-year terms by a simple majority of the people through a unique voting system. Candidates must be at least thirty-five years of age, native born, and in full possession of their civil rights. After a period following their election, the president and vice president are sworn in before both chambers of the General Assembly and take office on March 1. Neither may be reelected until five years after the completion of their terms.
Figure 9. Governmental Structure, 1990
The president's duties include publishing all laws and enforcing them, informing the General Assembly of the state of the republic and of proposed improvements and reforms, making objections to or observations on bills sent by the General Assembly, proposing bills to the chambers or amendments to laws previously enacted, conferring civilian and military offices, and removing civil servants (with the consent of the Senate) for "inefficiency, dereliction of duty, or malfeasance." The key civilian appointments made by the president are cabinet members.

A 1986 constitutional amendment returned to the presidency the power to command the armed forces and appoint the armed forces commander. The chief executive grants promotions to members of the armed forces, with the consent of the Senate for promotions to colonel or higher ranks. The president also is responsible for maintaining internal order and external security. Although the constitution does not give the president sweeping powers in cases of emergency, Article 168 empowers the chief executive "to take prompt measures of security in grave and unforeseen cases of foreign attack or internal disorder." In such an event, the president is required to explain his action to a joint session of the General Assembly or, if it is in recess, to the Permanent Commission within twenty-four hours.

Other presidential powers include decreeing the severance of diplomatic relations with another country and declaring war if arbitration or other pacific means to avoid it are unsuccessful. The president appoints ambassadors and other foreign service diplomatic personnel. The chief executive may not leave the country for more than forty-eight hours without authorization from the Senate. The president may not be impeached unless found guilty of violations of articles of the constitution or other serious offenses.

The Council of Ministers includes the cabinet ministers (appointed by the president) and the president of the Central Bank of Uruguay. Each appointee must be approved by a simple majority in each chamber of the General Assembly. Cabinet members must be native-born citizens in full possession of their civil rights and at least thirty years of age. They may be removed from office by impeachment proceedings initiated by the Chamber of Representatives and approved by the Senate.

When all the cabinet ministers or their deputies meet and act jointly, the body is known as the Council of Ministers. Presided over by the president of the republic, who has a vote, the Council of Ministers is responsible for all acts of government and administration. In addition, a number of autonomous entities (autonomous agencies or state enterprises; see Glossary) and decentralized services
are important in government administration (see Public Administra-
tion, this ch.).

The principal duties of the cabinet members are to enforce the
constitution, laws, decrees, and resolutions; to formulate and sub-
mit for the consideration of superior authority any laws, decrees,
and resolutions they deem appropriate; to effect—within the limits
of their functions—the payment of the national debt; to propose
the appointment or discharge of employees of their ministries; and
to perform any other functions entrusted to them by laws or by
measures adopted by the executive power. They may attend the
sessions of either chamber of the General Assembly and their respec-
tive standing committees, and they may take part in debate, but
they may not vote.

The Legislature

The bicameral General Assembly enacts laws and regulates the
administration of justice. The General Assembly consists of the
thirty-member Senate—thirty senators and the vice president of
the republic, who presides over it as well as the General Assembly
and has both a voice and a vote in Senate deliberations—and the
ninety-nine-member Chamber of Representatives. If the vice presi-
dent ever assumes the presidency, the senator heading the list of
the party that received the most votes in the last election will suc-
cceed to the presidency of the Senate.

Members of both legislative bodies are directly elected every five
years by a system of proportional representation. The Chamber
of Representatives represents the nineteen administrative subdi-
visions of the country, with each department (departamento) having
at least two representatives. The members of the Senate are also
elected by the people, but with the entire nation representing a single
electoral district. Members of the General Assembly must be natural
citizens or legal citizens with seven years’ exercise of their rights.
Senators must be at least thirty years of age, and representatives
at least twenty-five years of age. Uruguay does not have a residency
requirement for election to the Senate or the Chamber of Represen-
tatives. Consequently, almost all of the country’s politicians have
lived and worked in Montevideo. Military and civil service per-
sonnel or public officials may not be candidates for either cham-
ber of the General Assembly unless they resign their positions at
least three months before the election. In 1988 there were no fe-
male members of the General Assembly, but several served as al-
ternates.

The Chamber of Representatives can impeach any member of
either chamber, the president, the vice president, cabinet ministers,
President Lacalle
Courtesy Embassy of Uruguay, Washington
judges of the Supreme Court of Justice, and other judges. The Senate is responsible for trying these impeachment cases and can deprive a person of a post by a two-thirds vote of its membership. In addition, the Senate, in session from mid-March to mid-December, spends much time considering nominations for, appointments to, and removals from office submitted by the executive. In other respects, the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives have equal powers and duties. Members of either of the two chambers can initiate a bill. Both chambers must approve a proposed bill before it can be sent to the executive power to be published. The latter branch, however, has ten days to make objections to or observations on the bill. If the president objects to only part of a bill, the General Assembly can enact the other part.

Among the most important duties of the Chamber of Representatives—in joint session with the Senate—are the election of the members of the Supreme Court of Justice and three quasi-judicial autonomous entities: the Accounts Tribunal, the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, and the Electoral Court. These ordinary administrative courts hear cases involving the functioning of state administration. In addition, the Chamber of Representatives is empowered to grant pardons and settle disputes concerning legislation on which the two chambers disagree. The Chamber of Representatives also has the exclusive right to impeach members of both chambers, the president and vice president of the republic, the cabinet ministers, and members of the courts for violations of the constitution or other serious offenses. Impeachment proceedings must be tried before the Senate.

The Accounts Tribunal, which is a functionally autonomous appendage of the General Assembly, is responsible for determining taxes and reporting on the accounts and budgets of all the state organs. It is authorized to intervene in all matters relating to the financial activities of the state organs, departmental governments, and autonomous agencies, and it is authorized to report to the appropriate authority all irregularities in the management of public funds or infractions of budgetary and accounting laws. It is authorized to certify the legality of expenditures and payments and append pertinent objections whenever necessary. In the departmental governments and autonomous agencies, officials acting under the supervision of the tribunal perform the same duties. The tribunal’s opinions cover all the organs of the state, including departmental governments. An annual report must be submitted to the General Assembly. The Accounts Tribunal consists of seven members appointed by a two-thirds vote of the full membership of the General Assembly. Their elective qualifications are
the same as those of a senator. Their term of office ends when the succeeding General Assembly makes new appointments, but they may be reelected.

The Contentious-Administrative Tribunal hears pleas for the nullification of final administrative acts that are considered contrary to law or an abuse of authority made by the administration, state organs, departmental governments, autonomous entities, and decentralized services. It also has jurisdiction over the final administrative acts of the governments of the departments and of the autonomous entities. Its functions are only to appraise the act itself and to confirm or annul it, without alteration. Its decisions have effect only in the cases before it. The Contentious-Administrative Tribunal can act in cases of conflict of jurisdiction based on legislation and on differences that arise among the executive, the departmental governments, and the autonomous entities.

The qualifications necessary for election to the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, the manner of appointment, the remuneration, and the term of office are the same as those established for the members of the Supreme Court of Justice. The tribunal is composed of five judges appointed by the General Assembly for ten-year terms. It also has an "attorney general for administrative claims" (appointed by the president), whose qualifications, remuneration, and term of office are decided by the tribunal. The attorney general is heard at the final hearing of all matters within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

The Electoral Court, a quasi-judicial autonomous entity, supervises national, departmental, and municipal elections and has competence over all electoral acts and procedures. It rules in the last instance on appeals and complaints; it also judges the election of all the elective posts and the holding of a plebiscite (on constitutional issues) or referendum (on political issues). Of the Electoral Court's nine members, the General Assembly appoints five and their alternates by a two-thirds vote in joint session and elects the other four members and their alternates equally from the two political parties having the highest number of votes. The court has eighteen alternates in addition to the nine full members. Members serve four years until the succeeding legislature selects their replacements (see The Electoral Process, this ch.).

The Judiciary

Like all previous charters, the 1967 constitution establishes the judicial branch as an independent power of the state. The Supreme Court of Justice heads the judiciary, both civilian and military. Lower civilian courts include six appellate courts (for civil matters,
criminal matters, and labor matters), courts of first instance (sometimes referred to as lawyer courts [juzgados letrados]), and justice of the peace courts.

During the military regime (1973–85), the Ministry of Justice administered the courts, and military officers were appointed to the highest courts. As a result of the 1984 Naval Club Pact, which clipped the powers of the military courts, the judicial branch regained its autonomy when Sanguinetti assumed office on March 1, 1985. That May the General Assembly, despite the opposition of the Colorado Party, declared all posts of the Supreme Court of Justice vacant on the grounds that none of the justices had been legally appointed. Accordingly, all of the military officers appointed by the military regime to the high court or the appellate courts retired from their positions. Sanguinetti then formally abolished the Ministry of Justice, retaining only the minister of justice post. Nevertheless, there was a continuing public debate during his administration over the need to reform the legal and judicial systems.

Located in Montevideo, the Supreme Court of Justice manages the entire judicial system. It prepares budgets for the judiciary and submits them to the General Assembly for approval, proposes all legislation regarding the functioning of the courts, appoints judges to the appellate courts, and nominates all other judges and judicial officials. It has the power to modify any decisions made by the appellate courts and is the only court allowed to declare the unconstitutionality of laws passed by the General Assembly. It alone decides on conflicts affecting diplomats and international treaties, the execution of the rulings of foreign courts, and relations among agencies of the government. The president of the Supreme Court of Justice is empowered to attend meetings of the committees of both chambers of the General Assembly and has a voice in discussion but has no vote.

A conference of the two chambers of the General Assembly appoints the five members of the Supreme Court of Justice. The justices must be between forty and seventy years of age, native-born citizens in full possession of their civil rights, or legal citizens with ten years' exercise of their rights and twenty-five years of residence in the country. They also must have been a lawyer for ten years or must have been a judge or member of the Public Ministry for eight years. (The Public Ministry consists of the public attorneys, headed by the "attorney general of the court and attorney of the country," who acts independently before the Supreme Court of Justice.) Members serve for ten years and may be reelected after a break of five years. At the appointment of the president, two military justices serve on the Supreme Court of Justice on
an ad hoc basis and participate only in cases involving the military (see Military Justice, ch. 5).

Each of the appellate courts, also located in Montevideo, has three judges appointed by the Supreme Court of Justice with the consent of the Senate. To be a member, one must be at least thirty-five years of age, a native-born citizen or legal citizen for seven years, and a lawyer with at least eight years of experience or otherwise engaged in a law-related profession for at least six years. An appellate court judge is obliged to retire by age seventy. These courts do not have original jurisdiction but hear appeals from lower courts. The appellate courts divide responsibilities for civil matters (including matters concerning commerce, customs, and minors), as well as for criminal and labor affairs.

In Montevideo Department, the judges of first instance, sometimes referred to as lawyer judges (jueces letrados), decide on the appeals to lower-court rulings. In 1990 Montevideo Department had forty judges of first instance, including eighteen who decided on civil matters, four on minors, three on customs, ten on criminal cases, and five on labor cases.

Outside Montevideo Department, the first decision on all cases of civil, family, customs, criminal, or labor law is submitted to the municipal judges of first instance. Each department has up to
five municipal judges of first instance, located in the major cities. They rule on most minor cases, with the exception of those that are within the competence of the justices of the peace. Both municipal judges of first instance and the Montevideo Department judges of first instance must have previously served as justices of the peace.

At the lowest level, each of the country's 224 judicial divisions has a justice of the peace court. The Supreme Court of Justice appoints the 224 justices of the peace for four-year terms. They must be at least twenty-five years of age, native-born citizens or legal citizens for two years, and in full possession of their civil rights. Those who serve in Montevideo Department and the capitals and major cities of other departments must be lawyers; those in rural areas must be either lawyers or notaries. Their jurisdiction is limited to cases involving eviction, breach of contract, collection of rent, and all small-claims commercial and business cases.

The law recognizes only one category of lawyer. In order to practice law, an individual must first obtain the degree of law and social sciences from the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the University of the Republic (also known as the University of Montevideo). The degree is granted by the university after the successful completion of six years of studies. Candidates must be at least twenty-one years of age, listed in the Register of Lawyers maintained by the Supreme Court of Justice, not be under indictment for a crime penalized by corporal punishment, and not have been convicted of a crime. A public defender system was established in 1980 with the placing of lawyers in all courts to assist those unable to pay for their services. Public defenders—appointed jointly by the president and the minister of justice—protect the society's interests.

Public Administration

Uruguay traditionally has had a sizable civil service organization. Civil service regulations determine conditions for admission to the service as a career. In accordance with these regulations for service in the national government, departmental governments adopted regulations for their own civil service personnel. Permanent career status is achieved after a fairly short probationary period.

The Sanguinetti government reestablished the National Office of the Civil Service (Oficina Nacional del Servicio Civil—ONSC), which the military regime had abolished, as the technical advisory organ specializing in administrative reform matters. The ONSC publicizes its ideas on change and reform by sponsoring academic, public, and international seminars and roundtables.
The ONSC’s duties include controlling the entrance of personnel into the public administration and streamlining public institutions. Under Sanguinetti, the ONSC also implemented course requirements for civil service managers and, with the assistance of France’s National School of Public Administration (Ecole Nationale d’Administration Publique), created a “training course for high executives of the central administration.” During the first twenty years since its creation in 1969, the ONSC trained or provided technical assistance to some 4,000 public employees, more than one-third of them between 1986 and 1988.

Following ONSC guidelines, the Sanguinetti government restructured the civil service and reassigned 1,787 workers. At the end of 1988, the state employed a total of 271,124 workers (approximately 20 percent of the labor force), who included 1,281 members of the legislative branch, 106,455 members of the executive branch, 5,132 members of the judicial branch, 117,423 members of the autonomous entities, and 40,833 members of the departmental governments.

Over twenty autonomous entities administer certain national industrial and commercial services (see table 14, Appendix). These agencies are divided into two general classifications: the first is concerned with education, welfare, and culture; the second, with industry and commerce.

Local Government

Uruguay’s administrative subdivisions consist of nineteen departments (departamentos), which are subordinate to the central government and responsible for local administration. They enforce national laws and administer the nation’s social and educational policies and institutions within their departments. These departments have limited taxing powers, but they can borrow funds and acquire property. They also have the power to establish unpaid five-member local boards or town councils in municipalities other than the departmental capital if the population is large enough to warrant such a body.

Executive authority is vested in a governor (intendente), who administers the department, and in a thirty-one-member departmental board (junta departmental), which carries out legislative functions. These functions include approval of the departmental budget and judicial actions, such as impeachment proceedings against departmental officials, including the governor. At the municipal level, a mayor (intendente municipal) assumes executive and administrative duties, carrying out resolutions made by the local board (whose members are appointed on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties). The governor is required to comply with and enforce the constitution and the laws and to promulgate the decrees enacted by the departmental board. The governor is authorized to prepare the budget, submit it for approval to the departmental board, appoint the board’s employees, and, if necessary, discipline or suspend them. The governor represents the department in its relations with the national government and other departmental governments and in the negotiation of contracts with public or private agencies.

Like the governor, the members of the departmental board and the mayor are elected for five-year terms in direct, popular elections. A governor can be reelected only once, and candidates for the post must meet the same requirements as those for a senator, in addition to being a native of the department or a resident therein for at least three years before assuming office. Departmental board members must be at least twenty-three years of age, native born (or a legal citizen for at least three years), and a native of the department (or a resident for at least three years).

The board sits in the capital city of each department and exercises jurisdiction throughout the entire territory of the department. It can issue decrees and resolutions that it deems necessary either on the suggestion of the governor or on its own initiative. It can approve budgets, fix the amount of taxes, request the intervention of the Accounts Tribunal for advice concerning departmental finances or administration, and remove from office—at the request of the governor—members of nonelective local departmental boards. The board also supervises local public services; public health; and primary, secondary, preparatory, industrial, and artistic education. Although Montevideo is the smallest department in terms of area (divided into twenty-three geographic zones that generally coincide with the electoral zones), its departmental board had sixty-five members in 1990; all other departments had thirty-one-member boards and a five-member executive council appointed by the departmental board, with proportional representation from the principal political parties.

The Electoral Process

Uruguayans take voting very seriously. Voting, which is obligatory, is not restricted by race, sex, religion, or economic status. Other rules governing suffrage include mandatory inscription in the Civil Register and a system of proportional representation. These rules also include prohibition of political activity (with the exception of voting) by judicial magistrates, directors of the autonomous entities, and members of the armed forces and police.
In addition, the president of the republic and members of the Electoral Court are not permitted to serve as political party officials or engage in political election propaganda; all electoral boards must be elected; a two-thirds vote of the full membership of each chamber is needed to adopt any new law concerning the Civil Register or elections; and all national and local elections are to be held every five years on the last Sunday in November.

Uruguay’s electoral processes are among the most complicated known. The unusual Uruguayan electoral system combines primaries and a general election in one event. Primary and general elections combine proportional representation with a “double simultaneous vote” (doble voto simultáneo). This system, as established by the Elections Law of 1925, allows each party’s sub-lemas, or factions, to run rival lists of candidates.

Traditionally, under Uruguayan law the results of political elections are tabulated in an unusual fashion. Under the 1982 Political Parties Law, each party is allowed to present three tickets, or single candidates, each representing a different sub-lema, for executive and legislative posts, and these factions do not need the party’s approval of their candidates. A voter selects a faction and a list of candidates within that sub-lema. The votes of all the factions are given to the party (lema) to which they belong, and the presidency goes to the candidate of the sub-lema that receives the most votes within the winning party. Thus, even if a given ticket garners more votes than any other slate running for election, it cannot win unless its party also wins. The governing party is actually the majority group within the party that won the last elections. The disadvantages of this system are that it discourages intraparty selectivity in choosing presidential candidates, often allows politicians who receive only a minority of the vote to rise to power, blocks the rise of new parties and new leadership while encouraging fractionalization, and often results in a multiplicity of alliances or combinations of national and local candidates for office.

Election of members of the General Assembly is even more complicated. Election of the ninety-nine members of the Chamber of Representatives is based on the population in the country’s nineteen departments, whereas the thirty members of the Senate are elected at large from the nation. Seats are allocated on the basis of each party’s share of the total vote, but each party usually has various lists of candidates, among whom prior agreements have been made to unify or transfer votes. As a result, there have been frequent complaints that voters never know for whom they are ultimately voting in the congressional races. Electoral
fraud, however, is precluded by the traditional method of decentralized vote-counting at thousands of vote-counting tables.

In addition, the Electoral Court supervises the entire registration and voting process, registers parties and candidates, has final jurisdiction in all election disputes, and supervises the functioning of the various departmental electoral boards. It also supervises the National Electoral Office in Montevideo, which has the responsibility for organizing and maintaining the Civil Register of all eligible voters in the country. One Electoral Court exists at the national level and one in each department capital.

Before an election, the General Assembly allocates a sum of money for the Electoral Court to distribute among the political parties in proportion to the number of votes a party received in the last election. These funds help to defray campaign costs. Party-proposed ballots must be presented to the Electoral Court at least twenty days prior to an election. After making the final verification of ballots, the Electoral Court can annul an election, but only if gross irregularities are found.

Political Dynamics

Political Parties

The Colorado and National parties and, to a lesser extent, the Broad Front coalition, were the three major political entities in 1990. Until the 1971 elections, the Colorado and National parties together accounted for 90 percent of the votes cast; the remaining 10 percent of the votes were divided among various small parties. Some of the minor parties have followed the lead of the major parties and sought to enhance their electoral chances through coalitions, such as the Broad Front. The traditional two-party system was threatened for the first time by the Broad Front’s victory in the Montevideo municipal elections in 1989, its first win on the national level.

As previously noted, a system of coparticipation (coparticipación) in the government between the ruling party and the principal opposition has characterized Uruguayan politics since 1872. According to Weinstein, this term best described Uruguay’s unique political process and was still widely used among Uruguayans in the 1980s. Coparticipation meant that the two traditional parties and their members were entitled to divide and share the governing of the country. Indeed, in order to govern, the majority party had to make alliances with other parties because being the majority party in a proportional representation system did not necessarily mean that
Government and Politics

it had a simple majority in the General Assembly. For example, the Colorado Party almost always governed in alliance with a section of the National Party. During the first years of the Sanguinetti administration, the National Party refrained from systematic opposition, thereby helping to ease the legislative passage of government policies. The Colorado Party was expected to do the same for the Lacalle government. Sharing political power also has been determined by the principle of parity (paridad), meaning that the losing party’s participation in the government was based on the relative electoral strength of the two parties.

Each party permitted internal ideological divisions because each party could run multiple presidential candidates and its own slate of legislative nominees. Factions, or sub-lemas, fielded different lists of candidates for general elections. Voters expressed a preference for a list rather than an individual candidate, and they voted for a party. The winning list of the party that received the most votes won the presidency and a percentage of the seats in the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives corresponding to the percentage of votes that the party as a whole received. National and departmental elections were held simultaneously every five years. Campaigns were funded in part by government subsidies given to the parties and factions in accordance with their voting strength in the previous election.

Traditional Parties

Uruguay is one of the few Latin American countries with two political groupings—the Colorado and National parties—as old as the country itself. Most Uruguayans consider themselves either Colorados or Blancos from birth, and affiliation with one of the two major parties or their major sub-lemas is a part of one’s family heritage. The two parties traditionally maintained a rough equilibrium, and their factions had their own leaders, candidates, followers, policies, and organizational structures. These sub-lemas embraced persons of various political orientations and social backgrounds. In general, however, the Colorado Party traditionally was associated with the city, labor unions, and secularist and “progressive” movements, whereas the National Party identified with the interior farming groups and the more religious and conservative groups.

The cleavage between Montevideo and the rural interior influenced party affiliation and political attitudes to a greater extent than did differences in social status and income. (The coastal region often held the balance of power between Montevideo and the interior.) Although three-fourths of all voters remained loyal to the
traditional parties in the 1984 elections, the support of these par-
ties in Montevideo weakened gradually during the 1980s. The
decline of the National Party in Montevideo was the most pro-
nounced; it won none of the capital's twenty-three electoral zones
in 1984 and made no headway against the Broad Front in 1989.

Despite internal fractionalization, both traditional parties main-
tained the structures typical of more cohesive modern parties, in-
cluding conventions, general assemblies, party steering committees,
and caucuses. The fundamental units of the factions of both par-
ties were the neighborhood clubs, guided and controlled by profes-
sional politicians.

Vague ideological differences between the major parties still ex-
isted in the 1980s, but the differences involved not so much polit-
ics as allegiance to certain leaders and traditions. Although the
Colorados traditionally were more liberal than the Blancos, both
parties had liberal and conservative factions. In the General Assem-
by, the left wings of both parties often lined up in opposition to
both right wings on important votes. The Colorados also were more
anticlerical in the early twentieth century, but this distinction lost
most of its significance as both parties broadened their bases of sup-
port. The urban-based Colorados were considered more cosmo-
politan in outlook than the rural-based, tradition-oriented, and
economically conservative Blancos. In general, the followers of
Batlle y Ordóñez in the Colorado Party were more willing than
the Blanco leadership to undertake political, social, and economic
innovations.

The Colorado and National parties each had various
'sub-lemas
in late 1990. The Colorado Party's factions included the right-of-
center United Batllism (Batllismo Unido—BU), which was in the
majority for thirty years until August 1990; the left-of-center BU
sector, called the Social Action Movement (Movimiento de Ac-
ción Social—MAS), led by Hugo Fernández Faingold; Unity and
Reform (Unidad y Reforma), or List 15, led by Jorge Batlle Ibáñez;
the antimilitary Freedom and Change (Libertad y Cambio), or List
85, led by Enrique E. Tarigo, Sanguinetti's vice president; the In-
dependent Batlist Faction (Corriente Batlista Independiente—
CBI), led by Senator Manuel Flores Silva; Víctor Vaillant's
"progressive" Batlist Reaffirmation Movement (Movimiento de Reafirmación Batlista—MRB), a CBI splinter group; the rightist
Colorado and Batlist Union (Unión Colorado y Batlista—UCB),
or List 123; and Democratic Traditionalism (Tradicionalismo
Democrático—Trademo), a sector of the National Republican As-
sociation (Asociación Nacional Republicana—ANR).
The UCB was subdivided into three main groups: the minority right-wing and promilitary Pachequist faction led by Jorge Pacheco Areco (president, 1967–72); the sector led by Pablo Millor Coccaro, Pacheco’s principal rival; and the National Integrationist Movement (Movimiento Integracionista Nacional—MIN), which was formed in early 1986 and led by Senator Pedro W. Cersósimo. Following the 1989 elections, Millor’s sector caused a political storm within the UCB when it announced that it would henceforth operate autonomously, although still recognizing Pacheco’s leadership. Pacheco’s faction, for its part, founded the National Colorado Movement (Movimiento Nacional Colorado—MNC) on May 11, 1990.

As a result of the primaries of the Colorado Party in early August 1990, Batlle Ibáñez’s Unity and Reform sub-lema ousted the faction led by former President Sanguinetti from the leadership of the Colorado Party. Batlle Ibáñez’s faction obtained five seats on the party’s fifteen-member National Executive Committee, followed by Pacheco’s four seats, Sanguinetti’s three, and Millor’s three.

The National Party was divided into at least five factions. The Herrerist Movement (Movimiento Herrerista), or faction, of the National Party emerged in the 1930s. Lacalle founded the Herrerist National Council (Consejo Nacional Herrerista—CNH) in 1961. The CNH joined with Senator Dando Ortiz’s sector in 1987 to form the right-of-center Herrerist Movement. After Wilson Ferreira Aldunate’s death in March 1988, Lacalle assumed the presidency of the Herrerist Movement.

Other National Party factions included Carlos Julio Pereyra’s left-of-center La Rocha National Movement (Movimiento Nacional de La Rocha—MNR), the second largest National Party sub-lema; the centrist For the Fatherland (Por la Patria—PLP), founded in 1969 by Ferreira as a personalist movement, reorganized into a more democratic party in 1985, and led by Senator Alberto Sáenz de Zumarán after Ferreira’s death in 1988; Renovation and Victory (Renovación y Victoria—RV), led by Gonzalo Aguirre Ramírez, a constitutional lawyer; and the People’s Blanco Union (Unión Blanca Popular—UBP), founded in the late 1980s by Oscar López Balestra, a member of the Chamber of Representatives. The CNH, MNR, and PLP were all antimilitary factions.

