MARINE CORPS MILITARY GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) CRYPTOKEY LOADING COMPLIANCE
Date Signed: 10/4/2018 | MARADMINS Number: 566/18
MARADMINS : 566/18

R 032017Z OCT 18
MARADMIN 566/18
MSGID/GENADMIN, USMTF, 2007/CMC WASHINGTON DC C4 (UC)/F002//
SUBJ/MARINE CORPS MILITARY GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) CRYPTOKEY LOADING COMPLIANCE//
REF/A/DOC/CJCSI 6130.01F/20160930//
REF/B/DOC/DODM O-4650.11/20170526: CH 1 20170712//
REF/C/DOC/CNSSI 3006/20180201//NARR/REF A IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF (CJCS) INSTRUCTION: 2016 CJCS MASTER POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING (PNT) PLAN. REF B IS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) PNT SECURITY MANUAL. REF C IS THE OPERATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE FOR GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) PRECISE POSITIONING SERVICE (PPS) USER EQUIPMENT (UE). IT DESCRIBES THE SECURITY CONTROLS FOR GPS UE.//
POC/DAVID VAUGHN/CTR/UNIT: HQMC C4CS/NAME: WASHINGTON DC/TEL: 703-697-5417/EMAIL:DAVID.VAUGHN.CTR@USMC.MIL//
POC/ANDRE COLEMAN/CIV/UNIT: HQMC C4CS/NAME: WASHINGTON DC/TEL: 571-256-8836/EMAIL: ANDRE.COLEMAN@USMC.MIL//
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. Purpose.  This MARADMIN provides the policy for loading cryptokeys in military GPS.
2. Background.  In accordance with (IAW) ref (a), GPS is the primary source of position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information for the DoD.  All DoD combatant users must acquire, train with, and use GPS Precise Positioning Service (PPS) systems IAW the DoD Policy and Joint Staff Instruction.  This guidance mandates combatant users systems/platforms be equipped with approved PPS devices.  These devices should be properly keyed and used in an operating mode that makes maximum use of the encrypted GPS signals (i.e., avoid operating modes, such as "mixed mode" or "PPS Lockout", that permit free use of unencrypted GPS signals, etc.). PPS is the encrypted GPS service provided on L1 and L2 frequencies: PPS encrypted signals on these two separate frequencies provide enhanced accuracy and anti-spoofing protection against electromagnetic interference, and adversary jamming/spoofing attacks.  The benefits of PPS GPS are twofold: 1) The signal diversity, frequency bandwidth, and additional data from encrypted GPS provide resilience against adversary jamming/spoofing, and 2) PPS use effectively enables Joint Forces to employ counter-GPS capabilities (i.e., Navwar Blue Force Electronic Attack).   Though consumer-grade/commercial SPS GPS devices are widely available, inherent weaknesses of SPS GPS exist. Positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities provided by SPS GPS devices may not be reliable, or available during conflict.  Keyed PPS Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module(SAASM) based GPS UE such as Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR), or embedded Ground-Based GPS Receiver Applications Module (GB GRAM) provide enhanced assurance and exclusive use of GPS that are not available with consumer-grade/commercial SPS GPS devices.
3.  Action.
3.a. Per Refs (a), (b), and (c) all users must verify if the military GPS PPS UE is keyed and operating in PPS mode.  Mission requirements may vary, but at a minimum for a PPS UE device to access Y-Code PPS signals, an operator must load one or several valid and currently effective GPS crypto keys.  Loading the current SAASM Black Key Algorithm Update Parameter (BKAUPD) must be accomplished annually, and current Black Group Unique Variable (BGUV) should be loaded to enable Over the Air Distribution and Rekey (OTAD/OTAR).
3.b. Per Refs (a) and (b), all acquisition programs, regardless of whether they involve a platform, system, or device that are procured by the Marine Corps through the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and incorporate GPS, must use PPS GPS UE operating in keyed PPS mode. The only exception are units in combat or providing combat support with an approved waiver to policy.  Critical military operations, such as weapons delivery coordination, target location, fire support, close air support, extraction, and rendezvous, are not eligible for a waiver and must operate the PPS GPS UE in the keyed PPS mode.
4. Additional questions can be addressed to the POCs identified in this MARADMIN.
5. This MARADMIN is cancelled on 1 Jul 2025.
6. Release authorized by BGen Lorna M. Mahlock, Director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4), Department.//