R 231100Z FEB 01
FM CMC WASHINGTON DC//CMC//
TO ALMAR
BT
UNCLAS  //N03540//
ALMAR 006/01
MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC//
SUBJ/NAVAL COMMAND RELATIONS//
REF/A/CNO WASHINGTON DC//N00/231530Z FEB 01//
REF/B/CMC ALMAR 016/00//
REF/C/JOINT PUB 1-01/JOINT STAFF/05JUL2001//
NARR/REF A IS THE CNO'S VERSION OF THIS ALMAR (NAVOP 005/01). 
REF B IS THE COORDINATED CMC ALMAR 016-00 AND CNO MSG 102248Z
MAR 00, DIRECTING A ONE YEAR EVALUATION PERIOD OF NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS
COMMAND RELATIONS TO GATHER OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED FOR USE IN
REVISING JP 3-02, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. 
REF C ESTABLISHES POLICY AND PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR JOINT DOCTRINE
DEVELOPMENT.//
POC/M.S. YOUNG/CDR/OPNAV N512/-/TEL:(703) 695-4832//
POC/D.W. WHITE/LTCOL/POE30/-/TEL:(703) 614-2505//
RMKS/1.  PER REF A, THIS IS A COORDINATED CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS/
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS MESSAGE.
2.  IAW REF B, THE SEA II SEMINAR WAR GAME WAS CONDUCTED 23-26
JANUARY 2001 TO PROVIDE A SENIOR FLAG/GENERAL OFFICER FORUM FOR
ADDRESSING CRITICAL ISSUES WITH REGARD TO NAVAL COMMAND RELATIONS
FOR AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE.  ALL ISSUES BETWEEN NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
WERE SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED DURING THE GAME.  THIS UNIFIED NAVAL
POSITION WILL ACCELERATE THE REVISION OF JP 3-02.
3.  THE CONSENSUS NAVAL POSITION DESCRIBED BELOW IS THE RESULT OF
LESSONS LEARNED FROM AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, EXERCISES, AND THE
SEA II WAR GAME.
   A.  QUESTION: SHOULD THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER (JFC) NORMALLY
DELEGATE OPCON OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES TO A SERVICE OR FUNCTIONAL
COMPONENT COMMANDER?  IF SO, WHICH COMPONENT COMMANDER?
       POSITION: NO.  IT IS NOT DESIRABLE TO PRESCRIBE A PARTICULAR
COMMAND AUTHORITY.  EXPLORATION OF DIFFERENT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
DURING THE WAR GAME CONFIRMED THAT ALL THREE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
(OPCON, TACON, SUPPORTED/SUPPORTING) WERE VIABLE OPTIONS.
   B.  QUESTION: WHAT FACTORS SHOULD BE USED TO DETERMINE THE
SUPPORTED COMMANDER AT VARIOUS POINTS DURING THE AMPHIBIOUS
OPERATION?
       POSITION: THE FOLLOWING FACTORS SHOULD BE CONSIDERATIONS,
BUT ARE NOT ALL INCLUSIVE: MISSION, THREAT, TYPE/PHASE AND
DURATION OF OPERATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES, FORCE
CAPABILITIES, BATTLESPACE ASSIGNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS.
   C.  QUESTION: SHOULD THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIP OPTIONS AVAILABLE
TO THE ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION INCLUDE
OPCON, TACTICAL CONTROL (TACON), AND SUPPORT AS DESCRIBED IN
JP 0-2, UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF)?
       POSITION: YES.  THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIP OPTIONS SHOULD
INCLUDE ALL OPTIONS PER THE JP 0-2 UNAAF.  TACON INCLUDES ALL
AUTHORITY GRANTED UNDER OPCON IN JP 0-2 EXCEPT THOSE ITEMS
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED IN THE DEFINITION OF TACON.
SUPPORTED/SUPPORTING REQUIRES AN ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVE WITH
SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES AND, IF APPLICABLE, THE CRITERIA FOR
SHIFTING THE SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHASES/EVENTS.