Additional minor parties included the White Emblem (Divisa Blanca), a conservative party led by Eduardo Pons Etcheverry; Juan Pivel Devoto’s Nationalist Popular Faction (Corriente Popular Nacionalista—CPN), which broke away from the National Party in late 1986; the Barrán National Party (Partido Nacional-Barrán); the ultrarightist Society for the Defense of Family Tradition and
Property (Sociedad de Defensa de la Tradición Familia y Propiedad—TFP); the Humanist Party (Partido Humanista), which appeared in 1985; and the Animal Welfare Ecological Green Party (Eto-Ecologista—Partido Verde—EE-PV), which emerged in 1989.

**Broad Front**

In February 1971, Colorado Party dissident senators Zelmar Michelini (who was assassinated in 1976) and Hugo Batalla formed the left-of-center Broad Front (Frente Amplio) coalition in a bid to break the historical two-party system of Colorados and Blancos. The Socialist Party of Uruguay (Partido Socialista del Uruguay—PSU), one of Uruguay's oldest left-wing parties (founded in 1910 by Emilio Frugoni), was one of its principal members.

Another core Broad Front member, founded in 1921, was the Communist Party of Uruguay (Partido Comunista del Uruguay—PCU). Rodney Arismendi, PCU general secretary since 1955, returned to Uruguay in November 1984 after many years as a resident of Moscow; he died in 1988 and was replaced by Jaime Pérez, a former union leader. One of Sanguinetti's first acts after taking office was to lift the restrictions on the PCU (which had been banned) and its Moscow-line newspaper *El Popular*. The PCU had only an estimated 7,500 members in early 1990, but its apparatus controlled the majority of the country's labor unions.

The Broad Front had a strong following in Montevideo, with a presence in all social classes and all generations. Under military rule (1973—85), the alliance's leader, General (Retired) Liber Seregni Mosquera, was arrested, the Broad Front was outlawed, and its activists were persecuted. When national elections were held in 1984, the military banned Seregni from running. Nevertheless, with Juan José Crottogini as its candidate, the Broad Front received slightly more than 21 percent of the total vote, compared with 18.5 percent in the 1971 national elections.

The Broad Front coalition generally agreed with the Sanguinetti government's foreign policy and political leadership stances, but it was fundamentally opposed to its economic policies. For example, the Broad Front favored increasing real incomes and opposed the government's export-oriented policy.

Internal power struggles between moderate and radical sectors weakened the Broad Front in the late 1980s. By late 1987, the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano—PDC) and the People's Government Party (Partido por el Gobierno del Pueblo—PGP) were feuding with other coalition members over their demand that the alliance be redefined to give their own positions greater weight. The PDC and PGP wanted to reduce the hegemony
of the Marxist groups and their undue influence on Seregni's public stances. In 1988 a PDC faction broke away and sought an understanding with one of the factions of the National Party. The PDC and PGP then proposed that the alliance should field two presidential candidates in the November 1989 elections: Seregni and PGP leader Batalla. The Broad Front's radical Marxist and communist sector, however, opposed the idea of running two candidates because they regarded the front as a party and not a coalition. In December 1988, therefore, the leftist parties of the alliance decided that Seregni would be the Broad Front's sole candidate; but the PGP backed Batalla. The PDC and PGP withdrew from the alliance in February and March 1989, respectively, over the issue of presidential candidacies and the leftist control of the organization. Batalla's PGP, which accounted for about 40 percent of the alliance's electoral votes in 1984, had been responsible for eleven of the Broad Front's twenty-one representatives and three of its six senators.

By May 1989, the Broad Front consisted of fourteen parties. Smaller ones included the People's Victory Party (Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo—PVP) and the Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement of Independents (Movimiento de Independientes Revolucionario Oriental—MRO), a pro-Cuban group founded in 1961. Five parties were accepted as members in May 1989: the National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros—MLN-T), the 26th of March Movement of Independents (Movimiento de Independientes 26 de Marzo—26 M), the Trotskyite Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—PST), the Grito de Asencio Integration Movement (Movimiento de Integración Grito de Asencio), and a faction of the PDC.

The MLN-T—a former urban guerrilla organization established in 1962 and disbanded by the armed forces in 1972—was given amnesty by the General Assembly in March 1985. The MLN-T reorganized and appeared in the political arena in July 1986 but was not legally recognized until May 1989. With several hundred members, it was politically insignificant. In order to run candidates in the November 1989 elections, the MLN-T, together with other ultra-leftist forces—the PVP, PST, and MRO—created the People's Participation Movement (Movimiento de Participación Popular—MPP).

In 1989 the Broad Front also included a subcoalition called the Advanced Democracy Party (Partido de Democracia Avanzada), which served as a front for the PCU; the People's Broad Front Movement (Movimiento Popular Frenteamplista—MPF); the
Broad Front Unity Faction (Corriente de Unidad Frenteamplista—CUFO); the Pregón Movement (Movimiento Pregón); Alba Roballop’s left-wing Liberal Party (Partido Liberal), a sub-lema that joined in April 1989; the Nationalist Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Nacionalista—MAN), a nationalist organization; the Popular and Progressive Blanco Movement (Movimiento Popular Blanco y Progresista—MBPP), a moderate left-wing party; and the Movement for the People’s Government (Movimiento por el Gobierno del Pueblo—MGP), which became, in August 1986, the tenth political party of Uruguay to be created. The MGP subsequently merged with the PGP and adopted a social democratic program.

The Broad Front was organized like a communist party. It had a party congress with decision-making powers, under which was a central committee-like body called the national plenum. A president, Seregni, headed the 108-member national plenum, which met at least once every two months. A political bureau, which included the president, exercised day-to-day authority.

New Sector

After breaking away from the Broad Front in early 1989, the PDC and PGP joined with the Civic Union (Unión Cívica—UC) to form a coalition called the Integration Movement (Movimiento de Integración—MI). The MI nominated the PGP leader, Batalla—a senator, journalist, and lawyer—as its 1989 presidential candidate. On July 24, these three social democratic parties comprising the MI—the PGP, PDC, and UC—formally created a left-of-center electoral alliance within the MI called the New Sector (Nuevo Espacio), which reaffirmed Batalla as its presidential candidate.

Juan Guillermo Young and Carlos Vassallo, dissidents from the conservative Civic Union of Uruguay (Unión Cívica del Uruguay—UCU), a Catholic party founded in 1912, founded the PDC in 1962, when the UCU officially became the PDC. A left-of-center party, the PDC advocated social transformation through democratic means. The PDC soon fractionalized. In 1971, when the PDC joined with the PCU and PSU in the Broad Front, PDC dissidents, including former UCU members, broke away and formed the UC, an anti-Marxist social Christian party. The UC recognized a Christian democratic faction that also split from the PDC in 1980. From November 1982 to August 1984, the military regime banned the PDC for its policy of casting blank ballots.

In the second half of the 1980s, the UC was divided between its traditional sector, the Progressive Faction (Corriente Progresista), led by Humberto Ciganda and made up of other longtime
leaders, and the Renewal Faction (Corriente Renovadora), led by members of the Chamber of Representatives Julio Daverende and Heber Rossi Passina, UC secretary general Héctor Pérez Piera, and youth leaders. One leader of the UC’s Progressive Faction, the late Juan Vicente Chiarino, served as Sanguinetti’s defense minister. The withdrawal of the UC’s presidential candidate, Ciganda, from the November 1989 elections widened the split within the party.

Democratic Consolidation, 1985–90

The Sanguinetti Administration

The Sanguinetti government pursued a moderate and pragmatic approach to the nation’s problems. Having inherited a US$4.9 billion foreign debt accrued almost entirely during the military regime, the Sanguinetti government focused on foreign trade. On April 1, 1986, after several months of negotiations among the principal parties—the ruling Colorados, the Blancos, the Broad Front, and the UC—the leaders signed an agreement to promote the country’s economic and social development.

In August 1986, Sanguinetti, with the backing of his Colorado Party, submitted an unrestricted amnesty bill for the military and police to the General Assembly as an extension of the pardon granted to the Tupamaros. The government was able to obtain only fifty-five of the necessary sixty-six votes, however, so the proposal was rejected. The ruling Colorado Party then voted in favor of the bill sponsored by the National Party, which recommended trials only for those responsible for serious human rights violations. The Senate rejected the National Party bill as well, setting the stage for the worst political crisis in twenty months of democratic government. Lacking a majority in either of the two chambers, Sanguinetti met with opposition National Party leader Ferreira to attempt to reach a political solution on a number of points: the human rights issue; the extreme lack of expediency in General Assembly deliberations; interparty differences over the proposed national budget; and frequent clashes between the government and the opposition. In the first step leading to a resolution, the government and the National Party reached an agreement on the budget report, which the General Assembly subsequently approved.

In December 1986, after acrimonious debate (including fistfights in the Chamber of Representatives), the General Assembly approved the government’s alternative to an amnesty, consisting of a “full stop” to the examination of human rights violations committed by 360 members of the armed forces and police during the military regime. According to Amnesty International, thirty-two
Uruguayan citizens "disappeared," and thousands were victims of persecution and torture during that period. Groups opposed to what they called the "impunity" law—including the MNR, the Broad Front, the Tupamaros, the UC, and the most important labor confederation—launched a campaign, spearheaded by the MNR, to force a referendum on the issue. Led by human rights activists, university professors, and artists, these groups laboriously collected the required 555,701 "recall" signatures, all of which had to be certified by the Electoral Court. The measure carried by only 230 signatures. According to the constitution, the signatures of at least 25 percent of the electorate are needed for the holding of a referendum to revoke a law passed by the General Assembly.

Those who favored keeping the full-stop law—including the ruling Colorado Party and the Ferreira-led For the Fatherland (the principal National Party faction)—argued that the amnesty had given the country four years of stability and military obedience to democratic rule. They warned that a repeal could spark an army revolt. Nevertheless, the MRB supported the call for a referendum on the full-stop law. In the obligatory April 16, 1989, referendum—in which 85 percent of the population participated—Uruguayans voted by a decisive 57 percent to 43 percent to keep the full-stop law in effect and thereby maintain a peaceful democratic transition. Although the referendum's aftermath was characterized by tranquillity and a spirit of reconciliation, it highlighted Uruguay's growing generation gap. Approximately 75 percent of Montevideo residents between eighteen and twenty-nine voted against the full-stop law.

The November 1989 Elections

Of the dozen candidates running for the presidency in the elections of November 26, 1989, the two front-runners were the National Party's Lacalle and the ruling Colorado Party's Batlle Ibáñez (see table 17, Appendix). Both were from political families and were grandsons of the founders of their respective parties. The tradition of public service went back even further for Lacalle; his great-grandfather, Juan José de Herrera, was minister of foreign affairs in Blanco governments in the nineteenth century. Batlle Ibáñez—a lawyer, senator, and leader of the Colorado Party's majority sector, United Batllism (Batllismo Unido—BU)—descended from three presidents: his great-grandfather Lorenzo Batlle y Grau (1868-72), his great-uncle José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903-07, 1911-15), and his father, Luis Batlle Berres (1947-51).

The personalities of Lacalle and Batlle Ibáñez, rather than policy differences, dominated the campaign, although the issues debated
Flag-wavers outside the Legislative Palace on March 1, 1985, President Sanguinetti’s inauguration day
Courtesy Charles Guy Gillespie

were the ones that traditionally distinguished the two parties. Whereas the Colorado Party emphasized the role of the government in promoting the national welfare, the National Party focused on Uruguay’s people and society as being primarily responsible for their own destiny. The more controversial issues included “privatization” of state enterprises—such as the telephone company and ports—and the extension of university education to the interior. Both Batlle Ibáñez and Lacalle advocated reducing the state’s economic role, seeking foreign investment, and taking on the leftist-led unions. One difference was that Batlle Ibáñez favored paying the country’s foreign debt, whereas Lacalle favored renegotiating it (see Foreign Policy in 1990, this ch.). In a televised debate in October 1989, Batlle Ibáñez repeatedly noted their agreement on issues, while Lacalle distanced himself from his opponent, thereby apparently outscoring him. In general, the campaign was very respectful and lacking in “dirty tricks.”

Other 1989 presidential candidates included, on the Blanco side: Carlos Julio Pereyra, leftist leader of the MNR; Alberto Sáenz de Zumarán, a strongly antimilitary centrist endorsed by the Social Christian Movement (Movimiento Social Cristiano—MSC); and the CNH’s Francisco Ubilles. On the Colorado side, candidates
included Sanguinetti's former minister of labor and social welfare, Hugo Fernández Faingold, the MAS leader; and Jorge Pacheco Areco, the former president (1967–72) and later ambassador to Paraguay, as well as leader of the Colorado and Batllist Union (Unión Colorada y Batllista—UCB), who ran on a ticket with Pablo Millor Coccaro, whom he selected late in the campaign. Pacheco’s authoritarian and austere administration had been widely disliked, and Pacheco had spent his previous seventeen years out of the country—even serving as an ambassador for the military regime—but many Uruguayans still nostalgically identified him with a long-gone period of economic stability and security.

Of the National Party’s three candidates—Pereyra, Zumarán, and Lacalle—Lacalle initially had the least support among party members (20 percent), as compared with Pereyra (28 percent) and Zumarán (46 percent), according to a poll commissioned by a weekly news magazine, Búsqueda, in July 1988. This standing was reversed, however, by September 1989 when, according to a poll in Montevideo published by Búsqueda, 52 percent of those questioned voted for Lacalle, 34 percent for Pereyra, and 10 percent for Zumarán.

The total number of people duly registered to vote in the November 26, 1989, presidential elections was 2.4 million, of which 47.3 percent were Montevideo city residents and 52.7 percent were from the country’s nineteen departments. In an upset for the Colorado Party, Lacalle and his running mate, Gonzalo Aguirre Ramírez, won after their party garnered 37.7 percent of the 2 million votes cast, compared with the Colorado Party’s 29.2 percent, the Broad Front’s 20.6 percent, and the New Sector’s meager 8.6 percent. Other parties, including the EE–PV, received a total of 3.9 percent.

The other big winner was the Broad Front, whose mayoral candidate, Tabaré Vázquez, captured Montevideo’s municipal government. Vázquez, a cancer specialist and professor of oncology, as well as a member of the PSU’s central committee, became the city’s first Marxist mayor by obtaining 35 percent of the total vote.

The Colorado Party lost not only the elections but also ten departments and fifteen seats in the Chamber of Representatives. The National Party took seventeen departments, obtaining thirty-nine of the ninety-nine seats in the Chamber of Representatives; the Colorado Party, thirty; the Broad Front, twenty-one; and the New Sector, nine. Of the thirty Senate seats, the Blancos won twelve, the Colorados nine, the Broad Front seven, and the New Sector two. Aguirre’s own fledgling RV party overtook the veteran PLP and equaled the MNR by winning 112,000 votes, thereby winning two seats in the Senate and three in the Chamber of Representatives.
The Lacalle Administration

A climate of labor unrest, imminent economic crisis, and growing activism on the political left confronted Lacalle when he assumed office on March 1, 1990. Lacking a parliamentary majority, he formed a “European-style” coalition, called National Coincidence (Coincidencia Nacional), with the Colorado Party, the first such interparty sharing of power in a quarter-century. Nevertheless, the two parties were able to agree only on sharing four cabinet appointments and supporting the new government’s fiscal-reform measures.

Lacalle gave the posts of ministers of housing and social promotion, industry and energy, public health, and tourism to the Colorado Party in exchange for the necessary support in the General Assembly for approving various controversial projects regarding education, the fiscal deficit, and the right to strike—measures that labor unions and the left opposed. Lacalle chose Mariano Brito, a law professor with no previous government service, as his defense minister; Enrique Braga, one of his principal economic advisers, as his economy and finance minister; Héctor Gros Espiell, a lawyer-diplomat, as his foreign affairs minister; and Juan Andrés Ramírez, a lawyer-professor who had not previously occupied any key position, as his interior minister.

At the top of Lacalle’s policy priorities were regional economic integration and moving Uruguay toward a market economy, largely through privatization of inefficient state enterprises and through free trade (see Foreign Policy in 1990, this ch.). Unlike his predecessor, however, Lacalle found himself confronted with a Marxist mayor of Montevideo, whose Broad Front coalition was opposed to economic restructuring. By mid-1990 the prospects for a “cohabitation arrangement” between the neoliberal, right-of-center president and Vázquez appeared poor. Shortly after taking their respective offices, the two leaders publicly clashed on departmental government prerogatives. Vázquez sought to pursue autonomous policies in areas such as transportation, public works, and health and to decentralize power in Montevideo Department. Lacalle opposed Vázquez’s attempts to expand his departmental powers, arguing that a more powerful mayor of Montevideo would undermine the position of the executive branch. The confrontation that effectively ended the co-habitation arrangement took place over Montevideo’s new budget, which Lacalle threatened to block.

Political Forces and Interest Groups

The Military

Prior to the 1973 coup, the military exercised influence but had
Punta del Este, host city to international conferences
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank
rarely intervened directly in the political system. The fact that all of the defense ministers who served between 1959 and 1971 were military men indicated a degree of military influence. By 1984, when the military negotiated with the political parties on a transition to democratic government, the armed forces were considered a de facto political force (see The Growth of Military Involvement in Politics, ch. 5). As Uruguay returned formally to democratic rule in 1985, the armed forces continued to exercise a degree of tutelage over national affairs, despite their depoliticized role. Sanguinetti’s defense minister was a retired lieutenant general, Hugo M. Medina (the only military defense minister to serve in the 1980s), who as army commander in chief had refused to serve subpoenas on military officers. A poll commissioned by Búscqueda in September 1986 found that an overwhelming majority of Montevideo’s population believed, to varying degrees, that the military was still a factor in political power; only 10 percent believed that the military had no power.

Some observers and political party leaders commented on alleged military pressure to defeat a call for prosecution of military officers for human rights abuses. The issue arose in December 1986 after the General Assembly approved the full-stop amnesty law, which exonerated 360 members of the armed forces and the police accused of committing human rights abuses during the military regime. In one demonstration of possible continued military influence, Defense Minister Medina reflected military opinion in condemning the April 1989 referendum to decide the validity of the amnesty law. Medina emphasized that “the dignity of the national army” should not be violated. General Washington Varela, head of the Military Academy, warned that the army would “close ranks” if the amnesty were rescinded.

Amnesty appeared to be firm, but the question of whether or not the military would retain its traditionally apolitical role in the future was less certain. Stating that “the Pandora’s box of military intervention has been opened in Uruguay,” Martin Weinstei opined in 1989 that the military would continue to exercise a veto power over government action in human rights and military affairs and possibly assume a tutelary role in areas such as economic policy and labor relations. Military influence in the latter two areas, however, had not yet manifested itself in 1990. In order to demonstrate his authority over the military, Lacalle appointed a civilian as his defense minister and exercised his presidential prerogative to appoint armed forces commanders of his own choosing, regardless of seniority. His appointments of the air force
and naval commanders were third and fourth in seniority, respectively, among serving officers.

**Labor Unions**

In March 1985, Sanguinetti abrogated laws and decrees issued by the military regime that had banned the labor unions, the immunity of labor union leaders, and the right of public and private workers to strike. He also restored the legal status of the primarily communist-led National Convention of Workers (Convención Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT), dissolved by the military regime in 1973; in 1983 the Interunion Workers’ Assembly (or Plenum) (Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores—PIT) adopted the name PIT–CNT to show its link with the banned CNT. The long-repressed labor movement took advantage of its newly granted freedom by staging strikes and marches during the first six months of democracy.

The communist-led Uruguayan labor movement, which claimed to represent about 300,000 of the 1.3 million Uruguayan workers, also called general strikes in the late 1980s, as well as strikes in specific job areas, mostly involving civil service workers or those in state enterprises. In 1986 Sanguinetti’s government and the Colorado Party signed a “nonaggression” pact with the PCU. Under the Colorado-Communist Pact (the “Co-Co Pact”), militant labor members of the Colorado Party and the PCU formed alliances whenever the National Party promoted a movement within a labor organization. Nevertheless, the powerful main labor organization, the PIT–CNT, staged three general strikes in 1986.

The attitudes of the leadership of the Moscow-oriented World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which was affiliated with the PIT–CNT, were among the main issues discussed by candidates in the 1989 presidential campaign. The leading candidates endorsed proposals for legislation to require secret strike votes and other union regulation. Labor activity in Uruguay was virtually unregulated. The WFTU supported the PCU and other leftist political groups united in the Broad Front. In November 1989, the movement was preparing for a showdown with the mainstream political leaders over whether or not to espouse a more market-oriented economy with foreign investment. Although the PIT–CNT’s leadership opposed increasing foreign investment, the organization was becoming fractionalized among those influenced by perestroika (restructuring) in the Soviet Union, those who rejected it, and non-Marxists seeking to challenge leftist domination of the movement.

Lacalle advocated regulating labor union activities, including the right to strike. In his view, the decision on whether or not to strike
should be made by the workers in a secret vote, after the failure of obligatory reconciliation efforts. Shortly after Lacalle took office, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare Carlos Cat, who ran for mayor of Montevideo in the 1989 elections, met with representatives of business organizations and the PIT-CNT but failed to reach an agreement. The PIT-CNT demonstrated its right to strike with a six-hour general work stoppage on July 25, 1990, to protest the government's austerity and privatization programs.

Despite Lacalle's efforts to regulate the sector, Uruguay's labor movement in 1990 had significant clout as an interest group, mainly with regard to its highly disruptive strike tactics. Like leftist political organizations in general, however, the labor unions' continued use of the same rhetoric and methods that got results during the military regime were seen by some Uruguayan journalists and sociologists as major contributors to both emigration and apathy among young Uruguayans.

**The Roman Catholic Church**

The Roman Catholic Church has had only a minimal role in Uruguay because of a strong anticlerical bias bequeathed by Batlle y Ordoñez. Unlike many other Latin American countries, religion has not interfered in politics to any significant extent. Although 66 percent of the population was nominally Roman Catholic in 1990, less than half were practicing Catholics. The church's main political wing was the PDC, which advocated social transformation through democratic means. In addition, there were numerous lay organizations engaged in enhancing the church's social relevance. These included the Catholic Workers' Circle, Catholic Action, the Christian Democratic Youth Movement, and the Catholic Family Movement. The conservatives had few representatives among the clergy.

The election of Lacalle, a devout Catholic, may have reflected ascending Catholic influence in the nation. Another indicator of rising Catholic influence was the establishment in 1984 of the Catholic University of Uruguay in Montevideo, the country's only private university. However, the limits of Catholic influence in Uruguay were highlighted in early 1986 by the failure of a proposal by Catholic conservatives in the Colorado and National parties to ban the film *Hail Mary*, which the church hierarchy regarded as "pornographic and blasphemous."

**Students**

Student organizations have had little influence on their own, but they often supported the demands of labor unions and other groups.
The University of the Republic, Uruguay’s only public university, played a key role as an opposition force during the administrations of Pacheco (1967–72) and Juan María Bordaberry Arocena (1972–76). Shortly after taking office, Sanguinetti ordered the restoration of the legal status of the Federation of Uruguayan University Students (Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios del Uruguay—FEUU). The military regime, whose generals regarded the university as a center of leftist subversion, had banned the FEUU. University of the Republic student elections were held twice during the Sanguinetti administration, and student groups resumed campus political activities. As a result of the June 1989 university elections, leftists retained their dominance in 1990.

The Media

Uruguay’s long tradition of freedom of the press was severely curtailed during the twelve years of military dictatorship, especially its final years under Lieutenant General Gregorio Alvarez Armelino (1981–85). During his administration, more than thirty news organizations, including radio stations, publications, and television stations, were closed. On his first day in office in March 1985, Sanguinetti reestablished complete freedom of the press. His government also abrogated a regulation that compelled all international news agencies to supply a copy of all disseminated political news to the Ministry of Interior.

Although newspapers have played an important role in the evolution of Uruguayan party politics, they were generally affiliated with and dependent on one or the other of the traditional parties. This combination of party dependence before the military regime and censorship during it prevented the press and the media in general from developing into a Fourth Estate. After freedom of the press was restored in 1985, however, Montevideo’s newspapers (which accounted for all of Uruguay’s principal daily newspapers) greatly expanded their circulations and presumably increased their influence (see table 18, Appendix). Most of the twenty-five to thirty interior newspapers were biweekly, except for a couple of regional dailies.

Well over 100 periodicals were published in Uruguay. Búsqueda (Search) was Uruguay’s most important weekly news magazine. Founded in 1971, Búsqueda had close links to civilian economic officials in the Sanguinetti and Lacalle governments and served as an important forum for political and economic analysis. A right-of-center, independent publication, Búsqueda had a liberal editorial policy that espoused free markets, free trade, and private enterprise and competition. Although it sold only about 16,000 copies
a week, its estimated readership exceeded 50,000. The educational economic status of its readers placed them among the top 3 or 4 percent of the population.

Other periodicals included the PDC’s Aquí, a weekly founded in late 1984; the monthly Cuadernos de Marcha, founded in 1985 by Carlos Quijano—who founded the former weekly procommunist newspaper Marcha in 1939—and associated with the Broad Front; Zeta, a weekly founded in 1986 and affiliated with the PGP; and Mate Amargo, a fortnightly published by the Tupamaros with an estimated readership of 53,000. An additional 100 periodicals were imported from foreign countries.

Fifteen foreign wire services had offices in Montevideo. Persons affiliated with the National Party established Uruguay’s first private international news agency, PRESSUR, in 1984. The Sanguinetti government had its own official news service, the Presidential Information Service (Servicio Presidencial de Información—SEPREDI), presumably retained by Lacalle with a new staff. The leading press associations were the Association of Newspapers of Uruguay, the Uruguayan Press Association, and the National Association of Uruguayan Broadcasters (Asociación Nacional de Broadcasters Uruguayos—ANDEBU).

Other Interest Groups

Latinamerica Press reported that West German foundations had a heavy presence in Uruguay, where more than 100 research institutes, all funded from abroad, were engaged in nearly 500 projects. The report noted that the Colorado Party had developed close ties to the Hanns-Seidel Foundation over the years; the PDC and several Christian democratic business associations were connected to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation; the National Party received support from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation; and the PIT-CNT and PGP received financial support from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

What influence, if any, these foundations had on government policies was unclear, although their presence presumably enhanced West German-Uruguayan relations. However, when Sanguinetti visited the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1987 and signed a technical assistance agreement with the right-wing Hanns-Seidel Foundation, a scandal erupted in Montevideo over whether West German development foundations were using their funds to influence Uruguayan politics. The agreement provided for assistance by the Hanns-Seidel Foundation to the Ministry of Interior in the development of an antiterrorism computer system.
Foreign Relations

Uruguay's foreign policy has been shaped by its democratic tradition, its history of being a victim of foreign intervention, its status as the second smallest republic in South America (after Suriname), and its location between the two rival giants of the region: Argentina to the west and Brazil to the north. In the nineteenth century, Argentina and Brazil did not accept Uruguay's status as an independent republic, and they often invaded Uruguayan territory (see Beginnings of Independent Life, 1830-52, ch. 1). The British and French consuls, for their part, often exercised as much power as the local authorities. Thus, Uruguay's international relations historically have been guided by the principles of nonintervention, respect for national sovereignty, and reliance on the rule of law to settle disputes. The use of military force anywhere except internally was never a feasible option for Uruguay.

According to Bernardo Quagliotti de Bellis, a Uruguayan professor of law, his country had historically defined its foreign policy as based on five principles: affirmation of the right of self-determination of peoples; active participation in the process of political cooperation that attempts to look within and outside the region; coordination of positions on everything possible; recognition of the complexity and the diversity of the problems at hand; and flexibility combined with a sense of precaution.

Beginning with Batlle y Ordóñez's government in the early twentieth century, Uruguay has been active in international and regional organizations. It joined the United Nations (UN) in 1945 and has been a member of most of its specialized agencies. In 1986 Uruguay was elected to membership in the UN's Economic and Social Council. In December 1989, Uruguay signed the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Uruguay belonged to thirty-one other international organizations as well, including the Organization of American States (OAS), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—see Glossary), the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), the Latin American Economic System (Sistema Económico Latinoamericano—SELA), and the Latin American Integration Association (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración—ALADI; see Glossary). Uruguay was a signatory of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty), and the Río de la Plata Basin Treaty.

Uruguay has had strong political and cultural ties with the countries of Europe and the Americas. It has shared basic values with
them, such as support for constitutional democracy, political pluralism, and individual liberties. Historically, Uruguay has enjoyed a special relationship with Britain because of political and economic ties beginning in 1828 (see The Struggle for Independence, 1811–30, ch. 1). Bilateral relations with Argentina and Brazil have always been of particular importance. In 1974 and 1975, Uruguay signed economic and commercial cooperation agreements with both countries.

Traditionally, relations between Uruguay and the United States have been based on a common dedication to democratic ideals. Although it initially attempted neutrality in both world wars, Uruguay ultimately sided with the Allies. In World War I, Uruguay did not break relations with Germany and lift its neutrality policy until October 1917. By that time, the government of Feliciano Viera (1915–19) had recognized "the justice and nobility" of the United States severance of diplomatic relations with Germany in early 1917. In 1941 President Alfredo Baldomir (1938–43) allowed the United States to build naval and air bases in Uruguay. The United States also trained and supplied Uruguay's armed forces. In January 1942, one month after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Uruguay broke relations with the Axis. The United States reciprocated with generous loans. As a condition for admission to the San Francisco conference, where the United Nations Charter was drawn up, Uruguay declared war against the Axis on February 15, 1945. That year it also signed the Act of Chapultepec (a collective defense treaty of the American republics) and joined the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). In 1947 it signed the Rio Treaty, a regional alliance that established a mutual defense system.

During the 1973–85 period of military rule, Uruguay's traditionally democratic diplomacy was replaced by "military diplomacy" as determined by the "Doctrine of National Security." This military diplomacy gave priority to the serious problem of national and regional subversion and to historical conflicts affecting regional diplomatic stability, such as the issues of dams between Argentina and Brazil, sovereignty over the Beagle Channel, Bolivia's attempts to regain access to the Pacific from Chile, the Ecuador-Peru border dispute, and South Atlantic security.

Foreign Relations under Democratic Rule, 1985–90

With the return of democratic government in 1985, Uruguay's foreign policy underwent an abrupt change. After taking office, Sanguinetti vowed to maintain and increase diplomatic relations with every nation "that respects the international rules of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries." He carried
Government and Politics

out this policy by renewing relations with Cuba, Nicaragua, and China and by strengthening relations with the Soviet Union.

Sanguinetti’s first foreign affairs minister, Enrique Iglesias, conducted an intensive and successful diplomatic offensive to restore his country’s prestige. Once again, Uruguay began to host important international meetings, such as the September 1986 GATT conference and the second meeting of the presidents of the Group of Eight (the successor organization of the Contadora Support Group) in October 1988, at the seaside resort of Punta del Este. More world leaders visited Uruguay during the Sanguinetti administration than ever before in Uruguay’s history.

An important element of the Sanguinetti government’s foreign policy was the promotion of a more just world economy and of a more free and open trade system. Guided by Iglesias, Sanguinetti reintegrated Uruguay into the region, renewed and strengthened diplomatic and commercial relations with countries that were ignored for ideological reasons during the “military diplomacy” period, negotiated new markets for Uruguayan products, instigated a new round of negotiations in GATT, and designed a new Latin American strategy for dealing with the foreign debt. In April 1988, after Iglesias’s election as president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Luis A. Barrios Tassano became Sanguinetti’s second foreign affairs minister. Barrios described Uruguayan foreign policy as “pluralist, multifaceted, nationalist, and flexible.”

The United States

Although Uruguay was critical of unilateral United States military intervention in Latin America and elsewhere, bilateral relations during the 1985–90 period were excellent. The United States, which had expressed deep concern about the human rights situation beginning with the administration of Jimmy Carter, strongly supported Uruguay’s transition to democracy. In March 1985, Secretary of State George P. Shultz attended Sanguinetti’s presidential inauguration. As a member of the Contadora Support Group, Uruguay participated in meetings on Central American issues in 1985–86, particularly United States support for the anti-Sandinista resistance guerrillas in Nicaragua. The Sanguinetti government regarded United States aid to the anti-Sandinista Contra rebels in Nicaragua as an obstacle to peace in Central America. It also opposed the presence of United States troops in Honduras.

Despite his government’s criticism of United States military actions in Honduras, in Nicaragua, and against Libya in April 1986, Sanguinetti received a warm welcome at the White House during an official five-day state visit to the United States in June 1986,
the first by a Uruguayan president in more than thirty years. During
the visit, which was dominated by trade discussions, Sanguinetti
criticized United States protectionist policies, such as the decision
to subsidize grain exports to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he
departed Washington satisfied that the administration of President
Ronald W. Reagan had adopted a more flexible policy toward Uruguayan exports. Shultz again paid an official visit to Uruguay on
August 5, 1988, for talks with Sanguinetti, Barrios, and several
opposition leaders. The official talks centered on trade issues.

Although Uruguay’s relations with Panama at the time of the
United States military intervention there in December 1989 were
at their lowest possible level—without an ambassador—Sanguinetti
was again critical of the United States. He characterized the United
States military operation as a “step backward.”

Latin America

Sanguinetti favored the formation of a bloc of debtor countries
in Latin America to renegotiate the foreign debt. To that end, in
the late 1980s Uruguay joined the Cartagena Consensus (of which
Iglesias was secretary) on the foreign debt. Uruguay hosted the
temporary secretariat of the Cartagena Consensus follow-up com-
mittee, a group of Latin America’s eleven most indebted countries.

Uruguay also participated in the Group of Eight, a permanent
mechanism for consultation and political coordination that succeeded
the Contadora Support Group in December 1986. Like the Con-
tadora Support Group, the Group of Eight advocated democracy
and a negotiated solution to the Central American insurgency. It
consisted of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. The Sanguinetti government advocated
a diplomatic solution to the insurgency in Central America based
on the Caraballeda Declaration, a document drawn up on January
12, 1986, by the Contadora Support Group.

The Sanguinetti administration, after direct negotiations with
Cuba, resumed Uruguay’s commercial and cultural ties with the
island nation in April 1985 and diplomatic and consular relations
on October 17, 1985. It also reestablished diplomatic relations with
Nicaragua. Uruguay had discontinued its diplomatic and consul-
lar relations with Cuba on September 8, 1964, in compliance with
the decision of the OAS General Assembly, which sought to iso-
late the regime of Fidel Castro Ruz.

The Sanguinetti government’s differences with Cuba’s politi-
cal, social, and economic system, as well as with some foreign policy
issues, remained. For example, Sanguinetti disagreed with Castro’s
proposal to discontinue payment on the Latin American foreign debt. Sanguinetti believed that the resulting financial and commercial isolation would provoke much worse problems. In his view, the Cartagena Consensus, rather than a meeting in Havana, was the appropriate forum in which to discuss the debt issue. Both countries strengthened bilateral relations, however, by signing commercial agreements in May 1986 and March 1987 and by signing a five-year economic, industrial, scientific, and technical cooperation agreement on the latter occasion.

Sanguinetti considered regional integration in the Río de la Plata Basin the key to Uruguay’s foreign policy. Uruguay’s efforts at promoting integration were aided in the late 1980s by the emergence of democratic governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Paraguay. Sanguinetti sought a closer relationship with Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in the belief that Uruguay’s future was closely linked to the possibility of the integration of the Río de la Plata Basin. Although the Sanguinetti government supported Argentina’s claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), it adopted a neutral stance in the conflict between Argentina and Britain (which waged the South Atlantic War over the islands from April to June 1982) and made known its desire that military bases and other facilities not be installed in the South
Uruguay: A Country Study

Atlantic. In May 1985, Argentina and Uruguay signed the Declaration of Colonia, which established the framework for promoting economic and social integration between the two countries. Sanguinetti initiated a similar program of integration with Brazil. In August 1985, the Brazilian and Uruguayan presidents strengthened bilateral relations by holding the first meeting of the General Coordinating Commission and signing thirteen bilateral accords. The presidents of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay met in Brasília in 1986 to advance their integration process. In January 1990, Sanguinetti hosted an official visit by the Paraguayan president, Army General Andrés Rodríguez Pedotti, during which integration matters such as the River Transport System (consisting of the Río Paraguay-Río Paraná-Río Uruguay waterway) were discussed.

Other Regions

Since 1926 and renewed in 1943, Uruguay has had diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union, longer than any other South American nation. Relations were at a relatively low level during the military regime. In May 1985, the Sanguinetti government authorized the reopening of the Soviet-Uruguayan Cultural Center and, in September 1986, the opening of an office of the Soviet airline Aeroflot (Air Fleet) in Montevideo, with flights to Moscow beginning in 1987. During a meeting with Soviet foreign affairs minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze at the UN on September 24, 1985, Sanguinetti asked for the Soviet Union’s support for Uruguay’s desire to join the group of nations operating in Antarctica (which Uruguay subsequently joined). Shevardnadze later visited Uruguay in October 1987.

In the first visit of a Uruguayan president to the Soviet Union, Sanguinetti visited Moscow in March 1988 and held a “cordial and frank” two-hour meeting with General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Sanguinetti’s visit strengthened trade, economic, and cultural relations, to include the establishment of a joint Soviet-Uruguayan company. Sanguinetti also visited certain East European countries, including the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), and established trade relations.

Optimistic about trade prospects, Uruguay established diplomatic and formal commercial relations with China on February 3, 1988. By 1990 China was Uruguay’s fourth largest trading partner. Although both countries had conducted bilateral trade, diplomatic relations had been nonexistent since 1949. With the opening of diplomatic ties with China, Uruguay simultaneously severed relations with Taiwan. In November 1988, Sanguinetti paid a six-day official visit to China at the head of an eighty-member delegation.
Government and Politics

and signed four agreements designed to further strengthen bilateral relations. China's President Yang Shangkun reciprocated with a visit to Uruguay in May 1990. The Sanguinetti government also established trade ties with Malaysia and Singapore and was planning to reopen Uruguay's mission in India.

When Sanguinetti assumed office, Uruguay had only four resident ambassadors in all of the Middle East and Africa. By 1988 Uruguay had opened resident missions in Algeria and Côte d'Ivoire, had reestablished relations with Tanzania, and had established ties with Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain. In May 1986, the Sanguinetti government criticized what it termed the sovereignty and territorial integrity violations committed by the South African government against neighboring countries. It also denounced apartheid and stated its support for the peoples and governments of Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe against South African aggression. Although the Sanguinetti government announced in May 1986 that it was unwilling to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which it characterized as a terrorist organization, it accorded an official reception at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a PLO delegation participating in the first parliamentary congress of socialist parties in Latin America and the Caribbean in June 1989.

Foreign Policy in 1990

The general direction of Uruguayan foreign policy was not expected to change significantly under President Lacalle. His newly designated foreign affairs minister, Héctor Gros Espiell, told reporters in January 1990 that although there would be specific changes, adjustments, and differing viewpoints, the Lacalle government intended to maintain the general guidelines of Uruguay's existing foreign policy. Gros Espiell, the former head of Uruguay's School of Diplomacy, also noted, however, that under the new Foreign Service Law to be submitted to the General Assembly by the Lacalle government, the foreign service would be entirely revamped to make its operations more responsive to the national interests.

Gros Espiell also explained that the Lacalle government's foreign policy would emphasize the trend toward regional integration and that Uruguay would continue pursuing its integration policy with Argentina and Brazil. According to Gros Espiell, the Río de la Plata Basin would be Uruguay's first priority in foreign policy, with the Buenos Aires-Montevideo-Brasilia axis functioning in coordination with the Montevideo-Asunción-La Paz axis. In talks with the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in early 1990, Lacalle discussed ways to increase regional integration in the Río de la Plata Basin. One of Lacalle's foreign policy
goals was to integrate Bolivia and Paraguay into the Brazilian-Uruguayan-Argentine integration agreements and grant them free port facilities.

Lacalle favored using the Group of Eight and ALADI as instruments for promoting, with Argentina, a new Latin American integration process. In January 1990, he worked toward this through what he called the Group of Seven (because Panama’s membership was suspended in February 1988) with the intention of organizing, within five to ten years, a true Latin American common market. The Lacalle government wanted the Group of Eight (whose name was changed in 1990 to the Group of Rio) to expand to include Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Paraguay.

Lacalle told United States president George H.W. Bush during their unofficial meeting at the White House on February 5, 1990, that Uruguay could play an important role in the Río de la Plata Basin, but this role did not materialize in 1990. The Lacalle government reportedly had become uneasy over what it perceived to be a lack of interest toward integration with Uruguay shown by Argentina and Brazil (see Economic Integration, ch. 3).

Both pro-United States and pro-free market, Lacalle was expected to enjoy excellent relations with the Bush administration. Lacalle’s support of the United States varied, however, depending on the issue. When the United States military intervened in Panama in December 1989, Lacalle refused to recognize the new Panamanian government of Guillermo Endara. After the United States troops retreated to the former Canal Zone and their number was reduced to preintervention levels, Lacalle announced in March 1990 that his government would normalize relations with Panama by recognizing the Endara government. In keeping with its traditional position condemning the use of force, the Lacalle government denounced the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in early August 1990, urged action by the UN Security Council, and endorsed the UN sanctions against Iraq.

On other issues, Lacalle favored the United States policy position on the foreign debt problem and negotiated Uruguay’s external debt based on a proposal presented by Secretary of the Treasury Nicolas Brady in March 1989. The Brady Plan called for creditor banks to write off a portion of a developing country’s indebtedness in return for guaranteeing repayment of the remaining debt (see Foreign Debt, ch. 3). Lacalle enthusiastically endorsed President Bush’s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (see Glossary), made on June 27, 1990, for promoting the development of Latin America by opening a free-trade partnership with the region, either on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis. Lacalle was somewhat
President Lacalle addressing the Organization of American States, Washington, September 1990
Courtesy Organization of American States (Roberto Ribeiro)

ambivalent, however, toward the United States policy on drug trafficking. He viewed the issue as two sided, involving not only the Latin American producing countries but also the principal consuming country, the United States.

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Although few books on Uruguay’s government and politics in the 1980s were available in 1990, Uruguay has been the subject of considerable scholarly research. M.H.J. Finch and Alicia Casas de Barrán’s Uruguay lists comprehensively and evaluates succinctly major sources, including recent doctoral dissertations, on all aspects of Uruguay. A dated but still historically useful book is Russell H. Fitzgibbon’s Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy. A more up-to-date introduction to the country is Martin Weinstein’s Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads; his earlier book, Uruguay: The Politics of Failure, analyzes the causes of Uruguay’s descent from a model democracy to a military dictatorship. The human rights abuses committed by the military are detailed in Lawrence Weschler’s A Miracle, a Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers. An incisive fact-filled chapter on Uruguay’s party system may be found
Chapter 5. National Security
The colonial fortress museum of Santa Teresa National Park near Laguna Negra in Rocha Department
AS OF 1990, URUGUAY FACED no external threat. Its defense posture was based on the country’s geostrategic position as a buffer state. Defense planners recognized that the nation could never independently deter invasion, however unlikely, by either of its two giant neighbors—Argentina and Brazil—and instead counted on obtaining aid from one should the other attack. As a result, the armed forces were chiefly organized to cope with internal threats, although Uruguay had no terrorist or insurgency problem in the 1980s and 1990.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, an urban guerrilla movement—the National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros—MLN-T)—posed a significant threat to national security. The military ruthlessly suppressed the Tupamaros in 1972 after the police proved unable to do so. Although the Tupamaros had been brought under control by then, the military seized control of the government of Juan María Bordaberry Arocena (1972–76) in 1973 in order to suppress all activity it interpreted as threatening the public order. The military’s effort to rationalize and legitimate its role as political arbiter was rejected in a 1980 referendum. The defeat was attributable to the country’s strong national democratic tradition and to public bitterness over human rights abuses under military rule. The military, itself divided over the armed forces’ proper role in national political life, accepted the public’s decision, and civilian rule was restored completely in 1985.

After the resumption of civilian rule, the armed forces occupied a position much like that during the period before military rule; they were under the control of the civilian government and were largely excluded from national political and economic decision making. The armed forces continued to embrace a conservative and anticommunist political orientation. The military leadership, however, expressed its commitment to a pluralist democratic system on several occasions during the late 1980s and in 1990.

Acknowledging reluctantly that the nation faced no serious threat to internal order and sensitive to the dictates of a constrained national economy, during the late 1980s the military accepted an approximately 20 percent reduction in personnel, as well as a significant reduction in spending. As of 1990, armed forces strength was about 25,200, somewhat higher than the level maintained during premilitary rule.
The army was deployed geographically under regional headquarters; it was organized and equipped principally as a counterinsurgency force. The navy operated a coastal and riverine patrol fleet; it was supported by a small naval air arm. The air force provided counterinsurgency air support and transport and logistics services. Equipment in all three services was aging or obsolete, and, because of shortages of spare parts, some equipment could not operate. The straitened national economy, however, made replacement or modernization of the armed forces inventory unlikely in the near term.

Public order in the late 1980s was chiefly disturbed by occasional—and usually not very lengthy—public demonstrations or labor actions. Little violence was associated with such activities, and for the most part the National Police were able to maintain public order and contain ordinary crime without resorting to unusual force. The National Police were divided into local commands under a departmental chief in each of the country's nineteen departments.

Criminal justice was the responsibility of the national government. The Supreme Court of Justice administered the national judiciary and the country's criminal courts. Constitutional guarantees regarding civil rights and the right to a fair trial were routinely honored. Political prisoners were granted amnesty in 1985 and released from prison; there have been no credible reports of political arrests or human rights abuses since that time.

The Origin and Development of the Armed Forces

The military history of Uruguay is rooted in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century clashes between settlers from Spain's Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, ruled from Buenos Aires to the west, and settlers from Portugal's Viceroyalty of Brazil to the northeast (see The Struggle for Independence, 1811—30, ch. 1). At stake was the territory on the east bank of the Río Uruguay known as the Banda Oriental (eastern side, or bank), which formed a buffer between the two viceroyalties. In 1720 Spanish colonists built a fortress at Montevideo as an overt manifestation of their interest in the Banda Oriental and to put a stop to Portuguese expansion.

Evolution of the Army

The first armed forces associated with the Banda Oriental, or what was to become Uruguay, developed after the Spanish hold on Buenos Aires ended in 1810. Montevideo, the only Spanish stronghold in the area, soon became embroiled in the conflict, and residents of the interior of the Banda Oriental rebelled against Spanish rule. Led by José Gervasio Artigas, the independence movement
The colonial Watchman's Tower at Maldonado
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress
was started by a band of guerrillas that first joined with the independent government in Argentina to help free Montevideo from Spanish rule. General Artigas prematurely declared Uruguay independent in 1815 and formally took control of the new national army, which consisted of one battalion of ethnic European settlers and one battalion of freed slaves (see Artigas’s Revolution, 1811–20, ch. 1).

After Uruguay became an independent state in 1828, the new nation’s army consisted of a poorly organized irregular militia, of which a substantial portion of personnel were inducted slaves or minor criminals condemned to service. The army was employed in a short campaign in 1832 against a remnant Indian force. The low quality of the army’s personnel and its poor public image, however, made it neither an influential force in politics nor an effective military establishment.

Independence did not bring peace or an end to foreign military intervention. Uruguay was plagued by chronic disorder and repeated insurrections supported by various foreign powers (see Beginnings of Independent Life, 1830–52, ch. 1). Most of the disorder derived from political factionalism, as evidenced in the 1836 struggle between forces led by the nation’s first president, General José Fructoso Rivera (1830–35, 1838–43), and his successor, General Manuel Oribe (1835–38), who was backed by Argentina. In 1838 Rivera’s army prevailed, and Oribe fled to Buenos Aires. Oribe returned in 1842, however, and, using Blanco and Argentine forces, commenced a nine-year siege of Montevideo that attracted French, British, and Italian intervention. The siege and the war between Colorado forces in Montevideo and Blanco forces outside the capital, known as the Great War (Guerra Grande, 1843–52), helped forge the identities of what were to become the nation’s two dominant political parties (see Political Parties, ch. 4).

The end of the nine-year siege of Montevideo was followed by renewed conflict and foreign intervention. The Uruguayan Army in 1852 consisted of infantry, cavalry, and artillery elements and had a total strength of some 1,800 personnel; it was nonetheless unable to control the private political armies kept by local caudillos. In 1858 the country established the National Guard, in which males between seventeen and forty-seven years of age were required to serve. The main effect of the National Guard, however, was to provide local caudillos with better-trained personnel for their armies, which operated under the auspices of various factions of the Colorado Party (Partido Colorado) or the National Party (Partido Nacional, usually referred to as the Blancos).
Foreign intervention on behalf of the Blancos by Francisco Solano López, the Paraguayan dictator, embroiled Uruguay in a bloody war between the Triple Alliance of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay on the one side and Paraguay on the other side. During the War of the Triple Alliance (1865–70), some 3,000 Uruguayan troops joined the more professional armies of Brazil and Argentina. The Uruguayan Army emerged from the experience with somewhat more professional standards.

After the challenge of facing a foreign threat ended, the pattern of armed Colorado-Blanco clashes resumed. The war had strengthened the sense of national identity, but party loyalty remained intense, and for many Uruguayans it surpassed loyalty to the state. The army, itself highly politicized, worked to control banditry, engaged in public-works projects, and was active in controlling clashes between the private political armies. The number of combatants in the interparty struggles was never large, and the clashes were punctuated by a number of peace pacts that ended specific uprisings and formally redistributed power held by the dominant Cobardos in Montevideo to accommodate Blanco aspirations outside the capital.

The party clashes peaked around the turn of the twentieth century. A serious Blanco rebellion in 1897 ended in a “pact between the parties,” but, as in the past, the Blancos used the opportunity to consolidate their power and improve their armed strength. After Colorado president José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903–07, 1911–15) moved to check Blanco growth, Blanco rural leaders rose up in 1904 in the last of the armed conflicts between the two parties (see The New Country, 1903–33, ch. 1).

After the defeat of the Blanco uprising, the army replaced the private armed forces of the caudillos as the nation’s dominant armed force. Batlle y Ordóñez appointed and promoted only loyal officers; by 1915 almost all army officers were Colorados. In recognition of the politicization of the army and its growing influence, Batlle y Ordóñez and other civilian leaders followed a careful policy of balancing frequent transfers of loyal and suspected units in and out of Montevideo with increased investment in weaponry and increased personnel. As a result, the army nearly doubled in size between 1904 and 1914; it grew from about 6,000 to 12,000 personnel. Its position as the nation’s preeminent military force was strengthened after Uruguay made it illegal to address nonmilitary persons with a military title, which had formerly been a common practice among Blanco forces.

As the prospect of further revolution subsided, the active-duty forces were reduced through attrition in an effort to circumscribe
the army's political role. The army was spared serious budget cutting but was reorganized into smaller units intended to be expanded in wartime. The increase in the number of units meant more officers and more promotions; at the same time, the increase in the number of units also made it harder for officers to forge a unified political force. The government and the armed forces leadership placed new emphasis on developing an apolitical and professional military institution, and as a result the army essentially withdrew from the political arena.

After World War I, the army came under the influence of a French military mission, and officers began to train at the Military Academy at St. Cyr, France, and at various specialty schools of the French army. Under a French plan, the country was divided into four military regions, and the military air arm was strengthened. Modern equipment, including aircraft, was imported from various European sources. The army was used to support a coup by President Gabriel Terra (1931-38) in 1933 but did little except to prevent legislators from entering the General Assembly (the nation's bicameral legislature).

During World War II, the United States replaced France as the nation's foremost foreign military influence. United States assistance under the Lend-Lease Agreement focused primarily on aviation. The armed forces spent the 1950s and 1960s pursuing a program of gradual equipment modernization.