   D.  QUESTION: SHOULD THE TRADITIONAL CATF/CLF RELATIONSHIP
REMAIN AS AN OPTION?
       POSITION: CATF/CLF IS NOT A COMMAND RELATIONSHIP, BUT
RATHER ARE DESCRIPTIVE TERMS.  IN AN EFFORT TO CLARIFY COMMAND
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CATF AND CLF, THE FOLLOWING WILL BE
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO APPLICABLE JOINT PUBLICATIONS:
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (AF) - AN AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE AND A LANDING
FORCE TOGETHER WITH SUPPORTING FORCES THAT ARE TRAINED, ORGANIZED,
AND EQUIPPED FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.
AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (ATF) - A NAVY TASK ORGANIZATION FORMED TO
CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.  THE ATF TOGETHER WITH THE LANDING
FORCE AND SUPPORTING FORCES COMPRISE THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.
LANDING FORCE (LF) - A MARINE CORPS OR ARMY TASK ORGANIZATION
FORMED TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.  THE LANDING FORCE,
TOGETHER WITH THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE AND SUPPORTING FORCES,
COMPRISE THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.
   E.  QUESTION: SHOULD THE TERMS CATF/CLF BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE
NEW COMMAND RELATIONSHIP OPTIONS?
       POSITION: NO.  HOWEVER, THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
CATF, CLF, AND OTHER SUPPORTING FORCES SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE
INITIATING ORDER AND/OR ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVE.  THE PROPOSED
REVISED DEFINITIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE,
AND LANDING FORCE CLARIFY CURRENT DOCTRINAL DEFINITIONS OF CATF
AND CLF AS DESCRIPTIVE TERMS.
    F.  QUESTION: WHAT SHOULD THE NORMAL COMMAND RELATIONSHIP BE?
        POSITION: DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT SPECIFY A NORMAL COMMAND
RELATIONSHIP.  TYPICALLY, A SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP IS ESTABLISHED
BETWEEN THE TWO COMMANDERS BASED ON THE COMPLEMENTARY, RATHER THAN
SIMILAR NATURE AND CAPABILITIES OF THE ATF AND LF.  IT IS NOT THE
INTENT, HOWEVER, TO LIMIT THE COMMON SUPERIOR'S AUTHORITY TO
ESTABLISH EITHER AN OPCON OR TACON COMMAND RELATIONSHIP AS
APPROPRIATE.
4.  JP 3-02 NEXT STEPS.  TO ENSURE THAT DECISIONS REACHED DURING
THE SEA II SEMINAR WARGAME ARE ADEQUATELY CAPTURED, NAVY AND
MARINE CORPS COMMENTS WILL BE CONSOLIDATED BY NWDC AND MCCDC
RESPECTIVELY AND FORWARDED TO CINCLANTFLT (PRIMARY REVIEW
AUTHORITY).  CINCLANTFLT WILL THEN CONSOLIDATE ALL SERVICE COMMENTS
FOR JOINT REVIEW.  THE ANTICIPATED MILESTONES TO REACH FINAL
APPROVAL OF JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
-  MAY 01 (PRA SUBMISSION OF APPROVED CHANGES TO JS)
-  JUN 01 (FINAL COORDINATION)
-  JUL 01 (CJCS APPROVAL)
5.  IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF THESE CONSENSUS
DECISIONS ARE CAPTURED, COMMUNICATED, UNDERSTOOD, AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED BY ALL SAILORS AND MARINES.  TO THIS END,
THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TEAM SHALL DEVELOP COMPLEMENTARY TRAINING
AND EDUCATION PLANS THAT ARE IMBEDDED IN THE CURRICULA OF OUR
SCHOOLHOUSES, PRACTICED DURING TRAINING AND EXERCISES, AND
ULTIMATELY UTILIZED DURING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.  AS WE EDUCATE
OUR SAILORS AND MARINES, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE CLEARLY ARTICULATE
AND UNDERSTAND WHY THESE CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE.
6.  J. L. JONES, GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS.//
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