Development of the Navy

The Uruguayan Navy was formally established in 1860, and its forces saw action during the War of the Triple Alliance, principally in a transport capacity. The modern Uruguayan Navy, however, owes its professional development to the establishment in 1885 of the Military Academy, which offered training to naval and other officers. By 1910 navy strength was some 1,300 in all ranks, and vessels included gunboats (some armed with torpedoes), steamers, and various other small craft. The separate Naval Academy was established in 1916.

After World War I, many of the navy's aging vessels were withdrawn from service, and replacement was slow. The Naval Air Service was formed in 1925, but the first aircraft were not acquired until 1930. The only significant purchase of vessels between the wars was three patrol vessels and a training ship. Personnel declined to fewer than 1,000.

After the outbreak of World War II and the December 1939 Battle of the Río de la Plata, the government decided to strengthen the navy and the Naval Air Service (see Baldomir and the End
of Dictatorship, ch. 1). During the 1940s and 1950s, the navy, and naval aviation in particular, benefited from United States military assistance. In 1959 Uruguay—along with the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela—participated in the first large multinational exercise involving Latin American navies. Although the air arm (renamed the Naval Aviation Service in 1951) accounted for 50 percent of naval personnel in 1952, by the late 1960s naval air assets had begun to be withdrawn from service, and few modern replacements were acquired. At the same time, the fleet underwent a modest expansion, and a battalion of marines was added. During the 1970s, the government acquired a small number of vessels to replace aging equipment. In 1981 three large patrol craft were purchased new from France. The sole addition in the late 1980s was a frigate purchased used from the French navy and commissioned in late 1988. In early 1990, the Uruguayan Navy received two decommissioned United States Coast Guard cutters for coastal patrol and antinarcotics work under a United States Department of State antinarcotics program. Acquisitions were insufficient to offset the number of retired vessels, however, and a further reduction of the navy's assets seemed likely as more vessels had to be withdrawn from service.

Creation of an Independent Air Force

Military aviation began in 1913 as the Military Aeronautics Branch of the army, and as early as 1916 a flight training school was established near Montevideo. By the 1930s, the service comprised one bomber and three reconnaissance flights. It operated out of bases at Paso de Mendoza near Montevideo, at Durazno, and at the Military Air School at Pando in Canelones Department. Beginning in the late 1940s, United States military assistance focused on military aviation, and the inventory of military aircraft increased in number and quality. The Air Force Academy was established at Pando in 1950, and aviation instruction formerly conducted at the Military Academy was discontinued. In late 1953, the Uruguayan Air Force, which had continued to function as an integral part of the army, was established as an autonomous organization, equal in status with the army and the navy.

During the 1950s, the air force inventory was relatively well developed. As equipment aged, however, economic constraints prevented replacement, and the inventory grew smaller. By 1990 the air force had shrunk to a very modest size (about 100 aircraft) and operated largely obsolete equipment. Given the nation's continued economic problems and the low-threat environment, the air
force appeared likely to remain a well-trained, professional force but one that was poorly equipped.

The Growth of Military Involvement in Politics

Until the 1960s, the military was mostly ignored by politicians and played a marginal role in Uruguayan political life. A military career lacked prestige and respect. Officers came mainly from the lower middle class in the small towns and cities of the interior; troops were recruited from the lowest strata of the rural sector, mainly from the estancias (ranches) or from the ranks of the unemployed in the urban shantytowns (cantegriles).

In the second half of the 1960s, the military began to function in a limited law enforcement capacity after the national economy suffered a serious downturn and public discontent increasingly came to disrupt internal order. Initially backing up the National Police in confrontations with union members, students, and other protesters, the military was drawn further into the struggle as the decade progressed, manning road blocks, conducting searches, and eventually becoming targets themselves. The most significant threat to public order was the growth of the urban guerrilla movement known as the MLN-T, whose adherents were more commonly known as Tupamaros.

The armed forces leadership was divided internally over the military’s new role, but antipathy toward the Tupamaros’ Marxist political philosophy was strong among the politically conservative, staunchly anticommunist military leadership. Initially, the police had been charged with handling the problem, but as the disorder worsened, many in the armed forces grew impatient with the police’s lack of success. When President Jorge Pacheco Areco (1967–72) called on the army to take over responsibility for the problem on September 9, 1971, the Army Intelligence Service began to draw up a military offensive. After the Tupamaros escalated the guerrilla campaign in April 1972, President Bordaberry, Pacheco’s successor, and the General Assembly declared a state of “internal war” against them. The army was prepared, and the insurgency was crushed within a few months (see Pachequism, 1967–72, ch. 1).

By this time, however, the armed forces leadership had agreed that the military’s duty to the nation required it to pursue a level of internal order that was untroubled by leftist, student, labor, or other opposition or protest. The suspension of constitutional protections during the state of internal war was therefore prolonged by new legislation that put harsh controls on the press and on dissent. The new laws also stated that persons charged with crimes
against the national security were denied normal legal protections and were subject to preventive detention and trial in military courts.

In June 1973, the military compelled President Bordaberry to accept suspension of the democratic process and institute military rule through the creation of the National Security Council (Consejo de Seguridad Nacional—Cosena), made up of the commanders in chief of the army, navy, and air force, plus an additional senior military officer, and the ministers of national defense, interior, and foreign affairs. The General Assembly was abolished on June 27 and replaced with the thirty-member Council of State (Consejo de Estado). A new armed forces organic law, adopted in February 1974, assigned the military the role of protector of the nation’s traditional way of life against a communist threat. Beyond that general mission, however, the military had no coherent ideological agenda or any organized plan for national development. No charismatic military leader emerged to centralize power. Instead, decision making was characterized by consensus among senior officers, who were determined to use the military’s new powers to impose internal order (see The Military Government, 1973–85, ch. 1).

Until the 1972–73 period, the Uruguayan armed forces were among the least politicized in Latin America. The military had little experience in political affairs and no corporate political philosophy beyond a belief in democracy and an antipathy toward communism and extreme leftist political thought. Many within the armed forces viewed the military’s assumption of power in 1973 as a necessary but unfortunate interruption of the nation’s democratic tradition. A significant element within the military was never comfortable with the institution’s expanded role, however. Nonetheless, during the period of military rule, senior and sometimes mid-level officers served in positions of responsibility in various government agencies, the National Police, some businesses, and autonomous entities (autonomous agencies or state enterprises; see Glossary). In general, military personnel assigned to such posts found themselves poorly prepared in terms of either training or education to take on new responsibilities.

During the 1973–80 period, the military moved ruthlessly against all it deemed a security threat. An estimated 6,000 citizens were tried in the military courts, and critics charged that tens of thousands were detained, denied legal rights, or abused or tortured. During the same period, the military grew from some 22,000 to an estimated 30,000, and military officers began to serve as heads of state enterprises and as governors of departments.

In 1980 the military government attempted to legitimize the armed forces’ political role by submitting to public referendum a
new constitution that effectively gave the armed forces veto power within a restricted democracy. The regime publicly campaigned that the constitution moved the nation toward democracy. The government also identified opposition to the referendum with support for communism or, conversely, with support for continued military rule. Nonetheless, opposition positions were permitted expression, and the proposed constitution was rejected by 57 percent of the populace.

The armed forces leadership then instituted a process of slow disengagement from economic, political, and administrative positions of power. Surprising many local and foreign observers, the president of the Council of the Nation (Consejo de la Nación, consisting of the Council of State and twenty-eight military officers), which became the supreme governing body in 1976, appointed a retired military general as president of an interim administration designed to initiate a process to return the country to civilian leadership in 1985. In March 1984, the military negotiated the Naval Club Pact with most of the nation’s political parties to design the transition, which included reestablishment of the General Assembly. In March 1985, a new civilian president, Julio María Sanguinetti Cairolo (1985-90), was inaugurated. After 1985 the military leadership devoted itself to the management of a depoliticized and professional armed forces establishment.

The process of the military’s withdrawal from national political life was difficult. There were charges in the 1985-86 period, for instance, that the armed forces intelligence services continued to monitor opposition groups as potential sources of subversion. Such charges had died down by the late 1980s, after passage of a new armed forces law that reaffirmed the supremacy of civilian command and after senior military leaders made public statements of allegiance to civilian democratic rule.

The most difficult issue facing the nation in the wake of the return to civilian rule was how to treat military officers who had committed offenses during the period of military rule. In an effort to calm military and police fears and to put the nation’s troubled past behind it, the Chamber of Representatives passed, by a vote of sixty to thirty-seven, an amnesty bill on December 22, 1986, to prevent prosecution of nearly all such offenses. Almost immediately, opponents of the law launched a movement to bring the bill to a public referendum. After protracted legal deliberations, the bill was placed before the voters in 1989, and the public voted to retain the amnesty provisions. As of the end of 1990, the military continued to play a very minor role in the national economic and political life, and officers were no longer seconded to serve in the civilian administration.
The Armed Forces in the National Life

The armed forces continued to contribute to national development through civic-action programs in 1990. The army’s engineers were heavily involved in road building, repair, and maintenance; bridge construction; maintenance of the internal telecommunications network; and construction of public-works projects, such as schools and government buildings. The army’s Military Geographic Service was responsible for all mapping. The navy trained and supervised the nation’s merchant marine and operated navigational aids along inland waterways. The navy also conducted oceanographic studies, and its port facilities provided support and repair to Uruguay’s fishing and merchant fleets. The air force controlled and maintained the country’s airports and regulated civil aviation. It also transported passengers and cargo to isolated areas.

All services provided disaster-relief assistance. The army, for instance, constructed emergency dams and provided transportation in times of special need. The air force was active in search-and-rescue operations, air evacuation, and airlifts of emergency supplies. The navy provided surface and air rescue operations at sea, and in times of flooding it provided emergency transportation.

Manpower

Unlike most Latin American countries, entrance into the armed
forces was entirely through voluntary recruitment; there was no system of compulsory service. Initial enlistment was for one- or two-year terms, depending on the service and the assignment, and there was little difficulty in filling vacancies. Recruits were attracted by benefits, which included early retirement with pension, and by the opportunity to attend armed forces schools, which provided skills useful in civilian occupations. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were career soldiers, sailors, or airmen who were chosen from the recruits toward the end of the initial period of service. The small size of the armed forces permitted selection of physically qualified applicants; in keeping with the country's high literacy rate (96 percent in 1990), recruits generally had at least a basic education (see Education, ch. 2).

In 1990 over 573,000 males were fit for military service; enlisted personnel were between eighteen and forty-five years of age. A loosely organized reserve was made up of approximately 120,000 former members of the armed forces. Constituting only about 0.8 percent of the total population, the armed forces were not a drain on the country's work force.

Morale in the military services was generally adequate in 1990. The 1989 defeat of the referendum to overturn amnesty provisions for most military personnel who committed offenses during the period of military rule appeared to quell any lingering uneasiness in the armed forces over the relinquishment of power. The decrease in personnel during the 1985-87 period drew some protest, especially among those forced to leave service. Low levels of pay continued to be a major morale problem, despite a number of partially compensating benefits. The Ministry of National Defense reported in mid-1988 that from 1973 to 1988 enlisted men's salaries lost 34 percent of their purchasing power; officers' salaries, 44 percent; and auxiliary personnel's, 21.5 percent.

Military personnel, active-duty and retired, as well as their dependents, were entitled to medical care provided by the armed forces medical services. Officers could retire on partial pay after twenty years of service and on full pay after thirty years. NCOs received the same benefits after fifteen and twenty years of service, respectively. Additional allowances were provided for hazardous duty.

**Military Justice**

According to the constitution of 1967, the military justice system had jurisdiction over military offenders who committed crimes during wartime; in peacetime the system had jurisdiction only over military personnel charged with committing military offenses. During the period of military rule, civilians charged with crimes against
the national security were tried by military courts, as were most offenses committed by military personnel. The role of the military justice system was greatly reduced because of the return to democracy, however, and since that time the Supreme Court of Justice has consistently held that in peacetime, jurisdictional disputes between the parallel civil and military court systems should be resolved in favor of the civil courts. Whenever the Supreme Court of Justice accepted a military case on appeal, the law required that two military judges serve on the court on an ad hoc basis.

The Supreme Military Tribunal, which was composed of five members, four of whom had to be military field-grade officers, was the highest military appeals court for military offenders. Beneath it were two military judges of first instance, who had original jurisdiction over serious offenses and appellate jurisdiction over less serious offenses. Those who had committed less serious offenses were first tried by lower court judges.

**Defense Spending**

According to the latest government figures available in 1990, the defense budget for 1986 was N$Ur22.8 billion (for value of the Uruguayan new peso—see Glossary), or between US$125 million and US$150 million, depending on the source of information. The figure represented approximately 11.8 percent of total central government expenditures, down from the 12 percent to 15 percent levels sustained in the early 1980s. When measured in current pesos, military spending rose sharply during the 1979–86 period. When factoring in inflation, however, spending rose slowly during the 1977–81 period, then fell approximately 20 percent over the 1982–86 period.

The decline in real growth in the defense budget during the 1982–86 period was accompanied by a dramatic depreciation of the peso, making the dollar value of defense spending fall by some 62 percent over the period. This decline had a serious effect on military readiness by virtually precluding importation of spare parts, replacements, or modern equipment. Between 1977 and 1983, military equipment had accounted for between 0.5 and 3.7 percent of total annual imports. From 1984 to 1987, the nation imported no military supplies. As of 1990, a frigate imported in 1988 from France represented the only significant purchase of military equipment after 1983. There were unconfirmed reports in the international press, however, that in March 1990 the nation purchased two more frigates of the same class.

When compared with other Latin American countries, the portion of the national budget devoted to defense was above average.
The military’s portion of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) was about 2.4 percent in 1986, in the middle range for Latin American nations.

Until the late 1970s, the defense budget was augmented by large amounts of United States military assistance. Over the 1950–77 period, the country received nearly US$60 million of assistance in the form of grants and credits from the United States. During the 1977–78 period, however, the nation refused further assistance in response to harsh criticism from the administration of President Jimmy Carter over the military government’s human rights abuses. The United States resumed military assistance to Uruguay in 1987, after the return to civilian rule, but on a very limited level, in keeping with the overall reduction of United States security assistance worldwide. Aid during the 1987–90 period consisted of approximately US$1 million in grants intended to maintain equipment acquired from the United States. The United States also funded the education of a small number of Uruguayan military personnel at United States military facilities under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET assistance in United States fiscal year (FY) 1990 totaled US$124,000. The United States Department of Defense’s FY 1991 request totaled US$200,000.

Uruguay did not export any military equipment. The domestic defense industry was very limited in scope and produced only the most basic military supplies, such as small-arms ammunition, uniforms, and stores. The only exception was the navy’s shipyard, which built small patrol craft and was capable of providing dry-dock, overhaul, and repair support.

**Armed Forces Organization, Training, and Equipment**

Under the constitution, the president is commander in chief of the armed forces and exercises administrative control over the three services through the Ministry of National Defense. In practice, operational control passed through the service commanders, who were appointed by the president. There was a nominal chief of the joint staff but no substantive joint staff organization. In 1990 the defense minister was a former law professor who had been active in the transition to democracy. Assistants from each of the three services were assigned to the minister.

During the 1973–85 period, first the military government’s Council of State and then the Council of the Nation passed several laws that limited the president’s military control. Principal among these was the February 1974 decree that served as an organic law for the armed forces. Under this law, the commanders of the three services
National Security

were chosen by a board of generals from each respective service. During the 1984-85 transition to civilian rule, the appointment procedure was amended so that the boards of generals chose candidates from which the president then appointed service chiefs of staff. In 1986 the reestablished General Assembly returned the power of direct appointment of the service commanders to the president.

In 1987 the General Assembly passed a new organic law for the armed forces establishing that the "basic duty of the armed forces is to defend the honor, independence, and the peace of the republic, its territorial integrity, its Constitution, and its laws." The law explicitly stated that the armed forces should always act under the supreme command of the president and the minister of national defense in keeping with constitutional measures currently in force. Training practices were modified to include courses for military cadets on the proper role of the military in a democracy. The length a service commander could serve was cut from eight to five years, and service commanders were required to retire when the term of service expired. As of 1990, the government and the armed forces appeared to be adhering to all provisions of the law.

The Ministry of National Defense was responsible for the administration of military training, health, communications, and construction, and it supervised the military retirement and pension system. The ministry supervised the triservice Military Institute for Advanced Studies, which served as a national war college to train senior officers. Also under the ministry was the General Directorate of Defense Information (Dirección General de Información de Defensa—DGID). As reorganized by the executive branch in 1989, the DGID was a triservice agency that coordinated and planned all operations of the three separate military intelligence services. Traditionally, the army's intelligence branch was the most powerful of the military intelligence services.

The country was divided into four military regions. Military Region I, headquartered at Montevideo, had responsibility for the national capital and the departments of Montevideo and Canelones (see fig. 1). Military Region II, headquartered at San José, included the departments of Colonia, Durazno, Flores, Florida, San José, and Soriano. Military Region III, headquartered at Paso de los Toros, comprised the departments of Artigas, Paysandú, Río Negro, Rivera, Salto, and Tacuarembó. Military Region IV, headquartered at Maldonado, included the departments of Cerro Largo, Lavalleja, Maldonado, Rocha, and Treinta y Tres.

Uruguay had cordial foreign military relations with both Argentina and Brazil, as well as with the United States. During the 1980s, armed forces personnel represented the nation in foreign
peacekeeping activities in Cambodia, on the Angola-Namibia border, in the Sinai, and on the Iran-Iraq border. Uruguay was a member of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), which maintained a headquarters and staff in Washington and acted as a military advisory group to the Organization of American States (OAS), of which Uruguay was also a member.

Uruguay had a long history of military cooperation with neighboring countries. It joined with twenty other Latin American nations and the United States in 1945 to sign the Act of Chapultepec, in which each agreed to consult on any aggression against a co-signatory. Uruguay was also a signatory to the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), in which the United States and Latin American and Caribbean countries committed themselves to working toward the peaceful settlement of disputes and collective self-defense in the Americas. Uruguay also was a signatory to the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Uruguay also accepted the Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of such weapons.

**Army**

In May 1990, Lieutenant General Guillermo de Nava, the army commander, defined the army's mission and the role of its members. He stressed that "for the government and the country the most important action of the army is the exact compliance with our fundamental role that is defined in the law and which consists of defending the honor, the independence, and the peace of the Republic, the integrity of its territory, its Constitution, and its laws." He also maintained that the armed forces must take action against "all types of aggression."

Army personnel in 1990 numbered some 17,200, a reduction of 22 percent from the 1983 level of 22,000. The army consisted of infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer, signal, administrative, transport, matériel, medical, and veterinary services. The chief of the army staff presided over staff sections for personnel, intelligence, operations and instruction, logistics, and public relations.

The army's main tactical units were organized under four corps headquarters that were administrative rather than operational. Each corps was located in one of the four military regions (each army corps bore the same number as the military region). The four corps together had one independent infantry brigade, fifteen infantry battalions, six engineer battalions, six artillery battalions, and ten cavalry battalions (four horsed, three mechanized, two motorized,
and one armored). Each corps was responsible for at least three infantry battalions, one engineer battalion, and one field artillery battalion, as well as logistics, signals, and support units. The number and type of cavalry battalions within each corps varied.

The First Corps at Montevideo was traditionally the most powerful of the army’s main command elements. Its cavalry units included one horsed battalion, one mechanized battalion with scout cars, and one motorized battalion. The artillery command of the First Corps had one antiaircraft battalion in addition to its field artillery battalion.

One independent infantry brigade headquarters that performed many of the army’s administrative functions was attached to army headquarters at Montevideo. The brigade was responsible for one armored battalion, one airborne battalion, and one ranger infantry battalion. Also at the army level was one motorized cavalry battalion that functioned as a presidential bodyguard and performed ceremonial duties. One engineer brigade made up of two battalions, as well as assorted logistics and support elements, completed the units assigned to army headquarters.

The Second Corps was headquartered at San José. Under it was an armored cavalry battalion equipped with light tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs). The Third Corps, at Paso de los Toros, had two horsed battalions and one mechanized cavalry battalion. One of its infantry battalions was equipped with APCs. The Fourth Corps was headquartered at Minas. Within the Fourth Corps, one horsed battalion and one mechanized cavalry battalion were located at Melo.

Major ground force arms were relatively heterogeneous in origin. Much was obsolete United States equipment, some acquired thirdhand from various foreign sources. The armor inventory included fifty-four light tanks, all of United States or Belgian origin (see table 19, Appendix). The army also had Belgian-, United States-, and Brazilian-made armored vehicles. APCs included United States and West German models. Artillery pieces and air defense guns were of Swedish, Argentine, and United States manufacture. In general, the entire inventory was aging and in need of modernization, but economic considerations—combined with the absence of a significant internal or external threat—made it unlikely that new equipment would be ordered in the near future.

Army officers were trained at the four-year Military Academy, from which they were commissioned as second lieutenants. The army’s School of Arms and Services provided specialist training for recruits and officers. The Command and Staff School trained mid-level officers for promotion to staff or field positions.
Navy

As of 1990, naval strength stood at 4,500, which included both naval air personnel and marines. Personnel had been reduced from a high of 6,200 in 1983. The only naval base in operation was located at Montevideo, where facilities included a dry dock and a slipway. In addition to the naval staff, the navy’s commander was assisted by the chief of forces afloat and the chiefs of naval education and training, naval aviation, customs, and the marine police.

The navy was active in riverine and offshore patrol, transport, and sea-and-air rescue. In the late 1980s, naval vessels seized foreign boats caught fishing illegally in the country’s territorial waters. The navy also played a role in interdicting drug traffickers.

The fleet command was divided into one escort division and one patrol division. The escort division operated a newly acquired French frigate, as well as one other frigate, one destroyer escort, and one corvette, all formerly in service with the United States Navy (see table 20, Appendix). The patrol division had three relatively modern French-built large patrol craft, one antiquated Italian-built large patrol craft, two United States-built large patrol craft (delivered in February 1990), and two small patrol craft. The fleet also included one minesweeper, five amphibious landing craft, one training vessel, and a small number of support and utility craft. An additional two frigates of the same class (Rivière) as that purchased in 1988 were contracted for in February 1990. The ships were due for extensive refitting, making their delivery date uncertain.

Uruguayan Naval Aviation had 400 personnel. Operations were divided into combat, communications, and training elements. All naval aircraft were based at the naval air base at Laguna del Sauce in Maldonado Department. The marine detachment numbered 500 and was organized into a single battalion.

All naval schools were located at the Naval Training Center in the Montevideo port area. Naval officers underwent a five-year course at the Naval Academy, graduates of which were also commissioned in the National Maritime Police and the merchant marine. The senior school for naval officers was the Naval War College. Enlisted personnel were trained at the School of Naval Specialization.

The navy commanded the 1,500-strong National Maritime Police, which performed coast guard duties, supervised the nation’s ports and merchant marine, and acted as a harbor police. The maritime police operated three small patrol craft and a buoy tender. Its personnel were trained by the navy.
Air Force

Air force strength in 1990 was 3,500, down from 4,400 in 1983. The air force was equipped with eighteen combat aircraft, seven of which were used principally as trainers (see table 21, Appendix). The air force generally operated out of bases at Paso de Mendoza, Carrasco, Durazno, Laguna del Sauce, Laguna Negra, and Punta del Este.

The commander of the air force was assisted by a staff with sections for personnel, intelligence, operations, and matériel. The air force was organized into tactical, training, and matériel commands. The Tactical Air Command, whose headquarters were at Carrasco Air Base outside of Montevideo, was responsible for the operation of most of the service’s assets. These were apportioned between two air brigades. The first had one fighter squadron, three transport squadrons (which were also responsible for regular civilian flights), and a sea-and-air rescue group at Carrasco. The second brigade, at Durazno Air Base, had one training squadron for fighters and one liaison unit with other aircraft.

The Air Training Command, with one training squadron, was headquartered at the General Artigas Military Airport in Pando. It oversaw the Air Force Academy and the Military Air School at Pando and the Command and General Staff School at Carrasco, which provided advanced training for officers. The Air Technical School at Pando gave specialist training to officers and trained air force recruits. The school also trained paratroopers for the army. Attached to the Air Training Command were a small number of fixed-wing and rotary aircraft. The Air Matériel Command consisted of maintenance, supply, communications, and electronics elements. It also oversaw the administration and operation of military and civilian airfields.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

All three branches of the service had summer, winter, and dress uniforms. The army winter uniform was made of green gabardine, and the summer uniform was made of beige tropical worsted. For dress, a white blouse was worn in the summer. Navy and air force uniforms were similar in style and color to those of the respective United States forces. The blouse of the navy winter uniform was double breasted, and that of the summer uniform was single breasted.

Officer and enlisted ranks corresponded generally to those of the United States Armed Forces. Army officer ranks were indicated
Figure 10. Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1990
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<th>SOLDADO DE PRIMERA</th>
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<th>CABO DE PRIMERA</th>
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<th>SARGENTO DE PRIMERA</th>
<th>SUBOFICIAL MAYOR</th>
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<td>NO INSIGNIA</td>
<td>NO INSIGNIA</td>
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<th>CORPORAL/ SPECIALIST</th>
<th>SERGEANT</th>
<th>STAFF SERGEANT</th>
<th>SERGEANT 1ST CLASS</th>
<th>MASTER SERGEANT</th>
<th>SERGEANT MAJOR</th>
<th>COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR</th>
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<td>SOLDADO DE PRIMERA</td>
<td>CABO DE SEGUNDA</td>
<td>CABO DE PRIMERA</td>
<td>SARGENTO</td>
<td>SARGENTO DE PRIMERA</td>
<td>SUBOFICIAL MAYOR</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NO INSIGNIA</td>
<td>NO INSIGNIA</td>
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<th>AIRMAN 1ST CLASS</th>
<th>SENIOR AIRMAN / SERGEANT</th>
<th>STAFF SERGEANT</th>
<th>TECHNICAL SERGEANT</th>
<th>MASTER SERGEANT</th>
<th>SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT</th>
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<tr>
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<td>CABO DE SEGUNDA</td>
<td>CABO DE PRIMERA</td>
<td>SUBOFICIAL DE SEGUNDA</td>
<td>SUBOFICIAL DE PRIMERA</td>
<td>SUBOFICIAL DE CARGO</td>
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<td>NAVY</td>
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| UNITED STATES RANK TITLE | SEAMAN RECRUIT | SEAMAN APPRENTICE | SEAMAN | PETTY OFFICER 3D CLASS | PETTY OFFICER 2D CLASS | PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS | CHIEF PETTY OFFICER | SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER | MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER |

Figure 11. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1990
by gold buttons and braiding on shoulder boards; piping of various colors indicated the branch of service. Army enlisted ranks were indicated by yellow chevrons. Rank insignia for officers in both the navy and the air force were indicated by gold bands on the sleeves of the winter uniform and by similar bands on the shoulder boards of the summer uniform. Air force enlisted ranks were denoted by gray chevrons on a blue background, and navy enlisted ranks were indicated by yellow chevrons and stars on a red background (except for the rank equivalent to master chief petty officer, which was designated by a narrow gold band and loop on a navy-blue background) (see fig. 10; fig. 11).

Traditionally, Uruguayan governments have not awarded military decorations. The three branches of the armed forces, however, have awarded special emblems for excellence in graduation standing at the service academies and at service schools.

Public Order and Internal Security

Public order was well established in the nation, and the government committed sufficient resources to law enforcement to maintain domestic order throughout the country. Urban and rural areas were generally safe, as was travel throughout the nation. Citizens were able to conduct day-to-day affairs in peace and without government interference. The constitution guarantees the right to privacy and due process and freedom of the press, association, assembly, and religion. After the return to civilian rule in 1985, all of these rights were routinely respected by the government and by law enforcement agencies.

Several groups that were suppressed or banned under the period of military rule had since emerged as active participants in the national political life. These included leftist political parties, students, and labor organizations. During the late 1980s, each of these groups participated in protests or demonstrations. Such actions required government permits, which were routinely granted. Demonstrations by these groups were generally peaceful and free from government harassment.

Disputes between political parties or between factions of the same party occasionally flared into violence during the late 1980s; violence was usually minor, however, taking the form of vandalism or arson against party offices. In general, few injuries and little damage were sustained. In 1985 the government legalized all political parties, and as of 1990 there were no known political prisoners or any banned or illegal political groups in the nation.

The MLN-T, also known as the Tupamaros, was a former urban guerrilla organization given amnesty in 1985. The MLN-T
National Security

was established in 1962 by Raúl Sendic Antonaccio, leader of a group of students, peasants, and intellectuals who espoused an extreme nationalist and socialist ideology. Organized according to a clandestine cell-based structure, the movement conducted a guerrilla campaign from 1963 to 1973 that included bank robberies, kidnappings, sabotage, and jail breaks. The army effectively destroyed the Tupamaros in 1972, and its leaders were imprisoned for long terms or forced into exile (see The Military Government, 1973–85, ch. 1). After the remaining Tupamaro prisoners were freed under an amnesty decree in March 1985, the MLN–T publicly renounced armed struggle and committed itself to left-wing parliamentary politics. In 1990 the Tupamaros constituted a marginal political force of some several hundred members (see Political Parties, ch. 4). The group published a newspaper and operated a radio station in Montevideo.

Student organizations, repressed during the military regime, reestablished themselves in 1985 when academic freedom and university autonomy were restored. Several professors who had been dismissed for ideological reasons were allowed to return to their positions as well. During the late 1980s, students held several protests, none of which had a serious effect on public order (see Political Forces and Interest Groups, ch. 4).

Labor unions and labor activists were also targets of repression under the military regime. During the late 1980s, however, labor activity resumed, and several labor actions and strikes took place. Certain of these activities caused localized disruption of day-to-day activities, but most grievances were solved within a short time, and none led to serious violence. In 1986, during a strike by the staff of the state-owned National Administration of Fuels, Alcohol, and Portland Cement (Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcohol, y Portland—ANCAP), the military was called in to ensure distribution of fuel but did not act in a law enforcement capacity (see Labor, ch. 3).

Local and international human rights groups operated freely in the nation during the late 1980s, and these groups surfaced no credible reports of killings or disappearances. The constitution forbids brutal treatment of prisoners, and there were few accusations of torture of prisoners after 1985. The most dramatic exception took place in mid-1989, when the death of a bricklayer while in police custody led to charges of police brutality and mistreatment. Although the police maintained the man hanged himself in his cell, controversy over the case led to the resignation of the minister of interior and to the conviction of a deputy police chief for misconduct.
Human rights groups took serious exception to the 1986 law providing amnesty for military and police personnel charged with committing human rights abuses under the military government. According to a study by the General Assembly, some forty-six members of the military and police benefited from the amnesty. Human rights groups, however, claimed that the real number was well over 100. Military and police officers charged with corruption or with financial irregularities were not covered under the amnesty. In 1988 a former army general and a former minister of agriculture and fishing were charged with making illicit financial transactions during the period of military rule.

Crime

Official statistics on the incidence of crime during the 1980s were not available in 1990. In general, however, there did not appear to be an unusual degree of ordinary crime. Judging from reports in the national press, the level of crime was higher in urban areas, particularly in Montevideo, than in rural areas.

Smuggling was a perennial problem for law enforcement officials, and the borders with Argentina and Brazil were periodically closed during the late 1980s in an effort to control trafficking in contraband. In 1989 smuggling surged because of the strength of the Uruguayan new peso relative to Argentine and Brazilian currencies. The resulting fall in government tax revenue and legal domestic trade prompted the government to seal the borders once again. Residents of the border area protested, claiming that the government should differentiate between small- and large-scale smuggling.

During the late 1980s, the nation experienced problems with the sale and abuse of illegal narcotics and with drug trafficking. Stories in the domestic press covered a police raid on a cocaine laboratory and told of seizures of marijuana, LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), and cocaine. In an effort to focus more resources on the problem, the government in July 1988 announced the formation of the National Council for the Prevention and Repression of Illicit Traffic and Improper Use of Drugs. The new body was responsible for coordinating the nation’s antidrug campaign. After the international press reported in 1989 that Uruguayan gold merchants were involved in laundering drug money, the police began investigating possible domestic links to international drug-trafficking organizations.

The National Police

The National Police were established in 1829, one year after the country gained its independence. At that time, each department
A 1984 election campaign poster demanding amnesty for Tupamaros
Graffito denouncing Uruguay's foreign debt and the International
Monetary Fund, displayed during the 1984 election campaign
Courtesy Charles Guy Gillespie
was assigned a police chief, similar to the system in modern use. As of 1990, police forces numbered approximately 17,500, a ratio of about five police officers to each 1,000 inhabitants. At least 20 percent of the total was assigned to the capital area, in which about one-half of the country's total population lived. In all, about 40 percent of the police force was assigned to urban areas, and the remainder were assigned to rural settlements.

Article 168 of the constitution gives the president, acting through the minister of interior, responsibility for the preservation of public order. Article 173 authorizes him to appoint a chief of police for each of the departments, whom he is authorized to remove at will.

The Ministry of Interior had the responsibility for ensuring public safety throughout the nation, except for coastal areas and the shores of navigable rivers and lakes, which were the responsibility of the National Maritime Police, under the Uruguayan Navy. Police training was centralized under the administration of the ministry, which oversaw the operation of the Police Training Academy. The academy, established in 1936, had separate schools for officers and cadets and for other ranks. The course for noncommissioned officers ran for one year, and the course for cadets ran for two years. The academy also offered in-service and specialty courses of varying lengths.

Subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, the National Police were organized into four operating agencies: the Montevideo Police, the Interior Police, the National Traffic Police, and the National Corps of Firemen. Each of these agencies was administratively a separate entity, handling most personnel administration, including recruitment, separately.

The Montevideo Police had five administrative divisions: investigation, security, support services, intelligence, and legal affairs. Operationally, they were divided into the patrol services, canine corps, security and traffic bureau, criminal investigation bureau, and antismuggling brigade. The criminal investigation bureau was unique in that it conducted operations nationwide, not just in the capital area. The Montevideo Police maintained twenty-nine police stations, one of which was concerned solely with urban traffic. The Montevideo Police also worked out of police posts in small towns and villages near the capital.

The Interior Police coordinated the activities of the police forces maintained by each department. The National Traffic Police controlled traffic on the nation's roadways. The National Corps of Firemen was a centralized fire-prevention and fire-fighting agency. Its personnel underwent basic training with police personnel but
followed up with specialized training and career assignments. Detachments of the corps were assigned to police forces in each department and in the city of Montevideo.

Two police paramilitary organizations were assigned to the capital area. The first was the Republican Guard, which had some 500 personnel as of 1990. This unit was organized into cavalry elements used for guard duty, parades, and ceremonial occasions. When necessary, the Republican Guard was called on for riot duty back-up for the regular police. The Metropolitan Guard was responsible principally for guarding municipal property, banks, and embassies. As of 1990, its personnel numbered some 650. The Metropolitan Guard was conceived of as a paramilitary force and was equipped with machine guns and riot-control gear. The unit was also charged with helping the police control disturbances and acting as a ready reserve for emergencies of all types.

The Criminal Justice System

The constitution provides that judicial power be vested in the Supreme Court of Justice (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). Immediately below the Supreme Court of Justice are six appellate courts, including the appellate court on criminal matters. Its judgment is
by unanimous decision of the three justices. The next courts below the appellate courts are the courts of first instance, or lawyer courts (juzgados letrados), the principal courts of first instance for criminal felony cases. In 1990 Montevideo had ten courts of first instance to hear criminal cases, the departments of Paysandú and Salto had two each, and each of the other departments had one. The lower justice of the peace courts hear minor cases and have original jurisdiction over most misdemeanors.

The nation’s judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code of 1804. Once a suspect is identified, the constitution requires issuance of a written arrest warrant unless the suspect was caught during the commission of a crime. By law a suspect can be held incommunicado for twenty-four hours, after which he or she must be brought before a judge to answer charges. Judges then have twenty-four hours to decide whether to release or to charge the individual. Once charges are brought, an accused has the right to legal counsel; a public defender is appointed to represent those accused who cannot afford counsel. If the accused is charged with a crime carrying a penalty of at least two years, he or she can be confined during the investigation of the case. Bond is allowed in such cases, provided the individual is not deemed a danger to society or likely to flee.

The constitution requires that all trials be held in public to the extent that they have to be open and give a public statement of the charge. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, however, arguments by the prosecution and the defense are submitted to the judge in writing, and these written documents are not usually made public. The defense attorney has the right to review all written documents submitted to the court. The constitution does not provide protection against self-incrimination, and at trial an accused can be required to answer any questions from the judge. Based on the written statements submitted, the judge hands down his or her decision (usually without seeing the accused parties in person); there is no provision for trial by jury.

In the second half of the 1980s, several jurists and human rights groups suggested numerous changes to the judicial procedure to increase efficiency and fairness. Among the proposed reforms were the institution of trial by jury and tightened supervision of pretrial investigations, but as of 1990 none of these changes had been made.

The principal source of the nation’s criminal law was the Penal Code of 1889, which was amended in 1934 and contained three books. The first book concerned general principles of the law and the definition of offenses, which were divided according to gravity into felonies and misdemeanors. The first book also defined various
punishments, which comprised incarceration in a penitentiary or prison, exile, deprivation of political rights, disqualification or suspension of professional qualifications, and fines. It also discussed extenuating circumstances for a defendant, such as age, intoxication, or insanity. The second book concerned felony crimes, including crimes against the sovereignty of the state, the political order, public order, public administration, and public health. The remaining articles in the second book dealt with crimes against persons and property. The third book concerned misdemeanor offenses. In June 1989, the Penal Code was amended to provide sanctions against committing or inciting hatred or other forms of violence against persons based on race, color, religion, or national or ethnic origin.

In addition to the Penal Code, several other statutes covered criminal offenses. Drug legislation was covered in a 1974 law that regulated the commercial sale and use of controlled substances and penalized drug abuse and drug trafficking. Juvenile offenders were treated under a 1934 code for minors that established a juvenile court in Montevideo with jurisdiction over persons under the age of eighteen; in 1990 there were four such courts in Montevideo.

The Ministry of Interior supervised the federal prisons and departmental jails. All nineteen departments maintained jails in which accused persons were temporarily housed pending trial and sentencing. All prisoners sentenced to confinement were held in one of three federal prisons or at the work colony at San José. Two of the federal prisons were for men, and the third was for women. The work colony was designed to aid in the rehabilitation of prisoners for whom agricultural work was believed to be helpful.

Although the three federal prisons existed independently of each other, a single entity in the ministry administered them. A prerelease facility housed prisoners about to complete their term of imprisonment. These individuals could bring their families to live with them until their final discharge. The prisoners themselves were in charge of the facility under the guidance of trained instructors. The prison area was surrounded by a wide moat. The prerelease facility was outside the moat. Visits to minimum security inmates took place in the open; medium security inmates were separated from visitors by a glass partition; and those in maximum security were separated by reinforced glass partitions, with telephones for communication.

The Penal Code provided that inmates of minimum security institutions could be employed in such activities as road building, quarrying, and similar public improvement projects. The obligation to work was established by law, and work was mandatory for
prisoners who had not been tried. Prisoners earned small amounts for their labor; these sums were paid upon release. Prison labor was aimed at rehabilitating the individual, a principle no doubt derived from the country's tradition of extensive social services.

As of late 1990, no definitive studies dealing comprehensively with national security matters in contemporary Uruguay had been published. A general treatment of modern Uruguayan political life, touching on the military and its place in the national life, can be found in Martin Weinstein's *Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads*. The most complete coverage of the history and development of the armed forces is contained in the section "Uruguay" in Adrian J. English's *Regional Defence Profile, No. 1: Latin America*. For development of the armed forces since 1980, the reader must search through issues of the *Latin American Weekly Report*, the *Latin America Report* produced by the Joint Publications Research Service, and the *Daily Report: Latin America* put out by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Current order-of-battle information is available in the International Institute of Strategic Studies' excellent annual, *The Military Balance*. The best overview of conditions of public order is contained in the sections on Uruguay in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, a report submitted annually by the United States Department of State to the United States Congress. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Table
1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors
2 Population Size and Density by Department, 1985 Census
3 Ranking of Departments by Level of Development, 1978
4 Population, Selected Years, 1769–2020
5 Income Distribution by Area, 1986
6 Decline of Real Wages, 1968–82
7 Evolution of Real Wages, 1981–89
8 Decline of Real Minimum Wage, 1981–89
9 Key Economic Indicators, 1985–89
10 Public-Sector Finances, 1983–87
11 Public-Sector Expenditures, Selected Years, 1980–87
12 Public-Sector Revenues, 1980, 1984, and 1986
13 Agricultural and Fisheries Production, 1983–88
14 Selected Autonomous Entities, 1990
15 Manufacturing Production and Employment by Sector, 1987
16 Balance of Payments, 1984–88
17 Principal Political Parties, Factions, and Candidates, Elections of November 26, 1989
18 Principal Newspapers, 1990
19 Major Army Equipment, 1990
20 Major Navy Equipment, 1990
21 Major Air Force Equipment, 1990
### Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

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<td>(Centigrade)</td>
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### Table 2. Population Size and Density by Department, 1985 Census

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<td>Canelones</td>
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<td>Cerro Largo</td>
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<td>Colonia</td>
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<td>Durazno</td>
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<td>Flores</td>
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<td>Maldonado</td>
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<td>Montevideo</td>
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<td>Paysandú</td>
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<td>Salto</td>
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* Persons per square kilometer.

Table 3. Ranking of Departments by Level of Development, 1978

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<td>2</td>
<td>Maldonado</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Colonia</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Paysandú</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lavalleja</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soriano</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Flores</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Salto</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Canelones</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Rocha</td>
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</tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Durazno</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Río Negro</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>San José</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Treinta y Tres</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Artigas</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Cerro Largo</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Tacuarembó</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Rivera</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4. Population, Selected Years, 1769–2020 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1769</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2,186,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1796</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2,193,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2,596,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>128,000</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,788,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>132,000</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,908,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>223,000</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,955,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3,081,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>712,000</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3,152,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1,043,000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3,264,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1,294,000</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>3,679,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,699,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures for 1852, 1860, 1908, 1963, 1975, and 1985 are census results; figures for other years to 1988 are estimates; figures for 1995, 2000, and 2020 are projections. All figures are rounded off to the nearest thousand.
### Table 5. Income Distribution by Area, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Percentage Share of Household Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lowest 20 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montevideo</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department capitals</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of interior</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 6. Decline of Real Wages, 1968–82 (1968 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th>Public Sector</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 7. Evolution of Real Wages, 1981–89 (fourth quarter 1984 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th>Public Sector</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information from *Busqueda* [Montevideo], No. 540, June 14–20, 1990, 29.
### Table 8. Decline of Real Minimum Wage, 1981–89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* March 1973 = 100.

Source: Based on information from Búsqueda [Montevideo], No. 539, June 7–13, 1990, 27.

### Table 9. Key Economic Indicators, 1985–89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic product (GDP) *2</td>
<td>5,204</td>
<td>6,382</td>
<td>7,734</td>
<td>7,944</td>
<td>8,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth *3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force *4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate *3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate *5</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange rate *6</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign debt *2</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>5,238</td>
<td>5,888</td>
<td>6,330</td>
<td>6,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Preliminary.
2 In millions of United States dollars.
3 In percentages; real GDP growth takes inflation into account.
4 In percentages.
5 In Uruguayan new pesos (for value of the Uruguayan new peso—see Glossary) to United States dollars.
6 In Uruguayan new pesos (for value of the Uruguayan new peso—see Glossary) to United States dollars.
Table 10. Public-Sector Finances, 1983–87
(in millions of Uruguayan new pesos) *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taxes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>3,339</td>
<td>3,599</td>
<td>8,616</td>
<td>18,086</td>
<td>30,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>1,951</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>4,414</td>
<td>9,829</td>
<td>19,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods and services</td>
<td>15,718</td>
<td>24,037</td>
<td>48,750</td>
<td>95,781</td>
<td>163,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External trade</td>
<td>3,851</td>
<td>6,129</td>
<td>8,936</td>
<td>15,937</td>
<td>32,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payroll</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>2,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total taxes</strong></td>
<td>25,081</td>
<td>35,860</td>
<td>71,500</td>
<td>141,001</td>
<td>248,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nontax revenues</strong></td>
<td>4,204</td>
<td>3,937</td>
<td>5,197</td>
<td>8,850</td>
<td>22,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total revenues</strong></td>
<td>29,285</td>
<td>39,797</td>
<td>76,697</td>
<td>149,851</td>
<td>270,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General services</td>
<td>4,777</td>
<td>6,675</td>
<td>12,001</td>
<td>23,724</td>
<td>41,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>5,345</td>
<td>7,238</td>
<td>11,415</td>
<td>19,049</td>
<td>29,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td>4,090</td>
<td>7,689</td>
<td>16,261</td>
<td>32,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>2,001</td>
<td>2,384</td>
<td>4,824</td>
<td>10,782</td>
<td>18,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security</td>
<td>13,992</td>
<td>17,485</td>
<td>28,735</td>
<td>44,530</td>
<td>83,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7,632</td>
<td>17,601</td>
<td>26,761</td>
<td>46,824</td>
<td>88,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditures</strong></td>
<td>36,855</td>
<td>55,473</td>
<td>91,425</td>
<td>161,170</td>
<td>292,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficit</strong></td>
<td>7,570</td>
<td>15,676</td>
<td>14,728</td>
<td>11,319</td>
<td>22,049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For value of the Uruguayan new peso—see Glossary.


Table 11. Public-Sector Expenditures, Selected Years, 1980–87
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital expenditures</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current transfers and subsidies</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial investment and net lending</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest payments</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of goods and services</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, Washington, 1989, 481-84.
# Table 12. Public-Sector Revenues, 1980, 1984, and 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenues</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taxes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods and services</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External trade</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total taxes</strong></td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nontax revenues</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


# Table 13. Agricultural and Fisheries Production, 1983-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livestock products</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef and veal</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutton and lamb</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total livestock products</strong></td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crops</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>124</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soybeans</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total crops</strong></td>
<td>847</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fisheries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentine hake</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic croaker</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Striped weakfish</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total fisheries</strong></td>
<td>144</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| AFE     | Administración de los Ferrocarriles del Estado  
(State Railways Administration) |
| ANCAP   | Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcohol, y  
Portland  
(National Administration of Fuels, Alcohol, and Portland Cemetery) |
| ANDEBU  | Asociación Nacional de Broadcasters Uruguayos  
(National Association of Uruguayan Broadcasters) |
| ANEP    | Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos  
(National Association of Public Employees) |
| ANP     | Administración Nacional de Puertos  
(National Administration of Ports) |
| ANTEL   | Administración Nacional de Telecomunicaciones  
(National Telecommunications Administration) |
| BPS     | Banco de Previsión Social  
(Social Welfare Bank) |
| BROU    | Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay  
(Bank of Uruguay) |
| COCAP   | Consejo de Capacitación Profesional  
(Professional Training Council) |
| CONADI  | Comisión Nacional de Informática  
(National Informatics Commission) |
| INC     | Instituto Nacional de Colonización  
(National Land Settlement Institute) |
| OSE     | Administración de Obras Sanitarias del Estado  
(State Sanitary Works Administration) |
| PLUNA   | Primeras Líneas Uruguayas de Navegación Aérea  
(Uruguayan National Airlines) |
| SODRE   | Servicio Oficial de Difusión Radiotelevisión y Espectáculos  
(Official Radio and Television Service) |
| TAMU    | Transportes Aéreos Militares Uruguayos  
(Uruguayan Military Air Transport) |
| UTE     | Administración Nacional de Usinas y Transmisiones Eléctricas  
(National Administration for the Generation and Transmission of Electricity) |
### Table 15. Manufacturing Production and Employment by Sector, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Value'</th>
<th>Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverages</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles, apparel, and footwear</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum refining</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation goods</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel, metal, and metal products</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and paper products</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and appliances</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco products</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber products</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic products</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,350</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. In millions of United States dollars.
2. In thousands.


### Table 16. Balance of Payments, 1984-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current account</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise exports</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>1,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise imports</td>
<td>-732</td>
<td>-675</td>
<td>-814</td>
<td>-1,080</td>
<td>-1,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net other goods and services</td>
<td>-332</td>
<td>-309</td>
<td>-231</td>
<td>-242</td>
<td>-280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net transfers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance</td>
<td>-129</td>
<td>-119</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>-132</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital account</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct investment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio investment</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other long-term capital</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other short-term capital</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>-134</td>
<td>-156</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital account balance</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>-74</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net errors and omissions</td>
<td>-121</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>-68</td>
<td>-209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart items</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptional financing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other liabilities</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in reserves</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-43</td>
<td>-250</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>-37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(- means increase)

### Table 17. Principal Political Parties, Factions, and Candidates, Elections of November 26, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colorado Party</td>
<td>United Batllismo (Batallismo Unido—BU) (right-of-center)</td>
<td>Senator Jorge Batlle Ibáñez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Colorado)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colorado and Batllist Union (Unión Colorada y Batllista—UCB) (right-of-center)</td>
<td>Jorge Pacheco Areco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Social—MAS) (left-of-center)</td>
<td>Hugo Fernández Faingold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>Herrerist Movement (Movimiento Herrerista) (right-of-center)</td>
<td>Senator Luis Alberto Lacalle de Herrera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Partido Nacional)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La Rocha National Movement (Movimiento Nacional de La Rocha—MNR) (left-of-center)</td>
<td>Senator Carlos Julio Perez de Zumarán</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For the Fatherland (Por la Patria—PLP) (centrist)</td>
<td>Senator Alberto Sáenz de Zumarán</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Front</td>
<td>Left-of-center coalition of communist and socialist parties, Tupamaros, and eleven other small parties</td>
<td>General (Retired) Liber Seregni Mosquera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Frente Amplio)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Sector</td>
<td>Integration Movement (Movimiento de Integración—MI) coalition (left-of-center)</td>
<td>Senator Hugo Batalla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Nuevo Espacio)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Coalition consisted of Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano—PDC), Civic Union (Unión Cívica—UC), and People's Government Party (Partido por el Gobierno del Pueblo—PGP).*
Table 18. Principal Newspapers, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Circulation and Frequency</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Date Established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Día .............</td>
<td>100,000, daily; 150,000, Sunday</td>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>1886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Diario ..........</td>
<td>80,000, evening</td>
<td>Independent Colorado</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diario Oficial .....</td>
<td>Morning</td>
<td>Official gazette</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaceta Comercial ...</td>
<td>4,500, morning weekly</td>
<td>Independent leftist</td>
<td>1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Hora ............</td>
<td>Morning</td>
<td>Broad Front</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Mañana ..........</td>
<td>40,000, morning</td>
<td>Independent Colorado</td>
<td>1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundo Color ........</td>
<td>4,500, evening</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Opinión ..........</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>UCB</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El País ............</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>Conservative Blanco</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Razón ...........</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Últimas Noticias ...</td>
<td>19,000, evening</td>
<td>Moon Unification Church</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. — not available.

1 Unión Colorada y Batlista (Colorado and Battlist Union).
2 Movimiento Nacional de La Rocha (La Rocha National Movement).
### Table 19. Major Army Equipment, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>In Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tanks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-24 Chaffee light tanks</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-41A1 Bulldog light tanks</td>
<td>Belgium (United States-made)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scorpion light tanks</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>15 (more on order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armored vehicles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-3A1 White armored cars</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN-4-RM-62 armored cars</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M113 armored personnel carriers</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condor armored personnel carriers</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE-3 Jararaca armored reconnaissance vehicles</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE-9 Cascavel armored reconnaissance vehicles</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAL 7.62mm assault rifles</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bofors M-1902 75mm, towed</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Swedish-made)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-101A1 105mm howitzers</td>
<td>South Korea (United States-made)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-114A1 155mm, towed</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 81mm mortars</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107mm mortars</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-18 57mm recoilless rifles</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-40A1 106mm recoilless rifles</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antitank weapons</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milan 106mm antitank guns</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air defense weapons</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-167 Vulcan 20mm air defense guns</td>
<td>South Korea (United States-made)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bofors L/60 40mm air defense guns</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.
Table 20. Major Navy Equipment, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>In Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Escorts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commandant Rivière-class frigate</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealey-class frigate</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannon-class destroyer escort</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auk-class corvette</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patrol craft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigilante-class large patrol craft</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salto-class large patrol craft</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large patrol craft</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small patrol craft</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miscellaneous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant-class minesweeper</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM 6 landing craft</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD-43-class landing craft</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker 2</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training ship</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohoe-class salvage vessel</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport vessel 2</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naval aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grumman SA 2A/G Trackers</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech Super King Air 200T</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-28 Frennecks armed trainers</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech T-34 B/C</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech TC-45</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell 47 helicopter</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell 222 helicopter</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASA C-212-200 Aviocar</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikorsky SH-34 helicopters</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piper PA-18 Super Cub trainers</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN-7 trainers</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.

1 To be replaced by Commandant Rivière-class frigates on order.

2 Under civilian charter.
## Table 21. Major Air Force Equipment, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>In Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American AT-6A Texan</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech T-34A/B Mentor and T-6</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna T-41D Mescalero</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Light attack</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMA IA-58B Pucará</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna A-37B Dragonflies</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed AT-33 Shooting Stars</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liaison</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna U-17A Skywagon</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 182</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 310</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piper PA-18 Super Cub</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piper PA-23</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech Queen Air 80</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASA C-212 Aviocar</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embraer EMB-110</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fokker F-27</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairchild-Hiller FH-227</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas C-47</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embraer EMB-110B1</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander 680</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helicopters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell 212</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell UH-1B</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell UH-1H</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiller UH-23F</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Chapter 4


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Chapter 5

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272
ALADI (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración)—Latin American Integration Association. Headquartered in Montevideo, ALADI was established in August 1980 to replace the twenty-year-old Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). ALADI’s members included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Instead of uniform tariff cuts, ALADI advocated a regional tariff preference for goods originating in member states and tariffs scaled according to a member country’s level of economic development: most developed, intermediate, or least developed.

autonomous entities (entes autónomos)—Autonomous government agencies or state enterprises performing various industrial, commercial, or social services. The constitution stipulated that these bodies were to have a degree of autonomy or decentralization as established by laws enacted with the approval of an absolute majority of the full membership of each chamber of the General Assembly. They were administered by five- to seven-member boards of directors or directors general. Members were either elected by the Senate or appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate. The degree of autonomy or decentralization varied. For example, the constitution stipulated that postal, customs, port authority, and public health services were not to be fully decentralized, but rather granted only as much autonomy as was compatible with control by the executive. The autonomous agencies could be divided into two general classifications: the first was concerned with education, welfare, and culture; the second, with industry and commerce. In the first classification, autonomous agencies supervised the University of the Republic and the councils for secondary and elementary education, as well as the training for teachers. Others were concerned with radio, television, the theater, housing, welfare, and social security. In the second classification, agencies supervised the waterworks, fishing industry, ports, national merchant marine, and production of petroleum products, cement, alcoholic beverages, and electric power. In the commercial field, autonomous agencies supervised the Central Bank of Uruguay, the Social Welfare Bank, the State Insurance Bank, and the Mortgage Bank.
A three-fifths vote of the full membership of both chambers of the General Assembly was required for the passage of a law to allow the admission of private capital in the organization or expansion of the assets of any of the autonomous entities, and the contribution of private capital, if allowed, was never to be greater than that of the national government. The state could also participate in the industrial, agricultural, or commercial activities of enterprises formed by workers' cooperatives, if it had the consent of the enterprise. The autonomous entities could not conduct any business not specifically assigned to them by law, nor could they expend any of their resources for purposes foreign to their usual activities.

consumer price index (CPI)—A statistical measure of sustained change in the price level weighted according to spending patterns.

Enterprise for the Americas Initiative—A plan announced by President George H.W. Bush on June 27, 1990, calling for the United States to negotiate agreements with selected Latin American countries to reduce their official debt to the United States and make funds available through this restructuring for environmental programs; to stimulate private investment; and to take steps to promote extensive trade liberalization with the goal of establishing free trade throughout the Western Hemisphere.

fiscal year—Same as calendar year.

GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)—An intergovernmental agency related to the United Nations and headquartered in Geneva, GATT was established in 1948 as a multilateral treaty with the aim of liberalizing and stabilizing world trade. GATT's fundamental principles included non-discriminatory trade among members, protection of domestic trade through the customs tariff, and agreement on tariff levels through negotiations among the contracting parties. The Uruguay Round of major multilateral trade negotiations, the eighth such round of negotiations, began at Punta del Este in September 1986.

GDP (gross domestic product)—A measure of the total value of goods and services produced by the domestic economy during a given period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, compensation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of capital). The income arising from investments and possessions owned abroad is not included. Hence, the term domestic is used to distinguish GDP from GNP (q.v.).
Gross National Product (GNP)—The total market value of all final goods and services produced by an economy during a year. Obtained by adding GDP (q.v.) and the income received from abroad by residents, less payments remitted abroad to non-residents.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans often carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients.

Import-substitution industrialization—An economic development strategy that emphasizes the growth of domestic industries, often by import protection using tariff and nontariff measures. Proponents favor the export of industrial goods over primary products.

Peso—The traditional unit of currency, first issued in 1862. Replaced by the Uruguayan new peso (q.v.) in 1975 at the rate of 1,000 old pesos for each new peso. The term peso is often used as a short form to refer to the Uruguayan new peso in the post-1975 era.

terms of trade—The number of units that must be given up for one unit of goods by each party, e.g., nation, to a transaction. The terms of trade are said to move in favor of the party that gives up fewer units of goods than it did previously for one unit of goods received and against the party that gives up more units of goods for one unit of goods received. In international economics, the concept of “terms of trade” plays an important role in evaluating exchange relationships between nations.

Uruguayan new peso (N$Ur)—The Uruguayan unit of currency, consisting of 100 centésimos. Often referred to in short form as the peso. The Uruguayan new peso was introduced in 1975 to replace the old peso at the rate of 1,000 old pesos for each new peso. Since 1975 the exchange rate, linked to the United States dollar, has been frequently adjusted, with the value of the new peso declining. The average exchange rate per US$1 was N$Ur101 in 1985; N$Ur152 in 1986; N$Ur227 in 1987; N$Ur359 in 1988; N$Ur606 in 1989; and N$Ur1,171 in 1990. So extreme has the devaluation of the peso been that in 1991 Uruguayan authorities began to consider introducing another new peso, equal in value to 1,000 units of the existing new peso.
value-added tax (VAT)—An incremental tax applied to the value added at each stage of the processing of a raw material or the production and distribution of a commodity. It is calculated as the difference between the product value at a given stage and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs. The VAT is a form of indirect taxation, and its impact on the ultimate consumer is the same as that of a sales tax.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest of developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in less developed countries. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the IMF (q.v.).
abortion, 78
Acción, 34
Accounts Tribunal, 164–65, 170; duties of, 164; members of, 164–65
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), 82–83
Act of Chapultepec, 192, 218
Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcohol, y Portland. See National Administration of Fuels, Alcohol, and Portland Cement
Administración Nacional de Puertos. See National Administration of Ports
Administración Nacional de Telecomunicaciones. See National Telecommunications Administration
Administración Nacional de Usinas y Transmisiones Eléctricas. See National Administration for the Generation and Transmission of Electricity
Advanced Democracy Party, 177
Advance Grouping, 26
AEBU. See Uruguayan Association of Bank Employees
Africa: immigrants from, 65; relations with, 197
agricultural: enterprises, 120; expansion, 35, 56; exports, 124; markets, liberalization of, 44; practices, 99; reform, 10, 24
agricultural production, 123–25; of citrus, 125; of corn, 124–25; decline in, 112; labor force in, 120; land area dedicated to, 123; increase in, 119; methods, 118, 124; as percentage of gross domestic product, 109, 118; stagnation in, 118–19; subsidies, 124; of wheat, 124
agricultural products: citrus, 125; corn, 124–25; as inputs to manufacturing, 118; prices, 28; rice, 124; as source of foreign exchange, 119; wheat, 124
agriculture, 118–27; decline of, 97; effect of erosion on, 124; and industry, link between, 109; in interior, 56–57; labor force in, 115; land tenure, 120; land use, 119–20; in littoral, 57; and manufacturing, relationship between, 118; under military government, 45; research and development in, 24
Aguerrondo, Mario, 40, 41
Aguirre Ramírez, Gonzalo, 175, 182
AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency syndrome
air force, 139, 209–10, 213, 221; aircraft of, 208; commands of, 221; equipment of, 204, 208, 209–10; mission of, 204; number of personnel in, 221; organization of, 221; origins of, 209; training, 221
Air Force Academy, 209, 221
Air Technical School, 221
ALADI. See Latin American Integration Association
Alfonsín, Raúl, 146
Algeria, 197
Alliance for Progress, 39
Allies, 192
Alvarez Armelino, Gregorio, xxix, 46, 158, 189
Amézaga, Juan José, 32
Amézaga administration, 33–34; civil liberties restored under, 33
amnesty: for military, xxix–xxx, 179–80, 186, 212, 226; for political prisoners, 158, 204; for Tupamaros, 92, 158, 177, 189, 224
Amnesty International, xxix, 43, 179–80 amnesty law, 179–80, 186, 212; referendum on, 180
ANCAP. See National Administration of Fuels, Alcohol, and Portland Cement
ANDEBU. See National Association of Uruguayan Broadcasters
Animal Welfare Ecological Green Party (EE–PV), 176
ANP. See National Administration of Ports
ANR. See National Republican Association
Antarctica, 196
ANTEI. See National Telecommunications Administration
Aquí, 190
Arce, Liber, 40
architecture, 59–60
Argentina, xxix, 11; competition with,
Uruguay: A Country Study

xxxiii; emigration to, 69; as export market, 129, 145, 146; in Great War, xxvi; independence from, xxvi; influence of, 12, 14; integration with, 197, 198; invasions by, 191; military relations with, 217; relations with, 192, 195; rivalry of, with Brazil, xxvi, 3, 191; tourists from, 140; trade with, xxxii, 44; in Triple Alliance, xxvi—xxvii, 15, 207; war against (1839—42), 12

Arias de Saavedra, Hernando, 6
Arismendi, Rodney, 176
armed forces (see also military), 42; career in, 210; civic action programs of, 213; disaster-relief assistance by, 213; doctrine, xxx; history of, 204—8; insignia, 224; number of personnel in, 203; operational control of, 216; organic law, 211, 216—17; president as commander in chief of, xxx, 161, 216; ranks, 221—24; recruitment for, 214; reserve, 214; service commanders, 216—17; training of, by United States, 192; uniforms, 221

army, 204—8, 209, 218—19; Command and Staff School, 219; corps of, 219; deployment of, 204; early, 206; equipment of, 204, 208; ground force arms, 219; influence of, 207; intelligence, 217; Military Aeronautics Branch, 209; Military Geographic Service, 213; mission of, 218; number of personnel in, 218; officer training, 219; organization of, 204, 218—19; politicization of, 207; reduction of, 207—8; reorganization of, 207—8; School of Arms and Services, 219; size of, 207

Army Intelligence Service, 210
Artigas, José Gervasio, 3; background of, 8; death of, 10; exiled, 10; military campaigns of, xxvi, 8—9, 204—6

Artigas Department, 56; development in, 62; drought in, 124; farm workers union in, 74; rainfall in, 55; ranches in, 119, 122; temperatures in, 55

ASCEEP. See Students’ Social and Cultural Association for Public Education
Asociación de Empleados Bancarios del Uruguay. See Uruguayan Association of Bank Employees
Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración. See Latin American Integration

Association
Asociación Nacional de Broadcasters Uruguayos. See National Association of Uruguayan Broadcasters
Asociación Nacional Republicana. See National Republican Association
Asociación Rural. See Rural Association
Asociación Social y Cultural de Estudiantes de la Enseñanza Pública. See Students’ Social and Cultural Association for Public Education
Association of Newspapers of Uruguay, 190
Association of Professors of the University of the Republic, 73
Atlantic Ocean, xxiv
Atlántida, 60
Australia: emigration to, 69
autonomous agencies. See autonomous entities
autonomous entities, 25, 104, 129—30, 169; decrease in spending by, 113; effect of, on economy, 104; employment in, 115; largest, 129; as percentage of gross domestic product, 107; privatization of, xxxiv; role of, in government administration, 161—62; under Sanguinetti, 130

Axis, 192
Ayuí, 9
Azucitrus citrus plant, 130

Bahrain, 197
balance of payments, 28, 106, 112, 145—46
balance of trade, 98, 142, 144, 145; under military government, 108—9; positive, 102
Baldomir, Alfredo, 31, 192; political freedom restored under, 32
Baldomir administration, 32; neutrality of, in World War II, 32
Banco Comercial. See Commercial Bank
Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay. See Bank of Uruguay
Banco de Seguros del Estado. See State Insurance Bank
Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay. See Mortgage Bank of Uruguay
Banda Oriental, xxv, xxvi, 3, 8, 204; annexed by Brazil, 10
banking crisis, 38, 45, 123, 134; government intervention in, 45, 135
banking system, 20–21, 110, 132, 134–36; control by, of foreign currency sales, 30; effect of Great Depression on, 28; foreign influence in, 71; money laundering in, xxxi–xxxii, 136, 226; net worth of, 135; offshore transactions, xxxi, 136; regulations on, xxxi; secrecy laws in, xxxi
Bank of Uruguay (BROU), 21, 59, 134; in banking crisis, 135; foreign currency sales under, 35; foreign exchange under, 28; gold reserves of, 34; nationalized, 22–24; state control of, 110
banks: commercial, 134; deregulation of, 108, 134; dollarization of, 98, 114, 123, 134–35; foreign, 44; internationalization of, 136; problems in, 109; savings, 134
barbed wire, 18, 56, 102
Barrán National Party, 175
Barrios Tassano, Luis A., 193
Bases, 16
Batalla, Hugo, 47, 176, 177, 178
Batlle, César, 34
Batlle, Lorenzo, 34
Batlle Berres, Luis, 4, 34, 41, 180; agenda of, 34–35; cooperation of, with Herrera, 35; death of, 38; industrial policies of, 128
Batlle Ibáñez, Jorge, xxiv, 41, 44, 174, 175, 180–82; background of, 180; campaign of, 180–81
Batlle y Grau, Lorenzo, 17, 19, 21, 180
Batlle y Ordóñez, José, 4, 19, 34, 103, 180; collegial executive proposed by, 154; coparticipation proposed by, 156; death of, 27
Batlle y Ordóñez administration, 4, 21–26; capital punishment abolished under, 159; foreign policy under, 191; labor legislation under, 104, 115; political clashes under, 207; secularization under, 91; social reform under, xxvii, 22, 24–26, 27, 103, 104; state control of economy under, 104
Batllism, 103–4, 115; legacy of, 107
Batllismo Unido. See United Batllism
Batllist Reaffirmation Movement (MRB), 174
Batllists, 31, 32, 174
Battle of Carpiñera, 12
Battle of Las Piedras, 8–9
Battle of the Río de la Plata, 32, 208
Baygorria Dam, 132
beef (see also meat-processing industry), 56; prices, 122, 123, 134; production of, 105, 122; salting enterprises, 12, 102; subsidies for, in European Community, 107, 109, 119
beef exports, xxv, xxviii, 12, 56, 63, 97, 99–100, 104; attempts to revitalize, 113; decline in, 119
Berreta, Tomás, 34
Berro, Bernardo, 16–17
Biological Weapons Convention, 218
birth control, 66; practice of, 78
birth rate, 65–66; in rural areas, 78
Blanco Acevedo, Eduardo, 31
Blanco. See National Party
Bollandengues Corps, 8
Bohane people, 6
Boisson Lanza Pact, 42
Bolivia: economic integration with, 146–47, 198
Bonaparte, Joseph, 8
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 8
Bond International Gold, 131
Borda, Juan Idiarte, 19; assassinated, 20
Bordaberry, Juan Domingo R., 36
Bordaberry Arocena, Juan Marfa, xxviii–xxix, 5, 36, 41; resignation of, xxix, 43
Bordaberry administration, 189; destruction of Tupamaros under, 210; economic policies of, 5, 41; military takeover of, 203, 211; repression under, 5, 43
borders, 14
Botswana, 197
Brady, Nicolas, 144
Brady Plan, 144, 198
Braga, Enrique, 183
Brazil, xxix, 11; annexation of Banda Oriental by, 10; competition from, xxiii, xxviii; emigration to, 69; as export market, 129, 145, 146; in Great War, xxvi; immigration from, 15; influence of, 12; integration with, 197, 198; intervention of, 14–15; invasions by, 191; military relations with, 217; relations with, 192, 195, 196; rivalry of, with Argentina, xxvi, 3, 191; tourists from, 140; trade with, xxxii, 16; treaties with, 14; in Triple Alliance, xxvi–xxvii, 15, 207; war with, 3
Uruguay: A Country Study

Britain: control of public services by, 18, 30, 35; debt rescheduling with, 30; enterprises of, 35; immigration from, 15, 102; influence of, 191; intervention of, in Great War, xxvi, 13-14, 206; invasion of Uruguay by, xxv, 8; investment by, 24; loans from, 18; occupation of Montevideo by, xxv-xxvi; relations with, 31, 35, 192; in South Atlantic War, 195; trade with, 28

Brito, Mariano, 183

Broad Front, xxix, xxx, xxxv, 32, 40, 43, 44, 47, 151, 152, 172, 174, 176-78, 187; communist sector, 177; constituency of, 176; factions in, 176, 177; formation of, 92, 178; in 1989 election, 182; opposition of, to amnesty for military leaders, 180; opposition of, to Mercosur, xxxiii; organization of, 178; organs of, 190; outlawed, 176; platform of, 176

Broad Front Unity Faction (CUFO), 178

BROU. See Bank of Uruguay

Brum, Baltasar, 26, 29

BU. See United Batilism

budget deficit, xxiii, xxxv, 28, 80, 97, 111-12; Bank of Uruguay's role in, 135; inflationary means of financing, 143; after Korean War, 111; under military regime, 108; as percentage of gross domestic product, 113

Buenos Aires: migration to, 68; rivalry of, with Montevideo, 3, 7

Bush, George H.W., xxxii, 198

Búsqueda, xxiv, xxx, 182, 186; circulation of, 189-90; editorial policy of, 189

Cabot, Sebastian, 6

Campisteguy, Juan, 26

Canal Zone, 198

Canelones Department, 60, 209; development in, 62; farming in, 119-20; living standards in, 74; population of, 57, 66

capital punishment, 25; abolished, 159

Capitán Curbelo Airport, 139

Caraballeda Declaration, 194

Carrillos, Lorenzo, 26

Carrasco Air Base, 221

Carrasco International Airport, 59, 139

Cartagena Consensus, 194, 195

Carter, Jimmy, 193, 216

Castro Ruz, Fidel, 194

Cat, Carlos, 188

Catalan people, 6

Catholic Action, 188

Catholic Church, Roman, 188

Catholic Family Movement, 188

Catholicism, Roman (see also church-state conflict; church-state separation), 91, 159; influence of, 66, 77; as official religion, 11; restrictions on, 20, 77

Catholics: political parties of, 92, 188; practicing, 188

Catholic University of Uruguay, 87, 89, 188

Catholic Workers' Circle, 188

cattle, xxv; economic importance of, 12, 16; introduction of, from Europe, 6, 100; methods of raising, 100-101; number of, 120, 123; production, 102; as source of wealth, 3

cattle industry: beef, 56; dairy, 56, 57, 123; effect of Great Depression on, 28; effect of Great War on, 14

cattle ranchers, 28

cattle ranches, 56, 63

caudillos, 11, 206; patronage by, 72

CBI. See Independent Batilist Faction

cemeteries, 17, 91
census of 1985, 57-58

Center of Information and Studies of Uruguay (CIESU), 90-91

Central Bank of Uruguay, 39, 59, 112, 123, 134, 144, 161

Centro de Informaciones y Estudios del Uruguay. See Center of Information and Studies of Uruguay

Centro de Investigaciones Económicas. See Economic Research Center

Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios del Desarrollo, Uruguay. See Interdisciplinary Center of Development Studies, Uruguay

Centro Latinoamericano de Economía Humana. See Latin American Center for Human Economy

Cerro Largo Department, 56; development in, 62; ranches in, 119, 122

Cerrósimo, Pedro W., 175

Chamber of Commerce, 71

Chamber of Industry, 71

Chamber of Representatives, 29, 153, 182, 212; distribution of seats in, 173; members of, 162

280
Chamber of Senators. See Senate
Chaná people, 6
Charlone, César, 39
Charrúa people, xxv, 6
Chiarino, Juan Vicente, 179
children, 79
Chile: integration with, 198; tourists from, 141
China: relations with, 193, 196-97; Sanguinetti's visit to, 152, 196-97
Christian Democratic Party (PDC), 38, 90, 92, 176-77, 178, 190; organs of, 190
Christian Democratic Youth Movement, 188
church-state conflict (see also secularism), 17, 22
crunch-state separation, 25, 91, 154
CIEDUR. See Interdisciplinary Center of Development Studies, Uruguay
CIESU. See Center of Information and Studies of Uruguay
Ciganda, Humberto, 178, 179
CINVE. See Economic Research Center
Ciaplatine Province, xxvi, 10
citizens' rights, 25
Civic Union (UC), 46, 47, 151, 178; formed, 178
Civic Union of Uruguay (UCU), 22, 92, 178; opposition of, to amnesty for military leaders, 180
civil liberties: repression of, 5, 43; restored under Amézaga, 33; suspended, 40, 42
Civil Register, 19, 170, 171, 172
civil rights, 204; of women, 34
civil service, 168-69; as a career, 168; number of workers in, 169; training for, 169
CLAEH. See Latin American Center for Human Economy
cclimate, 55-56; rainfall, 55; seasons, 55; temperature, 55; weather, 55-56; winds, 56
CNH. See Herrerist National Council
CNT. See National Convention of Workers
coastal region, 60
Co-Co Pact. See Colorado-Communist Pact
Code of Criminal Procedure, 230
Coincidencia Nacional. See National Coincidence
"co-habitation arrangement." See Vázquez, Tabaré
collegiado. See collegial executive
collegial executive (see also National Council of Administration; National Council of Government), xxiii, xxvii-xxviii, 25, 28, 151; conflicts of, with president, 155; eliminated, 29, 39; implemented, 36, 154; ineffectiveness of, 156; proposed, 154; reestablished, 155
Colonia, 57, 139, 147
Colonia del Sacramento, xxv, 7
Colonia Department, 57; development in, 62; farming in, 119
Colorado and Batllist Union (UCB), 39, 155, 174, 182; factions of, 175
Colorado-Communist Pact, 187
Colorado Party (Colorado), xxix, xxxiv, xxxv, 18, 19, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 63, 151, 152, 156, 158, 172, 173, 190; affiliation with, 173; and amnesty for military leaders, 180; army of, 206; clashes of, with National Party, 207; Colorado-Communist Pact signed by, 187; division in, 25, 31; factions of, 173, 174; income redistribution under, 77; jobs dispensed by, 107; National Executive Committee, 175; in 1989 election, 182; origins of, 4, 12; platform of, 4, 173, 174, 181; political control by, 101-3; profile of members of, xxvi, 72; purge of, 44
Colorado Party for Tradition (Sosism), 26
Colorado Party-General Rivera (Riverists), 25
Comando Juan Antonio Lavalleja. See Juan Antonio Lavalleja Command
Comisión de Productividad, Precios, e Ingresos. See Productivity, Prices, and Income Commission
Command and General Staff School, 221
Command and Staff School, 219
Commercial Bank, 134, 135; sale of, xxxi
communication, 18, 19, 132, 140, 213; broadcast facilities, 140
Communism, 177; as labor ideology, 116
Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU), xxx, 26, 31, 32, 116, 176; allied with Christian Democrats, 92; banned, 43; Communist-Communist Pact signed by, 187
compadrazgo, 78
Conae. See National Council for Education

Index

281
Conapro. See National Conciliatory Program
Concertación Nacional Programática. See National Conciliatory Program
Confederation of State Civil Service Organizations, 73
Consejo de Estado. See Council of State
Consejo de la Nación. See Council of the Nation
Consejo de Seguridad Nacional. See National Security Council
Consejo Nacional de Administración. See National Council of Administration
Consejo Nacional de Educación. See National Council for Education
Consejo Nacional de Gobierno. See National Council of Government
Consejo Nacional Herrerista. See Herrerist National Council
constitutional reform, 155
constitution of 1830, 11, 152, 153-54; courts under, 154; General Assembly under, 153; Neighbors’ Council under, 154; president under, 153; violations of, 154
constitution of 1917, 25, 152, 154-55; collegial executive under, 154; coparticipation under, 154; president under, 154; separation of church and state under, 154
constitution of 1934, 29, 152; collegial executive under, 155; Council of Ministers under, 155; Supreme Court of Justice under, 155
constitution of 1942, 33, 155-56
constitution of 1952, 36, 152; coparticipation under, 156
constitution of 1967, 39, 152, 156-59; amendment procedure for, 157; coparticipation under, 156; education under, 159; General Assembly under, 156; legislation under, 156; military decrees amending, 157, 158; new text for, 158-59; Permanent Commission under, 156; president under, 156, 228
constitution of 1980 (military): rejected, xxix, 158, 203, 212
Constitution of the United States, 9
construction, 76, 130-31; decline in, 112; growth of, 131
Contadora Support Group (see also Group of Eight), 193
Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, 164, 165; duties of, 165; members of, 165
Convención Nacional de Trabajadores. See National Convention of Workers
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 191
coparticipation, xxvii, 17, 33, 156, 172-73; ended, 21, 39; initiated, 154, 154; mandated, 36
Coprin. See Productivity, Prices, and Income Commission
Corriente Batlista Independiente. See Independent Batlist Faction
Corriente de Unidad Frentamplista. See Broad Front Unity Faction
Corriente Popular Nacionalista. See Nationalist Popular Faction
Corriente Renovadora. See Renewal Faction
Corte Suprema de Justicia. See Supreme Court of Justice
Cosena. See National Security Council
Côte d’Ivoire, 197
Council of Ministers, 155, 159; duties of, 161-62; members of, 161-62
Council of State, 32, 42, 43, 157, 211, 216
Council of the Nation, 157, 212, 216
coup d’état: of 1898, 20; of 1933, 29, 155, 208
court system (see also under individual courts), 165-68, 230; appellate, 167; justice of the peace, 168; juvenile, 231; military, 214-15
CPN. See Nationalist Popular Faction
crime, 226
criminal justice, 204, 229-32
criollos, 8, 64-65
Crottogini, Juan José, 176
Cuadernos de Marcha, 190
Cuareim culture, 6
Cuba: relations with, 193, 194-95; trade with, 16, 194; visit of Vázquez to, xxxi
Cuestas, Juan Lindolfo, 20
CUFO. See Broad Front Unity Faction
currency: collapse of, 45; convertibility of, 44; devaluation of, 28, 30, 39, 135; market, 114
customs laws, 18
Customs Regulations Act (1815), 10
dairy industry, 56, 57, 123
Daverede, Julio, 179
debt: burden, 109; crisis, 143; domestic, 98, 99; foreign, 98, 111; policy, 143; ratio of, to gross domestic product, 143; service, 143–44, 145
Declaration of Colonia, 196
defense industry, 216
defense spending, 215–16; for equipment, 215; as percentage of government spending, 80, 215–16; as percentage of gross national product, 216; reduced, xxx, 203, 215
Demichelli Lizaso, Alberto, 43
Democratic Blanco Union (UBD), 37, 38
Democratic Traditionalism (Trademo), 174
departments (see also under individual departments), 11, 169–70
development plans: five-year, 41; ten-year, 39
DGID. See General Directorate of Defense Information
DGSS. See General Directorate of Social Security
Díaz de Solís, Juan, xxv, 6
diplomatic relations, 161
Dirección General de Información de Defensa. See General Directorate of Defense Information
Dirección General de Seguridad Social. See General Directorate of Social Security
“directing influence,” 19
dissidents, 38
Divisa Blanca. See White Emblem
divorce, 22, 24–25; grounds for, 77–78; legalized, 91; rate, 78
Doctrine of National Security, 43, 192
dollar: appreciation of, 143; decline of, 142
domestic goods, 103
domestic industries, 106; market for, xxxiv, 127, 128
domestic servants, 76, 78
double simultaneous vote, 171
drought, effect of: on agricultural production, 124; on hydroelectric generation, 145; on livestock production, 122
drug abuse, 82, 83, 226, 231
drug trafficking, 83, 136, 226, 231; United States policy on, 199, 209
Dumas, Alexandre, 13
Durazno, 209
Durazno Air Base, 221
Durazno Department, 56; development in, 62; ranches in, 119, 122
East Germany. See German Democratic Republic
Echegoyen, Martín R., 38
economic: austerity, xxx, xxxi, xxxiii; growth, 99; integration, 146–47, 193; reform, 25–26, 97; stabilization, 112; stagnation, xxviii, xxxiv
economic development, 35, 51, 179; in early twentieth century, 97; in interior region, 56
economic policies, 40, 111–14; under Bordaberry, 5, 41; under Sanguinetti, 112–13; as motivation for emigration, 68; military, 44, 45, 97, 112; of National Party, 5; of Pacheco, 5; of Végh, 45, 46
Economic Research Center (CINVE), 90
economic restructuring: measures, 107–8; under military regime, 107–9; results of, 108, 109
Economist, 144
economy, 12; Batllist legacy for, 107; in colonial period, 100–101; crisis of 1890, 20; decline of, in 1950s, 36, 100; foreign involvement in, 102; free-market, 38, 41; government’s role in, 97, 109, 111; informal sector of, 70, 74, 76; in littoral region, 57; under military regime, 107–9; postindependence, 101; stagnant, 69; state control of, 104
Economy Institute, 105
Ecuador, 198
education (see also under type of school), 51, 86–91; under Colorados, 89–91; compulsory, xxvii, 159; of elite, 70; evolution of, 88–89; free public, xxvii, xxviii, 69, 72, 80, 159; local jurisdiction over, 170; of middle class, 73, 78; under military rule, 89; origins of, 88–89; policy, 24; primary, 86; private, 70; reform of, 4, 19, 89; religious, 22; secondary, 39; spending on, 80–82, 89, 90; of women, 78
education system, 86–88; facilities of, 86; purges of, 88–89; teachers rehired by, 90; under Terra, 31
EE–PV. See Animal Welfare Ecological Green Party
elderly: poverty among, 76

Index
El Clarín, xxxii
El Día, 21, 34, 39

election of 1989, xxx, 152, 180-82; candidates in, 181-82; issues in, 181; outcome of, 182

elections, 159; campaign funds for, 172; of 1938, 31; of 1971, 40-41; of 1976, 43; of 1982, 46; of 1984, 47; schedule for, 171, 173; suspended, 43; tabulation of results of, 171

Elections Law, 20

Executive (see also collegial executive; president), 159-62; duties of, 161; powers of, 161

Export: economy, 105; markets, 129, 145, 146; policy, 119; sector, 107, 113

export earners, 60; beef, 63, 99-100; hides, 100; mutton, 99-100; wool, 63, 99-100

export earnings: effect of, on labor, 104; during Great Depression, 10; stagnation of, 111

export-oriented growth, 107

Exports, xxv, xxviii, 142; decline in earnings from, 100, 106, 143; diversification of, 99; emphasis on, 98, 109, 128-29; growth of, 108; in Korean War, 105; nontraditional, 145; subsidized, 108; value of, 104; volume of, 102

Embalse del Río Negro, 31, 55

emigration, 43, 65, 68-69; destinations for, 65, 69; effect of, on population growth, 62, 66; motivation for, 68-69, 88, 89, 188; statistics, 68-69

Eto-Ecologista—Partido Verde. See Animal Welfare Ecological Green Party

Europe: emigration to, 69; immigration from, 27; trade with, 16

European Community: beef subsidies in, 107, 109, 119; as export market, 145

Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), 195

Family: life, 77-80; ties, 78, 79

farmers, 74

Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios del Uruguay. See Federation of Uruguayan University Students

Federación Rural. See Rural Federation

Federal League, 9

Federal League for Rural Action (LFAR), 36, 37, 71

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany): relations with, 190

Federation of Uruguayan Sanitation Workers, 73

Federation of Uruguayan University Students (FEUU), 189

Ferdinand VII, 8

Fernández Faingold, Hugo, 174, 182

Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, 40, 41, 44, 47, 151, 175, 179

fertility, 66

FEUU. See Federation of Uruguayan University Students
Gillespie, Charles Guy, xxiii
Giró, Juan Francisco, 16
"Gironists of 73," 17
GNP. See gross national product
Golbery do Couto e Silva, Artur, 43
gold reserves, xxix, 34, 146
gold standard, 18
Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 196
government, civil: control of military by, 203; and labor, relationship between, 115-17, 118; reduction of spending by, 112; restoration of, 117, 151, 212; role of, in economy, 97, 109, 111; role of, in labor policy, 115
government, local, 169-70; administration of, 169; departmental board, 169, 170; governor of, 169, 170; mayor of, 169-70; powers of, 169
government, military, xxiii, 17-18, 107; balance of trade under, 108-9; banking under, 134; civil service abolished by, xxix, 168; crimes committed by, xxix-xxx; diplomacy under, 192; economic policies of, 44, 97, 112; ended, xxix; export policies of, 119, 128-29; human rights abuses by, 186, 203; initiation of, xxviii-xxix, 211; interest groups banned by, 189; judiciary under, 166; labor under, 116-17; personnel assignments under, 211; political repression under, 211; torture under, 211
government structure, 159-70; executive, 159-62; judiciary, 165-68; legislature, 162-65; public administration, 168-69; succession in, 162
Graf Spee, 32
Grauer, Julio César, 26, 29
Great Depression, xxviii, 28, 100, 111; exports during, 105; industry during, 128
Great War (1843-52), xxvi, 13-14; Argentina in, xxvi; effect of, on cattle industry, 14; governments in, 13; international intervention in, 13-14
Grito de Asencio Integration Movement, 177
Gros Espiell, Héctor, 183, 197
gross domestic product (GDP), xxiii, 51; agricultural production as percentage of, 109, 118; autonomous entities as percentage of, 107; budget deficit as percentage of, 113; decline in, 112; defense spending as percentage of, 216; fishing as percentage of, 109; foreign debt as percentage of, 142; growth of, xxx, 45, 98, 108, 109, 110; health care spending as percentage of, 80; industrial output as percentage of, 106, 109, 127, 128; livestock raising as percentage of, 106, 109; in 1990, 97; ratio of debt to, 143; service sector as percentage of, 110, 132
gross national product (GNP), 37, 216
Group of Eight (see also Contadora Support Group; Group of Rio), 193, 194, 198
Group of Rio, 198
Group of Seven, 198
Guarani people, xxv
Guerra Grande. See Great War
Gutiérrez Ruiz, Héctor, 43
Haedo, Eduardo Víctor, 38
Hail Mary, 188
Hanns-Seidel Foundation, 190
HDI. See Human Development Index
health care: causes of death, 82; coverage, 80; distribution of, 82; facilities, 80, 82, 83; immunizations, 84; private, 80; public, 72, 80, 83-84; spending on, 80, 84
health plans, 83-84
Herrera, Juan José de, 180
Herrera, Luis Alberto de, 25, 27, 36, 37, 151, 155; and coup of 1933, 29; cooperation of Battle Berres with, 35; death of, 37; opposition of, to United States bases, 32
Herrera y Obes, Julio, 19
Herrerist Movement, 175
Herrerist National Council (CNH), 175
Herrerists, 32, 38, 40, 41, 42, 155
highways. See roads
Honorary Commission for Imports and Exchange, 30
horses: introduction of, from Europe, 6, 100
hospitals: military, 83; public, 24, 80, 83
household composition, 78
housing, 59-60
Hudson, W.H., xxv
Human Development Index (HDI), xxiii, 51-52
human rights, 47, 48, 204; groups, 225-26; violations by military, 179, 186, 193, 203, 216, 226
hydroelectricity, 131-32, 145
hydrography, 52-55

IADB. See Inter-American Defense Board
IDB. See Inter-American Development Bank
Iglesias, Enrique, 193, 194
IMET. See International Military Education and Training
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
immigration, 15-16, 20, 24, 27, 51; from Africa, 65; from Brazil, 15; from Britain, 15, 102; effect of, xxvii; effect of, on ethnic composition, 64; effect of, on Montevideo, 102-3; from Europe, 27; from France, 16, 102; from Italy, xxvii, 15, 51, 65, 102; from Lebanon, 27; as source of labor, 106; from Spain, xxvii, 15, 16, 51, 102; from Syria, 27
impeachment, 162-64
imports: decline in, 106; effect of Great Depression on, 28; industrial, 145; limitations on, 30; sources of, 145
import-substitution industrialization, 35, 37, 71, 106, 111, 119, 128; shortcomings of, 106
import tariffs, 103; reduction of, 108
Imprensa Nacional. See National Printing Press
income distribution, 76-77, 97, 99, 106
independence, 152; declared, 11, 206; movement, 3, 8-11, 204-6
Independent Battlist Faction (CBI), 174
Independent Nationalists, 31, 32, 37
India, 197
Indians (see also under names of individual peoples), 10; genocide of, 6, 65, 206; resistance by, to European invaders, 3, 91
industrial development, 18; under Amézaga, 33; background of, 128-29; under Batlle Berres, 128; under Batlle y Ordóñez, 105-6; effect of Great Depression on, 28, 128
industrial growth: stagnation of, 106
industrial imports, 145
industrialists, 22
industrial output, 128; as percentage of gross domestic product, 106, 109, 127, 128
industry, xxiii, 127-32; and agriculture, link between, 109; domestic consumables, 99; growth of, 129; labor force in, 74, 115; under military government, 45, 108; problems in, 109; protectionist policy for, 24, 127-28; state control of, 27; Terra's support for, 30
INET. See National Institute of Technical Education
infant mortality, 82
inflation, xxiii, 80, 143; attempts to reduce, 99, 113, 117; factors in, 108; increasing, 106, 107, 114; in 1950s, 37; in 1960s, 38, 39, 107; in 1970s, 45, 107, 108; in 1980s, xxix, xxx, 98, 109, 110, 112, 113; in 1990s, xxxiv
infrastructure: development of regional, 147; modernization of, 131
Institute for the Scientific Nutrition of the People, 31
Institute of Social Sciences, 89
Institutional Act No. 1, 43
Instituto de Economía. See Economy Institute
Instituto Nacional de Educación Técnica. See National Institute of Technical Education
"Instructions of the Year Thirteen," 9
insurance companies, 110; privatization of, xxxi
Integration Movement (MI), 178
intellectuals, 38
Intelsat. See International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), 192, 218
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 193; loans from, 136
Inter-American Foundation, 90
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), 191, 192, 218
Interdisciplinary Center of Development Studies, Uruguay (CIEDUR), 91
interest groups, 73, 183-90
interest rates, 142-43
Interior Police, 228
interior region, 56-57; agriculture in, 56-57; departments in, 56; development in, 56-57; industry in, 56
International Development Agency, 90
international meetings, xxxi, 193

Index
Uruguay: A Country Study

International Military Education and Training (IMET), 216
International Monetary Fund (IMF), xxxiv, 5, 39, 112, 143
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 140, 191
international trade, 144—45
Interunion Workers' Assembly (or Ple num) (PIT), 46, 76, 187
investment: decline in, 111, 112; domestic, 97; foreign, 24; growth of, 108; public, 111, 130; by ranchers, 105, 106
Iraq, xxxii, 198
Israel: emigration to, 65
Italy: immigration from, xxvii, 15, 51, 65, 102; intervention of, in Great War, 13, 206; relations with, 31
Jackson, Geoffrey, 40
Jesuits, xxv, 17
Jews, 65, 92
John XXIII (Pope), 92
Juan Antonio Lavalleja Command, xxxv
judges: appointment of, 164, 166; of first instance, 167–68; justices of the peace, 168; lawyer judges, 167; requirements for, 166; terms of, 166
judicial system, 229—30; inmates under, 231; suggested changes to, 230; suspects under, 230; trials under, 230
judiciary (see also under individual courts), 165–68; courts of, 165, 167; under military government, 166; public defenders in, 168

Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 190
Korean War: exports during, xxviii, 105, 128

labor, 114–18; activists, 225; contracts, 117–18; and government, relationship between, 115–17, 118; legislation, 103–4, 115; movement, 115–17; policy, 115
labor force: in agriculture, 115; in civil service, 169; distribution of, 114–15; effect of export earnings on, 104; in industry, 74; profile of, 114–15; size of, 114
labor unions, xxxi, 32, 37, 187–88; federation of, 76; conflict by, xxxiv, 38, 40, 204; Lacalle's attempt to regulate, 187–88; under military government, xxxix; political activity of, 224, 225; restored under Sanguinetti, 187; role of, in restoring civilian government, 117
Lacalle administration, xxx, 183; austerity program under, xxx, xxxi; banking under, 156; debt under, 142; fishing industry under, 126; labor unions under, 187–88; party politics under, 173; and Vázquez's "co-habitation arrangement," 152
Lacalle de Herrera, Luis Alberto, xxiii–xxiv, xxxii–xxxiii, 44, 147, 151, 175, 180, 188; appointment of armed forces commanders by, 186–87; background of, 151, 180; campaign of, 180–81; economic adjustment under, 99; support for, xxxv, 182
Laguna del Sauce, 220
Laguna Merín, xxiv, 14, 55
La Paloma, 125
La Rocha National Movement (MNR), 175, 180, 182
Latin American Bishops Conference: of 1968, 92; of 1979, 92
Latin American Center for Human Economy (CLAEH), 90
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), xxxi, 191, 198
Latin America Press, 190
Latorre, Lorenzo, 18, 63
Lavalleja, Juan Antonio, xxvi, 11, 12
Lavalleja Department, 56; development in, 62; ranches in, 119
Law of Common Education (1877), xxvii, 88
Law of Mandatory Civil Marriage, 19
Law of Professional Associations, 116
lawyer courts, 166
lawyers, 168
leather, 12, 56, 100; exports, 102, 145
Lebanon: immigration from, 27
Lebret, Father, 92
Leftist Liberty Front (Fidel), 38
Lend-Lease Agreement, 208
LFAR. See Federal League for Rural Action
Liberal Party, 178
Liberdad y Cambio. See Freedom and Change
Liebig Meat Extract Company, 16
life expectancy, xxiv, 66, 82, 86; effect of, on population growth, 62
Liga Federal de Acción Rural. See Federal League for Rural Action
List 14, 34, 38, 39
List 15, 34, 174
List 85, 174
List 99, 40, 47
List 123, 174
literacy rate, 86
littoral region, 57
livestock exports, xxviii, 109; transfer of earnings from, 111
livestock prices, 123–24
livestock production, 102; effect of drought on, 122; land area dedicated to, 123; methods, 118; as percentage of gross domestic product, 106, 109
livestock products, 105; dependence on, 99
livestock raising, 16, 120–23; improvements in, 18; methods of, 99, 118, 122
livestock sector (see also cattle; sheep), xxiii, 5; under Battle y Ordóñez, 104; credit problems in, 134; liberalization of, 44; price controls on, 107; recovery in, 119; stagnation in, 35, 36–37, 101; Terra’s support for, 30
living standards, 77; of blue-collar workers, 74; of farmers, 74; of middle class, 73
Llamadas, 65
loans: from Britain, 18; dollar-denominated, 123; from United States, 27, 192
López Balestra, Oscar, 175
lower class, 70, 74–76; as proportion of population, 70
magazines, 59
Magellan, Ferdinand, 6
Malaysia, 197
Maldonado Department, 50; construction boom in, 131; development in, 62; ranches in, 119
MAN. See Nationalist Action Movement
Manini Ríos, Carlos 25, 27
Mann, Horace, xxvii
manufactured products, 106
manufacturing: agricultural inputs for, 118, 130; and agriculture, relationship between, 118; decline in, 112; nationalization of, 111
Marcha, 190
Maritain, Jacques, 92
markets: agricultural, liberalization of, 44; currency, 114; domestic, xxxiv, 127, 128; export, 129, 145, 146
marriage: common-law, 78; equality in, 78–79; mandatory civil, 19, 77, 91
Martínez Trueba, Andrés, 36, 36
Mate Amargo, 190
máteriel: acquisition of, 209, 215; modernization of, 208
maternity leave, 37
MBPP. See Popular and Progressive Blanco Movement
meat-processing industry (see also beef), 16, 57, 123; agricultural inputs for, 130; British control of, 24; economic changes in, 21; export by, xxviii, 145; improvements in, 102; refrigeration in, 21–22, 102
media, 59, 189–90
medidas prontas de seguridad. See prompt security measures
Medina, Hugo M., 186
Méndez, Aparicio, 43
Mercado Común del Sur. See Southern Cone Common Market
merchant marine, 213, 220
Mercosur. See Southern Cone Common Market
mestizos, xxv, 10, 65
Metropolitan Guard, 229
MGP. See Movement for the People’s Government
MI. See Integration Movement
Michelini, Zelmar, 43, 47, 176
middle class, 22, 24, 70, 72–73; debt in, 73; as domestic market, 106; importance of education to, 73; importance of titles to, 73; moonlighting in, 72; occupations of, 72, 73; as proportion of population, 70
Middle East: relations with, 197
military, 183–87; amnesty for, xxix–xxx, 179–80, 186, 212, 226; assistance, 209; government control of, 203; intelligence, 212, 217; involvement in politics, 210–12; justice, 214–15; law enforcement by, 210; officers, 201; peacekeeping activities, 218; political influence of, 186–87; political orientation of, 203, 210, 211; reduction of, xxx, 203; regions, 217; suppression of
Uruguay: A Country Study

Tupamaros by, xxviii, 203; takeover of Bordaberry government, 203
Military Academy, 186, 209; established, 208; training, 217, 219
Military Academy at St. Cyr (France), 207
Military Air School, 209, 221
Military Institute for Advanced Studies, 217
military personnel: benefits for, 214; demographic profile of, 210; morale of, 214; pay for, 214; as percentage of population, 214; reaction of, to military government, 211
military relations: with Argentina, 217; with Brazil, 217; with United States, 217
Millor Coccaro, Pablo, 175, 182
MIN. See National Integrationist Movement
Mineração e Participação. See Mining Copartnership
mining, 131
Mining Copartnership, 131
Ministry of Economy and Finance, 39
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 197
Ministry of Interior, 190, 228, 231
Ministry of Justice, 158; abolished, 166; duties of, 166
Ministry of National Defense, xxx, 110, 214, 216; civilian as head of, 42; duties of, 217
Ministry of Public Health, 82, 83, 84
Ministry of Tourism, 141
missionaries, xxv
Mitirione, Dan A., 40
MLN-T. See National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros
MNC. See National Colorado Movement
MNR. See La Rocha National Movement
modernization, xxiv, 20, 22
monetary exchange market, 38; unified, 39
monetary policy, 113-14; sterilization, 114
money supply, 107
Montevideo, 12; British occupation of, xxv-xxvi, 8; Carrasco, 59; classes in, 59; as commercial center, 7-8, 16; effects of economic growth on, 102; El Prado, 59; fortress at, 204; founded, xxiv, 3, 58, 101; health coverage in, 83; industrial development in, 105-6; labor movement in, 115; mayor of, 152, 182, 183; naval base, 220; Old City, 58-59; Pocitos, 59, 60; population in, 11, 20, 27, 66; poverty in, 77; protests in, 40; public services in, 35; rainfall in, 55; ranchers in, 70; rivalry of, with Buenos Aires, 3, 7; shantytowns in, 59, 210; siege of, xxv, xxvi, 9, 13-14, 206; slave trade through, 7-8; temperatures in, 55; unemployment in, 76
Montevideo, port of, 22, 125
Montevideo Department, 183; courts in, 167-68; development in, 62; government in, 170; population of, 57; population density of, 58
Montevideo Police, 228
Montevideo Port Authority, 26, 130
Montevideo region, Greater, 57-60; departments in, 57
mortality, 66; causes of death, 82; rate, 82
Mortgage Bank of Uruguay, 134; nationalized, 24
Movement for the People’s Government (MGP), 178
Movimiento de Acción Nacionalista. See Nationalist Action Movement
Movimiento de Independientes 26 de Marzo. See 26th of March Movement of Independents
Movimiento de Independientes Revolucionario Oriental. See Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement of Independents
Movimiento de Integración. See Integration Movement
Movimiento de Integración Grito de Ascencio. See Grito de Asencio Integration Movement
Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros. See National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros
Movimiento de Participación Popular. See People’s Participation Movement
Movimiento de Reafirmación Batillista. See Batillist Reaffirmation Movement
Movimiento Herrista. See Herrist Movement
Movimiento Integracionista Nacional. See National Integrationist Movement
Movimiento Nacional Colorado. See National Colorado Movement
Movimiento Nacional de La Rocha. See La Rocha National Movement

290
Movimiento Popular Blanco y Progressista. See Popular and Progressive Blanco Movement

Movimiento Popular Frenteamplista. See People’s Broad Front Movement

Movimiento por el Gobierno del Pueblo. See Movement for the People’s Government

Movimiento Pregón. See Pregón Movement

Movimiento Social Cristiano. See Social Christian Movement

MPF. See People’s Broad Front Movement

MPP. See People’s Participation Movement

MRB. See Batlist Reaffirmation Movement

MRO. See Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement of Independents

MSC. See Social Christian Movement

Nardone, Benito, 36, 37, 38

National Administration for the Generation and Transmission of Electricity (UTE), 129, 132; privatization of, xxxiv

National Administration of Fuels, Alcohol, and Portland Cement (ANCAP), 28, 30, 45, 104, 129, 225; oil refining by, 132; privatization of, xxxiv

National Administration of Ports (ANP), 26, 129–30

National Administration of Public Education, 89

National Affordable Housing Institute, 31

National Association of Uruguayan Broadcasters (ANDEBU), 190

National Board for the Control of Drug Trafficking and Narcotics Abuse, 83

National Coincidence, xxxi, xxxiii, 183

National Colorado Movement (MNC), 175

National Conciliatory Program (Conapro), 117

National Convention of Workers (CNT), xxix, 38, 40; banned, 43, 76, 116; formed, 76; restored, 187; strike of 1973, 42, 116

National Corps of Firemen, 228–29

National Council for Education (Conae), 41, 89

National Council for the Prevention and Repression of Illicit Traffic and Improper Use of Drugs, 225

National Council of Administration, xxvii, 25

National Council of Government, 36, 37, 38, 156

National Dairy Products Cooperative, 123

National Economic Inspection Committee, 28–29

National Electoral Office, 172

National Federation of Secondary Teachers, 73

National Fishing Development Plan, 125

National Fishing Institute, 125

National Guard, 206

National Institute of Technical Education (INET), 88

National Integrationist Movement (MIN), 175

Nationalist Action Movement (MAN), 178

Nationalist Popular Faction (CPN), 175

nationalization, 21–24, 111; of Bank of Uruguay, 22–24; of manufacturing, 111; of Mortgage Bank of Uruguay, 24; of public services, 22; in service sector, 22; weakened by Terra, 30

National Land Settlement Institute, 35

National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros (MLN—T), 5, 38, 41–42, 177, 224–25; amnesty for, 92, 158, 177, 189, 224; defeat of, xxviii, 42, 177, 203, 210, 225; established, 177, 225; opposition of, to amnesty for military leaders, 180; organs of, 190; reorganized, xxx, 177, 225; terrorism by, xxviii, 40, 107, 203, 225

National Maritime Police, 220, 228

National Mining and Geology Institute, 131

National Office of the Civil Service (ONSC), 168–69; abolished, 168; duties of, 169; training by, 169

National Party (Blancos), xxix, xxxiv, 19, 20, 32, 36, 40, 41, 43, 47, 63, 151, 152, 156, 158, 172, 173, 190; administrations of, 37–39; affiliation with, 173; army of, 206; boycott of 1910 elections by, 22; clashes of, with Colorado Party, 207; decline of, 174; divisions in, xxxiii–xxxiv, 32, 37, 38; economic
policies of, 5; factions of, 173, 174, 175; insurrection by, 17, 21; jobs dispensed by, 107; origins of, 4, 12; platform of, 4, 25, 173, 174, 181; popularity of, xxx, xxxv; profile of members of, xxvi, 72; purge of, 44; support of ranchers for, 71 National Police, 203, 210, 226–29; established, 226; number of personnel in, 228; organization of, 204, 228; training, 228

National Printing Press, xxxiv

National Refrigerating (Frigonal), 27 National Republican Association (ANR), 174 National School of Public Administration (France) (Ecole Nationale d’Administration Publique), 169 national security, 158; internal, 224–25; threats to, 203 National Security Council (Cosena), 42, 157, 211 National Subsistence Council, 35 National Telecommunications Administration (ANTEL), 130, 140 National Traffic Police, 228 Nava, Guillermo de, xxx, 218 Naval Academy, 208, 220 Naval Air Service, 208–9 Naval Aviation Service, 209, 220 Naval Club Pact, 47, 151, 166, 212 Naval Training Center, 220 navy, 208–9, 220; air base, 220; equipment of, 204; established, 208; marines in, 209, 220; mission of, 204; naval base, 220; number of personnel in, 208, 220; organization of, 220; shipyard, 216; training, 220; vessels of, 208, 220 neo-Batllism, 34–36 Netherlands: emigration to, 69 neutrality, 32, 192 new peso, Uruguayan (see also peso), 45; collapse of, 73; floated against dollar, 98 New Sector, 178, 182 newspapers, 51, 59; party affiliations of, 189 Nicaragua: relations with, 193, 194 North Tramway and Railway Company (see also State Railways Administration), 18, 24 Nueva Palmira, 147 Nuevo Espacio. See New Sector nutrition, 51 OAS. See Organization of American States Office of Labor, 115 Office of Planning and Budget, 39, 40 Oficina Nacional del Servicio Civil. See National Office of the Civil Service oil: crisis, 45, 107, 108, 122; imports, 131, 132, 145; price of, 142 Oman, 197 ONSC. See National Office of the Civil Service Operation Manufacture, 123 Organic University Law, 37, 88 Organization of American States (OAS), 191, 218, 194 Oríbe, Manuel, 4, 12; exiled, 12, 206; as president, 12, 206 Oriental Republic of Uruguay, xxvi, 3; established, 11, 152–53 Orthodox Herrerists, 38 Ortiz, Dando, 175 Paraguay: economic integration with, 146–47, 198; relations with, 195; tourists from, 141; trade with, xxxii; war declared on, xxvii, 15, 207 parity, 173 Partido Colorado. See Colorado Party Partido Comunista del Uruguay. See Communist Party of Uruguay Partido de Democracia Avanzada. See Advanced Democracy Party Partido Demócrata Cristiano. See Christian Democratic Party Partido Liberal. See Liberal Party Partido Nacional. See National Party Partido Nacional-Barrán. See Barrán National Party Partido por el Gobierno del Pueblo. See People’s Government Party Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo. See People’s Victory Party

292
Index

Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores. *See* Socialist Workers’ Party
Partido Socialista del Uruguay. *See* Socialist Party of Uruguay
Pascale, Ricardo, 144
Paso de los Toros Dam, 31, 55
Paso de Mendoza, 209
pasture, 56, 100, 119
Paul VI (Pope), 92
Paysandú, 16, 57, 139
Paysandú Department, 56, 57; development in, 62; ranches in, 119
PCU. *See* Communist Party of Uruguay
PDC. *See* Christian Democratic Party
Penal Code (1889), 230–31; amended, 231; inmates under, 231–32
pensioners, 111; poverty among, 76
pensions, xxiv, xxxv, 72, 84–86; decline in, 76; initiation of, 84; recovery of, 77
People’s Blancon Union (UBP), 175
People’s Broad Front Movement (MPF), 177
People’s Government Party (PGP), 176–77, 190; organs of, 190
People’s Participation Movement (MPP), 177
People’s Victory Party (PVP), 177
Pereira, Gabriel, 16
Perestroika, 187
Pereyra, Carlos Julio, 44, 181, 182
Pérez, Jaime, 176
Pérez Piera, Héctor, 179
Permanent Civil Register Law, 20
periodicals, 189–90
Perón, Juan Domingo, 34
Persian Gulf crisis, xxxii, 145, 198
Peso (*see also* new peso, Uruguayan): decline of, 143; devaluation of, 113, 135; issued, 102
PGP. *See* People’s Government Party
Piriápolis, 60, 125
PIT. *See* Interunion Workers’ Assembly (or Plenum)
PIT–CNT, 46, 76, 187, 190; strike by, 47
Pivel Devoto, Juan, 175
Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores. *See* Interunion Workers’ Assembly (or Plenum)
PLO. *See* Palestine Liberation Organization
PLP. *See* For the Fatherland
PLUNA. *See* Uruguayan National Airlines
police. *See* National Police
Police Training Academy, 228
political: conflict, 63; development index, xxiii–xxiv; instability, 12, 101; rights, 20, 25; violence, 28
*A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870* (Finch), 128
political exiles, xxix; return of, xxiv, 69, 225
political parties (*see also* under individual parties), 17, 172–79; administrative structure of, 174; affiliation with, 173; disputes among, 224; distribution of jobs by, 111; established, 4; factions of, 26, 173; ideological differences between, 174; legalized, 224; membership of, 72; political activity of, 224; proliferation of, 22; restrictions on, 43; under military government, xxix
Political Parties Law, 29, 35, 46, 171
political prisoners, xxix; amnesty for, 158, 204
political uprisings, 31, 204, 224; in 1960s, 38, 40; suppression of, 29, 210
Polo Progresista. *See* Progressive Pole
Pons Etcheverry, Eduardo, 175
Ponsonby, John (Lord), 11
Popular and Progressive Blanco Movement (MBPP), 178
Popular Union, 38
population, 20, 62–63, 97; aging of, 66, 85–86; average age of, 85; birth rate, 62; distribution of, 11, 20; in 1830, 11; in 1879, 16; factors in size of, 62; growth rate, 62, 65–66, 67, 97; immigrant, 16; increase in, 27; in 1985, 62; in 1988, 62
Pork Barrel Pact, 28
Por la Patria. *See* For the Fatherland
port facilities, 125, 131; privatization of, xxxi
Portugal: colony founded by, 7; independence from, xxvi; rivalry of, with Spain, xxv, 3, 204
Portuguese military, xxv
postal service, 19, 110
poverty: families living in, xxxiv, 77
Pregón Movement. *See* Movimiento Pregón
presidency, 36
president (*see also* executive), 25, 42; appointment of armed forces commanders by, 186–87; as commander in chief of
Uruguay: A Country Study

armed forces, 216; conflicts of, with collegial executive, 155; under constitution of 1967, 157; hierarchy under, 159; inauguration of, 159

Presidential Information Service (SEPREDI), 190
press: freedom of, 189; restrictions on, xxxix, 43, 210; services, 190
PRESSUR, 190
price controls, 108
Primera Líneas Uruguayas de Navegación Aérea. See Uruguayan National Airlines
prisons, 231-32
privatization, xxiv, xxxi, xxxiv, 181; opposition to, xxxiii
Productivity, Prices, and Income Commission (Coprin), 40
professional associations, 73
Progressive Faction, 178-79
Progressive Pole, xxxiv
prompt security measures, 37, 40
Protestants, 92
PST. See Socialist Workers’ Party
PSU. See Socialist Party of Uruguay
public: administration, 168-69; assistance, 31; health, 170; housing, 59; order, 224-25, 228
Public Companies Law, xxxiii
public employees: reinstatement of, 117; strikes by, 116
Public Ministry, 166
public sector: burdens of, 107; debt burden of, 109, 129, 141; size of, 98; as source of employment, xxviii, 97, 99, 107, 111, 115; unions in, 98, 188
public services: British control of, 18, 35; initiation of, 16; local jurisdiction over, 170; modernization of, 20; nationalization of, 22; reduction of, xxx; role of state in, 35; spending on, 82
public-works projects, 213
Punta del Este, 34, 60, 125, 139; construction boom in, 131; international meetings in, xxxi; tourism in, 141
purgers, 44
PVP. See People’s Victory Party
Radical Blanco Party, 26, 31
radio: sets, 51; stations, 59, 140, 190
railroads, 19, 35, 102, 139; passengers on, 139
Ramírez, Juan Andrés, 183
ranchers, 29-30; benefits granted to, 30; government conflicts with, 35; investment by, 105, 106
ranches, 210; land area of, 119
Reagan, Ronald W., 194
recession, 97, 109, 112, 129
recreation, 79-80
regional integration, 146-47, 195, 197-98
regions, 56-62; coastal, 60; development of, 60-62; Greater Montevideo, 57-60; interior, 56-57; littoral, 57
religion (see also under individual religions), 11, 91-92; observance, 91
Renewal Faction, 179
Renovación y Victoria. See Renovation and Victory
Renovation and Victory (RV), 175, 182
repression, 29, 43; of labor, 116; under military government, xxviii, 211; as motivation for emigration, 68
Republican Guard, 229
República Oriental del Uruguay. See Oriental Republic of Uruguay
research institutes, 90, 190
rice, 56-57
Río Guareim, 14
Río de Janeiro, 11
Río de la Plata, xxiv, xxv, 3, 6, 7, 9, 12
Río de la Plata Basin trade region, xxiv, 195, 197, 198
Río de la Plata Basin Treaty, 191
Río Grande do Sul State, Brazil, 19-20
Río Negro, xxv, 31, 55
Río Negro Department, 56, 57; development in, 62; farming in, 119
Río Paraná, 9, 14
Río Treaty. See Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
Río Uruguay, xxiv, xxv, 3, 9, 14, 52-55, 139-40
Río Yaguarón, xxiv, 14
Río Yi, 55
Rivera, José Fructoso, 4, 12; as president, 12, 206
Rivera Department, 56; development in, 62; drought in, 124; ranches in, 119
Riverism, 26
Riverists. See Colorado Party-General

Qatar, 197
Quagliotti de Bellis, Bernardo, 191
Quijano, Carlos, 26, 190
Rivera, 25
rivers, 52-55
River Transport System, xxxii, 196
roads, 131, 136; maintenance of, 213; modernization of, 139
Roballo, Alba, 178
Rocha Department, 60; development in, 62; ranches in, 119
Rodríguez Pedotti, Andrés, 147, 196
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 31
Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 12; exiled, 14; fall from power of, 14; in Great War, 14
Rossi Passina, Heber, 179
rural areas: under Batlle y Ordóñez, 104; electrical network in, 132; families in, 78; literacy rate in, 86; political affiliation in, 174; political control in, 101; population in, 11, 63; population growth rate in, 67; road network in, 136; symbolic kinship ties in, 78
Rural Association, 16, 18, 27
Rural Code (1875), 18
rural economy, 100; development of, 101
Rural Federation, 24, 27, 70
Ruralists, 38, 41, 74
rural-urban conflict, 63; decrease in, 71; economic, 101; political, 4, 173-74
rural workers, 74; under Amézaga, 33-34; wages of, 77
Rural Worker Statute, 34
RV. See Renovation and Victory
Salto, 9, 16, 139
Salto Department, 56; development in, 62; ranches in, 119, 122
Salto Grande Dam, 57, 131-32
San Felipe de Montevideo (see also Montevideo): founded, 7
Sanguinetti Cairolo, Julio María, xxix, 41, 47, 86, 146, 151, 175, 212; background of, 151-52
Sanguinetti administration, xxiv, 109-11, 151-52, 179-80; agriculture under, 109; autonomous entities under, 130; Colorado-Communist Pact signed by, 187; economy under, 98, 109-11, 112, 129; education under, 89; fiscal policy under, 112-13, 117-18; foreign relations under, 192-97; human rights under, 158; infrastructure under, 132; labor under, 117, 187; news service of, 190; party politics in, 173; restoration of democracy under, 189; tourism under, 141
San José Department: development in, 62; farming in, 119-20
Santos, Máximo, 18
Saravia, Aparicio, 19-20, 21
Sarney Costa, José, 146
School of Arms and Services, 210
School of Diplomacy, 197
School of Naval Specialization, 220
schools, postsecondary: enrollment, 86
schools, primary: enrollment, 86, 89; number of, 86-87; pupil-teacher ratio in, 87
schools, secondary: academic, 87; enrollment, 86, 87, 89; political activity in, 88; technical, 87, 89
secularism (see also church-state conflict), 4
secularization, 19, 24-25; origins of, 91
Senate, 29, 33, 153, 155, 159; distribution of seats in, 173; impeachment by, 162-64; members of, 162; in 1989 election, 182
Sendic, Raúl Antonaccio, 38
SEPREDI. See Presidential Information Service
Seregni Mosquera, Libé, 47, 151, 177, 178
Serrato, José, 26
service sector, 132-41; export of, 132-34; labor force in, 115; nationalization in, 111; as percentage of gross domestic product, 110, 132
Servicio Presidencial de Información. See Presidential Information Service
Shevardnadze, Eduard A., 196
Shultz, George P., 193, 194
Singapore, 197
slave trade, 7-8
smuggling, 226
Social Christian Movement (MSC), 181
social classes, xxvii, 69-76; lower, 70; middle, 70; separation of, 59; stratification of, 70; upper, 70
Social Democracy, 26
social development, 51, 179; in interior region, 56
Socialist Party of Uruguay (PSU), 22, 26, 31, 32, 176; allied with Christian Democrats, 92; banned, 39

295
Socialist Workers' Party (PST), 177
social reform, 27; under Amézaga, 33; under Batlle y Ordóñez, xxvii, 22, 24-26, 27, 103, 104; end to, 25-26; during Great Depression, 28; weakened by Terra, 30
social rights, 29
social security system, 27, 80; abuse of, 84-85; categories of benefits in, 85; government spending on, 80; pensions, 84-86; reform of, xxxii; spending on, xxxv, 85
social services: control of, 45; cutbacks in, xxiv
Social Welfare Bank, 39, 84, 134
social welfare programs, xxiii, xxvii, 4, 22, 37, 97, 99; opposition to, 36; proposals to restructure, xxxiv-xxxv; supported by exports, 99, 111
Sociedad de Defensa de la Tradición Familia y Propiedad. See Society for the Defense of Family Tradition and Property
Society for the Defense of Family Tradition and Property (TFP), 176
Solano López, Francisco, 15, 207
Soriano, xxv
Soriano Department, 56, 57; development in, 62; farming in, 119
Sosa, Julio María, 26
Sosism, 26
South Africa, 197
South Atlantic War, 195
Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), xxxii-xxxiii; reaction to, xxxii-xxxiii
The Southern Star/La Estrella del Sur, xxvi
Soviet Union, 187; relations with, 31, 193, 196; Sanguinetti's visit to, 152, 196
Soviet-Uruguayan Cultural Center, 196
Spain: discovery of Uruguay by, 3; immigration to, 3; emigration to, 69; immigration from, xxvii, 15, 16, 51, 102; independence from, xxvi; invasion of, by Napoleon, 8; relations with, 31; rivalry of, with Portugal, xxv, 3, 204
Spanish military, xxv
State Electric Power and Telephone Company, 28
State Electric Power Company, 22, 28
state enterprises. See autonomous entities
State Insurance Bank, 134, 147
State Railways Administration (see also North Tramway and Railway Company), 24, 39
State Security Law (1972), 42
Stock Exchange, 59
strike insurance, 37
strikes, 210; of 1950s, 37; of 1960s, 116; of 1973, 42; of 1980s, 115, 117, 187, 225; of 1990s, xxxiv, 188; by public employees, 116, 188; repressed, 26
student demonstrations, 40, 43, 46, 88, 210, 225
student organizations, 225
students, 87, 188-89; influence of, 188-89; number of, 88; political activity of, 224, 225
Students' Social and Cultural Association for Public Education (ASCEEP), 46
sub-lemas. See political parties, factions of; see under individual parties
suffrage (see also voting): under 1830 constitution, 11; under 1934 constitution, 29; universal male, 26; women's, xxvii, 29, 78, 159
Supreme Court of Justice, 154, 155, 157, 165, 215, 229-30; appointment of judges by, 167, 168; appointment of members of, 164, 166; members of, 166; powers of, 166, 204; regeneration of, 166; women on, 159
Supreme Military Tribunal, 215
Switzerland, 51
"Switzerland of South America," xxiii, 34, 36, 51, 100
Syria: immigration from, 27
Tacuarembó Department, 56; development in, 62; drought in, 124; ranches in, 119, 122
Taiwan, 196
Tajes, Máximo, 19
TAMU. See Uruguayan Military Air Transport
Tanzania, 197
tariff barriers, xxxii, 97; effect of, on domestic industry, 106, 127; lowered under military regime, 108
tariff reduction agreements, 146
Tarigo, Enrique E., 174
taxes, 18, 24, 80; increased under Lacalle, xxx; increased under Sanguinetti, 113
Index

tax policies, 70

teachers: qualifications of, 86; training, 86
telegraph networks, 102
telephone system, 20, 51, 59, 140; privatization of, xxxi
television: sets, 51; stations, 59, 140, 189
Terra, Gabriel, xxviii, 27-28, 155; attempt to assassinate, 29; coup of, 208
Terra, Juan Pablo, 92
Terrists, 35, 155
terrorism, xxxv, 107
textile industry, 130
TFP. See Society for the Defense of Family Tradition and Property
Thirty-Three Heroes, xxvi, 11, 12
Tlatelolco Treaty. See Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
topography, 52
torture, xxix, 42, 43, 180, 211
tourism, xxxiv, 110, 132, 140—41; value of, 140
Trademo. See Democratic Traditionalism
Tradicionalismo Democrático. See Democratic Traditionalism
tradition, xxiv
transportation, 18, 19, 35, 110, 132, 136-40; automobile, 139; highway network, 136; international, 136; public, 139; water, 139-40
Transpotes Aéreos Militares Uruguayos. See Uruguayan Military Air Transport
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty), 191, 218
Treaty of Aceguá (1904), 21
Treaty of Asunción, xxxii
Treaty of Montevideo, 11
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 218
Treinta y Tres Department, 56; development in, 62; farming in, 119-20
Tribunal of Administrative Claims, 157
Triple Alliance, 15, 207
Tupí-Guaraní people, 6
26 M. See 26th of March Movement of Independents
26th of March Movement of Independents (26 M), 177
UBD. See Democratic Blanco Union
Ubilles, Francisco, 181
UBP. See People's Blanco Union
UC. See Civic Union
UCB. See Colorado and Batllist Union
UCU. See Civic Union of Uruguay
UGT. See General Union of Workers
UNDP. See United Nations Development Programme
underemployment, 73
unemployment: creation of jobs to prevent, 80; in Great Depression, 28; after Korean War, 111; level, xxxiv, 76, 110; under military regime, 109; as motivation for emigration, 68-69; under Sanguinetti regime, 112; of university graduates, 73; of urban poor, 76
Unidad y Reforma. See Unity and Reform
Unión Blanca Democrática. See Democratic Blanco Union
Unión Blanca Popular. See People's Blanco Union
Unión Cívica. See Civic Union
Unión Cívica del Uruguay. See Civic Union of Uruguay
Unión Colorado y Batllista. See Colorado and Batllist Union
Unión General de Trabajadores. See General Union of Workers
union movement, 27
Unión Popular. See Popular Union
unions, 5; activities of, 117; banned by Bordaberry, 5, 44; establishment of, 16; repression of, 72; white-collar, 72, 73
unitary rule: versus federalism, 4
United Batllism (BU), 174, 180
United Nations: membership in, 191
United Nations Economic and Social Council, 191
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 51
United Provinces of the Río de la Plata: Banda Oriental incorporated into, 11; formed, 9
United States, 45; anti-money-laundering agreement with, xxxii; criticism from, 216; criticism of, 193; debt to, 141; debt rescheduling with, 30; emigration to, 69; as export market, 145; free-trade pact with, xxxii; Human Development Index rank of, 52; industries, 30; influence of, 208; installation of military bases by, xxviii, 32, 192; investment by, 24; loans from, 27, 192; matériel

297
acquired from, 209; military assistance from, 209, 216; military relations with, 217; relations with, 31, 192, 193–94; state visit to, 193; support for, 198; trade with, 16, 37
United States Department of Defense, 216
United States Department of State, 209
Unity and Reform, 34, 36, 38, 41, 174, 175
University of Montevideo. See University of the Republic
University of the Republic, 19, 71, 87, 105; autonomy of, 37, 88, 90, 225; enrollments in, 89; expense of attending, 87; faculties in, 31; law school, 168; medical school, 80; political activity in, 88, 189, 225; relations of, with government, 40, 43; restructured, 31; students, 87; women at, 24
upper class, 70; as proportion of population, 70
urban areas: literacy rate in, 86; political affiliation in, 174; population in, 11, 63; population growth rate in, 67; poverty in, 76
urbanization, 66–67; effect of, on population growth, 62; of interior, 56
urban migration, 67–68; by women, 78
urban-rural conflict. See rural-urban conflict
Urquiza, Justo José de, 14
Uruguay: etymology of the word Uruguay, xxiv–xxv
Uruguayan Association of Bank Employees (AEBU), 73
Uruguayan Bishops Conference, 91
Uruguayan Federation of Elementary Teachers, 73
Uruguayan Military Air Transport (TAMU), 139
Uruguayan National Airlines (PLUNA), 139; privatization of, xxxi, xxxiv
Uruguayan Press Association, 190
Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement of Independents (MRO), xxxv, 177
Uruguayan Syndicalist Union, 27
Uruguay Round, xxxi, 193
Usinas Eléctricas y Teléfonos del Estado. See State Electric Power and Telephone Company
UTE. See National Administration for the Generation and Transmission of Electricity
vacation communities, 60
Valliant, Víctor, 174
Varela, José Pedro, xxvii, 17–18, 19, 88
Varela, Washington, 186
Vassallo, Carlos, 178
Vázquez, Tabaré, xxx, xxxv, 152, 182, 183; "co-habitation arrangement" of, 152
Végh Villegas, Alejandro, 40; economic plan of, 45, 46
Venezuela: emigration to, 69
vice president, 159
Viceroyalty of Brazil, 204
Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, 7, 204; dissolved, 9
Viera, Feliciano, 25, 192
Vierism, 26
Visión magazine, 126
voters, 182
voting (see also suffrage), 170–72; compulsory, xxvii, 152, 159, 170; rules governing, 170–71; supervision of, 172; turnout, 152
wage, minimum: adoption of, xxvii; in 1980s, 74, 77; in 1990, 74
wage and price freeze, 77, 116
wage councils, 77, 116; abolished, 116; reestablished, 117
wages, xxxi, 116; increases in, 117; indexation of, 118; negotiations for, 117
wages, real, 37, 40, 98, 117, 118; decrease in, xxx, 45, 77, 107, 112, 115; recovery of, 77
War of the Triple Alliance, xxvi–xxvii
Weinstein, Martin, 155, 172, 186
West Germany. See Federal Republic of Germany
White Emblem, 175
Williman administration, 22
Williman, Claudio, 22
women: barriers for, 159; civil rights of, 34, 77, 159; and divorce, 25, 77–78; education of, 78, 88; employment of, 72, 76, 78; maternity leave for, 37; roles of, 79; suffrage of, xxvii, 31, 78, 159; university education of, 24; urban migration by, 78
wool: demand for, 102, 123; production of, 105, 122
wool exports, xxv, xxviii, 37, 56, 63, 97,
Index

102, 122, 145; attempts to revitalize, 113; decline in, 119, 122; during Korean War, 105, 128; as source of foreign exchange, 122

workers, 22; blue-collar, 74–76; dismissed for political activities, 116; rights of, 4, 31, 33; salaries of, 112; transfer of rural earnings to, 111; unemployment among, 112

working conditions: reform of, 4, 27

World Bank: loans from, 136–39

World Cup, 27, 34

World Federation of Trade Unions, 187

World War I, 192

World War II: exports during, xxviii, 105; labor during, 116; United States influence during, 208

Yang Shangkun, 197

Yaro people, 6

yerba maté, 79

Young, Juan Guillermo, 178

youth: rebelliousness of, 79, 180

Zambia, 197

Zerbino, Ricardo, 144

Zeta, 190

Zimbabwe, 197

Zumarán, Alberto Sáenz de, xxxiv, 75, 181, 182
# Published Country Studies

**(Area Handbook Series)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>550–65</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>550–87</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550–98</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>550–78</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>550–44</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>550–174</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>550–59</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>550–82</td>
<td>Guyana and Belize</td>
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<tr>
<td>550–73</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>550–151</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<tr>
<td>550–169</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>550–165</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>550–176</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>550–21</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550–175</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>550–154</td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550–170</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>550–39</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550–66</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>550–68</td>
<td>Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>550–20</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>550–31</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>550–168</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>550–25</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550–61</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>550–182</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550–50</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>550–30</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>550–166</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>550–34</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>550–159</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>550–56</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>550–77</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>550–81</td>
<td>Korea, North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550–60</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>550–41</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550–26</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>550–58</td>
<td>Laos</td>
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301
550–156 Paraguay 550–185 Persian Gulf States
550–42 Peru 550–89 Thailand
550–72 Philippines 550–97 Tunisia
550–162 Poland 550–80 Turkey
550–181 Portugal 550–74 Uganda
550–160 Romania 550–97 Turkey
550–37 Rwanda and Burundi 550–80 Turkey
550–51 Saudi Arabia 550–74 Uganda
550–70 Senegal 550–97 Tunisia
550–180 Sierra Leone 550–75 Venezuela
550–184 Singapore 550–97 Tunisia
550–86 Somalia 550–99 Yugoslavia
550–93 South Africa 550–67 Zaire
550–95 Soviet Union 550–75 Zambias
550–179 Spain 550–171 Zimbabwe
550–96 Sri Lanka 550–75 Zambia
550–27 Sudan 550–93 Yugoslavia
550–47 Syria 550–32 Vietnam
550–62 Tanzania